The Missing Shade of Blue

"The Missing Shade of Blue" is an example introduced by the Scottish philosopher David Hume to show that it is at least conceivable that the mind can generate an idea without first being exposed to the relevant sensory experience. It is regarded as a problem by philosophers because it appears to stand in direct contradiction to what Hume had just written.

The source of the problem

In both ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' and '' An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'', philosopher David Hume argues that all perceptions of the mind can be classed as either 'Impressions' or 'Ideas'. He further argues that:

The problem of the ''missing shade of blue'' arises because just two paragraphs later Hume seems to provide just such an idea. He says:

Responses to the problem

Some philosophers take Hume to task for presenting such a clear counter-example and then dismissing it as insignificant. Pritchard says:

Other philosophers take a more generous view of Hume's position. Jenkins says:

It is sometimes said that the problem is even more severe than Hume thinks. Hume claims that this instance is 'singular', but Alexander Broadie writes:

However, as Williams points out, Hume's own words imply that he was fully aware of this. Hume begins the relevant paragraph by talking about both sounds and colours. In addition, when first introducing the missing shade of blue he says, "except one particular shade of blue, for instance". The words "for instance" show that he could easily have chosen a different example. When he later says, "this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing" he cannot be referring to this particular example, but rather to the ''type'' of exception that it represents.

When Hume says, "Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him," he is assuming that colours are composed of a set of distinct independent hues, when in reality they form a continuum. However, Fogelin suggests, "Perhaps the reason that Hume does not see this is that he is thinking about the ideas of objects and not about objects themselves. In particular, he may hold that the notion of an indistinguishable difference between ideas make no sense. There is nothing more to an idea than that which can be discerned within it. If this is Hume's position, then the notion that two ideas can be different without being discernibly different would be a contradiction in terms."

Suggested solutions

A fully adequate solution to the problem will have the following features. It will:

# Recognise that Hume believed the problem to be a genuine counter-example;
# Recognise that Hume included the example for a purpose;
# Provide an explanation that harmonizes well with other features of Hume's epistemology.

The problem has been tackled in various ways:

Mental mixing

Mental mixing is the solution proposed by Morris. The idea here is that just as paints are mixed to produce the range of colour swatches found in a hardware store, so it should be possible for colours to be mixed in the mind in some kind of analogous way. However, without further argument it is not obvious that we are endowed with any such ability and, if we were, it is not clear why it would be limited to the mixing of closely related impressions; yet, if this were not the case, then, contrary to what Morris says, it would open the floodgates to a range of philosophically suspect ideas.

Colours as complex ideas

Another way of dissolving the problem has been to suggest that colours might also be regarded as complex ideas. This is tempting since Hume has only spoken of "the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses." That 'augmenting' and 'diminishing' do not apply only to physical size is clear from the way Hume suggests that our idea of God "arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom." However, this fails our third criterion, for Hume clearly distinguishes between complex ideas and simple ideas in a way that excludes the possibility of colours being complex. In the treatise (Book1, Part1, Section1), Hume writes:

It does not undermine Hume's main concern

Hume's lack of concern might be explained by the fact that, although it contradicts the claim that all simple ideas are preceded by simple impressions, this is not a problem because it is not Hume's primary concern. This answer draws attention to what Hume says at the end of Section 2 of the ''Enquiries'':

The fact that this contradicts Hume's explicitly stated purpose is explained by arguing that the Treatise has to be understood as a gradual unfolding of his views. The problem is that Hume never makes this clear, and if this is the way it is meant to be read then, as Williams says, "The narrative character of the Treatise is...disguised...by the superficial resemblance of the former to Locke's Essay... Also, there is the fact that he drops the problem in the same way in the Enquiry, which arguably lacks the narrative character of the ''Treatise''."

The exception really is singular

Fogelin argues that the reason this exception is a genuine exception that can be safely ignored is because despite being simple ideas, colours and shades can be organised into a highly organised colour space, (and that sounds and tastes, etc., can be similarly organised.) Hume allows that some simple ideas can be seen to be similar to one another without them sharing anything in common. The proviso that they do not share anything in common is important because otherwise this feature might be separated off and this would show that the original idea was in fact complex. In a note added to the Treatise commenting on abstract ideas Hume says:

It is this very ability to recognize similarity that enables us to arrange the shades of blue in order and to notice that two adjoining shades differ more than any two other adjoining shades. If it be allowed that the notion of hue can arise through abstraction even though it cannot in any instance be separated from a given example, then it may be fairly argued that the ability to fill a gap in the colour space is quite a different matter to coming up with an isolated idea without any prior impression. It would certainly still be the case that the ability to conjure up the idea of the missing shade of blue is dependent on at least some prior impressions.

The problem with this claim is that there needs to be some way of showing that the exception really is limited and will not affect the important general claim that ideas depend on impressions. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with regular polygons of all kinds except the one having five sides...

Hume needs an exception

By whatever means the idea of the missing shade is to be created, there is still the question of why Hume takes such pains to present the example to his readers. Of course, it may just be that Hume was aware of it as an exception and was being open and honest. On the other hand, Nelson suggests the intriguing possibility that far from being an oversight or an embarrassment to his wider project, the ''missing shade of blue'' example turns out to be crucial. Later Hume will divide all objects of human reason into ' Relations of Ideas' and ' Matters of Fact'. The former are certain and do not necessarily say anything about what actually exists in the world; the latter do make claims about the world, but "the contrary of every matter of fact is still possible". With this in mind it can be asked what status holds for the claim that "all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones". If this is a Relation of Ideas, then it does not necessarily say anything true about the world, and this will not suit Hume's purpose at all; if it is a Matter of Fact, then the contrary must be possible. The inconsequential hypothetical possibility that we are able to raise up to ourselves the idea of the missing shade of blue, even if in practice this does not ever happen, will ensure that Hume's description of the origin of ideas is grounded in fact.

However, what is required of matters of fact is the ''logical'' possibility that they could be other than they are, not the ''practical'' possibility. This being the case, it is not necessary to construct an elaborately worked out example; it would be sufficient to say that we might have been constituted differently.

A singular exception doesn't really change the probability of Hume's thesis

Hume states that the model of rationality that humans ''use'' and ''must use''Hume intends this model of rationality to be not only explanatory of how we ''do'' reason, but also ''normative'' by prescribing how we ''should'' reason. with regard to reasonings concerning matters of fact is not classical logic, but rather some kind of probabilistic logic where we associate a probability to factual statements (indeed, recalling Locke, Hume calls reasoning about matters of fact as merely ''probable'', and contrasts it with the ''demonstrative'' kind of reasoning that instead concerns relations of ideas).Hume writes in ''Section VI'' (On Probability) of the ''Enquiry'': «Mr. Locke divides all arguments into ''demonstrative'' and ''probable''. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable that all men must die, or that the sun will rise tomorrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into ''demonstrations, proofs,'' and ''probabilities''. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition». This is especially clear in Hume's treatment of miracles in ''Section X'' of the ''Enquiry'', in which he claims that the probability of a certain factual thesis (in this case the thesis that "miracles do occur") ''is'' and ''must'' be evaluated by weighting all the evidences in favour of it with all the contrary evidences.

Since Hume's thesis that "all simple ideas come from simple impressions" is a matter of fact (ie. a factual statement), we can associate a probability to it. And the only way of evaluating the probability of this thesis is by weighting all the evidences. Since, except the "missing shade of blue", ''all'' the countless other direct evidences favour it, the influence (via Bayes theorem) of this singular contrary evidence on the probability of Hume's thesis can reasonably be expected to be minimal. And that's why Hume can reasonably say that this contrary evidence can be disregarded
or, as he puts it, that «it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim».

Against such interpretation is the fact that Hume himself in ''Section II'' calls the "missing shade of blue" as a «proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions», where in ''Section VI'' he defines ''"proof"'' as not a demonstrative argument but as an argument from experience that «leaves no room for doubt or opposition». If Hume is using his terminology consistently across sections, then his use of the term "proof" in reference to the "missing shade of blue" would imply that its effect on the probability of the thesis would not at all be minimal, but rather that it would enormously decrease it to the point of "leaving no room" in favour of the thesis itself.

See also

* Color vision
* Mary's room
* New riddle of induction

References

External links

Nelson, J.O. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed", Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2(November 1989An Interactive Exploration of Hume's Missing Shade of Blue

{{DEFAULTSORT:Missing Shade Of Blue
Cognitive science literature
David Hume
Thought experiments in philosophy of mind