A smart card, chip card, or integrated circuit card (ICC), is any
pocket-sized card that has embedded integrated circuits. Smart
cards are made of plastic, generally polyvinyl chloride, but sometimes
polyethylene-terephthalate-based polyesters, acrylonitrile butadiene
styrene or polycarbonate. Since April 2009, a Japanese company has
manufactured reusable financial smart cards made from paper.
Smart cards can be contact, contactless, or both. They can provide
personal identification, authentication, data storage, and application
processing. Smart cards may provide strong security authentication
for single sign-on (SSO) within organizations.
1.2 Carte Bleue
1.4 Development of contactless systems
2.1 Contact smart cards
2.2 Contactless smart cards
3.4 Public transit
3.5 Computer security
3.8 Other uses
3.9 Multiple-use systems
7 Smart cards and electronic commerce
9 See also
11 Further reading
12 External links
In 1968 and 1969
Helmut Gröttrup and
Jürgen Dethloff jointly filed
patents for the automated chip card.
Roland Moreno patented the memory
card concept in 1974. An important patent for smart cards with a
microprocessor and memory as used today was filed by Jürgen Dethloff
in 1976 and granted as USP 4105156 in 1978. In 1977, Michel Ugon
from Honeywell Bull invented the first microprocessor smart card with
two chips: one microprocessor and one memory, and in 1978, he patented
the self-programmable one-chip microcomputer (SPOM) that defines the
necessary architecture to program the chip. Three years later,
Motorola used this patent in its "CP8". At that time, Bull had 1,200
patents related to smart cards. In 2001, Bull sold its CP8 division
together with its patents to Schlumberger, who subsequently combined
its own internal smart card department and CP8 to create Axalto. In
Axalto and Gemplus, at the time the world's top two smart-card
manufacturers, merged and became Gemalto. In 2008, Dexa Systems spun
Schlumberger and acquired Enterprise Security Services
business, which included the smart-card solutions division responsible
for deploying the first large-scale smart-card management systems
based on public key infrastructure (PKI).
The first mass use of the cards was as a telephone card for payment in
French payphones, starting in 1983.
After the Télécarte, microchips were integrated into all French
Carte Bleue debit cards in 1992. Customers inserted the card into the
merchant's point-of-sale (POS) terminal, then typed the personal
identification number (PIN), before the transaction was accepted. Only
very limited transactions (such as paying small highway tolls) are
processed without a PIN.
Smart-card-based "electronic purse" systems store funds on the card,
so that readers do not need network connectivity. They entered
European service in the mid-1990s. They have been common in Germany
(Geldkarte), Austria (Quick Wertkarte),
Belgium (Proton), France
(Moneo), the Netherlands (
Chipknip Chipper (decommissioned in
2001)), Switzerland ("Cash"), Norway ("Mondex"),
4B"), Sweden ("Cash", decommissioned in 2004), Finland ("Avant"), UK
("Mondex"), Denmark ("Danmønt") and Portugal ("Porta-moedas
Multibanco"). Private electronic purse systems have also been deployed
such as the Marines corps (USMC) at Parris Island allowing small
amount payments at the cafeteria.
Since the 1990s, smart cards have been the subscriber identity modules
(SIMs) used in European
GSM mobile-phone equipment. Mobile phones are
widely used in Europe, so smart cards have become very common.
Further information: EMV
MasterCard Visa (EMV)-compliant cards and equipment are
widespread with the deployment led by European countries. The United
States started later deploying the
EMV technology in 2014, with the
deployment still in progress in 2018. Typically, a country's national
payment association, in coordination with
American Express and
Japan Credit Bureau
Japan Credit Bureau (JCB),
jointly plan and implement
Historically, in 1993 several international payment companies agreed
to develop smart-card specifications for debit and credit cards. The
original brands were MasterCard, Visa, and Europay. The first version
EMV system was released in 1994. In 1998 the specifications
EMVCo maintains these specifications. EMVco's purpose is to assure the
various financial institutions and retailers that the specifications
retain backward compatibility with the 1998 version. EMVco upgraded
the specifications in 2000 and 2004.
EMV compliant cards were first accepted into
Malaysia in 2005  and
later into United States in 2014.
MasterCard was the first company
that was allowed to use the technology in the United States. The
United States has felt pushed to use the technology because of the
increase in identity theft. The credit card information stolen from
Target in late 2013 was one of the largest indicators that American
credit card information is not safe. Target made the decision on April
30, 2014 that it would try to implement the smart chip technology in
order to protect itself from future credit card identity theft.
Before 2014, the consensus in America was that there was enough
security measures to avoid credit card theft and that the smart chip
was not necessary. The cost of the smart chip technology was
significant, which was why most of the corporations did not want to
pay for it in the United States. The debate came when online credit
theft was insecure enough for the United States to invest in the
technology. The adaptation of EMV's increased significantly in 2015
when the liability shifts occurred in October by the credit card
Development of contactless systems
See also: Contactless payment
Contactless smart cards do not require physical contact between a card
and reader. They are becoming more popular for payment and ticketing.
Typical uses include mass transit and motorway tolls. Visa and
MasterCard implemented a version deployed in 2004–2006 in the U.S.,
with Visa's current offering called Visa Contactless. Most contactless
fare collection systems are incompatible, though the
NXP Semiconductors has a considerable market share in the US
Smart cards are also being introduced for identification and
entitlement by regional, national, and international organizations.
These uses include citizen cards, drivers’ licenses, and patient
cards. In Malaysia, the compulsory national ID
MyKad enables eight
applications and has 18 million users. Contactless smart cards are
ICAO biometric passports to enhance security for international
A smart card may have the following generic characteristics:
Dimensions similar to those of a credit card. ID-1 of the ISO/IEC 7810
standard defines cards as nominally 85.60 by 53.98 millimetres
(3.37 in × 2.13 in). Another popular size is ID-000,
which is nominally 25 by 15 millimetres (0.98 in
× 0.59 in) (commonly used in SIM cards). Both are 0.76
millimetres (0.030 in) thick.
Contains a tamper-resistant security system (for example a secure
cryptoprocessor and a secure file system) and provides security
services (e.g., protects in-memory information).
Managed by an administration system, which securely interchanges
information and configuration settings with the card, controlling card
blacklisting and application-data updates.
Communicates with external services through card-reading devices, such
as ticket readers, ATMs, DIP reader, etc.
Contact smart cards
Illustration of smart-card structure and packaging
4 by 4 mm silicon chip in a SIM card, which was peeled open. Note the
thin gold bonding wires and the regular, rectangular digital-memory
Smart-card reader on a laptop
A smart-card pinout. VCC: Power supply. RST: Reset signal, used to
reset the card's communications. CLK: Provides the card with a clock
signal, from which data communications timing is derived. GND: Ground
(reference voltage). VPP: ISO/IEC 7816-3:1997 designated this as a
programming voltage: an input for a higher voltage to program
persistent memory (e.g., EEPROM). ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006 designates it
SPU, for either standard or proprietary use, as input and/or output.
I/O: Serial input and output (half-duplex). C4, C8: The two remaining
contacts are AUX1 and AUX2 respectively and are used for USB
interfaces and other uses. However, the usage defined in ISO/IEC
7816-2:1999/Amd 1:2004 may have been superseded by ISO/IEC
Contact smart cards have a contact area of approximately 1 square
centimetre (0.16 sq in), comprising several gold-plated
contact pads. These pads provide electrical connectivity when inserted
into a reader, which is used as a communications medium between
the smart card and a host (e.g., a computer, a point of sale terminal)
or a mobile telephone. Cards do not contain batteries; power is
supplied by the card reader.
ISO/IEC 7810 and
ISO/IEC 7816 series of standards define:
physical shape and characteristics,
electrical connector positions and shapes,
communications protocols, including commands sent to and responses
from the card,
Because the chips in financial cards are the same as those used in
subscriber identity modules (SIMs) in mobile phones, programmed
differently and embedded in a different piece of PVC, chip
manufacturers are building to the more demanding GSM/3G standards. So,
for example, although the
EMV standard allows a chip card to draw
50 mA from its terminal, cards are normally well below the
telephone industry's 6 mA limit. This allows smaller and cheaper
financial card terminals.
Communication protocols for contact smart cards include T=0
(character-level transmission protocol, defined in ISO/IEC 7816-3) and
T=1 (block-level transmission protocol, defined in ISO/IEC 7816-3).
Contactless smart cards
Main article: Contactless smart card
A second card type is the contactless smart card, in which the card
communicates with and is powered by the reader through RF induction
technology (at data rates of 106–848 kbit/s). These cards
require only proximity to an antenna to communicate. Like smart cards
with contacts, contactless cards do not have an internal power source.
Instead, they use an inductor to capture some of the incident
radio-frequency interrogation signal, rectify it, and use it to power
the card's electronics.
APDU transmission by a contactless interface is defined in ISO/IEC
A hybrid smart card, which clearly shows the antenna connected to the
Hybrid cards implement contactless and contact interfaces on a single
card with dedicated modules/storage and processing.
Dual-interface cards implement contactless and contact interfaces on a
single card with some shared storage and processing. An example is
Porto's multi-application transport card, called Andante, which uses a
chip with both contact and contactless (
ISO/IEC 14443 Type B)
The CCID (Chip Card Interface Device) is a
USB protocol that allows a
smartcard to be connected to a computer, using a standard USB
interface. This allows the smartcard to be used as a security token
for authentication and data encryption such as Bitlocker. CCID devices
typically look like a standard
USB dongle and may contain a SIM card
Smart cards serve as credit or ATM cards, fuel cards, mobile phone
SIMs, authorization cards for pay television, household utility
pre-payment cards, high-security identification and access badges, and
public transport and public phone payment cards.
Smart cards may also be used as electronic wallets. The smart card
chip can be "loaded" with funds to pay parking meters, vending
machines or merchants. Cryptographic protocols protect the exchange of
money between the smart card and the machine. No connection to a bank
is needed. The holder of the card may use it even if not the owner.
Examples are Proton, Geldkarte,
Chipknip and Moneo. The German
Geldkarte is also used to validate customer age at vending machines
Contactless smart card
Contactless smart card and Credit card
These are the best known payment cards (classic plastic card):
Visa: Visa Contactless, Quick VSDC, "qVSDC", Visa Wave, MSD, payWave
MasterCard: PayPass Magstripe, PayPass MChip
American Express: ExpressPay
Roll-outs started in 2005 in the U.S. Asia and Europe followed in
2006. Contactless (non-PIN) transactions cover a payment range of
~$5–50. There is an
ISO/IEC 14443 PayPass implementation. Some, but
not all PayPass implementations conform to EMV.
EMV cards work like magnetic stripe cards. This is common in the
U.S. (PayPass Magstripe and Visa MSD). The cards do not hold or
maintain the account balance. All payment passes without a PIN,
usually in off-line mode. The security of such a transaction is no
greater than with a magnetic stripe card transaction.
EMV cards can have either contact or contactless interfaces. They work
as if they were a normal
EMV card with a contact interface. Via the
contactless interface they work somewhat differently, in that the card
commands enabled improved features such as lower power and shorter
The subscriber identity modules used in mobile-phone systems are
reduced-size smart cards, using otherwise identical technologies.
Smart-cards can authenticate identity. Sometimes they employ a public
key infrastructure (PKI). The card stores an encrypted digital
certificate issued from the PKI provider along with other relevant
information. Examples include the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
Common Access Card
Common Access Card (CAC), and other cards used by other governments
for their citizens. If they include biometric identification data,
cards can provide superior two- or three-factor authentication.
Smart cards are not always privacy-enhancing, because the subject may
carry incriminating information on the card. Contactless smart cards
that can be read from within a wallet or even a garment simplify
authentication; however, criminals may access data from these cards.
Cryptographic smart cards are often used for single sign-on. Most
advanced smart cards include specialized cryptographic hardware that
uses algorithms such as RSA and
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
Today's cryptographic smart cards generate key pairs on board, to
avoid the risk from having more than one copy of the key (since by
design there usually isn't a way to extract private keys from a smart
card). Such smart cards are mainly used for digital signatures and
The most common way to access cryptographic smart card functions on a
computer is to use a vendor-provided PKCS#11 library.
Microsoft Windows the
Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) API is
The most widely used cryptographic algorithms in smart cards
GSM so-called "crypto algorithm") are
Triple DES and
RSA. The key set is usually loaded (DES) or generated (RSA) on the
card at the personalization stage.
Some of these smart cards are also made to support the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard for Personal
Identity Verification, FIPS 201.
Turkey implemented the first smart card driver's license system in
1987. Turkey had a high level of road accidents and decided to develop
and use digital tachograph devices on heavy vehicles, instead of the
existing mechanical ones, to reduce speed violations. Since 1987, the
professional driver's licenses in Turkey have been issued as smart
cards. A professional driver is required to insert his driver's
license into a digital tachograph before starting to drive. The
tachograph unit records speed violations for each driver and gives a
printed report. The driving hours for each driver are also being
monitored and reported. In 1990 the European Union conducted a
feasibility study through BEVAC Consulting Engineers, titled
"Feasibility study with respect to a European electronic drivers
license (based on a smart-card) on behalf of Directorate General VII".
In this study, chapter seven describes Turkey's experience.
Argentina's Mendoza province began using smart card driver's licenses
in 1995. Mendoza also had a high level of road accidents, driving
offenses, and a poor record of recovering fines.
Smart licenses hold up-to-date records of driving offenses and unpaid
fines. They also store personal information, license type and number,
and a photograph. Emergency medical information such as blood type,
allergies, and biometrics (fingerprints) can be stored on the chip if
the card holder wishes. The Argentina government anticipates that this
system will help to collect more than $10 million per year in fines.
Gujarat was the first Indian state to introduce a smart card
license system. As of 2005, it has issued 5 million smart card
driving licenses to its people.
In 2002, the Estonian government started to issue smart cards named ID
Kaart as primary identification for citizens to replace the usual
passport in domestic and EU use. As of 2010 about 1 million smart
cards have been issued (total population is about 1.3 million) and
they are widely used in internet banking, buying public transport
tickets, authorization on various websites etc.
By the start of 2009, the entire population of
Belgium was issued eID
cards that are used for identification. These cards contain two
certificates: one for authentication and one for signature. This
signature is legally enforceable. More and more services in Belgium
use eID for authorization.
Spain started issuing national ID cards (DNI) in the form of
Smartcards in 2006 and gradually replaced all the older ones with
Smartcards. The idea was that many or most bureaucratic acts could be
done online but it was a failure because the Administration did not
adapt and still mostly requires paper documents and personal
On August 14, 2012, the ID cards in
Pakistan were replaced. The Smart
Card is a third generation chip-based identity document that is
produced according to international standards and requirements. The
card has over 36 physical security features and has the
latest[clarification needed] encryption codes. This smart card
replaced the NICOP (the ID card for overseas Pakistani).
Smart cards may identify emergency responders and their skills. Cards
like these allow first responders to bypass organizational paperwork
and focus more time on the emergency resolution. In 2004, The Smart
Card Alliance expressed the needs: "to enhance security, increase
government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal
privacy by establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for
secure and reliable forms of identification". emergency response
personnel can carry these cards to be positively identified in
emergency situations. WidePoint Corporation, a smart card provider to
FEMA, produces cards that contain additional personal information,
such as medical records and skill sets.
In 2007, the
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) proposed a new standard
defining V1.0 of the Smart Card Web Server (SCWS), an HTTP server
embedded in a SIM card intended for a smartphone user. The
non-profit trade association SIMalliance has been promoting the
development and adoption of SCWS. SIMalliance states that SCWS offers
end-users a familiar, OS-independent, browser-based interface to
secure, personal SIM data. As of mid-2010, SIMalliance had not
reported widespread industry acceptance of SCWS. The OMA has been
maintaining the standard, approving V1.1 of the standard in May 2009,
and V1.2 is expected was approved in October 2012.
Smart cards are also used to identify user accounts on arcade
Main article: List of smart cards
SmartRider smart card (Transperth)
Smart cards, used as transit passes, and integrated ticketing are used
by many public transit operators. Card users may also make small
purchases using the cards. Some operators offer points for usage,
exchanged at retailers or for other benefits. Examples include
Singapore's CEPAS, Toronto's Presto card, Hong Kong's Octopus Card,
London's Oyster Card, Dublin's Leap card, Brussels' MoBIB, Québec's
OPUS card, San Francisco's Clipper card, Auckland's AT Hop, Brisbane's
go card, Perth's
SmartRider and Sydney's Opal card. However, these
present a privacy risk because they allow the mass transit operator
(and the government) to track an individual's movement. In Finland,
for example, the Data Protection
Ombudsman prohibited the transport
Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council
Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council (YTV) from collecting such
information, despite YTV's argument that the card owner has the right
to a list of trips paid with the card. Earlier, such information was
used in the investigation of the Myyrmanni bombing.
Department for Transport
Department for Transport mandated smart cards to administer
travel entitlements for elderly and disabled residents. These schemes
let residents use the cards for more than just bus passes. They can
also be used for taxi and other concessionary transport. One example
is the "Smartcare go" scheme provided by Ecebs. The UK systems use
ITSO Ltd specification.
Smart cards can be used as a security token.
Firefox web browser can use smart cards to store
certificates for use in secure web browsing.
Some disk encryption systems, such as Microsoft’s BitLocker, can use
smart cards to securely hold encryption keys, and also to add another
layer of encryption to critical parts of the secured disk.
GnuPG, the well known encryption suite, also supports storing keys in
a smart card.
Smart cards are also used for single sign-on to log on to computers.
Smart cards are being provided to students at some schools and
colleges. Uses include:
Tracking student attendance
As an electronic purse, to pay for items at canteens, vending
machines, laundry facilities, etc.
Tracking and monitoring food choices at the canteen, to help the
student maintain a healthy diet
Tracking loans from the school library
Access control for admittance to restricted buildings, dormitories,
and other facilities. This requirement may be enforced at all times
(such as for a laboratory containing valuable equipment), or just
during after-hours periods (such as for an academic building that is
open during class times, but restricted to authorized personnel at
night), depending on security needs.
Access to transportation services
Smart health cards can improve the security and privacy of patient
information, provide a secure carrier for portable medical records,
reduce health care fraud, support new processes for portable medical
records, provide secure access to emergency medical information,
enable compliance with government initiatives (e.g., organ donation)
and mandates, and provide the platform to implement other applications
as needed by the health care organization.
Smart cards are widely used to encrypt digital television streams.
VideoGuard is a specific example of how smart card security worked.
The Malaysian government promotes
MyKad as a single system for all
MyKad started as identity cards carried by
all citizens and resident non-citizens. Available applications now
include identity, travel documents, drivers license, health
information, an electronic wallet, ATM bank-card, public toll-road and
transit payments, and public key encryption infrastructure. The
personal information inside the MYKAD card can be read using special
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Smart cards have been advertised as suitable for personal
identification tasks, because they are engineered to be tamper
resistant. The chip usually implements some cryptographic algorithm.
There are, however, several methods for recovering some of the
algorithm's internal state.
Differential power analysis
Differential power analysis involves measuring the precise time and
electric current required for certain encryption or decryption
operations. This can deduce the on-chip private key used by public key
algorithms such as RSA. Some implementations of symmetric ciphers can
be vulnerable to timing or power attacks as well.
Smart cards can be physically disassembled by using acid, abrasives,
solvents, or some other technique to obtain unrestricted access to the
on-board microprocessor. Although such techniques may involve a risk
of permanent damage to the chip, they permit much more detailed
information (e.g., photomicrographs of encryption hardware) to be
The benefits of smart cards are directly related to the volume of
information and applications that are programmed for use on a card. A
single contact/contactless smart card can be programmed with multiple
banking credentials, medical entitlement, driver’s license/public
transport entitlement, loyalty programs and club memberships to name
just a few. Multi-factor and proximity authentication can and has been
embedded into smart cards to increase the security of all services on
the card. For example, a smart card can be programmed to only allow a
contactless transaction if it is also within range of another device
like a uniquely paired mobile phone. This can significantly increase
the security of the smart card.
Governments and regional authorities save money because of improved
security, better data and reduced processing costs. These savings help
reduce public budgets or enhance public services. There are many
examples in the UK, many using a common open LASSeO specification.
Individuals have better security and more convenience with using smart
cards that perform multiple services. For example, they only need to
replace one card if their wallet is lost or stolen. The data storage
on a card can reduce duplication, and even provide emergency medical
The first main advantage of smart cards is their flexibility. Smart
cards have multiple functions which simultaneously can be an ID, a
credit card, a stored-value cash card, and a repository of personal
information such as telephone numbers or medical history. The card can
be easily replaced if lost, and, the requirement for a PIN (or other
form of security) provides additional security from unauthorised
access to information by others. At the first attempt to use it
illegally, the card would be deactivated by the card reader itself.
The second main advantage is security. Smart cards can be electronic
key rings, giving the bearer ability to access information and
physical places without need for online connections. They are
encryption devices, so that the user can encrypt and decrypt
information without relying on unknown, and therefore potentially
untrustworthy, appliances such as ATMs. Smart cards are very flexible
in providing authentication at different level of the bearer and the
counterpart. Finally, with the information about the user that smart
cards can provide to the other parties, they are useful devices for
customizing products and services.
Other general benefits of smart cards are:
Increasing data storage capacity
Reliability that is virtually unaffected by electrical and magnetic
Smart cards and electronic commerce
Smart cards can be used in electronic commerce, over the Internet,
though the business model used in current electronic commerce
applications still cannot use the full potential of the electronic
medium. An advantage of smart cards for electronic commerce is their
use customize services. For example, in order for the service supplier
to deliver the customized service, the user may need to provide each
supplier with their profile, a boring and time-consuming activity. A
smart card can contain a non-encrypted profile of the bearer, so that
the user can get customized services even without previous contacts
with the supplier.
A false smart-card, with two 8-bit CMOS microcontrollers, used in the
nineties to decode the signals of Sky Television.
The plastic card in which the chip is embedded is fairly flexible. The
larger the chip, the higher the probability that normal use could
damage it. Cards are often carried in wallets or pockets, a harsh
environment for a chip. However, for large banking systems,
failure-management costs can be more than offset by fraud
If the account holder's computer hosts malware, the smart card
security model may be broken.
Malware can override the communication
(both input via keyboard and output via application screen) between
the user and the application.
Man-in-the-browser malware (e.g., the
Trojan Silentbanker) could modify a transaction, unnoticed by the
user. Banks like Fortis and
reader") in the Netherlands combine a smart card with an unconnected
card reader to avoid this problem. The customer enters a challenge
received from the bank's website, a PIN and the transaction amount
into the reader, The reader returns an 8-digit signature. This
signature is manually entered into the personal computer and verified
by the bank, preventing point-of-sale-malware from changing the
Smart cards have also been the targets of security attacks. These
attacks range from physical invasion of the card's electronics, to
non-invasive attacks that exploit weaknesses in the card's software or
hardware. The usual goal is to expose private encryption keys and then
read and manipulate secure data such as funds. Once an attacker
develops a non-invasive attack for a particular smart card model, he
or she is typically able to perform the attack on other cards of that
model in seconds, often using equipment that can be disguised as a
normal smart card reader. While manufacturers may develop new card
models with additional information security, it may be costly or
inconvenient for users to upgrade vulnerable systems. Tamper-evident
and audit features in a smart card system help manage the risks of
Another problem is the lack of standards for functionality and
security. To address this problem, the Berlin Group launched the
ERIDANE Project to propose "a new functional and security framework
for smart-card based Point of Interaction (POI) equipment".
List of smart cards
Open Smart Card Development Platform
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
^ "ISO/IEC 7816-2:1999/Amd 1:2004 – Assignment of contacts C4 and
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Missing or empty title= (help)
Missing or empty title= (help)
Missing or empty title= (help)
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^ "What is "Aime"?". Retrieved August 6, 2017.
Octopus Card Benefits
^ "Smartcare go". Retrieved 24 September 2012.
^ Mozilla certificate store
^ smartcard howto for GNUPG
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^ MYKAD SDK
^ Lasseo#Examples of Smart Card Schemes using LASSeO
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Wikimedia Commons has media related to Smart cards.
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Smart cards in China
Octopus card (Hong Kong)
Panyu Lotus Pass
Beijing-Tianjin CRBE Pass
Smart cards in Japan
EX-IC (Tōkaidō and Sanyō Shinkansen)
Hayakaken (Fukuoka, subway)
IC e-card (Matsuyama)
ICOCA (Osaka, JR West)
Kitaca (Sapporo, JR Hokkaido)
Mejiron Nimoca (Oita)
Nagasaki Smart Card (Nagasaki)
nimoca (Fukuoka, Nishitetsu)
SUGOCA (Fukuoka, JR Kyushu)
Suica (Tokyo, JR East)
TOICA (Nagoya, JR Central)
Broadcast encryption and digital rights management
Conditional access system
Smart cards and encryption
Digital video disc
Content Scramble System (CSS)
Advanced Access Content System
Advanced Access Content System (AACS)
Analogue broadcast encoding
See also free-to-view and pay television
BNF: cb119733403 (data)