COMMANDERS AND LEADERS
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Abdel Hakim Amer
Abdul Munim Riad
Zaid ibn Shaker
Abdul Rahman Arif
Mubarak Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
Saleh Mohammed Al-Sabah
Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
300 combat aircraft
TOTAL TROOPS: 264,000
Syria, Jordan, and Iraq: 307,000
957 combat aircraft
Lebanon: 2 combat aircraft
TOTAL TROOPS: 547,000
CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
776 –983 killed
400 tanks destroyed
46 aircraft destroyed
EGYPT: 10,000 –15,000 killed or missing
JORDAN: 6,000 killed or missing
SYRIA: 2,500 killed
IRAQ: 10 killed
LEBANON: One aircraft lost
Hundreds of tanks destroyed
452+ aircraft destroyed
20 Israeli civilians killed
US Navy sailors killed
* Waiting period
* Jordanian campaign
* Ammunition Hill
* Old City
* USS _Liberty_ incident
The SIX-DAY WAR (Hebrew : מלחמת ששת הימים, _Milhemet
Sheshet Ha Yamim_; Arabic : النكسة, _an-Naksah_, "The Setback"
or حرب ۱۹٦۷, _Ḥarb 1967_, "War of 1967"), also known as the
JUNE WAR, 1967 ARAB–ISRAELI WAR, or THIRD ARAB–ISRAELI WAR, was
fought between June 5 and 10, 1967 by
Israel and the neighboring
Egypt (known at the time as the
United Arab Republic
United Arab Republic ),
Jordan , and
Israel and its neighbours had never fully
normalised following the
1948 Arab–Israeli War . In 1956 Israel
invaded the Egyptian
Sinai , with one of its objectives being the
reopening of the
Straits of Tiran which
Egypt had blocked to Israeli
shipping since 1950.
Israel was subsequently forced to withdraw, but
won a guarantee that the
Straits of Tiran would remain open. Whilst
United Nations Emergency Force was deployed along the border,
there was no demilitarisation agreement.
In the period leading up to June 1967, tensions became dangerously
Israel reiterated its post-1956 position that the closure
of the straits of Tiran to its shipping would be a _casus belli _ and
in late May Nasser announced the straits would be closed to Israeli
Egypt then mobilised its forces along its border with Israel,
and on 5 June
Israel launched what it claimed were a series of
preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian airfields. Claims and
counterclaims relating to this series of events are one of a number of
controversies relating to the conflict .
The Egyptians were caught by surprise, and nearly the entire Egyptian
air force was destroyed with few Israeli losses, giving the Israelis
air superiority . Simultaneously, the Israelis launched a ground
offensive into the
Gaza Strip and the Sinai, which again caught the
Egyptians by surprise. After some initial resistance, Egyptian leader
Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the evacuation of the Sinai. Israeli forces
rushed westward in pursuit of the Egyptians, inflicted heavy losses,
and conquered the Sinai.
Jordan to begin attacks on
Israel by using
the initially confused situation to claim that
Egypt had defeated the
Israeli air strike. Israeli counterattacks resulted in the seizure of
East Jerusalem as well as the
West Bank from the Jordanians, while
Israel's retaliation against
Syria resulted in its occupation of the
Golan Heights .
On June 11, a ceasefire was signed. Arab casualties were far heavier
than those of Israel: fewer than a thousand Israelis had been killed
compared to over 20,000 from the Arab forces. Israel's military
success was attributed to the element of surprise, an innovative and
well-executed battle plan, and the poor quality and leadership of the
Israel seized control of the
Gaza Strip and the Sinai
Peninsula from Egypt, the
West Bank and
East Jerusalem from Jordan,
Golan Heights from Syria. Israeli morale and international
prestige were greatly increased by the outcome of the war and the area
under Israeli control tripled. However, the speed and ease of Israel's
victory would lead to a dangerous overconfidence within the ranks of
Israel Defense Forces (IDF), contributing to initial Arab
successes in the subsequent 1973
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War . The displacement of
civilian populations resulting from the war would have long-term
consequences, as 300,000
Palestinians fled the
West Bank and about
100,000 Syrians left the Golan to become refugees. Across the Arab
world, Jewish minority communities were expelled, with refugees going
Israel or Europe.
* 1 Background
* 1.1 Military preparation
* 2 Armies and weapons
* 2.1 Armies
* 2.2 Weapons
* 3 Fighting fronts
* 3.1 Preemptive air attack
Gaza Strip and
* 3.2.1 Northern (El Arish) Israeli division
* 3.2.2 Advance on
* 3.2.3 Mid-front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division
* 3.2.4 Other Israeli forces
* 3.2.5 The Egyptian Army
* 3.2.6 Next fighting days
* 3.3.1 Israeli cabinet meets
* 3.3.2 Initial response
* 3.3.3 Jordanian battalion at Government House
* 3.3.4 Israeli invasion
* 3.3.5 The Old City (June 7)
* 3.4.1 Syria\'s attack
Israeli Air Force attacks the Syrian airfields
* 3.4.3 Israelis debate whether the
Golan Heights should be attacked
* 3.4.4 Israeli attack: first day
* 3.4.5 Israeli attack: the next day
* 4 Conclusion
* 4.1 Casualties
* 5 Controversies
* 5.1 Preemptive strike v. unjustified attack
* 5.2 Allegations of atrocities against Egyptian soldiers
* 5.3 Allegations of military support from the US, UK and Soviet
* 5.4 USS _Liberty_ incident
* 6 Aftermath
Israel and Zionism
* 6.2 Jews in Arab countries-Pogroms and expulsion
* 6.3 Antisemitism against Jews in Communist countries
* 6.4 Peace and diplomacy
* 6.5 Captured territories and Arab displaced populations
* 6.6 Long term
* 7 See also
* 8 Notes
* 9 Footnotes
* 10 References
* 11 Further reading
* 12 External links
Origins of the Six-Day War On 22 May 1967,
President Nasser addressed his pilots at
Bir Gifgafa Airfield in
Sinai: "The Jews are threatening war – we say to them ahlan
After the 1956
Suez Crisis ,
Egypt agreed to the stationing of a
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the
Sinai to ensure all
parties would comply with the
1949 Armistice Agreements . In the
following years there were numerous minor border clashes between
Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. In early November
Syria signed a mutual defense agreement with Egypt. Soon
thereafter, in response to
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
guerilla activity, including a mine attack that left three dead,
the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) attacked the village of as-Samu in the
Jordanian-occupied West Bank. Jordanian units that engaged the
Israelis were quickly beaten back. King Hussein of
Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to come to Jordan's
aid, and "hiding behind UNEF skirts".
In May 1967, Nasser received false reports from the
Soviet Union that
Israel was massing on the Syrian border. Nasser began massing his
troops in two defensive lines in the
Sinai Peninsula on Israel's
border (May 16), expelled the UNEF force from Gaza and
Sinai (May 19)
and took up UNEF positions at
Sharm el-Sheikh , overlooking the
Straits of Tiran .
Israel reiterated declarations made in 1957 that
any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war, or
justification for war, and Nasser declared the Straits closed to
Israeli shipping on May 22–23. The U.S. President at the time,
Lyndon Johnson , later had this to say about closure of these straits
being a cause of the war:
If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than
any other, it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that
Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent, maritime
passage must be preserved for all nations.
On May 30,
Egypt signed a defense pact. The following day,
at Jordan's invitation, the Iraqi army began deploying troops and
armoured units in Jordan. They were later reinforced by an Egyptian
contingent. On June 1,
Israel formed a
National Unity Government by
widening its cabinet, and on June 4 the decision was made to go to
war. The next morning,
Operation Focus , a large-scale
surprise air strike that was the opening of the Six-Day War.
Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained
extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from sorties ,
enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day (as
opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two sorties per day).
This enabled the
Israeli Air Force (IAF) to send several attack waves
against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the war, overwhelming
the Egyptian Air Force, and allowed it to knock out other Arab air
forces on the same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that
the IAF was helped by foreign air forces (see Controversies relating
Six-Day War ). Pilots were extensively schooled about their
targets, and were forced to memorize every single detail, and
rehearsed the operation multiple times on dummy runways in total
The Egyptians had constructed fortified defenses in the Sinai. These
designs were based on the assumption that an attack would come along
the few roads leading through the desert, rather than through the
difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the
Egyptian defenses head-on, and instead surprised them from an
James Reston, writing in _
The New York Times _ on May 23, 1967,
noted, "In discipline, training, morale, equipment and general
competence his army and the other Arab forces, without the direct
assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis. ...
Even with 50,000 troops and the best of his generals and air force in
Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and
primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a
On May 26, 1967, the CIA estimated: "The Israelis … If they attack
now they … would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the
entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them
heavy losses of men and materiel."
On the eve of the war,
Israel believed it could win a war in 3–4
United States estimated
Israel would need 7–10 days to
win, with British estimates supporting the U.S. view.
ARMIES AND WEAPONS
The Israeli army had a total strength, including reservists, of
264,000, though this number could not be sustained, as the reservists
were vital to civilian life.
Against Jordan's forces on the West Bank,
Israel deployed about
40,000 troops and 200 tanks (eight brigades). Israeli Central Command
forces consisted of five brigades. The first two were permanently
Jerusalem and were called the
Brigade and the
Harel Brigade .
Mordechai Gur 's 55th Paratroopers Brigade
was summoned from the
Sinai front. The 10th Armored
stationed north of the
West Bank . The Israeli Northern Command
provided a division (three brigades) led by Major-General
Elad Peled ,
which was stationed in the
Jezreel Valley to the north of the West
On the eve of the war,
Egypt massed approximately 100,000 of its
160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all of its seven divisions
(four infantry, two armoured and one mechanized), four independent
infantry brigades and four independent armoured brigades. No fewer
than a third of them were veterans of Egypt's continuing intervention
North Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists.
These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs, and more than 1,000 artillery
Syria's army had a total strength of 75,000 and was deployed along
the Syrian border.
Jordanian Armed Forces included 11 brigades, totalling 55,000
troops and equipped with some 300 modern Western tanks, 250 of which
were U.S. M48 Pattons . Nine brigades (45,000 troops, 270 tanks, 200
artillery pieces) were deployed in the
West Bank , including the elite
armoured 40th, and two in the
Jordan Valley . They possessed sizable
numbers of M113 APCs, a new battalion of mechanized infantry , and a
paratrooper battalion trained in the new U.S.-built school. They also
had 12 battalions of artillery and six batteries of 81 mm and 120 mm
Jordanian Army , then known as the
Arab Legion , was a
long-term-service, professional army, relatively well-equipped and
well-trained. Furthermore, Israeli post-war briefings said that the
Jordanian staff acted professionally as well, but was always left
"half a step" behind by the Israeli moves. The small Royal Jordanian
Air Force consisted of only 24 British-made
Hawker Hunter fighters,
six transports, and two helicopters. According to the Israelis, the
Hawker Hunter was essentially on par with the French-built Dassault
Mirage III – the IAF's best plane.
100 Iraqi tanks and an infantry division were readied near the
Jordanian border. Two squadrons of fighter-aircraft, Hawker Hunters
and MiG 21s , were rebased adjacent to the Jordanian border.
The Arab air forces were aided by volunteer pilots from the Pakistan
Air Force acting in an independent capacity, and by some aircraft from
Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, and
Saudi Arabia to make up for the
massive losses suffered on the first day of the war. PAF pilots shot
down several Israeli planes.
With the exception of Jordan, the Arabs relied principally on Soviet
weaponry. Jordan's army was equipped with American weaponry, and its
air force was composed of British aircraft.
Egypt had by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab air
forces, consisting of about 420 combat aircraft, all of them
Soviet-built and with a heavy quota of top-of-the-line MiG-21s . Of
particular concern to the Israelis were the 30
Tu-16 "Badger" medium
bombers , capable of inflicting heavy damage on Israeli military and
Israeli weapons were mainly of Western origin. Its air force was
composed principally of French aircraft, while its armoured units were
mostly of British and American design and manufacture. Some infantry
weapons, including the ubiquitous
Uzi , were of Israeli origin.
PT-76 , and
SU-100 /152 World War II-vintage self-propelled guns.
Jordan used M-47
, M-48 , and M-48A1 Patton tanks.
Panzer IV (used by Syria)
M50 and M51 Shermans , M48A3 Patton , Centurion ,
AMX-13 . The
Centurion was upgraded with the British 105 mm L7 gun prior to the
war. The Sherman also underwent extensive modifications including a
larger 105 mm medium velocity, French gun, redesigned turret, wider
tracks, more armour, and upgraded engine and suspension.
M2 , /
M3 Half-track ,
M1937 Howitzer , BM-21 , D-30 (2A18) Howitzer , M1954 field gun ,
M-52 105 mm self-propelled howitzer (used by Jordan)
M50 self-propelled howitzer and Makmat 160 mm self-propelled mortar
Obusier de 155 mm Modèle 50 , AMX 105 mm Self-Propelled Howitzer
Tu-16 , Il-28 , Il-18 , Il-14 ,
Hawker Hunter used by
Jordan and Iraq
Dassault Mirage III
Dassault Mirage III ,
Dassault Super Mystère , Sud Aviation
Mystere IV ,
Dassault Ouragan ,
Fouga Magister trainer
outfitted for attack missions, Nord 2501IS military cargo plane
Mi-6 , Mi-4
Super Frelon ,
SA-2 Guideline ,
ZSU-57-2 mobile anti-aircraft cannon
MIM-23 Hawk ,
Bofors 40 mm
Port Said submachine gun ,
RPK , RPD ,
DShK HMG, B-10 and
B-11 recoilless rifles
FN FAL ,
FN MAG ,
AK-47 , M2 Browning , Cobra ,
Nord SS.10 ,
RL-83 Blindicide anti-tank infantry weapon, Jeep-mounted 106 mm
PREEMPTIVE AIR ATTACK
Operation Focus See also: Order of battle for the
Six-Day War Israeli troops examine destroyed Egyptian aircraft.
Dassault Mirage at the
Israeli Air Force Museum . Operation
Focus was mainly conducted using French built aircraft.
Israel's first and most critical move was a surprise attack on the
Egyptian Air Force . Initially, both
Israel announced that
they had been attacked by the other country.
On June 5 at 7:45 Israeli time, as civil defense sirens sounded all
over Israel, the IAF launched
Operation Focus (_Moked_). All but 12 of
its nearly 200 operational jets launched a mass attack against
Egypt's airfields. The Egyptian defensive infrastructure was
extremely poor, and no airfields were yet equipped with hardened
aircraft shelters capable of protecting Egypt's warplanes. Most of the
Israeli warplanes headed out over the
Mediterranean Sea , flying low
to avoid radar detection, before turning toward Egypt. Others flew
Red Sea .
Meanwhile, the Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively
shutting down their entire air defense system: they were worried that
rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field
Abdel Hakim Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route
from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the
Sinai to meet the commanders of the
troops stationed there. In any event, it did not make a great deal of
difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover
and well below the lowest point at which its SA-2 surface-to-air
missile batteries could bring down an aircraft.
Although the powerful Jordanian radar facility at
waves of aircraft approaching
Egypt and reported the code word for
"war" up the Egyptian command chain, Egyptian command and
communications problems prevented the warning from reaching the
targeted airfields. The Israelis employed a mixed-attack strategy:
bombing and strafing runs against planes parked on the ground, and
bombing to disable runways with special tarmac-shredding penetration
bombs developed jointly with France, leaving surviving aircraft unable
to take off. The runway at the
Arish airfield was spared, as the
Israelis expected to turn it into a military airport for their
transports after the war. Surviving aircraft were taken out by later
attack waves. The operation was more successful than expected,
catching the Egyptians by surprise and destroying virtually all of the
Egyptian Air Force on the ground, with few Israeli losses. Only four
unarmed Egyptian training flights were in the air when the strike
began. A total of 338 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed and 100 pilots
were killed, although the number of aircraft lost by the Egyptians is
Among the Egyptian planes lost were all 30
Tu-16 bombers, 27 out of
40 Il-28 bombers, 12
Su-7 fighter-bombers, over 90 MiG-21s , 20
MiG-19s , 25
MiG-17 fighters, and around 32 assorted transport planes
and helicopters. In addition, Egyptian radars and SAM missiles were
also attacked and destroyed. The Israelis lost 19 planes, including
two destroyed in air-to-air combat and 13 downed by anti-aircraft
artillery. One Israeli plane, which was damaged and unable to break
radio silence, was shot down by Israeli Hawk missiles after it strayed
Negev Nuclear Research Center . Another was destroyed by an
exploding Egyptian bomber.
The attack guaranteed Israeli air superiority for the rest of the
war. Attacks on other Arab air forces by
Israel took place later in
the day as hostilities broke out on other fronts.
The large numbers of Arab aircraft claimed destroyed by
that day were at first regarded as "greatly exaggerated" by the
Western press. However, the fact that the Egyptian Air Force, along
with other Arab air forces attacked by Israel, made practically no
appearance for the remaining days of the conflict proved that the
numbers were most likely authentic. Throughout the war, Israeli
aircraft continued strafing Arab airfield runways to prevent their
return to usability. Meanwhile, Egyptian state-run radio had reported
an Egyptian victory, falsely claiming that 70 Israeli planes had been
downed on the first day of fighting.
GAZA STRIP AND SINAI PENINSULA
Conquest of Sinai. June 5–6, 1967 People in a bomb
The Egyptian forces consisted of seven divisions : four armoured ,
two infantry , and one mechanized infantry . Overall,
Egypt had around
100,000 troops and 900–950 tanks in the Sinai, backed by 1,100 APCs
and 1,000 artillery pieces. This arrangement was thought to be based
on the Soviet doctrine, where mobile armour units at strategic depth
provide a dynamic defense while infantry units engage in defensive
Israeli forces concentrated on the border with
Egypt included six
armoured brigades , one infantry brigade, one mechanized infantry
brigade, three paratrooper brigades, giving a total of around 70,000
men and 700 tanks, who were organized in three armoured divisions.
They had massed on the border the night before the war, camouflaging
themselves and observing radio silence before being ordered to
The Israeli plan was to surprise the Egyptian forces in both timing
(the attack exactly coinciding with the IAF strike on Egyptian
airfields), location (attacking via northern and central
as opposed to the Egyptian expectations of a repeat of the 1956 war,
when the IDF attacked via the central and southern routes) and method
(using a combined-force flanking approach, rather than direct tank
Arish ) Israeli Division
On June 5, at 7:50 a.m., the northernmost Israeli division,
consisting of three brigades and commanded by Major General
, one of Israel's most prominent armour commanders, crossed the border
at two points, opposite
Nahal Oz and south of
Khan Yunis . They
advanced swiftly, holding fire to prolong the element of surprise.
Tal's forces assaulted the "
Rafah Gap", a seven-mile stretch
containing the shortest of three main routes through the
El-Qantarah el-Sharqiyya and the
Suez Canal . The Egyptians had four
divisions in the area, backed by minefields, pillboxes, underground
bunkers, hidden gun emplacements and trenches. The terrain on either
side of the route was impassable. The Israeli plan was to hit the
Egyptians at selected key points with concentrated armour.
Tal's advance was led by the 7th Armored
Brigade under Colonel Shmuel
Gonen . The Israeli plan called for the 7th
Brigade to outflank Khan
Yunis from the north and the 60th Armored
Brigade under Colonel
Menachem Aviram would advance from the south. The two brigades would
link up and surround Khan Yunis, while the paratroopers would take
Rafah . Gonen entrusted the breakthrough to a single battalion of his
Initially, the advance was met with light resistance, as Egyptian
intelligence had concluded that it was a diversion for the main
attack. However, as Gonen's lead battalion advanced, it suddenly came
under intense fire and took heavy losses. A second battalion was
brought up, but was also pinned down. Meanwhile, the 60th Brigade
became bogged down in the sand, while the paratroopers had trouble
navigating through the dunes. The Israelis continued to press their
attack, and despite heavy losses, cleared the Egyptian positions and
Khan Yunis railway junction in little over four hours.
Gonen's brigade then advanced nine miles to
Rafah in twin columns.
Rafah itself was circumvented, and the Israelis attacked Sheikh Zuweid
, eight miles to the southwest, which was defended by two brigades.
Though inferior in numbers and equipment, the Egyptians were deeply
entrenched and camouflaged. The Israelis were pinned down by fierce
Egyptian resistance, and called in air and artillery support to enable
their lead elements to advance. Many Egyptians abandoned their
positions after their commander and several of his staff were killed.
The Israelis broke through with tank-led assaults. However, Aviram's
forces misjudged the Egyptians' flank, and were pinned between
strongholds before they were extracted after several hours. By
nightfall, the Israelis had finished mopping up resistance. Israeli
forces had taken significant losses, with Colonel Gonen later telling
reporters that "we left many of our dead soldiers in Rafah, and many
burnt-out tanks." The Egyptians suffered some 2,000 casualties and
lost 40 tanks.
Advance On Arish
Israeli reconnaissance forces from the "Shaked" unit in Sinai
during the war.
On June 5, with the road open, Israeli forces continued advancing
Arish . Already by late afternoon, elements of the 79th
Battalion had charged through the seven-mile long Jiradi
defile, a narrow pass defended by well-emplaced troops of the Egyptian
112th Infantry Brigade. In fierce fighting, which saw the pass change
hands several times, the Israelis charged through the position. The
Egyptians suffered heavy casualties and tank losses, while Israeli
losses stood at 66 dead, 93 wounded and 28 tanks. Emerging at the
western end, Israeli forces advanced to the outskirts of Arish. As it
reached the outskirts of Arish, Tal's division also consolidated its
Rafah and Khan Yunis.
The following day, June 6, the Israeli forces on the outskirts of
Arish were reinforced by the 7th Brigade, which fought its way through
the Jiradi pass. After receiving supplies via an airdrop, the Israelis
entered the city and captured the airport at 7:50 am. The Israelis
entered the city at 8:00 am. Company commander
Yossi Peled recounted
Arish was totally quiet, desolate. Suddenly, the city turned
into a madhouse. Shots came at us from every alley, every corner,
every window and house." An IDF record stated that "clearing the city
was hard fighting. The Egyptians fired from the rooftops, from
balconies and windows. They dropped grenades into our half-tracks and
blocked the streets with trucks. Our men threw the grenades back and
crushed the trucks with their tanks." Gonen sent additional units to
Arish, and the city was eventually taken.
Avraham Yoffe 's assignment was to penetrate Sinai
south of Tal's forces and north or Sharon's. Yoffe's attack allowed
Tal to complete the capture of the Jiradi defile, Khan Yunis. All of
them were taken after fierce fighting. Gonen subsequently dispatched a
force of tanks, infantry and engineers under Colonel Yisrael Granit to
continue down the Mediterranean coast towards the
Suez Canal , while a
second force led by Gonen himself turned south and captured Bir Lahfan
and Jabal Libni.
Abu-Ageila ) Israeli Division
Ariel Sharon during the Battle of
Further south, on June 6, the Israeli 38th Armored Division under
Ariel Sharon assaulted
Um-Katef , a heavily fortified
area defended by the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division under
Major-General Sa'adi Nagib, and consisting of some 16,000 troops. The
Egyptians also had a battalion of tank destroyers and a tank regiment,
formed of Soviet World War II armour, which included 90 T-34-85 tanks,
SU-100 tank destroyers, and about 16,000 men. The Israelis had
about 14,000 men and 150 post-World War II tanks including the AMX-13
, Centurions , and M50 Super Shermans (modified
M-4 Sherman tanks).
Two armoured brigades in the meantime, under Avraham Yoffe, slipped
across the border through sandy wastes that
Egypt had left undefended
because they were considered impassable. Simultaneously, Sharon's
tanks from the west were to engage Egyptian forces on
and block any reinforcements. Israeli infantry would clear the three
trenches, while heliborne paratroopers would land behind Egyptian
lines and silence their artillery. An armoured thrust would be made at
al-Qusmaya to unnerve and isolate its garrison. Israeli Armor of
the Six Day War: pictured here the
As Sharon's division advanced into the Sinai, Egyptian forces staged
successful delaying actions at Tarat Umm, Umm Tarfa, and Hill 181. An
Israeli jet was downed by anti-aircraft fire, and Sharon's forces came
under heavy shelling as they advanced from the north and west. The
Israeli advance, which had to cope with extensive minefields, took a
large number of casualties. A column of Israeli tanks managed to
penetrate the northern flank of Abu Ageila, and by dusk, all units
were in position. The Israelis then brought up ninety 105 mm and 155
mm artillery guns for a preparatory barrage, while civilian buses
brought reserve infantrymen under Colonel
Yekutiel Adam and
helicopters arrived to ferry the paratroopers. These movements were
unobserved by the Egyptians, who were preoccupied with Israeli probes
against their perimeter.
As night fell, the Israeli assault troops lit flashlights, each
battalion a different color, to prevent friendly fire incidents. At
10:00 pm, Israeli artillery began a barrage on Um-Katef, firing some
6,000 shells in less than twenty minutes, the most concentrated
artillery barrage in Israel's history. Israeli tanks assaulted the
northernmost Egyptian defenses and were largely successful, though an
entire armoured brigade was stalled by mines, and had only one
mine-clearance tank. Israeli infantrymen assaulted the triple line of
trenches in the east. To the west, paratroopers commanded by Colonel
Danny Matt landed behind Egyptian lines, though half the helicopters
got lost and never found the battlefield, while others were unable to
land due to mortar fire. Those that successfully landed on target
destroyed Egyptian artillery and ammunition dumps and separated gun
crews from their batteries, sowing enough confusion to significantly
reduce Egyptian artillery fire. Egyptian reinforcements from Jabal
Libni advanced towards
Um-Katef to counterattack, but failed to reach
their objective, being subjected to heavy air attacks and encountering
Israeli lodgements on the roads. Egyptian commanders then called in
artillery attacks on their own positions. The Israelis accomplished
and sometimes exceeded their overall plan, and had largely succeeded
by the following day. The Egyptians took heavy casualties, while the
Israelis lost 40 dead and 140 wounded.
Yoffe's attack allowed Sharon to complete the capture of the
Um-Katef, after fierce fighting. The main thrust at
stalled due to mines and craters. After IDF engineers had cleared a
path by 4:00 pm, Israeli and Egyptian tanks engaged in fierce combat,
often at ranges as close as ten yards. The battle ended in an Israeli
victory, with 40 Egyptian and 19 Israeli tanks destroyed. Meanwhile,
Israeli infantry finished clearing out the Egyptian trenches, with
Israeli casualties standing at 14 dead and 41 wounded and Egyptian
casualties at 300 dead and 100 taken prisoner.
Other Israeli Forces
Further south, on June 5, the 8th Armored
Brigade under Colonel
Albert Mandler , initially positioned as a ruse to draw off Egyptian
forces from the real invasion routes, attacked the fortified bunkers
at Kuntilla, a strategically valuable position whose capture would
enable Mandler to block reinforcements from reaching
Um-Katef and to
join Sharon's upcoming attack on Nakhl . The defending Egyptian
battalion, outnumbered and outgunned, fiercely resisted the attack,
hitting a number of Israeli tanks. However, most of the defenders were
killed, and only three Egyptian tanks, one of them damaged, survived.
By nightfall, Mendler's forces had taken Kuntilla.
With the exceptions of
Rafah and Khan Yunis, Israeli forces had
initially avoided entering the
Gaza Strip . Israeli Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan had expressly forbidden entry into the area. After
Palestinian positions in Gaza opened fire on the Negev settlements of
Kissufim , IDF Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin overrode Dayan's
instructions and ordered the 11th Mechanized
Brigade under Colonel
Yehuda Reshef to enter the Strip. The force was immediately met with
heavy artillery fire and fierce resistance from Palestinian forces and
remnants of the Egyptian forces from Rafah.
By sunset, the Israelis had taken the strategically vital Ali Muntar
Gaza City , but were beaten back from the city
itself. Some 70 Israelis were killed, along with Israeli journalist
Ben Oyserman and American journalist
Paul Schutzer . Twelve members of
UNEF were also killed. On the war's second day, June 6, the Israelis
were bolstered by the 35th Paratroopers
Brigade under Colonel Rafael
Eitan , and took
Gaza City along with the entire Strip. The fighting
was fierce, and accounted for nearly half of all Israeli casualties on
the southern front. However, Gaza rapidly fell to the Israelis.
Meanwhile, on June 6, two Israeli reserve brigades under Yoffe, each
equipped with 100 tanks, penetrated the
Sinai south of Tal's division
and north of Sharon's, capturing the road junctions of Abu Ageila, Bir
Lahfan, and Arish, taking all of them before midnight. Two Egyptian
armoured brigades counterattacked, and a fierce battle took place
until the following morning. The Egyptians were beaten back by fierce
resistance coupled with airstrikes, sustaining heavy tank losses. They
fled west towards Jabal Libni.
The Egyptian Army
During the ground fighting, remnants of the Egyptian Air Force
attacked Israeli ground forces, but took losses from the Israeli Air
Force and from Israeli anti-aircraft units. Throughout the last four
days, Egyptian aircraft flew 150 sorties against Israeli units in the
Many of the Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to
prevent the Israelis from reaching the
Suez Canal or engaged in combat
in the attempt to reach the canal. However, when the Egyptian Field
Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of
Abu-Ageila , he
panicked and ordered all units in the
Sinai to retreat. This order
effectively meant the defeat of Egypt.
Meanwhile, President Nasser , having learned of the results of the
Israeli air strikes, decided together with Field Marshal Amer to order
a general retreat from the
Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed
instructions were given concerning the manner and sequence of
Next Fighting Days
This section NEEDS ADDITIONAL CITATIONS FOR VERIFICATION . Please
help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources .
Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2017)_ _(Learn
how and when to remove this template message )_
Conquest of Sinai. June 7–8, 1967 Play media Newsreel
from June 6 about the first Israeli-Egyptian fighting. An
Israeli gunboat passes through the
Straits of Tiran near Sharm El
As Egyptian columns retreated, Israeli aircraft and artillery
attacked them. Israeli jets used napalm bombs during their sorties.
The attacks destroyed hundreds of vehicles and caused heavy
casualties. At Jabal Libni, retreating Egyptian soldiers were fired
upon by their own artillery. At Bir Gafgafa, the Egyptians fiercely
resisted advancing Israeli forces, knocking out three tanks and eight
half-tracks, and killing 20 soldiers. Due to the Egyptians' retreat,
the Israeli High Command decided not to pursue the Egyptian units but
rather to bypass and destroy them in the mountainous passes of West
Therefore, in the following two days (June 6 and 7), all three
Israeli divisions (Sharon and Tal were reinforced by an armoured
brigade each) rushed westwards and reached the passes. Sharon's
division first went southward then westward, via An-Nakhl , to Mitla
Pass with air support. It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's
division, while its other units blocked the
Gidi Pass . These passes
became killing grounds for the Egyptians, who ran right into waiting
Israeli positions and suffered heavy losses. According to Egyptian
Mahmoud Riad , 10,000 men were killed in one day alone, and
many others died from hunger and thirst. Tal's units stopped at
various points to the length of the Suez Canal.
Israel's blocking action was partially successful. Only the Gidi pass
was captured before the Egyptians approached it, but at other places,
Egyptian units managed to pass through and cross the canal to safety.
Due to the haste of the Egyptian retreat, soldiers often abandoned
weapons, military equipment, and hundreds of vehicles. Many Egyptian
soldiers were cut off from their units had to walk about 200
kilometers on foot before reaching the
Suez Canal with limited
supplies of food and water and were exposed to intense heat. Thousands
of soldiers died as a result. Many Egyptian soldiers chose instead to
surrender to the Israelis. However, the Israelis eventually exceeded
their capabilities to provide for prisoners. As a result, they began
directing soldiers towards the
Suez Canal and only taking prisoner
high-ranking officers, who were expected to be exchanged for captured
During the offensive, the
Israeli Navy landed six combat divers from
Shayetet 13 naval commando unit to infiltrate
The divers sank an Egyptian minesweeper before being taken prisoner.
Shayetet 13 commandos also infiltrated into
Port Said harbour, but
found no ships there. A planned commando raid against the Syrian Navy
never materialized. Both Egyptian and Israeli warships made movements
at sea to intimidate the other side throughout the war, but did not
engage each other. However, Israeli warships and aircraft did hunt for
Egyptian submarines throughout the war.
On June 7,
Israel began the conquest of
Sharm el-Sheikh . The Israeli
Navy started the operation with a probe of Egyptian naval defenses. An
aerial reconnaissance flight found that the area was less defended
than originally thought. At about 4:30 am, three Israeli missile boats
opened fire on Egyptian shore batteries, while paratroopers and
commandos boarded helicopters and
Nord Noratlas transport planes for
an assault on Al-Tur, as Chief of Staff Rabin was convinced it was too
risky to land them directly in Sharm el-Sheikh. However, the city had
been largely abandoned the day before, and reports from air and naval
forces finally convinced Rabin to divert the aircraft to Sharm
el-Sheikh. There, the Israelis engaged in a pitched battle with the
Egyptians and took the city, killing 20 Egyptian soldiers and taking 8
prisoner. At 12:15 pm, Defense Minister Dayan announced that the
Straits of Tiran constituted an international waterway open to all
ships without restriction.
On June 8,
Israel completed the capture of the
Sinai by sending
infantry units to
Ras Sudar on the western coast of the peninsula.
Several tactical elements made the swift Israeli advance possible:
first, the surprise attack that quickly gave the Israeli Air Force
complete air superiority over the
Egyptian Air Force ; second, the
determined implementation of an innovative battle plan; third, the
lack of coordination among Egyptian troops. These factors would prove
to be decisive elements on Israel's other fronts as well.
Jordanian campaign (1967) The
Jordan salient , June
Jordan was reluctant to enter the war. Nasser used the confusion of
the first hours of the conflict to convince King Hussein that he was
victorious; he claimed as evidence a radar sighting of a squadron of
Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt, which he said
was an Egyptian aircraft en route to attack Israel. One of the
Jordanian brigades stationed in the
West Bank was sent to the Hebron
area in order to link with the Egyptians. Hussein decided to attack.
The IDF's strategic plan was to remain on the defensive along the
Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign against
Intermittent machine-gun exchanges began taking place in
9:30 am, and the fighting gradually escalated as the Jordanians
introduced mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Under the orders from
General Narkis, the Israelis responded only with small-arms fire,
firing in a flat trajectory to avoid hitting civilians, holy sites or
the Old City. At 10:00 am on June 5, the
Jordanian Army began shelling
Israel. Two batteries of
155 mm Long Tom cannons opened fire on the
Tel Aviv and
Ramat David Airbase . The commanders of these
batteries were instructed to lay a two-hour barrage against military
and civilian settlements in central Israel. Some shells hit the
Tel Aviv .
By 10:30 am, Eshkol had sent a message via
Odd Bull to King Hussein
promising not to initiate any action against
Jordan if it stayed out
of the war. King Hussein replied that it was too late, "the die was
cast ". At 11:15 am, Jordanian howitzers began a 6,000-shell barrage
at Israeli Jerusalem. The Jordanians initially targeted kibbutz Ramat
Rachel in the south and
Mount Scopus in the north, then ranged into
the city center and outlying neighborhoods. Military installations,
the Prime Minister's Residence, and the
Knesset compound were also
targeted. Israeli civilian casualties totalled 20 dead and about 1,000
wounded. Some 900 buildings were damaged, including Hadassah Ein Kerem
At 11:50 am, sixteen Jordanian Hawker Hunters attacked
Netanya , Kfar
Kfar Saba , killing one civilian, wounding seven and
destroying a transport plane. Three Iraqi Hawker Hunters strafed
civilian settlements in the Jezreel Valley, and an Iraqi Tupolev Tu-16
Afula , and was shot down near the Megiddo airfield. The
attack caused minimal material damage, hitting only a senior citizens'
home and several chicken coops, but sixteen Israeli soldiers were
killed, most of them when the Tupolev crashed.
Israeli Cabinet Meets
When the Israeli cabinet convened to decide what to do, Yigal Allon
Menahem Begin argued that this was an opportunity to take the Old
Jerusalem , but Eshkol decided to defer any decision until
Moshe Dayan and
Yitzhak Rabin could be consulted.
Uzi Narkiss made a
number of proposals for military action, including the capture of
Latrun , but the cabinet turned him down. Dayan rejected multiple
requests from Narkiss for permission to mount an infantry assault
towards Mount Scopus. However, Dayan sanctioned a number of more
limited retaliatory actions.
Shortly before 12:30 pm, the
Israeli Air Force attacked Jordan's two
airbases. The Hawker Hunters were refueling at the time of the attack.
The Israeli aircraft attacked in two waves, the first of which
cratered the runways and knocked out the control towers, and the
second wave destroyed all 21 of Jordan's
Hawker Hunter fighters, along
with six transport aircraft and two helicopters. One Israeli jet was
shot down by ground fire.
Israeli aircraft also attacked H-3, an
Iraqi Air Force base in
western Iraq. During the attack, 12 MiG-21s, 2 MiG-17s, 5 Hunter F6s,
and 3 Il-28 bombers were destroyed or shot down. A Pakistani pilot
stationed at the base shot down an Israeli fighter and a bomber during
the raid. The Jordanian radar facility at
Ajloun was destroyed in an
Israeli airstrike. Israeli
Fouga Magister jets attacked the Jordanian
Brigade with rockets as it moved south from the Damiya Bridge.
Dozens of tanks were knocked out, and a convoy of 26 trucks carrying
ammunition was destroyed. In Jerusalem,
Israel responded to Jordanian
shelling with a missile strike that devastated Jordanian positions.
The Israelis used the L missile, a surface-to-surface missile
developed jointly with
France in secret.
Battalion At Government House
Battle of Ammunition Hill
A Jordanian battalion advanced up Government House ridge and dug in
at the perimeter of Government House, the headquarters of the United
Nations observers, and opened fire on Ramat Rachel, the Allenby
Barracks and the Jewish section of
Abu Tor with mortars and recoilless
rifles. UN observers fiercely protested the incursion into the neutral
zone, and several manhandled a Jordanian machine gun out of Government
House after the crew had set it up in a second-floor window. After the
Jabel Mukaber , an advance patrol was sent out and
approached Ramat Rachel, where they came under fire from four
civilians, including the wife of the director, who were armed with old
Czech-made weapons. Israeli paratroopers flush out Jordanian
soldiers from trenches during the
Battle of Ammunition Hill .
Silhouette of Israeli paratroops advancing on Ammunition Hill.
The immediate Israeli response was an offensive to retake Government
House and its ridge. The
Jerusalem Brigade's Reserve
under Lieutenant-Colonel Asher Dreizin, was given the task. Dreizin
had two infantry companies and eight tanks under his command, several
of which broke down or became stuck in the mud at Ramat Rachel,
leaving three for the assault. The Jordanians mounted fierce
resistance, knocking out two tanks.
The Israelis broke through the compound's western gate and began
clearing the building with grenades, before General
Odd Bull ,
commander of the UN observers, compelled the Israelis to hold their
fire, telling them that the Jordanians had already fled. The Israelis
proceeded to take the Antenna Hill, directly behind Government House,
and clear out a series of bunkers to the west and south. The fighting,
often conducted hand-to-hand, continued for nearly four hours before
the surviving Jordanians fell back to trenches held by the Hittin
Brigade, which were steadily overwhelmed. By 6:30 pm, the Jordanians
had retreated to
Bethlehem , having suffered about 100 casualties. All
but ten of Dreizin's soldiers were casualties, and Dreizin himself was
wounded three times.
During the late afternoon of June 5, the Israelis launched an
offensive to encircle Jerusalem, which lasted into the following day.
During the night, they were supported by intense tank, artillery and
mortar fire to soften up Jordanian positions. Searchlights placed atop
the Labor Federation building, then the tallest in Israeli Jerusalem,
exposed and blinded the Jordanians. The
Brigade moved south
of Jerusalem, while the mechanized
Harel Brigade and 55th Paratroopers
Mordechai Gur encircled it from the north.
A combined force of tanks and paratroopers crossed no-man's land near
Mandelbaum Gate . One of Gur's paratroop battalions approached the
fortified Police Academy. The Israelis used bangalore torpedoes to
blast their way through barbed wire leading up to the position while
exposed and under heavy fire. With the aid of two tanks borrowed from
Jerusalem Brigade, they captured the Police Academy. After
receiving reinforcements, they moved up to attack Ammunition Hill .
The Jordanian defenders, who were heavily dug-in, fiercely resisted
the attack. All of the Israeli officers except for two company
commanders were killed, and the fighting was mostly led by individual
soldiers. The fighting was conducted at close quarters in trenches and
bunkers, and was often hand-to-hand. The Israelis captured the
position after four hours of heavy fighting. During the battle, 36
Israeli and 71 Jordanian soldiers were killed.
The battalion subsequently drove east, and linked up with the Israeli
Mount Scopus and its Hebrew University campus. Gur's other
battalions captured the other Jordanian positions around the American
Colony , despite being short on men and equipment and having come
under a Jordanian mortar bombardment while waiting for the signal to
At the same time, the mechanized
Harel Brigade attacked the fortress
Latrun , which the Jordanians had abandoned due to heavy Israeli
tank fire. The brigade attacked
Har Adar , but seven tanks were
knocked out by mines, forcing the infantry to mount an assault without
armoured cover. The Israeli soldiers advanced under heavy fire,
jumping between stones to avoid mines. The fighting was conducted at
close-quarters, often with knives and bayonets.
The Jordanians fell back after a battle that left two Israeli and
eight Jordanian soldiers dead, and Israeli forces advanced through
Beit Horon towards
Ramallah , taking four fortified villages along the
way. By the evening, the brigade arrived in Ramallah. Meanwhile, the
Abu Tor following a fierce battle,
severing the Old City from
Bethlehem and Hebron.
Meanwhile, 600 Egyptian commandos stationed in the
West Bank moved to
attack Israeli airfields. Led by Jordanian intelligence scouts, they
crossed the border and began infiltrating through Israeli settlements
Hatzor . They were soon detected and sought shelter
in nearby fields, which the Israelis set on fire. Some 450 commandos
were killed, and the remainder escaped to Jordan.
From the American Colony, the paratroopers moved towards the Old
City. Their plan was to approach it via the lightly defended Salah
al-Din Street. However, they made a wrong turn onto the heavily
Nablus Road. The Israelis ran into fierce resistance. Their
tanks fired at point-blank range down the street, while the
paratroopers mounted repeated charges. Despite repelling repeated
Israeli charges, the Jordanians gradually gave way to Israeli
firepower and momentum. The Israelis suffered some 30 casualties –
half the original force – while the Jordanians lost 45 dead and 142
Meanwhile, the Israeli 71st
Battalion breached barbed wire and
minefields and emerged near Wadi Joz, near the base of Mount Scopus,
from where the Old City could be cut off from
Jericho and East
Jerusalem from Ramallah. Israeli artillery targeted the one remaining
Jerusalem to the West Bank, and shellfire deterred the
Jordanians from counterattacking from their positions at
Augusta-Victoria. An Israeli detachment then captured the Rockefeller
Museum after a brief skirmish.
Afterwards, the Israelis broke through to the Jerusalem-Ramallah
road. At Tel al-Ful, the Israelis fought a running battle with up to
thirty Jordanian tanks. The Jordanians stalled the advance and
destroyed a number of half-tracks, but the Israelis launched air
attacks and exploited the vulnerability of the external fuel tanks
mounted on the Jordanian tanks. The Jordanians lost half their tanks,
and retreated towards
Jericho . Joining up with the 4th Brigade, the
Israelis then descended through
Shuafat and the site of what is now
French Hill , through Jordanian defenses at Mivtar, emerging at
Ammunition Hill. An Israeli airstrike near the Augusta-Victoria
With Jordanian defenses in
Jerusalem crumbling, elements of the
Brigade and an infantry battalion were sent from
Jericho to reinforce Jerusalem. Its original orders were to repel the
Israelis from the
Latrun corridor, but due to the worsening situation
in Jerusalem, the brigade was ordered to proceed to Jerusalem's Arab
suburbs and attack
Mount Scopus . Parallel to the brigade were
infantrymen from the Imam Ali Brigade, who were approaching Issawiya .
The brigades were spotted by Israeli aircraft and decimated by rocket
and cannon fire. Other Jordanian attempts to reinforce
beaten back, either by armoured ambushes or airstrikes.
Fearing damage to holy sites and the prospect of having to fight in
built-up areas, Dayan ordered his troops not to enter the Old City.
He also feared that
Israel would be subjected to a fierce
international backlash and the outrage of Christians worldwide if it
forced its way into the Old City. Privately, he told David Ben-Gurion
that he was also concerned over the prospect of
Jerusalem's holy sites, only to be forced to give them up under the
threat of international sanctions.
The Old City (June 7)
On June 7, heavy fighting ensued. Dayan had ordered his troops not to
enter the Old City; however, upon hearing that the UN was about to
declare a ceasefire, he changed his mind, and without cabinet
clearance, decided to capture it. Two paratroop battalions attacked
Augusta-Victoria Hill, high ground overlooking the Old City from the
east. One battalion attacked from Mount Scopus, and another attacked
from the valley between it and the Old City. Another paratroop
battalion, personally led by Gur, broke into the Old City, and was
joined by the other two battalions after their missions were complete.
The paratroopers met little resistance. The fighting was conducted
solely by the paratroopers; the Israelis did not use armour during the
battle out of fear of severe damage to the Old City.
In the north, one battalion from Peled's division was sent to check
Jordanian defenses in the
Jordan Valley. A brigade belonging to
Peled's division captured the western part of the West Bank. One
brigade attacked Jordanian artillery positions around
Jenin , which
Ramat David Airbase . The Jordanian 12th Armored
Battalion, which outnumbered the Israelis, held off repeated attempts
to capture Jenin. However, Israeli air attacks took their toll, and
the Jordanian M48 Pattons , with their external fuel tanks, proved
vulnerable at short distances, even to the Israeli-modified Shermans.
Twelve Jordanian tanks were destroyed, and only six remained
David Rubinger 's famed photograph of IDF
Western Wall shortly after its capture.
From left to right: Zion Karasenti, Yitzhak Yifat, and Haim Oshri.
Just after dusk, Israeli reinforcements arrived. The Jordanians
continued to fiercely resist, and the Israelis were unable to advance
without artillery and air support. One Israeli jet attacked the
Jordanian commander's tank, wounding him and killing his radio
operator and intelligence officer. The surviving Jordanian forces then
withdrew to Jenin, where they were reinforced by the 25th Infantry
Brigade. The Jordanians were effectively surrounded in Jenin.
Jordanian infantry and their three remaining tanks managed to hold
off the Israelis until 4:00 am, when three battalions arrived to
reinforce them in the afternoon. The Jordanian tanks charged, and
knocked out multiple Israeli vehicles, and the tide began to shift.
After sunrise, Israeli jets and artillery conducted a two-hour
bombardment against the Jordanians. The Jordanians lost 10 dead and
250 wounded, and had only seven tanks left, including two without gas,
and sixteen APCs. The Israelis then fought their way into Jenin, and
captured the city after fierce fighting.
After the Old City fell, the
Brigade reinforced the
paratroopers, and continued to the south, capturing
Judea and Gush
Hebron was taken without any resistance. Fearful that Israeli
soldiers would exact retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city's
Jewish community, Hebron's residents flew white sheets from their
windows and rooftops, and voluntarily gave up their weapons. The Harel
Brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the
Jordan River .
On June 7, Israeli forces seized
Bethlehem , taking the city after a
brief battle that left some 40 Jordanian soldiers dead, with the
remainder fleeing. On the same day, one of Peled's brigades seized
Nablus ; then it joined one of Central Command's armoured brigades to
fight the Jordanian forces; as the Jordanians held the advantage of
superior equipment and were equal in numbers to the Israelis.
Again, the air superiority of the IAF proved paramount as it
immobilized the Jordanians, leading to their defeat. One of Peled's
brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming from
Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the
Jordan river crossings
together with the Central Command's 10th. Engineering Corps sappers
blew up the Abdullah and Hussein bridges with captured Jordanian
mortar shells, while elements of the
Harel Brigade crossed the river
and occupied positions along the east bank to cover them, but quickly
pulled back due to American pressure. The Jordanians, anticipating an
Israeli offensive deep into Jordan, assembled the remnants of their
army and Iraqi units in
Jordan to protect the western approaches to
Amman and the southern slopes of the
Golan Heights .
No specific decision had been made to capture any other territories
controlled by Jordan. After the Old City was captured, Dayan told his
troops to dig in to hold it. When an armoured brigade commander
West Bank on his own initiative, and stated that he could
Jericho , Dayan ordered him back. It was only after intelligence
reports indicated that Hussein had withdrawn his forces across the
Jordan River that Dayan ordered his troops to capture the West Bank.
According to Narkis:
First, the Israeli government had no intention of capturing the West
Bank. On the contrary, it was opposed to it. Second, there was not any
provocation on the part of the IDF. Third, the rein was only loosened
when a real threat to Jerusalem's security emerged. This is truly how
things happened on June 5, although it is difficult to believe. The
end result was something that no one had planned.
The Battle of Golan Heights, June 9–10.
In May–June 1967, the Israeli government did everything in its
power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front. Eshkol and
his colleagues took into account the possibility of some fighting on
the Syrian front.
False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli army
and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon be attacking Tel Aviv
influenced Syria's decision to enter the war. Syrian artillery began
shelling northern Israel, and twelve Syrian jets attacked Israeli
settlements in the
Galilee . Israeli fighter jets intercepted the
Syrian aircraft, shooting down three and driving off the rest. In
addition, two Lebanese
Hawker Hunter jets, two of the twelve Lebanon
had, crossed into Israeli airspace and began strafing Israeli
positions in the Galilee. They were intercepted by Israeli fighter
jets, and one was shot down. People in a bomb shelter at
A minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plants at Tel Dan
(the subject of a fierce escalation two years earlier), Dan , and
She\'ar Yashuv . These attacks were repulsed with the loss of twenty
soldiers and seven tanks. An Israeli officer was also killed. But a
broader Syrian offensive quickly failed. Syrian reserve units were
broken up by Israeli air attacks, and several tanks were reported to
have sunk in the
Other problems included tanks being too wide for bridges, lack of
radio communications between tanks and infantry, and units ignoring
orders to advance. A post-war Syrian army report concluded:
Our forces did not go on the offensive either because they did not
arrive or were not wholly prepared or because they could not find
shelter from the enemy's planes. The reserves could not withstand the
air attacks; they dispersed after their morale plummeted.
The Syrians abandoned hopes of a ground attack and began a massive
bombardment of Israeli communities in the
Hula Valley instead.
Israeli Air Force Attacks The Syrian Airfields
On the evening of June 5, the
Israeli Air Force attacked Syrian
Syrian Air Force lost some 32 MiG 21s , 23
MiG-17 fighters, and two
Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, two-thirds of its
fighting strength. The Syrian aircraft that survived the attack
retreated to distant bases and played no further role in the war.
Following the attack,
Syria realised that the news it had received
Egypt of the near-total destruction of the Israeli military could
not have been true.
Israelis Debate Whether The
Golan Heights Should Be Attacked
On June 7 and 8, the Israeli leadership debated about whether to
Golan Heights as well.
Syria had supported pre-war raids
that had helped raise tensions and had routinely shelled
the Heights, so some Israeli leaders wanted to see
Military opinion was that the attack would be extremely costly, since
it would entail an uphill battle against a strongly fortified enemy.
The western side of the
Golan Heights consists of a rock escarpment
that rises 500 meters (1,700 ft) from the Sea of
Galilee and the
Jordan River , and then flattens to a gently sloping plateau. Dayan
opposed the operation bitterly at first, believing such an undertaking
would result in losses of 30,000 and might trigger Soviet
intervention. Prime Minister Eshkol , on the other hand, was more open
to the possibility, as was the head of the Northern Command, David
Elazar , whose unbridled enthusiasm for and confidence in the
operation may have eroded Dayan's reluctance.
Eventually, the situation on the Southern and Central fronts cleared
up, intelligence estimated that the likelihood of Soviet intervention
had been reduced, reconnaissance showed some Syrian defenses in the
Golan region collapsing, and an intercepted cable revealed that Nasser
was urging the President of
Syria to immediately accept a cease-fire.
At 3 am on June 9,
Syria announced its acceptance of the cease-fire.
Despite this announcement, Dayan became more enthusiastic about the
idea and four hours later at 7 am, "gave the order to go into action
against Syria" without consultation or government authorisation.
The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine
brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armour.
Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (the 8th
Brigade and the Golani
Brigade ) in the northern part of the
Givat HaEm , and another two (infantry and one of Peled's
brigades summoned from Jenin) in the center. The Golan Heights' unique
terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several
kilometers running east to west), and the general lack of roads in the
area channeled both forces along east-west axes of movement and
restricted the ability of units to support those on either flank. Thus
the Syrians could move north-south on the plateau itself, and the
Israelis could move north-south at the base of the Golan escarpment.
Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected
Eli Cohen (who was captured and executed in Syria
in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions.
Syria had built
extensive defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers,
comparable to the
Maginot Line .
As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially
effective in the Golan because the fixed fortifications were so
effective. However, the Syrian forces proved unable to put up
effective defense largely because the officers were poor leaders and
treated their soldiers badly; often officers would retreat from
danger, leaving their men confused and ineffective. The Israelis also
had the upper hand during close combat that took place in the numerous
Syrian bunkers along the Golan Heights, as they were armed with the
Uzi , a submachine gun designed for close combat, while Syrian
soldiers were armed with the heavier
AK-47 assault rifle, designed for
combat in more open areas.
Israeli Attack: First Day
Israeli tanks advancing on the Golan Heights. June 1967
On the morning of June 9, Israeli jets began carrying out dozens of
sorties against Syrian positions from Mount Hermon to Tawfiq, using
rockets salvaged from captured Egyptian stocks. The airstrikes knocked
out artillery batteries and storehouses and forced transport columns
off the roads. The Syrians suffered heavy casualties and a drop in
morale, with a number of senior officers and troops deserting. The
attacks also provided time as Israeli forces cleared paths through
Syrian minefields. However, the airstrikes did not seriously damage
the Syrians' bunkers and trench systems, and the bulk of Syrian forces
on the Golan remained in their positions.
About two hours after the airstrikes began, the 8th Armored
led by Colonel
Albert Mandler , advanced into the
Golan Heights from
Givat HaEm . Its advance was spearheaded by Engineering Corps sappers
and eight bulldozers, which cleared away barbed wire and mines. As
they advanced, the force came under fire, and five bulldozers were
immediately hit. The Israeli tanks, with their maneuverability sharply
reduced by the terrain, advanced slowly under fire toward the
fortified village of Sir al-Dib, with their ultimate objective being
the fortress at Qala. Israeli casualties steadily mounted. Part of the
attacking force lost its way and emerged opposite Za'ura, a redoubt
manned by Syrian reservists. With the situation critical, Colonel
Mandler ordered simultaneous assaults on Za'ura and Qala. Heavy and
confused fighting followed, with Israeli and Syrian tanks struggling
around obstacles and firing at extremely short ranges. Mandler
recalled that "the Syrians fought well and bloodied us. We beat them
only by crushing them under our treads and by blasting them with our
cannons at very short range, from 100 to 500 meters." The first three
Israeli tanks to enter Qala were stopped by a Syrian bazooka team, and
a relief column of seven Syrian tanks arrived to repel the attackers.
The Israelis took heavy fire from the houses, but could not turn back,
as other forces were advancing behind them, and they were on a narrow
path with mines on either side. The Israelis continued pressing
forward, and called for air support. A pair of Israeli jets destroyed
two of the Syrian tanks, and the remainder withdrew. The surviving
defenders of Qala retreated after their commander was killed.
Meanwhile, Za'ura fell in an Israeli assault, and the Israelis also
captured the 'Ein Fit fortress.
In the central sector, the Israeli 181st
Battalion captured the
strongholds of Dardara and Tel Hillal after fierce fighting. Desperate
fighting also broke out along the operation's northern axis, where
Brigade attacked thirteen Syrian positions, including the
formidable Tel Fakhr position. Navigational errors placed the Israelis
directly under the Syrians' guns. In the fighting that followed, both
sides took heavy casualties, with the Israelis losing all nineteen of
their tanks and half-tracks. The Israeli battalion commander then
ordered his twenty-five remaining men to dismount, divide into two
groups, and charge the northern and southern flanks of Tel Fakhr. The
first Israelis to reach the perimeter of the southern approach laid
bodily down on the barbed wire, allowing their comrades to vault over
them. From there, they assaulted the fortified Syrian positions. The
fighting was waged at extremely close quarters, often hand-to-hand.
On the northern flank, the Israelis broke through within minutes and
cleared out the trenches and bunkers. During the seven-hour battle,
the Israelis lost 31 dead and 82 wounded, while the Syrians lost 62
dead and 20 captured. Among the dead was the Israeli battalion
commander. The Golani Brigade's 51st
Battalion took Tel 'Azzaziat, and
Darbashiya also fell to Israeli forces. Play media Universal
Newsreel from June 9 about the war and UN reactions.
By the evening of June 9, the four Israeli brigades had all broken
through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced.
Thousands of reinforcements began reaching the front, those tanks and
half-tracks that had survived the previous day's fighting were
refueled and replenished with ammunition, and the wounded were
evacuated. By dawn, the Israelis had eight brigades in the sector.
Syria's first line of defense had been shattered, but the defenses
beyond that remained largely intact. Mount Hermon and the Banias in
the north, and the entire sector between Tawfiq and Customs House Road
in the south remained in Syrian hands. In a meeting early on the night
of June 9, Syrian leaders decided to reinforce those positions as
quickly as possible, and to maintain a steady barrage on Israeli
Israeli Attack: The Next Day
Throughout the night, the Israelis continued their advance. Though it
was slowed by fierce resistance, an anticipated Syrian counterattack
never materialized. At the fortified village of Jalabina, a garrison
of Syrian reservists, leveling their anti-aircraft guns, held off the
Israeli 65th Paratroop
Battalion for four hours before a small
detachment managed to penetrate the village and knock out the heavy
Meanwhile, the 8th Brigade's tanks moved south from Qala, advancing
six miles to Wasit under heavy artillery and tank bombardment. At the
Banias in the north, Syrian mortar batteries opened fire on advancing
Israeli forces only after Golani
Brigade sappers cleared a path
through a minefield, killing sixteen Israeli soldiers and wounding
On the next day, June 10, the central and northern groups joined in a
pincer movement on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty
territory as the Syrian forces retreated. At 8:30 am, the Syrians
began blowing up their own bunkers, burning documents and retreating.
Several units joined by Elad Peled's troops climbed to the Golan from
the south, only to find the positions mostly empty. When the 8th
Brigade reached Mansura, five miles from Wasit, the Israelis met no
opposition and found abandoned equipment, including tanks, in perfect
working condition. In the fortified Banias village, Golani Brigade
troops found only several Syrian soldiers chained to their positions.
During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre
room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west.
In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after an agreed-upon
cease-fire to occupy strategically strong positions. To the east,
the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position
later became the cease-fire line known as the "Purple Line ".
_Time _ magazine reported: "In an effort to pressure the United
Nations into enforcing a ceasefire,
Damascus Radio undercut its own
army by broadcasting the fall of the city of
Quneitra three hours
before it actually capitulated. That premature report of the surrender
of their headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left
in the Golan area."
Israeli Military Governorate Play media
Universal Newsreel from June 13 about the war
By June 10,
Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan
Heights, and a ceasefire was signed the day after.
Israel had seized
Gaza Strip , the
Sinai Peninsula , the
West Bank of the Jordan
River (including East Jerusalem), and the
Golan Heights . About one
million Arabs were placed under Israel's direct control in the newly
captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300
kilometers in the south, 60 kilometers in the east, and 20 kilometers
of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security asset that would
prove useful in the
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War six years later.
Speaking three weeks after the war ended, as he accepted an honorary
degree from Hebrew University,
Yitzhak Rabin gave his reasoning behind
the success of Israel: Our airmen, who struck the enemies' planes so
accurately that no one in the world understands how it was done and
people seek technological explanations or secret weapons; our armoured
troops who beat the enemy even when their equipment was inferior to
his; our soldiers in all other branches … who overcame our enemies
everywhere, despite the latter's superior numbers and
fortifications—all these revealed not only coolness and courage in
the battle but … an understanding that only their personal stand
against the greatest dangers would achieve victory for their country
and for their families, and that if victory was not theirs the
alternative was annihilation.
In recognition of contributions, Rabin was given the honour of naming
the war for the Israelis. From the suggestions proposed, including the
"War of Daring", "War of Salvation", and "War of the Sons of Light",
he "chose the least ostentatious, the Six-Day War, evoking the days of
Dayan's final report on the war to the Israeli general staff listed
several shortcomings in Israel's actions, including misinterpretation
of Nasser's intentions, overdependence on the United States, and
reluctance to act when
Egypt closed the Straits. He also credited
several factors for Israel's success:
Egypt did not appreciate the
advantage of striking first and their adversaries did not accurately
gauge Israel's strength and its willingness to use it.
In Egypt, according to Heikal , Nasser had admitted his
responsibility for the military defeat in June 1967. According to
historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan, Nasser's mistaken decisions to expel
the international peacekeeping force from the
Sinai Peninsula and
Straits of Tiran in 1967 led to a state of war with Israel,
despite Egypt's lack of military preparedness.
After the 1973
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War ,
Egypt reviewed the causes of its loss
of the 1967 war. Issues that were identified included "the
individualistic bureaucratic leadership"; "promotions on the basis of
loyalty, not expertise, and the army's fear of telling Nasser the
truth"; lack of intelligence; and better Israeli weapons, command,
organization, and will to fight.
Israeli casualties of war
Between 776 and 983 Israelis were killed and 4,517 were wounded. 15
Israeli soldiers were captured. Arab casualties were far greater.
Between 9,800 and 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were listed as killed or
missing in action. An additional 4,338 Egyptian soldiers were
captured. Jordanian losses are estimated to be 6,000 killed or
missing and 533 captured, though Gawrych cites a number of some 700
killed in action with another 2,500 wounded. The Syrians were
estimated to have sustained between 1,000 and 2,500 killed in
action. Between 367 and 591 Syrians were captured.
Controversies relating to the Six-Day War
PREEMPTIVE STRIKE V. UNJUSTIFIED ATTACK
At the commencement of hostilities, both
that they had been attacked by the other country. The Israeli
government later abandoned its initial position, acknowledging Israel
had struck first, claiming that it was a preemptive strike in the face
of a planned invasion by Egypt. On the other hand, the Arab view was
that it was unjustified to attack Egypt. Many commentators consider
the war as the classic case of anticipatory attack in self-defense.
ALLEGATIONS OF ATROCITIES AGAINST EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS
It has been alleged that Nasser did not want
Egypt to learn of the
true extent of his defeat and so ordered the killing of Egyptian army
stragglers making their way back to the Suez canal zone. There have
also been allegations from both Israeli and Egyptian sources that
Israeli troops killed unarmed Egyptian prisoners.
ALLEGATIONS OF MILITARY SUPPORT FROM THE US, UK AND SOVIET UNION
There have been a number of allegations of direct military support of
Israel during the war by the US and the UK, including the supply of
equipment (despite an embargo) and the participation of US forces in
the conflict. Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories
have been disputed and it has been claimed that some were given
currency in the Arab world to explain the Arab defeat. It has also
been claimed that the Soviet Union, in support of its Arab allies,
used its naval strength in the Mediterranean to act as a major
restraint on the US Navy.
America features prominently in
Arab conspiracy theories purporting
to explain the June 1967 defeat.
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal , a
confidant of Nasser, claims that President
Lyndon B. Johnson was
obsessed with Nasser and that Johnson conspired with
Israel to bring
him down. The reported Israeli troop movements seemed all the more
threatening because they were perceived in the context of a US
conspiracy against Egypt. Salah Bassiouny of the Foreign ministry,
claims that Foreign Ministry saw the reported Israeli troop movements
as credible because
Israel had reached the level at which it could
find strategic alliance with the United States. During the war, Cairo
announced that American and British planes were participating in the
Israeli attack. Nasser broke off diplomatic relations following this
allegation. Nasser's image of the
United States was such that he might
well have believed the worst. However
Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser
used this deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the United States
as a political cover-up for domestic consumption. Lutfi Abd al-Qadir,
the director of Radio
Cairo during the late 1960s, who accompanied
Nasser to his visits in Moscow, had his conspiracy theory that both
the Soviets and the Western powers wanted to topple Nasser or to
reduce his influence.
USS _LIBERTY_ INCIDENT
USS Liberty incident
On June 8, 1967, USS _Liberty_ , a
United States Navy electronic
intelligence vessel sailing 13 nautical miles (24 km) off
outside Egypt's territorial waters ), was attacked by Israeli jets and
torpedo boats, nearly sinking the ship, killing 34 sailors and
Israel said the attack was a case of mistaken identity,
and that the ship had been misidentified as the Egyptian vessel _El
Israel apologized for the mistake, and paid compensation to
the victims or their families, and to the
United States for damage to
the ship. After an investigation, the U.S. accepted the explanation
that the incident was friendly fire and the issue was closed by the
exchange of diplomatic notes in 1987. Others however, including the
United States Secretary of State
Dean Rusk , Chief of Naval
Operations at the time, Admiral Thomas Moorer , some survivors of the
attack and intelligence officials familiar with transcripts of
intercepted signals on the day, have rejected these conclusions as
unsatisfactory and maintain that the attack was made in the knowledge
that the ship was American.
The political importance of the 1967 War was immense; Israel
demonstrated that it was able and willing to initiate strategic
strikes that could change the regional balance.
Egypt and Syria
learned tactical lessons and would launch an attack in 1973 in an
attempt to reclaim their lost territory.
After following other Arab nations in declaring war, Mauritania
remained in a declared state of war with
Israel until about 1999.
United States imposed an embargo on new arms agreements to all
Middle East countries, including Israel. The embargo remained in force
until the end of the year, despite urgent Israeli requests to lift it.
ISRAEL AND ZIONISM
Following the war,
Israel experienced a wave of national euphoria,
and the press praised the military's performance for weeks afterward.
New "victory coins" were minted to celebrate. In addition, the world's
Israel grew, and the country's economy, which had been in
crisis before the war, flourished due to an influx of tourists and
donations, as well as the extraction of oil from the Sinai's wells.
The aftermath of the war is also of religious significance. Under
Jordanian rule , Jews were expelled from
Jerusalem and were
effectively barred from visiting the
Western Wall (even though Article
VIII of the 1949 Armistice Agreement demanded Israeli Jewish access to
the Western Wall). Jewish holy sites were not maintained, and Jewish
cemeteries had been desecrated. After the annexation to Israel, each
religious group was granted administration over its holy sites. For
the first time since 1948, Jews could visit the Old City of Jerusalem
and pray at the Western Wall, the holiest site where Jews are
permitted to pray. Despite the
Temple Mount being the most important
holy site in Jewish tradition, the al-Aqsa Mosque has been under sole
administration of the Jordanian Muslim
Waqf , and Jews are barred from
praying on the Temple Mount, although they are allowed to visit it.
In Hebron, Jews gained access to the
Cave of the Patriarchs (the
second most holy site in Judaism, after the Temple Mount) for the
first time since the 14th century (previously Jews were allowed to
pray only at the entrance). Other Jewish holy sites, such as
Rachel\'s Tomb in
Bethlehem and Joseph\'s Tomb in Nablus, also became
The war inspired the
Jewish diaspora , which was swept up in
overwhelming support for Israel. According to Michael Oren, the war
enabled American Jews to "walk with their backs straight and flex
their political muscle as never before. American Jewish organizations
which had previously kept
Israel at arms length suddenly proclaimed
their Zionism." Record numbers of Jewish immigrants arrived from
Western countries after the war, although many of them would later
return to their countries of origin. Most notably, the war stirred
Zionist passions among Jews in the
Soviet Union , who had by that time
been forcibly assimilated. Many Soviet Jews subsequently applied for
exit visas and began protesting for their right to immigrate to
Israel. Following diplomatic pressure from the West, the Soviet
government began granting exit visas to Jews in growing numbers. From
1970 to 1988, some 291,000 Soviet Jews were granted exit visas, of
whom 165,000 immigrated to
Israel and 126,000 immigrated to the United
JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES-POGROMS AND EXPULSION
Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries
Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries
In the Arab nations, populations of minority Jews faced persecution
and expulsion following the Israeli victory. According to historian
Michael B. Oren :
Mobs attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia,
and Morocco, burning synagogues and assaulting residents. A pogrom in
Tripoli, Libya , left 18 Jews dead and 25 injured; the survivors were
herded into detention centers. Of Egypt's 4,000 Jews, 800 were
arrested, including the chief rabbis of both
and their property sequestered by the government. The ancient
Baghdad were placed under house arrest,
their leaders imprisoned and fined. A total of 7,000 Jews were
expelled, many with merely a satchel .
ANTISEMITISM AGAINST JEWS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Following the war, a series of antisemitic purges began in Communist
countries. Some 11,200 Jews from Poland immigrated to
1968 Polish political crisis
1968 Polish political crisis and the following year.
PEACE AND DIPLOMACY
Following the war,
Israel made an offer for peace that included the
return of most of the recently captured territories. According to
Chaim Herzog :
On June 19, 1967, the
National Unity Government voted unanimously to
Egypt and the
Golan Heights to
Syria in return for
peace agreements. The Golans would have to be demilitarized and
special arrangement would be negotiated for the Straits of Tiran. The
government also resolved to open negotiations with King Hussein of
Jordan regarding the Eastern border.
The June 19 Israeli cabinet decision did not include the
Gaza Strip ,
and left open the possibility of
Israel permanently acquiring parts of
West Bank . On June 25–27,
Israel incorporated East Jerusalem
together with areas of the
West Bank to the north and south into
Jerusalem's new municipal boundaries.
The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the
United States. The U.S. was informed of the decision, but not that it
was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from
Syria, and some historians claim that they may never have received the
In September, the Khartoum Arab Summit resolved that there would be
"no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel". However, as
Avraham Sela notes, the Khartoum conference effectively marked a shift
in the perception of the conflict by the Arab states away from one
centered on the question of Israel's legitimacy, toward one focusing
on territories and boundaries. This was shown on November 22 when
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council Resolution
242 . Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations with
Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the
equation that any direct peace talks with
Israel were tantamount to
After the war, the entire Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe (with the
exception of Romania) broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.
The 1967 War laid the foundation for future discord in the region, as
the Arab states resented Israel's victory and did not want to give up
On November 22, 1967, the
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 242 , the "land for peace " formula, which called for
Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied" in 1967 and "the
termination of all claims or states of belligerency". Resolution 242
recognized the right of "every state in the area to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
Israel returned the
Egypt in 1978, after the Camp
David Accords , and disengaged from the
Gaza Strip in the summer of
2005. Its army frequently re-enters Gaza for military operations and
still retains control of the seaports, airports and most of the border
CAPTURED TERRITORIES AND ARAB DISPLACED POPULATIONS
1967 Palestinian exodus
There was extensive displacement of populations in the captured
territories: of about one million
Palestinians in the
West Bank and
Gaza, 300,000 (according to the
United States Department of State )
either fled, or were displaced from their homes, to Jordan, where they
contributed to the growing unrest. The other 700,000 remained. In
the Golan Heights, an estimated 80,000 Syrians fled.
only the inhabitants of
East Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights to
receive full Israeli citizenship, applying its law, administration and
jurisdiction to these territories in 1967 and 1981, respectively. The
vast majority of the populations in both territories declined to take
citizenship. See also
Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Golan Heights
In his book _Righteous Victims_ (1999), Israeli "
New Historian "
Benny Morris writes:
In three villages southwest of
Jerusalem and at Qalqilya, houses were
destroyed "not in battle, but as punishment ... and in order to chase
away the inhabitants ... contrary to government ... policy," Dayan
wrote in his memoirs. In Qalqilya, about a third of the homes were
razed and about 12,000 inhabitants were evicted, though many then
camped out in the environs. The evictees in both areas were allowed to
stay and later were given cement and tools by the Israeli authorities
to rebuild at least some of their dwellings.
But many thousands of other
Palestinians now took to the roads.
Perhaps as many as seventy thousand, mostly from the
fled during the fighting; tens of thousands more left over the
following months. Altogether, about one-quarter of the population of
the West Bank, about 200–250,000 people, went into exile. ... They
simply walked to the
Jordan River crossings and made their way on foot
to the East Bank. It is unclear how many were intimidated or forced
out by the Israeli troops and how many left voluntarily, in panic and
fear. There is some evidence of IDF soldiers going around with
loudspeakers ordering West Bankers to leave their homes and cross the
Jordan. Some left because they had relatives or sources of livelihood
on the East Bank and feared being permanently cut off.
Thousands of Arabs were taken by bus from
East Jerusalem to the
Allenby Bridge , though there is no evidence of coercion. The free
Israeli-organized transportation, which began on June 11, 1967, went
on for about a month. At the bridge they had to sign a document
stating that they were leaving of their own free will. Perhaps as many
as 70,000 people emigrated from the
Gaza Strip to
Egypt and elsewhere
in the Arab world.
On July 2, the Israeli government announced that it would allow the
return of those 1967 refugees who desired to do so, but no later than
August 10, later extended to September 13. The Jordanian authorities
probably pressured many of the refugees, who constituted an enormous
burden, to sign up to return. In practice only 14,000 of the 120,000
who applied were allowed by
Israel back into the
West Bank by the
beginning of September. After that, only a trickle of "special cases"
were allowed back, perhaps 3,000 in all. (328–29)
In addition, between 80,000 and 110,000 Syrians fled the Golan
Heights, of which about 20,000 were from the city of Quneitra.
According to more recent research by the Israeli daily _
Haaretz _, a
total of 130,000 Syrian inhabitants fled or were expelled from the
territory, most of them pushed out by the Israeli army.
Israel made peace with
Egypt following the
Camp David Accords
Camp David Accords of 1978
and completed a staged withdrawal from the
Sinai in 1982. However, the
position of the other occupied territories has been a long-standing
and bitter cause of conflict for decades between
Israel and the
Palestinians, and the Arab world in general.
Egypt eventually withdrew their claims to sovereignty over
West Bank and Gaza, respectively. (The
Sinai was returned to Egypt
on the basis of the
Camp David Accords
Camp David Accords of 1978.)
Israel and Jordan
signed a peace treaty in 1994 .
After the Israeli conquest of these newly acquired 'territories', it
launched a large settlement effort in these areas to secure a
permanent foothold. There are now hundreds of thousands of Israeli
settlers in the West Bank. They are a matter of controversy within
Israel, both among the general population and within different
political administrations, supporting them to varying degrees.
Palestinians consider them a provocation. The Israeli settlements in
Gaza were evacuated and destroyed in August 2005 as a part of Israeli
disengagement from Gaza .
Abba Eban , Israeli Foreign Minister
Hafez al-Assad , Syrian Defense Minister
Leonid Brezhnev , Soviet leader
* List of modern conflicts in the
Robert McNamara , U.S. Defense Secretary
* Syrian towns and villages depopulated in the Arab–Israeli
U Thant , Secretary General of the United Nations
1. ^ Photograph: It was twenty minutes after the capture of the
Western Wall that
David Rubinger shot his "signature" photograph of
three Israeli paratroopers gazing in wonder up at the wall . As part
of the terms for his access to the front lines, Rubinger handed the
negatives to the Israeli government, who then distributed this image
widely. Although he was displeased with the violation of his
copyright, the widespread use of his photo made it famous , and it is
now considered a defining image of the conflict and one of the
best-known in the history of
Israel announced that they had been attacked by
the other country.
* Gideon Rafael received a message from the Israeli foreign office:
"Inform immediately the President of the Sec. Co. that
Israel is now
engaged in repelling Egyptian land and air forces." At 3:10 am, Rafael
Hans Tabor , the Danish President of the Security
Council for June, with the news that Egyptian forces had "moved
against Israel". Bailey 1990, p. 225.
* , both
Egypt claimed to be repelling an invasion by the
other. Bailey 1990, p. 225.
* "Egyptian sources claimed that
Israel had initiated hostilities
but Israeli officials – Eban and Evron – swore that
fired first" Oren 2002, p. 196.
* "Gideon Rafael phoned Danish ambassador Hans Tabor, Security
Council president for the month of June, and informed him that Israel
was responding to a 'cowardly and treacherous' attack from Egypt..."
Oren, p. 198.
4. ^ Lenczowski 1990, pp. 105–15, Citing Moshe Dayan, _Story of My
Nadav Safran , _From War to War: The Arab–Israeli
Confrontation, 1948–1967_, p. 375
Israel clearly did not want the US government to know too much about
its dispositions for attacking Syria, initially planned for June 8,
but postponed for 24 hours. It should be pointed out that the attack
on the Liberty occurred on June 8, whereas on June 9 at 3 am, Syria
announced its acceptance of the cease-fire. Despite this, at 7 am,
that is, four hours later, Israel's minister of defense,
Moshe Dayan ,
"gave the order to go into action against Syria."
* ^ Krauthammer 2007.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, p. 237
* ^ "Pakistani Pilots in Arab
Israel War". Opinion Maker. 10 August
2012. Archived from the original on 2013-05-12. Retrieved 2013-05-13.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Tucker 2004, p. 176.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Griffin 2006, p. 336.
* ^ _A_ _B_
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Gawrych 2000, p. 3
* ^ Zaloga, Steven (1981). _Armour of the
Middle East Wars
1948–78 (Vanguard)_. Osprey Publishing.
* ^ _A_ _B_ El Gamasy 1993 p. 79.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Herzog 1982, p. 165.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_ _E_
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004
* ^ _A_ _B_ Herzog 1982, p. 183.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _Warfare since the Second World War_, By Klaus Jürgen
Gantzel, Torsten Schwinghammer, p. 253
* ^ _A_ _B_ _Wars in the Third World since 1945_, (NY 1991) Guy
* ^ _A_ _B_ Tucker, Spencer C. (2010). _The Encyclopedia of Middle
East Wars. The
United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and
Iraq Conflicts_. ABC-CLIO. p. 1198. ISBN 978-1-85109-947-4 .
* ^ _A_ _B_ Woolf, Alex (2012). _Arab–Israeli War Since 1948_.
Heinemann-Raintree. p. 27. ISBN 978-1-4329-6004-9 .
* ^ _A_ _B_ Sachar, Howard M. (2013). _A History of Israel: From
the Rise of Zionism to Our Time_. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8041-5049-1
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Oren, pp. 185–87
* ^ Gerhard, William D.; Millington, Henry W. (1981). "Attack on a
SIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty" (PDF). NSA History Report, U.S.
Cryptologic History series. National Security Agency. partially
declassified 1999, 2003.
* ^ Both USA and
Israel officially attributed the USS _Liberty_
incident as being due to mistaken identification.
* ^ Major General Indar Jit Rikhye (28 October 2013). _The Sinai
Blunder: Withdrawal of the
United Nations Emergency Force Leading...._
Taylor & Francis. pp. 8–. ISBN 978-1-136-27985-0 .
* ^ Ami Gluska (12 February 2007). _The Israeli Military and the
Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy
1963–67_. Routledge. p. 152. ISBN 978-1-134-16377-9 . On the evening
of 22 May, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, accompanied by ... Egyptian
air force base at Bir Gafgafa in
Sinai and addressed the pilots and
officers. ... 'The Jews are threatening war – we say to them ahlan
* ^ "First
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) – Background
(Full text)". Rauschning, Wiesbrock Sachar 2007, pp. 504, 507–08.
* ^ Some sources date the agreement to November 4, others to
November 7. Most sources simply say "November". Gawrych (2000) p. 5
* ^ Schiff, Zeev, _History of the Israeli Army_, Straight Arrow
Books (1974) p. 145
* ^ Churchill Burrowes & Douglas 1972, pp. 224–25
* ^ Shemesh, Moshe (2007). _Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism
and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir\'s
Descent to War, 1957–1967_. Sussex Academic Press. p. 118. ISBN
1-84519-188-9 . The Jordanian leadership's appraisal of the
repercussions of the Samu' raid was a major factor in King Husayn's
decision to join Nasir's war chariot by signing a joint defense pact
Egypt on May 30, 1967. This was the determining factor for
Jordan's participation in the war that would soon break out....
Convinced after the Samu' raid that Israel's strategic goal was the
West Bank, Husayn allied himself to Nasir out of a genuine fear that,
in a comprehensive war,
Israel would invade the
West Bank whether or
Jordan was an active participant.
* ^ Tessler, Mark (1994). _A History of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict_. John Wiley & Sons. p. 378. ISBN 0-253-20873-4 . Towards the
War of June 1967: Growing tensions in the region were clearly visible
long before Israel's November attack on Samu and two other West Bank
towns. An escalating spiral of raid and retaliation had already been
set in motion...
* ^ Herzog 1982, p. 148
* ^ John Quigley , _The
Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense:
Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War_, Cambridge University
Press, 2013, p. 32.
* ^ Shlaim (2007) p. 238
* ^ Samir A. Mutawi (18 July 2002). _
Jordan in the 1967 War_.
Cambridge University Press. p. 93. ISBN 978-0-521-52858-0 . Although
Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a
model of moderation. His speech on 21 May demanded that Nasser
withdraw his forces from
Sinai but made no mention of the removal of
UNEF from the Straits nor of what
Israel would do if they were closed
to Israeli shipping. The next day Nasser announced to an astonished
world that henceforth the Straits were, indeed, closed to all Israeli
* ^ Cohen, Raymond. (1988), p. 12
* ^ "Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag
exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through
Straits of Tiran will be regarded by
Israel as an attack entitling
it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of
the Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure
the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the
Straits." "Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir,
1 March 1957".
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – The State of
* ^ Morris, Benny (1999). _Righteous Victims: A History of the
Zionist–Arab Conflict, 1881–1998_. Random House. p. 306. ISBN
* ^ Gat, Moshe (2003). _Britain and the Conflict in the Middle
East, 1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War_. Greenwood
Publishing Group. p. 202. ISBN 0-275-97514-2 .
* ^ Colonomos, Ariel (2013). _The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to
Justify Preventive War?_. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 25. ISBN
* ^ "LBJ Pledges U.S. to Peace Effort", _Eugene Register-Guard_
(June 19, 1967). See also Johnson, Lyndon. "Address at the State
Department\'s Foreign Policy Conference for Educators" (June 19,
* ^ Churchill po. 52 and 77
* ^ Reston, James (May 24, 1967). "Washington: Nasser\'s Reckless
Cairo and Moscow The U.S. Commitment The Staggering Economy
Moscow\'s Role". _The New York Times_. p. 46.
* ^ Sherman Kent for the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of
National Estimates (May 26, 1967). "Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967,
Document 79 79. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency\'s
Board of National Estimates to Director of Central Intelligence
Helms". Washington. The most likely course seems to be for Nasser to
hold to his present winnings as long as he can, and in as full measure
as he can. As of the moment he has vastly enhanced his own prestige in
Egypt and throughout the Arab world, diminished the standing of Israel
and, at least for the moment, administered a serious setback to the
US. Moreover, by simply standing where he is he places the Israelis in
an extremely difficult position. He keeps the crisis at high pitch,
and as long as this continues the Israelis must remain mobilized. This
they cannot do for long without adverse effects upon their economy. 5.
The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's
action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which
might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far
more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We
believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from
the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them
heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have
sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting
more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not
embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of
* ^ Quigley, _The
Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defence_, p. 60.
(Cambridge University Press)
* ^ Stone 2004, p. 217.
* ^ Pollack 2004, p. 294
* ^ Pollack 2004, p. 59
* ^ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997, p. 76.
* ^ Mutawi 2002, p. 42.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Segev 1967, pp. 82, 175–91.
* ^ Pollack 2004, pp. 293–94
* ^ "Air Warriors". _
Pakistan Air Force_. Retrieved 15 July 2017.
* ^ "Eagle Biography - Saiful Azam". _Air University_. Retrieved 15
* ^ Oren, 176; Benny Morris, _Righteous Victims_, 318.
* ^ Pollack 2004, p. 58.
* ^ de Mazarrasa, Javier (1994) (in Spanish). Blindados en España
2ª Parte: La Dificil Postguerra 1939–1960. Valladolid, Spain:
Quiron Ediciones. p. 50. ISBN 84-87314-10-4
* ^ Perrett, Bryan (1999). _Panzerkampfwagen IV medium tank:
1936–1945_. Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey. p. 44. ISBN
* ^ Oren 2002, p. 172
* ^ Bowen 2003, p. 99 (author interview with Moredechai Hod, May 7,
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "The War: Day
One, June 5".
* ^ Bowen 2003, pp. 114–15 (author interview with General
Salahadeen Hadidi who presided over the first court martial of the
heads of the air force and the air defense system after the war).
* ^ Oren 2002 p. 171
* ^ Pollack 2005, p. 474.
* ^ Oren, 176, says 282 out of 420. Morris, 318, says 304 out of
419. Mark Tessler, _A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict_
(Indiana, 1994), p. 396, says over 350 planes were destroyed.
* ^ Long 1984, p. 19, Table 1.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, p. 178
* ^ Oren, p. 175
* ^ _A_ _B_ "Part 4: The 1967 Six Day War". Retrieved April 20,
* ^ Pollack 2004, p. 59.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_ Oren, p. 180
* ^ Oren, p. 181
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, p. 202
* ^ "Six Day War". Israeli-weapons. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
* ^ Oren, p. 182
* ^ Simon Dunstan,_The Six Day War 1967: Sinai_, Osprey Publishing,
2012, p. 125
* ^ Leslie Stein,_The Making of Modern Israel: 1948–1967_, Polity
Press, 2013 p. 181.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, p. 201
* ^ _A_ _B_ Hammel 1992, p. 239
* ^ Oren, p. 212
* ^ Oren, p. 211
* ^ Mubasher, Abdou (7–13 June 2007). "The road to Naksa".
_Al-Ahram_. Retrieved 24 May 2017.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, p. 248
* ^ Oren 2002, pp. 184–185.
* ^ "On June 5,
Israel sent a message to Hussein urging him not to
open fire. Despite shelling into West Jerusalem, Netanya, and the
outskirts of Tel Aviv,
Israel did nothing." The Six Day War and Its
Enduring Legacy. Summary of remarks by
Michael Oren at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy , May 29, 2002.
* ^ Donald Neff (1984). _Warriors for Jerusalem: the six days that
changed the Middle East_. Linden Press/Simon & Schuster. p. 205. ISBN
978-0-671-45485-2 . Odd Bull: " was a threat, pure and simple and it
is not the normal practice of the U.N. to pass on threats from one
government to another." However, as "…this message seemed so
important… we quickly sent it…and King Hussein received the
message before 10:30 the same morning."
* ^ _A_ _B_ Shlaim (2000). _The Iron Wall:
Israel and the Arab
World_. pp. 243–244. In May–June 1967 Eshkol 's government did
everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian
front. Eshkol and his colleagues took into account the possibility of
some fighting on the Syrian front. But they wanted to avoid having a
Jordan and the inevitable complications of having to deal
with the predominantly Palestinian population of the West Bank. The
fighting on the eastern front was initiated by Jordan, not by Israel.
King Hussein got carried along by a powerful current of Arab
nationalism. On May 30 he flew to
Cairo and signed a defense pact with
Nasser. On June 5,
Jordan started shelling the Israeli side in
Jerusalem. This could have been interpreted either as a salvo to
uphold Jordanian honour or as a declaration of war. Eshkol decided to
give King Hussein the benefit of the doubt. Through General
Odd Bull ,
the Norwegian commander of UNTSO, he sent the following message the
morning of June 5: "We shall not initiate any action whatsoever
against Jordan. However, should
Jordan open hostilities, we shall
react with all our might, and the king will have to bear the full
responsibility of the consequences." King Hussein told General Bull
that it was too late; the die was cast.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Shlaim, 2001, p. 244.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Oren, pp. 187–88
* ^ "
United Nations June 5, 1967". United Nations. Archived from
the original on December 26, 2011. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
* ^ Oren, p. 187
* ^ _A_ _B_ Shlaim 2001, p. 245.
* ^ Oren, p. 188–89
* ^ "Pacifica Military History – Free Samples".
Pacificamilitary.com. June 5, 1967. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, pp. 191–92
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_ Oren, p. 222
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Oren, p. 203
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren, pp. 222–23
* ^ Oren, p. 224
* ^ Oren, p. 219
* ^ Shlaim 2001, p. 246.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Sachar 1976. p. 642.
* ^ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "
* ^ _A_ _B_ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "The War: Day
Five, June 9".
* ^ Morris, 2001, p. 325
* ^ Hammel 1992, p. 387
* ^ Oren, p.280
* ^ Oren, pp. 281–82
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Oren, p. 283
* ^ Oren, p. 295
* ^ _Video: Cease-Fire. Uneasy Truce In Mid-East, 1967/06/13
Universal Newsreel . 1960. Retrieved February 22, 2012.
* ^ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "Playing for the Brink".
* ^ "A Campaign for the Books". _Time _. September 1, 1967.
* ^ "
Six-Day War –
Middle East ".
* ^ Sachar 1976. p. 660.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section
* ^ Elie Podeh; Onn Winckler (1 December 2004). _Rethinking
Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt_.
University Press of Florida. pp. 110, 111. ISBN 978-0-8130-3137-8 .
The most outstanding exponent of the Nasserist narrative was Muhammad
Hasanayn Haykal, who also embodied the revolutionary heritage
personally as Nasser's closest aid and the editor in chief of the
state-sponsored dailies Al-Akhbar and Al-Ahram.... Haykal acknowledged
that Nasser had erred in various fields, noting that he had admitted,
for example, his responsibility for the military defeat in the June
* ^ Elie Podeh; Onn Winckler (1 December 2004). _Rethinking
Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt_.
University Press of Florida. pp. 105, 106. ISBN 978-0-8130-3137-8 .
the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a
series of articles published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a
hook published in 2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult, .... The
events leading up to the nationalization of the
Suez Canal Company, as
other events during Nasser's rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be
far from a rational, responsible leader. ... His decision to
Suez Canal was his alone, made without political or
military consultation. ... The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted,
was Nasser's inclination to solitary decision making... the
revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser—repeated
its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping
force from the
Sinai Peninsula and close the
Straits of Tiran in 1967.
Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of
* ^ Churchill & Churchill 1967, p. 189
* ^ _A_ _B_ Quigley, John (2005). _The Case for Palestine: An
International Law Perspective_. London: Duke University Press. p. 163.
ISBN 0-8223-3539-5 .
* ^ "BBC Panorama". BBC News. February 6, 2009. Retrieved February
* ^ "
Egypt State Information Service". Sis.gov.eg. Retrieved
February 1, 2012.
* ^ UN Security Council meeting 1347 Archived March 19, 2011, at
Wayback Machine . (June 5, 1967)
* ^ Kinga Tibori Szabó (22 August 2011). _Anticipatory Action in
Self-Defence: Essence and Limits under International Law_. Springer
Science & Business Media. pp. 147, 148. ISBN 978-90-6704-796-8 . (p.
147) The sequence of events that led to the Israeli pre-emptive strike
did indeed create a situation where an armed attack seemed
unavoidable. (p. 148 ) Many commentators treat it (the six day war) as
the locus classicus of anticipatory action in self defence
* ^ John Quigley (17 December 2012). _The
Six-Day War and Israeli
Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War_.
Cambridge University Press. pp. 135–. ISBN 978-1-139-62049-9 .
Terence Taylor…wrote in 2004…that "many scholars" considered
Israel to have "conducted the (1967) action in anticipatory of
* ^ Churchill Bar-On, Morris and Golani 2002; Fisher, Ronal 'Mass
Murder in the 1956 War', _Ma'ariv_, August 8, 1995.
* ^ Laub, Karin"Archived copy". Archived from the original on
December 11, 2003. Retrieved December 11, 2003. CS1 maint: Unfit url
(link ), _Associated Press_, August 16, 1995. Retrieved from the
Wayback Machine. October 14, 2005.
* ^ "
Israel Reportedly Killed POWs", August 17, 1995
* ^ Segev, T., 2007, p. 374
* ^ Ibrahim, Youssef (September 21, 1995). "
Egypt Says Israelis
Killed P.O.W.\'s in \'67 War". _The New York Times_.
* ^ Mansour 1994, p. 89
* ^ Green 1984
* ^ Smith, September 15, 1967
* ^ Bowen 2003, p. 89.
* ^ Phythian 2001, pp. 193–94.
* ^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) pp. 8, 53, 60, 75, 193, 199, 297
* ^ Podeh, _
Middle East Quarterly_, Winter 2004, pp. 51-62
* ^ Hattendorf 2000
* ^ "McNamara: US Near War in \'67". _The Boston Globe_. September
16, 1983. p. 1.
* ^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 8
* ^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 60
* ^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 75
* ^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 199
* ^ John Crewdson (2 October 2007). "New revelations in attack on
American spy ship". _Chicago Tribune_.
* ^ Tim Fischer, \'Six days of war, 40 years of secrecy,\' _The Age
_ May 27, 2007.
* ^ John Quigley , _The
Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense:
Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War_, Cambridge University
Press 2013 p. 93. Cf
Dean Rusk , _As I Saw it: A Secretary of State's
Memoirs_, W.W. Norton, 1990 pp. 386–88.
* ^ Brams Youngs 2001, p. 12
Amos Oz interview with
Phillip Adams , 10 September 1991,
ABC Radio National 23 December 2011
* ^ William B. Quandt (2001). _Peace Process: American Diplomacy
and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967_. University of California
Press. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-520-22374-5 . once hostilities were under
way, the United states imposed an embargo on new arms agreements to
all countries of the Middle East, including Israel. The embargo
remained in force through the end of the year, despite urgent Israeli
requests to lift it.
* ^ Oren, p. 309
* ^ "Fact Sheet No. 52, Remembering the Six Day War". May 7, 2007.
Archived from the original on May 14, 2008. Retrieved March 28, 2008.
* ^ Tessler, Mark A. (1994). _A History of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict_. Indiana University Press. p. 326. ISBN 0-253-35848-5 .
* ^ Aikman, David (1998). _Great Souls: Six Who Changed a Century_.
Lexington Books. p. 349. ISBN 0-7391-0438-1 .
* ^ The "Status Quo" on the
Temple Mount November–December 2014
Jerusalem in the unholy grip of religious fervor, Times of
Israel. November 6, 2014
Cave of the Patriarchs Archived March 18, 2015, at the Wayback
Machine . Chabad.org
* ^ Tom Selwyn. _Contested Mediterranean Spaces: The Case of
Rachel's Tomb, Bethlehem, Palestine_.
Berghahn Books . pp. 276–278.
* ^ "Archaeology in Israel: Joseph\'s Tomb".
* ^ Oren, p. 332
* ^ "The 40th anniversary of the
Six-Day War / Rate of return".
_Haaretz_. June 1, 2007. Retrieved October 10, 2014.
* ^ Tolts, Mark. Post-Soviet Aliyah and Jewish Demographic
* ^ Oren 2002, pp. 306–07
* ^ Ringer, Ronald (2006). _Excel HSC Modern History_. Pascal
Press. p. 390. Retrieved 2013-09-10.
* ^ Włodzimierz Rozenbaum, CIAO: Intermarium, _National Convention
of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies_,
Atlanta, Ga., 8–11 October 1975.
* ^ Communiqué: Investigation regarding communist state officers
who publicly incited hatred towards people of different nationality.
Institute of National Remembrance _,
Warsaw . Publication on Polish
site of IPN: July 25, 2007.
* ^ Herzog 1989, p. 253.
* ^ Shlaim 2001, p. 254.
* ^ Sela 1997, p. 108.
* ^ Itamar Rabinovich; Haim Shaked. _From June to October: The
Middle East Between 1967 And 1973_. Transaction Publishers. p. 192.
ISBN 978-1-4128-2418-7 . In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser
posited the equation that any direct peace talks with
tantamount to surrender. His efforts to forestall any movement toward
direct negotiations ...
* ^ Webman, Esther (2011). _The Global Impact of the Protocols of
the Elders of Zion: A Century-Old Myth_. Routledge. p. 133. ISBN
* ^ "US State Department".
* ^ "Right of return: Palestinian dream". UK: BBC News. April 15,
* ^ "Distribution of the Palestinian Population And Jewish Settlers
West Bank and Gaza Since 1967". Archived from the original on
May 14, 2010. Retrieved July 17, 2010.
* ^ "Golan Heights". Retrieved October 8, 2005.
* ^ Morris (2001) p. 327
* ^ "Al-Qunayṭirah". _
Encyclopædia Britannica Online_. 2010.
Retrieved July 18, 2010.
* ^ Shay Fogelman, "The disinherited", _Haaretz_, July 30, 2010
* al-Qusi, Abdallah Ahmad Hamid. (1999). _Al-Wisam fi at-Ta'rikh_.
Cairo: Al-Mu'asasa al-'Arabiya al-Haditha. No ISBN available.
* Aloni, Shlomo (2001). _Arab–Israeli Air Wars 1947–1982_.
Osprey Aviation. ISBN 1-84176-294-6
* Alteras, Isaac. (1993). _Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.–Israeli
Relations, 1953–1960_, University Press of Florida. ISBN
* Bailey, Sydney (1990). _Four Arab–Israeli Wars and the Peace
Process_. London: The MacMillan Press. ISBN 0-312-04649-9 .
* Bar-On, Mordechai; Morris, Benny & Golani, Motti (2002).
Reassessing Israel's Road to Sinai/Suez, 1956: A "Trialogue". In Gary
A. Olson (Ed.). _Traditions and Transitions in
Israel Studies: Books
on Israel, Volume VI_ (pp. 3–42). SUNY Press. ISBN 0-7914-5585-8
* Bar-On, Mordechai (2006). _Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military
History_, ISBN 0-275-98158-4
* Bard, Mitchell G. (2002, 2008). _The Complete Idiot's Guide to
Middle East Conflict_. NY: Alpha books. ISBN 0-02-864410-7 . 4th
Edition ISBN 1-59257-791-1 . Chapter 14, "Six Days to Victory" is
reproduced online as _The 1967 Six-Day War_. at the Jewish Virtual
Library of the
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise .
* Ben-Gurion, David. (1999). Ben-Gurion diary: May–June 1967.
Israel Studies_ 4(2), 199–220.
* Black, Ian (1992). _Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's
Intelligence Services_. Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-3286-3
* Bober, Arie (ed.) (1972). _The other Israel_. Doubleday Anchor.
ISBN 0-385-01467-8 .
* Boczek, Boleslaw Adam (2005). _International Law: A Dictionary_.
Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0-8108-5078-8
* Borowiec, Andrew. (1998). _Modern Tunisia: A Democratic
Apprenticeship_. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-96136-2 .
* Bowen, Jeremy (2003). _Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the
Middle East_. London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-3095-7
* Brams, Steven J. & Jeffrey M. Togman. (1998). _Camp David: Was the
agreement fair?_ In Paul F. Diehl (Ed.), _A Road Map to War:
Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict_. Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press. ISBN 0-8265-1329-8 .
* Brecher, Michael. (1996). Eban and Israeli foreign policy:
Diplomacy, war and disengagement. In _A Restless Mind: Essays in Honor
of Amos Perlmutter_, Benjamin Frankel (ed.), pp. 104–117. Routledge.
* Bregman, Ahron. (2000). _Israel's Wars, 1947–1993_. Routledge.
ISBN 0-415-21468-8 .
* Bregman, Ahron (2002). _Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947_.
London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
* Burrowes, Robert & Muzzio, Douglas. (1972). The Road to the Six
Day War: Towards an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and
Israel, 1965–67. _The Journal of Conflict Resolution_, Vol. 16, No.
2, Research Perspectives on the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A Symposium,
* Cohen, Raymond. (1988) Intercultural Communication between Israel
and Egypt: Deterrence Failure before the Six-Day war. _Review of
International Studies_, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1–16
* Christie, Hazel (1999). _Law of the Sea_. Manchester: Manchester
University Press. ISBN 0-7190-4382-4
* Churchill, Randolph & Churchill, Winston. (1967 ). _The Six Day
War_. Houghton Mifflin Company. ISBN 0-395-07532-7
* Colaresi, Michael P. (2005). _Scare Tactics: The politics of
international rivalry_. Syracuse University Press. ISBN
* Eban, Abba (1977). _Abba Eban: An Autobiography_. Random House.
* Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (1997). _Syria
Some Leaders Decide That Force is the Only Way to Curtail Terrorism
Some Israeli Leaders See Need for Force to Curb Syrians". _The New
* El-Gamasy, Mohamed Abdel Ghani . (1993). _The October War_. The
American University in
Cairo Press. ISBN 977-424-316-1 .
* Gawrych, George W. (2000). _The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War
and Policy Between
Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
Wars_. Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-31302-4 . Available in multiple PDF
files from the
Combat Studies Institute and the Combined Arms Research
Library , CSI Publications in parts.
* Gelpi, Christopher (2002). _Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the
Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining_. Princeton University Press. ISBN
* Gerner, Deborah J. (1994). _One Land, Two Peoples._ Westview
Press. ISBN 0-8133-2180-8 , p. 112
* Gerteiny, Alfred G. & Ziegler, Jean (2007). _The Terrorist
Conjunction: The United States, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and
Al-Qā'ida_. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-99643-3 , p. 142
* Gilbert, Martin. (2008). _
Israel – A History_. McNally & Loftin
Publishers. ISBN 0-688-12363-5 . Chapter available online: Chapter 21:
* Goldstein, Erik (1992). _Wars and Peace Treaties, 1816–1991_.
Routledge. ISBN 0-415-07822-9
* Green, Stephen J. (1984). _Taking Sides: America's Secret
Relations With Militant Israel_. William Morrow & Co. ISBN
* Griffin, David J. (2006). _
Hawker Hunter 1951 to 2007_ Lulu.com, 4
edition. ISBN 1-4303-0593-2 .
* Haddad, Yvonne. (1992). Islamists and the "Problem of Israel": The
1967 Awakening. _
Middle East Journal_, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 266–85.
* Hajjar, Sami G. The Israel-
Syria Track, _
Middle East Policy _,
Volume VI, February 1999, Number 3. Retrieved September 30, 2006.
* Hammel, Eric (1992). _Six Days in June: How
Israel Won the 1967
Arab–Israeli War_. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7434-7535-6
* Hattendorf, John B. (2000). _Naval Strategy and Power in the
Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future_. Taylor & Francis. ISBN
* Handel, Michael I. (1973). _Israel's political-military doctrine._
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. ISBN
* Hart, Alan (1989) _Arafat, A political biography._ Indiana
University Press ISBN 0-253-32711-3 .
Herzog, Chaim (1982). _The Arab-Israeli Wars_. Arms Issue 56943;
Herzog, Chaim (1989). _Heroes of Israel: Profiles of Jewish
Courage_. Little Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-35901-7 .
* Higham, Robin. (2003). _100 Years of Air Power and Aviation_. TAMU
Press. ISBN 1-58544-241-0 .
* Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (2003). _The international politics of the
Middle East_. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-5346-7
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). _Background on Israeli
POWs and MIAs_.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). _The
Six-Day War (June
Israel Reportedly Killed POWs in \'67 War; Historians Say Deaths
of Hundreds of Egyptians Was Covered Up
Israel Reportedly Killed POWs
in \'67 War; Historians Say Deaths of Hundreds of Egyptians Was
Covered Up", _
The Washington Post _, August 17, 1995, p. A.30 (Fee
* James, Laura (2005). The Nassar And His Enemies: Foreign Policy
Decision Making In
Egypt On The Eve Of The Six Day War. _The Middle
East Review of International Affairs_. Volume 9, No. 2, Article 2.
* "Israelis Say Tape Shows Nasser Fabricated \'Plot\'; Recording
Said to Be of Phone Call to Hussein Gives Plan to Accuse U.S. and
Britain". _The New York Times_. June 9, 1967. p. 17. Retrieved June
* Jia, Bing Bing. (1998). _The Regime of Straits in International
Law_ (Oxford Monographs in International Law). Oxford University
Press, USA. ISBN 0-19-826556-5 .
* Koboril, Iwao and Glantz, Michael H. (1998). _Central Eurasian
United Nations University Press. ISBN 92-808-0925-3
* Krauthammer, Charles (May 18, 2007). "Prelude to the Six Days".
_The Washington Post_. pp. A23. ISSN 0740-5421 . Retrieved June 20,
* Lavoy, Peter R.; Sagan, Scott Douglas & Wirtz, James J. (Eds.)
(2000). _Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons_. Cornell University Press. ISBN
* Leibler, Isi (1972). _The Case For Israel_. Australia: The
Executive Council of Australian Jewry. ISBN 0-9598984-0-9 .
* Lenczowski, George . (1990). _American Presidents and the Middle
East_. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-0972-6 .
* Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. (1994). Transcript, Robert S.
McNamara Oral History,
Special Interview I, March 26, 1993, by Robert
Dallek, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. Retrieved July 20, 2010.
* "McNamara: US Near War in \'67". _The Boston Globe_. September 16,
1983. p. 1.
* Mansour, Camille. (1994). _Beyond Alliance:
Israel and US Foreign
Policy_. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-08492-7 .
* Maoz, Zeev (2009). _Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis
of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy_. The University of Michigan
Press. ISBN 978-0-472-03341-6
* Morris, Benny (2001) _Righteous Victims_ New York, Vintage Books.
* Miller, Benjamin. (2007). _States, Nations, and the Great Powers:
The Sources of Regional War and Peace_. Cambridge University Press.
* Murakami, Masahiro. (1995). _Managing Water for Peace in the
Middle East: Alternative Strategies_.
United Nations University Press.
ISBN 92-808-0858-3 .
* Mutawi, Samir A. (18 July 2002). _
Jordan in the 1967 War_.
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-52858-0 .
* Nordeen, Lon ">(PDF). _Journal of Palestine Studies_. XXVII (1):
67–75. doi :10.1525/jps.1997.27.1.00p0164l .
* Phythian, Mark (2001). _The Politics of British Arms Sales Since
1964_. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 0-7190-5907-0
* Podeh, Elie (Winter 2004). "The Lie That Won\'t Die: Collusion,
Middle East Quarterly_. 11 (1).
* Pimlott, John. (1983).
Middle East Conflicts: From 1945 to the
Present. Orbis. ISBN 0-85613-547-X .
* Pollack, Kenneth (2004). _Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness,
1948–1991_. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-8783-6
* Pollack, Kenneth (2005). Air Power in the Six-Day War. _The
Journal of Strategic Studies_. 28(3), 471–503.
* Prior, Michael (1999). _Zionism and the State of Israel: A Moral
Inquiry_. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-20462-3
* Quandt, William B. (2005). _Peace Process: American Diplomacy and
the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967_. Brookings Institution Press
and the University of California Press; 3 edition. ISBN 0-520-24631-4
* Quigley, John B. (2005). _Case for Palestine: An International Law
Perspective_. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-3539-5
* Quigley, John B. (1990). _Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to
Justice_. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-1023-6
* Rabil, Robert G. (2003). _Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and
Lebanon_. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-58826-149-2
* Rabin, Yitzhak (1996). _The Rabin Memoirs_. University of
California Press. ISBN 0-520-20766-1 .
* Rauschning, Dietrich; Wiesbrock, Katja ISBN 0-375-71132-5 .
* Sadeh, Eligar (1997). _Militarization and State Power in the
Arab–Israeli Conflict: Case Study of Israel, 1948–1982_. Universal
Publishers. ISBN 0-9658564-6-1
* Sandler, Deborah; Aldy, Emad & Al-Khoshman Mahmoud A. (1993).
_Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba. – A regional environmental
challenge_. Environmental Law Institute. 0911937463.
* Seale, Patrick (1988). _Asad: The Struggle for Peace in the Middle
East_. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06976-5
* Segev, Samuel (1967). A Red Sheet: the Six Day War.
* Segev, Tom (2005). _
Israel in 1967_. Keter. ISBN 965-07-1370-0 .
* Segev, Tom (2007). _1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that
Transformed the Middle East_ Metropolitan Books. ISBN
* Sela, Avraham (1997). _The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order_. SUNY Press.
* Shafqat, Saeed (2004). _Islamic world and South Asia: Rise of
Islamism and Terror, Causes and Consequences?_. In Kaniz F. Yusuf
(Ed.) _Unipolar World & The Muslim States_. Islamabad:
* Shemesh, Moshe (2008). _Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and
the Six Day War_. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 1-84519-188-9 .
* Shlaim, Avi (2000). _The Iron Wall:
Israel and the Arab World_. W.
W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-32112-6 . ISBN 0-393-04816-0
* Shlaim, Avi (2007) _Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in
War and Peace_ Vintage Books ISBN 978-1-4000-7828-8
* Shlaim, Avi; Louis, William Roger (13 February 2012), _The 1967
Arab–Israeli War: Or