The Complexity of Cooperation
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''The Complexity of Cooperation'', by
Robert Axelrod Robert Marshall Axelrod (born May 27, 1943) is an American political scientist. He is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan where he has been since 1974. He is best known for his interdisciplinary work o ...
, is the sequel to ''
The Evolution of Cooperation ''The Evolution of Cooperation'' is a 1984 book written by political scientist Robert Axelrod that expands upon paper of the same name written by Axelrod and evolutionary biologist W.D. Hamilton. The book details a theory on the emergence of co ...
''. It is a compendium of seven articles that previously appeared in journals on a variety of subjects. The book extends Axelrod's method of applying the results of game theory, in particular that derived from analysis of the
Prisoner's Dilemma The Prisoner's Dilemma is an example of a game analyzed in game theory. It is also a thought experiment that challenges two completely rational agents to a dilemma: cooperate with their partner for mutual reward, or betray their partner ("def ...
(IPD) problem, to real world situations.


Prisoner's Dilemma findings

Axelrod explains the
Tit for tat Tit for tat is an English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation". It developed from "tip for tap", first recorded in 1558. It is also a highly effective strategy in game theory. An intelligent agent, agent using this strategy will first coope ...
(TFT or T4T) strategy emerged as the most robust option in early IPD tournaments on computer. This strategy combines a willingness to cooperate with a determination to punish non-cooperation. In these articles, however, he shows, that under more complex circumstances, such as the possibility of error, strategies that are a little more cooperative or a little less punitive do even better than TFT. Generous TFT, or GTFT, cooperates a bit more often than TFT, while Contrite TFT or CTFT defects less frequently.


Applications

Axelrod applies various models related to IPD to a variety of situations, drawing conclusions from these simulations about the ways in which groups form, adhere, oppose or join other groups, and other topics in the fields of genetic evolution, business, political science, military alliances, wars, and more. He has added introductions to these articles explaining what real-world issues drove his research.


Critical response

Philosopher and political economist
Francis Fukuyama Francis Yoshihiro Fukuyama (; born October 27, 1952) is an American political scientist, political economist, international relations scholar and writer. Fukuyama is known for his book ''The End of History and the Last Man'' (1992), which argue ...
, writing for the Foreign Affairs, praises the book for showing that realist models, which assume that in situations lacking a single sovereign actor that anarchy will necessarily result, are too simplistic. Fukuyuma, expresses concern, however, that the game theory approaches aren't sufficiently complex to model real international relations, because they assume a world with large numbers of simple actors. Fukuyama holds that, instead, the real world consists of a small number of highly complex actors, thus potentially limiting the applicability of Axelrod's analysis.


References

1997 non-fiction books Psychology books Books about game theory Princeton University Press books {{Psych-book-stub