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Expressivism
In meta-ethics, expressivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms – for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being" – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions.Horgan & Timmons (2006b), p. 86 Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences to have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences. Overview Expressivism is a form of moral anti-realism or nonfactualism: the view that there are no moral facts that moral sentences ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Quasi-realism
Quasi-realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that: # Ethical sentences do not express propositions. # Instead, ethical sentences project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties. This makes quasi-realism a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism. Quasi-realism stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as emotivism and universal prescriptivism), as well as to all forms of cognitivism (including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism). Overview Simon Blackburn derived quasi-realism from a Humean account of the origin of our moral opinions, adapting Hume's genealogical account in the light of evolutionary game theory. To support his case, Blackburn has issued a challenge, ''Blackburn's Challenge'', to anyone who can explain how two situations can demand different ethical responses without referring to a difference in the situations themselves. Because this challenge is effectively unmeetable, Blackburn argues that there must be a rea ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Allan Gibbard
Allan Fletcher Gibbard (born 1942) is an American philosopher who is the Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Gibbard has made major contributions to contemporary ethical theory, in particular metaethics, where he has developed a contemporary version of non-cognitivism. He has also published articles in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and social choice theory: in social choice, he first proved the result known today as Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which had been previously conjectured by Michael Dummett and Robin Farquharson. Life and career Allan Fletcher Gibbard was born on April 7, 1942, in Providence, Rhode Island. He received his B.A. in mathematics from Swarthmore College in 1963 with minors in physics and philosophy. After teaching mathematics and physics in Ghana with the Peace Corps (1963–1965), Gibbard studied philosophy at Harvard University, participating in the seminar on ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Meta-ethics
In metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, ground, and meaning of moral judgment, ethical belief, or values. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations). While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, metaethics addresses questions about the nature of goodness, how one can discriminate good from evil, and what the proper account of moral knowledge is. Similar to accounts of knowledge generally, the threat of skepticism about the possibility of moral knowledge and cognitively meaningful moral propositions often motivates positive accounts in metaethics. Another distinction is often made between the nature of questions related to each: first-order (substantive ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Emotivism
Emotivism is a meta-ethics, meta-ethical view that claims that ethical Sentence (linguistics), sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book ''Language, Truth and Logic'', but its development owes more to C. L. Stevenson. Emotivism can be considered a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism. It stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as quasi-realism and universal prescriptivism), as well as to all forms of Cognitivism (ethics), cognitivism (including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism). In the 1950s, emotivism appeared in a modified form in the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare. History Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century, but it was born centuries earlier. In 1710, George Berkeley wrote that language ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Error Theory
Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethics, metaethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality does not exist. Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism, which allows for actions to be wrong relative to a particular culture or individual. It is also distinct from expressivism, according to which when we make moral claims, "We are not making an effort to describe the way the world is ... we are venting our emotions, commanding others to act in certain ways, or revealing a plan of action". Moral nihilism today broadly tends to take the form of an Error Theory: the view developed originally by J.L. Mackie in his 1977 book ''Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong'', although prefigured by Axel Hägerström in 1911. Error theory and nihilism broadly take the form of a ''negative claim'' about the existence of objective values or properties. Under traditional views there are moral properties or methods which hold objectively in ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ethical Subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that: #Ethical sentences express propositions. #Some such propositions are true. #The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people. This makes ethical subjectivism a form of cognitivism (because ethical statements are the types of things that can be true or false). Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to moral realism, which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of human opinion; to error theory, which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense; and to non-cognitivism, which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all. Relationship to moral anti-realism Ethical subjectivism is a form of moral anti-realism that denies the "metaphysical thesis" of moral realism, (the claim that moral truths are ordinary facts about the world). ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
James Dreier
James Dreier (born 1960) is an American philosopher and Judy C. Lewent and Mark L. Shapiro Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He is known for his work in metaethics, especially on the subjects of expressivism and metametaethics. Dreier is an associate editor of Ethics (journal) ''Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy'' is a peer-reviewed academic journal established in 1890 as the ''International Journal of Ethics'', renamed in 1938, and published since 1923 by the University of Chi ....https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/journals/et/board Books * James Dreier (ed.), ''Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory'', Blackwell, 2006, 331pp., ISBN 1405101792. References External links * 21st-century American philosophers American philosophy academics living people Brown University faculty American ethicists 1960 births Princeton University alumni {{US-philosopher-stub ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world." If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible. Non-cognitivism entails that non-cognitive attitudes underlie moral discourse and this discourse therefore consists of non-declarative speech acts, although accepting that its surface features may consistently and efficiently work as if moral discourse were cognitive. The point of interpreting moral claims as non-declarative speech acts is to explain what moral claims mean if they are neither true nor false (as philosophies such as logical positivism entail). Utterances like "Boo to killing!" and "Don't kill ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Argument
An argument is a series of sentences, statements, or propositions some of which are called premises and one is the conclusion. The purpose of an argument is to give reasons for one's conclusion via justification, explanation, and/or persuasion. Arguments are intended to determine or show the degree of truth or acceptability of another statement called a conclusion. The process of crafting or delivering arguments, argumentation, can be studied from three main perspectives: the logical, the dialectical and the rhetorical perspective. In logic, an argument is usually expressed not in natural language but in a symbolic formal language, and it can be defined as any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others through deductively valid inferences that preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion. This logical perspective on argument is relevant for scientific fields such as mathematics and computer science. Logic is the study of the form ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy
The ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (''SEP'') is a freely available online philosophy resource published and maintained by Stanford University, encompassing both an online encyclopedia of philosophy and peer-reviewed original publication. Each entry is written and maintained by an expert in the field, including professors from many academic institutions worldwide. Authors contributing to the encyclopedia give Stanford University the permission to publish the articles, but retain the copyright to those articles. Approach and history As of August 5, 2022, the ''SEP'' has 1,774 published entries. Apart from its online status, the encyclopedia uses the traditional academic approach of most encyclopedias and academic journals to achieve quality by means of specialist authors selected by an editor or an editorial committee that is competent (although not necessarily considered specialists) in the field covered by the encyclopedia and peer review. The encyclopedia was created i ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
