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Fitch-style Calculus
Fitch notation, also known as Fitch diagrams (named after Frederic Fitch), is a notational system for constructing formal proofs used in sentential logics and predicate logics. Fitch-style proofs arrange the sequence of sentences that make up the proof into rows. A unique feature of Fitch notation is that the degree of indentation of each row conveys which assumptions are active for that step. Example Each row in a Fitch-style proof is either: * an assumption or subproof assumption. * a sentence justified by the citation of (1) a rule of inference and (2) the prior line or lines of the proof that license that rule. Introducing a new assumption increases the level of indentation, and begins a new vertical "scope" bar that continues to indent subsequent lines until the assumption is discharged. This mechanism immediately conveys which assumptions are active for any given line in the proof, without the assumptions needing to be rewritten on every line (as with sequent-style proof ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Frederic Fitch
Frederic Brenton Fitch (September 9, 1908, Greenwich, Connecticut – September 18, 1987, New Haven, Connecticut) was an American logician, a Sterling Professor at Yale University. Education and career At Yale, Fitch earned his B.A in 1931 and his Ph.D. from Yale in 1934 under the supervision of F. S. C. Northrop. From 1934 to 1937 Fitch was a postdoc at the University of Virginia. In 1937 he returned to Yale, where he taught until his retirement in 1977. His doctoral students include Alan Ross Anderson, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and William W. Tait. Work Fitch was the inventor of the Fitch-style calculus for arranging formal logical proofs as diagrams. In his 1963 published paper "A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts" he proves "Theorem 5" (originally by Alonzo Church), which later became famous in context of the knowability paradox. [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Formal Proof
In logic and mathematics, a formal proof or derivation is a finite sequence of sentences (called well-formed formulas in the case of a formal language), each of which is an axiom, an assumption, or follows from the preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. It differs from a natural language argument in that it is rigorous, unambiguous and mechanically verifiable. If the set of assumptions is empty, then the last sentence in a formal proof is called a theorem of the formal system. The notion of theorem is not in general effective, therefore there may be no method by which we can always find a proof of a given sentence or determine that none exists. The concepts of Fitch-style proof, sequent calculus and natural deduction are generalizations of the concept of proof. The theorem is a syntactic consequence of all the well-formed formulas preceding it in the proof. For a well-formed formula to qualify as part of a proof, it must be the result of applying a rule of th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Sentential Logic
Propositional calculus is a branch of logic. It is also called propositional logic, statement logic, sentential calculus, sentential logic, or sometimes zeroth-order logic. It deals with propositions (which can be true or false) and relations between propositions, including the construction of arguments based on them. Compound propositions are formed by connecting propositions by logical connectives. Propositions that contain no logical connectives are called atomic propositions. Unlike first-order logic, propositional logic does not deal with non-logical objects, predicates about them, or quantifiers. However, all the machinery of propositional logic is included in first-order logic and higher-order logics. In this sense, propositional logic is the foundation of first-order logic and higher-order logic. Explanation Logical connectives are found in natural languages. In English for example, some examples are "and" (conjunction), "or" (disjunction), "not" ( negation) and "if" ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Predicate Logic
First-order logic—also known as predicate logic, quantificational logic, and first-order predicate calculus—is a collection of formal systems used in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science. First-order logic uses quantified variables over non-logical objects, and allows the use of sentences that contain variables, so that rather than propositions such as "Socrates is a man", one can have expressions in the form "there exists x such that x is Socrates and x is a man", where "there exists''"'' is a quantifier, while ''x'' is a variable. This distinguishes it from propositional logic, which does not use quantifiers or relations; in this sense, propositional logic is the foundation of first-order logic. A theory about a topic is usually a first-order logic together with a specified domain of discourse (over which the quantified variables range), finitely many functions from that domain to itself, finitely many predicates defined on that domain, and a set of ax ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rule Of Inference
In the philosophy of logic, a rule of inference, inference rule or transformation rule is a logical form consisting of a function which takes premises, analyzes their syntax, and returns a conclusion (or conclusions). For example, the rule of inference called ''modus ponens'' takes two premises, one in the form "If p then q" and another in the form "p", and returns the conclusion "q". The rule is valid with respect to the semantics of classical logic (as well as the semantics of many other non-classical logics), in the sense that if the premises are true (under an interpretation), then so is the conclusion. Typically, a rule of inference preserves truth, a semantic property. In many-valued logic, it preserves a general designation. But a rule of inference's action is purely syntactic, and does not need to preserve any semantic property: any function from sets of formulae to formulae counts as a rule of inference. Usually only rules that are recursive are important; i.e. rules suc ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Tautology (logic)
In mathematical logic, a tautology (from el, ταυτολογία) is a formula or assertion that is true in every possible interpretation. An example is "x=y or x≠y". Similarly, "either the ball is green, or the ball is not green" is always true, regardless of the colour of the ball. The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein first applied the term to redundancies of propositional logic in 1921, borrowing from rhetoric, where a tautology is a repetitive statement. In logic, a formula is satisfiable if it is true under at least one interpretation, and thus a tautology is a formula whose negation is unsatisfiable. In other words, it cannot be false. It cannot be untrue. Unsatisfiable statements, both through negation and affirmation, are known formally as contradictions. A formula that is neither a tautology nor a contradiction is said to be Contingency (philosophy), logically contingent. Such a formula can be made either true or false based on the values assigned to its propositi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Reductio Ad Absurdum
In logic, (Latin for "reduction to absurdity"), also known as (Latin for "argument to absurdity") or ''apagogical arguments'', is the form of argument that attempts to establish a claim by showing that the opposite scenario would lead to absurdity or contradiction. This argument form traces back to Ancient Greek philosophy and has been used throughout history in both formal mathematical and philosophical reasoning, as well as in debate. Examples The "absurd" conclusion of a ''reductio ad absurdum'' argument can take a range of forms, as these examples show: * The Earth cannot be flat; otherwise, since Earth assumed to be finite in extent, we would find people falling off the edge. * There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one. The first example argues that denial of the premise would result in a ridiculous conclusion, against the evidence of our senses. The second example is a mathematical proof ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Natural Deduction
In logic and proof theory, natural deduction is a kind of proof calculus in which logical reasoning is expressed by inference rules closely related to the "natural" way of reasoning. This contrasts with Hilbert-style systems, which instead use axioms as much as possible to express the logical laws of deductive reasoning. Motivation Natural deduction grew out of a context of dissatisfaction with the axiomatizations of deductive reasoning common to the systems of Hilbert, Frege, and Russell (see, e.g., Hilbert system). Such axiomatizations were most famously used by Russell and Whitehead in their mathematical treatise ''Principia Mathematica''. Spurred on by a series of seminars in Poland in 1926 by Łukasiewicz that advocated a more natural treatment of logic, Jaśkowski made the earliest attempts at defining a more natural deduction, first in 1929 using a diagrammatic notation, and later updating his proposal in a sequence of papers in 1934 and 1935. His proposals led to diffe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Frederic Brenton Fitch
Frederic Brenton Fitch (September 9, 1908, Greenwich, Connecticut – September 18, 1987, New Haven, Connecticut) was an American logician, a Sterling Professor at Yale University. Education and career At Yale, Fitch earned his B.A in 1931 and his Ph.D. from Yale in 1934 under the supervision of F. S. C. Northrop. From 1934 to 1937 Fitch was a postdoc at the University of Virginia. In 1937 he returned to Yale, where he taught until his retirement in 1977. His doctoral students include Alan Ross Anderson, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and William W. Tait. Work Fitch was the inventor of the Fitch-style calculus for arranging formal logical proofs as diagrams. In his 1963 published paper "A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts" he proves "Theorem 5" (originally by Alonzo Church), which later became famous in context of the knowability paradox. [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Jon Barwise
Kenneth Jon Barwise (; June 29, 1942 – March 5, 2000) was an American mathematician, philosopher and logician who proposed some fundamental revisions to the way that logic is understood and used. Education and career Born in Independence, Missouri to Kenneth T. and Evelyn Barwise, Jon was a precocious child. A pupil of Solomon Feferman at Stanford University, Barwise started his research in infinitary logic. After positions as assistant professor at Yale University and the University of Wisconsin, during which time his interests turned to natural language, he returned to Stanford in 1983 to direct the Center for the Study of Language and Information. He began teaching at Indiana University in 1990. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1999. In his last year, Barwise was invited to give the 2000 Gödel Lecture; he died prior to the lecture. Philosophical and logical work Barwise contended that, by being explicit about the context in whic ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
John Etchemendy
John W. Etchemendy (born 1952 in Reno, Nevada) is an American logician and philosopher who served as Stanford University's twelfth Provost. He succeeded John L. Hennessy to the post on September 1, 2000 and stepped down on January 31, 2017. Education and career John Etchemendy received his bachelor's and master's degrees at the University of Nevada, Reno before earning his PhD in philosophy at Stanford in 1982. He has been a faculty member in Stanford's Department of Philosophy since 1983, prior to which he was a faculty member in the Philosophy Department at Princeton University. He is also a faculty member of Stanford's Symbolic Systems Program and a senior researcher at the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford. At Stanford, Etchemendy served as director of the Center for the Study of Language and Information from 1990 to 1993, senior associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences from 1993 to 1997, and chair of the Department of Philosophy ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Language, Proof And Logic
Language, Proof and Logic is an educational software package, devised and written by Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, geared to teaching formal logic through the use of a tight integration between a textbook (same name as the package) and four software programs, where three of them are logic related (Boole, Fitch and Tarski's World) and the other (Submit) is an internet-based grading service. The name is a pun derived from ''Language, Truth, and Logic'', the philosophy book by A. J. Ayer. On September 2, 2014, there was launched a massive open online course (MOOC) with the same name, which utilizes this educational software package. Description A short description of the programs: * Boole (named after George Boole) - a program that facilitates the construction and checking of truth tables and related notions ( tautology, tautological consequence, etc.); * Fitch (named after Frederic Brenton Fitch) - a natural deduction proof environment in Fitch-style calculus for giving and chec ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
