Commanders and leaders
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Abdel Hakim Amer
Abdul Munim Riad
Zaid ibn Shaker
Abdul Rahman Arif
300 combat aircraft
Total troops: 264,000
Syria, Jordan, and Iraq: 307,000
957 combat aircraft
Lebanon: 2 combat aircraft 
Total troops: 547,000
Casualties and losses
400 tanks destroyed
46 aircraft destroyed
Egypt: 10,000–15,000 killed or missing
Jordan: 696 killed or missing
Syria: 2,500 killed
Iraq: 10 killed
Lebanon: One aircraft lost
Hundreds of tanks destroyed
452+ aircraft destroyed
20 Israeli civilians killed
US Navy sailors killed
USS Liberty incident
Six-Day War (Hebrew: מלחמת ששת הימים, Milhemet
Sheshet Ha Yamim; Arabic: النكسة, an-Naksah, "The Setback" or
حرب ۱۹٦۷, Ḥarb 1967, "War of 1967"), also known as the June
War, 1967 Arab–Israeli War, or Third Arab–Israeli War, was fought
between June 5 and 10, 1967 by
Israel and the neighboring states of
Egypt (known at the time as the United Arab Republic), Jordan, and
Israel and its neighbours had never fully normalised
following the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. In 1956
Israel invaded the
Egyptian Sinai, with one of its objectives being the reopening of the
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran which
Egypt had blocked to Israeli shipping since
Israel was subsequently forced to withdraw, but won a guarantee
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran would remain open. While the United Nations
Emergency Force was deployed along the border, there was no
In the period leading up to June 1967, tensions became dangerously
Israel reiterated its post-1956 position that the closure
of the straits of Tiran to its shipping would be a casus belli. In May
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that the straits would
be closed to Israeli vessels and then mobilised its Egyptian forces
along its border with Israel. On 5 June
Israel launched what it
claimed were a series of preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian
airfields. Claims and counterclaims relating to this series of events
are one of a number of controversies relating to the conflict.
The Egyptians were caught by surprise, and nearly the entire Egyptian
air force was destroyed with few Israeli losses, giving the Israelis
air supremacy. Simultaneously, the Israelis launched a ground
offensive into the
Gaza Strip and the Sinai, which again caught the
Egyptians by surprise. After some initial resistance, Egyptian leader
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the evacuation of the Sinai. Israeli forces
rushed westward in pursuit of the Egyptians, inflicted heavy losses,
and conquered the Sinai.
Jordan to begin attacks on
Israel by using
the initially confused situation to claim that
Egypt had defeated the
Israeli air strike. Israeli counterattacks resulted in the seizure of
East Jerusalem as well as the
West Bank from the Jordanians, while
Israel's retaliation against
Syria resulted in its occupation of the
On June 11, a ceasefire was signed. In the aftermath of the war,
Israel had crippled the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian militaries,
having killed over 20,000 troops while only losing less than 1,000 of
their own. The Israeli success was the result of a well-played and
prepared strategy, the poor leadership of the Arab states and their
poor military leadership and strategy.
Israel seized the Gaza Strip
Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the
West Bank from
Jordan and the
Golan Heights from Syria. Israel's international standing greatly
improved in the years after and their victory humiliated Egypt, Jordan
and Syria, leading Nasser to resign in shame; he was later reinstated
after protests in
Egypt against his resignation occurred. However, the
speed and ease of Israel's victory would lead to a dangerous
overconfidence within the ranks of the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF),
contributing to initial Arab successes in the subsequent 1973 Yom
Kippur War; another Israeli success occurred in the
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War and
the Arab militaries were again crushed. The displacement of civilian
populations resulting from the war would have long-term consequences,
Palestinians fled the
West Bank and about 100,000 Syrians
Golan Heights to become refugees. Across the Arab world,
Jewish minority communities were expelled, with refugees going to
Israel or Europe.
1.1 Military preparation
2 Armies and weapons
3 Fighting fronts
3.1 Preemptive air attack
Gaza Strip and
3.2.1 Northern (El Arish) Israeli division
3.2.2 Advance on Arish
3.2.3 Mid-front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division
3.2.4 Other Israeli forces
3.2.5 The Egyptian Army
3.2.6 Next fighting days
3.3 West Bank
3.3.1 Israeli cabinet meets
3.3.2 Initial response
3.3.3 Jordanian battalion at Government House
3.3.4 Israeli invasion
West Bank (June 7)
3.4 Golan Heights
3.4.1 Syria's attack
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Air Force attacks the Syrian airfields
3.4.3 Israelis debate whether the
Golan Heights should be attacked
3.4.4 Israeli attack: first day
3.4.5 Israeli attack: the next day
5.1 Preemptive strike v. unjustified attack
5.2 Allegations of atrocities committed against Egyptian soldiers
5.3 Allegations of military support from the US, UK and Soviet Union
5.4 USS Liberty incident
Israel and Zionism
6.2 Jews in Arab countries-Pogroms and expulsion
6.3 Antisemitism against Jews in Communist countries
6.4 Peace and diplomacy
6.5 Captured territories and Arab displaced populations
6.6 Long term
7 See also
11 Further reading
12 External links
Main article: Origins of the Six-Day War
On 22 May 1967, President Nasser addressed his pilots at Bir Gifgafa
Airfield in Sinai: "The Jews are threatening war – we say to them
ahlan wa-sahlan (welcome)!"
After the 1956 Suez Crisis,
Egypt agreed to the stationing of a United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the
Sinai to ensure all parties
would comply with the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In the following
years there were numerous minor border clashes between
Israel and its
Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. In early November 1966, Syria
signed a mutual defense agreement with Egypt. Soon after this, in
Palestine Liberation Organisation
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) guerilla
activity, including a mine attack that left three dead,
the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) attacked the village of as-Samu in the
Jordanian-occupied West Bank. Jordanian units that engaged the
Israelis were quickly beaten back. King Hussein of Jordan
criticized Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to come
to Jordan's aid, and "hiding behind UNEF skirts".
In May 1967, Nasser received false reports from the
Soviet Union that
Israel was massing on the Syrian border. Nasser began massing his
troops in two defensive lines in the
Sinai Peninsula on Israel's
border (May 16), expelled the UNEF force from Gaza and
Sinai (May 19)
and took over UNEF positions at Sharm el-Sheikh, overlooking the
Straits of Tiran.
Israel repeated declarations it made in 1957
that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war, or
justification for war, but Nasser closed the Straits to
Israeli shipping on May 22–23. After the war, U.S.
Lyndon Johnson commented:
If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than
any other, it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent, maritime
passage must be preserved for all nations.
On May 30,
Egypt signed a defense pact. The following day,
at Jordan's invitation, the Iraqi army began deploying troops and
armoured units in Jordan. They were later reinforced by an
Egyptian contingent. On June 1,
Israel formed a National Unity
Government by widening its cabinet, and on June 4 the decision was
made to go to war. The next morning,
Israel launched Operation Focus,
a large-scale surprise air strike that was the opening of the Six-Day
Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained
extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from sorties,
enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day (as
opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two sorties per day).
This enabled the
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Air Force (IAF) to send several attack waves
against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the war, overwhelming
the Egyptian Air Force, and allowed it to knock out other Arab air
forces on the same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that
the IAF was helped by foreign air forces (see Controversies relating
to the Six-Day War). Pilots were extensively schooled about their
targets, and were forced to memorize every single detail, and
rehearsed the operation multiple times on dummy runways in total
The Egyptians had constructed fortified defenses in the Sinai. These
designs were based on the assumption that an attack would come along
the few roads leading through the desert, rather than through the
difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the
Egyptian defenses head-on, and instead surprised them from an
James Reston, writing in
The New York Times
The New York Times on May 23, 1967, noted,
"In discipline, training, morale, equipment and general competence his
[Nasser's] army and the other Arab forces, without the direct
assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis. ...
Even with 50,000 troops and the best of his generals and air force in
Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and
primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a
On the eve of the war,
Israel believed it could win a war in 3–4
United States estimated
Israel would need 7–10 days to
win, with British estimates supporting the U.S. view.
Armies and weapons
The Israeli army had a total strength, including reservists, of
264,000, though this number could not be sustained, as the reservists
were vital to civilian life.
Against Jordan's forces on the West Bank,
Israel deployed about 40,000
troops and 200 tanks (eight brigades). Israeli Central Command
forces consisted of five brigades. The first two were permanently
Jerusalem and were the
Brigade and the
mechanized Harel Brigade. Mordechai Gur's 55th Paratroopers Brigade
was summoned from the
Sinai front. The 10th Armored
stationed north of the West Bank. The Israeli Northern Command
comprised a division of three brigades led by Major General Elad Peled
which was stationed in the
Jezreel Valley to the north of the West
On the eve of the war,
Egypt massed approximately 100,000 of its
160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all seven of its divisions
(four infantry, two armoured and one mechanized), four independent
infantry brigades and four independent armoured brigades. Over a third
of these soldiers were veterans of Egypt's continuing intervention
North Yemen Civil War
North Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists.
These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs, and more than 1,000 artillery
Syria's army had a total strength of 75,000 and was deployed along the
border with Israel.
Jordanian Armed Forces
Jordanian Armed Forces included 11 brigades, totalling 55,000
troops. Nine brigades (45,000 troops, 270 tanks, 200 artillery
pieces) were deployed in the West Bank, including the elite armoured
40th, and two in the
Jordan Valley. They possessed sizable numbers of
M113 APCs and were equipped with some 300 modern Western tanks, 250 of
which were U.S. M48 Pattons. They also had 12 battalions of artillery,
six batteries of 81 mm and 120 mm mortars, a paratrooper
battalion trained in the new U.S.-built school and a new battalion of
mechanized infantry. The Jordanian Army, then known as the Arab
Legion, was a long-term-service, professional army, relatively
well-equipped and well-trained. Israeli post-war briefings said that
the Jordanian staff acted professionally, but was always left "half a
step" behind by the Israeli moves. The small Royal Jordanian Air Force
consisted of only 24 British-made
Hawker Hunter fighters, six
transports, and two helicopters. According to the Israelis, the Hawker
Hunter was essentially on par with the French-built Dassault Mirage
III – the IAF's best plane.
100 Iraqi tanks and an infantry division were readied near the
Jordanian border. Two squadrons of Iraqi fighter-aircraft, Hawker
Hunters and MiG 21s, were rebased adjacent to the Jordanian
The Arab air forces were reinforced by some aircraft from Libya,
Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, and
Saudi Arabia to make up for the massive
losses suffered on the first day of the war. They were also aided by
volunteer pilots from the
Pakistan Air Force acting in an independent
capacity. PAF pilots shot down several Israeli planes.
With the exception of Jordan, the Arabs relied principally on Soviet
weaponry. Jordan's army was equipped with American weaponry, and its
air force was composed of British aircraft.
Egypt had by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab air
forces, consisting of about 420 combat aircraft, all of them
Soviet-built and with a heavy quota of top-of-the-line MiG-21s. Of
particular concern to the Israelis were the 30
Tu-16 "Badger" medium
bombers, capable of inflicting heavy damage on Israeli military and
Israeli weapons were mainly of Western origin. Its air force was
composed principally of French aircraft, while its armoured units were
mostly of British and American design and manufacture. Some infantry
weapons, including the ubiquitous Uzi, were of Israeli origin.
Iraq used T-34/85, T-54, T-55, PT-76, and SU-100/152
World War II-vintage self-propelled guns.
Jordan used M-47, M-48, and
M-48A1 Patton tanks.
Panzer IV (used by Syria)
M50 and M51 Shermans, M48A3 Patton, Centurion, AMX-13. The Centurion
was upgraded with the British 105 mm L7 gun prior to the war. The
Sherman also underwent extensive modifications including a larger
105 mm medium velocity, French gun, redesigned turret, wider
tracks, more armour, and upgraded engine and suspension.
BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-50,
M2, / M3 Half-track, Panhard AML
M1937 Howitzer, BM-21, D-30 (2A18) Howitzer, M1954 field gun, M-52
105 mm self-propelled howitzer (used by Jordan)
M50 self-propelled howitzer and Makmat 160 mm self-propelled
mortar, Obusier de 155 mm Modèle 50, AMX 105 mm
MiG-21, MiG-19, MiG-17, Su-7B, Tu-16, Il-28, Il-18, Il-14, An-12,
Hawker Hunter used by
Jordan and Iraq
Dassault Mirage III, Dassault Super Mystère, Sud Aviation Vautour,
Mystere IV, Dassault Ouragan,
Fouga Magister trainer outfitted for
attack missions, Nord 2501IS military cargo plane
Super Frelon, Sikorsky S-58
ZSU-57-2 mobile anti-aircraft cannon
MIM-23 Hawk, Bofors 40 mm
Port Said submachine gun, AK-47, RPK, RPD,
DShK HMG, B-10 and B-11
Uzi, FN FAL, FN MAG, AK-47, M2 Browning, Cobra, Nord SS.10, RL-83
Blindicide anti-tank infantry weapon, Jeep-mounted 106 mm
Preemptive air attack
Main article: Operation Focus
See also: Order of battle for the Six-Day War
Israeli troops examine destroyed Egyptian aircraft.
Dassault Mirage at the
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Air Force Museum.
Operation Focus was
mainly conducted using French built aircraft.
Israel's first and most critical move was a surprise attack on the
Egyptian Air Force. Initially, both
Israel announced that
they had been attacked by the other country.
On June 5 at 7:45 Israeli time, as civil defense sirens sounded all
over Israel, the IAF launched
Operation Focus (Moked). All but 12 of
its nearly 200 operational jets launched a mass attack against
Egypt's airfields. The Egyptian defensive infrastructure was
extremely poor, and no airfields were yet equipped with hardened
aircraft shelters capable of protecting Egypt's warplanes. Most of the
Israeli warplanes headed out over the Mediterranean Sea, flying low to
avoid radar detection, before turning toward Egypt. Others flew over
the Red Sea.
Meanwhile, the Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively
shutting down their entire air defense system: they were worried that
rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field
Abdel Hakim Amer
Abdel Hakim Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route
from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the
Sinai to meet the commanders of the
troops stationed there. In any event, it did not make a great deal of
difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover
and well below the lowest point at which its SA-2 surface-to-air
missile batteries could bring down an aircraft.
Although the powerful Jordanian radar facility at
waves of aircraft approaching
Egypt and reported the code word for
"war" up the Egyptian command chain, Egyptian command and
communications problems prevented the warning from reaching the
targeted airfields. The Israelis employed a mixed-attack strategy:
bombing and strafing runs against planes parked on the ground, and
bombing to disable runways with special tarmac-shredding penetration
bombs developed jointly with France, leaving surviving aircraft unable
to take off. The runway at the
Arish airfield was spared, as the
Israelis expected to turn it into a military airport for their
transports after the war. Surviving aircraft were taken out by later
attack waves. The operation was more successful than expected,
catching the Egyptians by surprise and destroying virtually all of the
Egyptian Air Force
Egyptian Air Force on the ground, with few Israeli losses. Only four
unarmed Egyptian training flights were in the air when the strike
began. A total of 338 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed and 100
pilots were killed, although the number of aircraft lost by the
Egyptians is disputed.
Among the Egyptian planes lost were all 30
Tu-16 bombers, 27 out of 40
Il-28 bombers, 12
Su-7 fighter-bombers, over 90 MiG-21s, 20 MiG-19s,
MiG-17 fighters, and around 32 assorted transport planes and
helicopters. In addition, Egyptian radars and SAM missiles were also
attacked and destroyed. The Israelis lost 19 planes, including two
destroyed in air-to-air combat and 13 downed by anti-aircraft
artillery. One Israeli plane, which was damaged and unable to
break radio silence, was shot down by Israeli Hawk missiles after it
strayed over the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Another was
destroyed by an exploding Egyptian bomber.
The attack guaranteed Israeli air supremacy for the rest of the war.
Attacks on other Arab air forces by
Israel took place later in the day
as hostilities broke out on other fronts.
The large numbers of Arab aircraft claimed destroyed by
Israel on that
day were at first regarded as "greatly exaggerated" by the Western
press. However, the fact that the Egyptian Air Force, along with other
Arab air forces attacked by Israel, made practically no appearance for
the remaining days of the conflict proved that the numbers were most
likely authentic. Throughout the war, Israeli aircraft continued
strafing Arab airfield runways to prevent their return to usability.
Meanwhile, Egyptian state-run radio had reported an Egyptian victory,
falsely claiming that 70 Israeli planes had been downed on the first
day of fighting.
Gaza Strip and
Conquest of Sinai. June 5–6, 1967
People in a bomb shelter at Kfar Maimon
The Egyptian forces consisted of seven divisions: four armoured, two
infantry, and one mechanized infantry. Overall,
Egypt had around
100,000 troops and 900–950 tanks in the Sinai, backed by 1,100 APCs
and 1,000 artillery pieces. This arrangement was thought to be
based on the Soviet doctrine, where mobile armour units at strategic
depth provide a dynamic defense while infantry units engage in
Israeli forces concentrated on the border with
Egypt included six
armoured brigades, one infantry brigade, one mechanized infantry
brigade, three paratrooper brigades, giving a total of around 70,000
men and 700 tanks, who were organized in three armoured divisions.
They had massed on the border the night before the war, camouflaging
themselves and observing radio silence before being ordered to
The Israeli plan was to surprise the Egyptian forces in both timing
(the attack exactly coinciding with the IAF strike on Egyptian
airfields), location (attacking via northern and central
as opposed to the Egyptian expectations of a repeat of the 1956 war,
when the IDF attacked via the central and southern routes) and method
(using a combined-force flanking approach, rather than direct tank
Northern (El Arish) Israeli division
On June 5, at 7:50 a.m., the northernmost Israeli division,
consisting of three brigades and commanded by Major General Israel
Tal, one of Israel's most prominent armour commanders, crossed the
border at two points, opposite
Nahal Oz and south of Khan Yunis. They
advanced swiftly, holding fire to prolong the element of surprise.
Tal's forces assaulted the "
Rafah Gap", a seven-mile stretch
containing the shortest of three main routes through the
El-Qantarah el-Sharqiyya and the Suez Canal. The Egyptians had four
divisions in the area, backed by minefields, pillboxes, underground
bunkers, hidden gun emplacements and trenches. The terrain on either
side of the route was impassable. The Israeli plan was to hit the
Egyptians at selected key points with concentrated armour.
Tal's advance was led by the 7th Armored
Brigade under Colonel Shmuel
Gonen. The Israeli plan called for the 7th
Brigade to outflank Khan
Yunis from the north and the 60th Armored
Brigade under Colonel
Menachem Aviram would advance from the south. The two brigades would
link up and surround Khan Yunis, while the paratroopers would take
Rafah. Gonen entrusted the breakthrough to a single battalion of his
Initially, the advance was met with light resistance, as Egyptian
intelligence had concluded that it was a diversion for the main
attack. However, as Gonen's lead battalion advanced, it suddenly came
under intense fire and took heavy losses. A second battalion was
brought up, but was also pinned down. Meanwhile, the 60th Brigade
became bogged down in the sand, while the paratroopers had trouble
navigating through the dunes. The Israelis continued to press their
attack, and despite heavy losses, cleared the Egyptian positions and
Khan Yunis railway junction in little over four hours.
Gonen's brigade then advanced nine miles to
Rafah in twin columns.
Rafah itself was circumvented, and the Israelis attacked Sheikh
Zuweid, eight miles to the southwest, which was defended by two
brigades. Though inferior in numbers and equipment, the Egyptians were
deeply entrenched and camouflaged. The Israelis were pinned down by
fierce Egyptian resistance, and called in air and artillery support to
enable their lead elements to advance. Many Egyptians abandoned their
positions after their commander and several of his staff were
The Israelis broke through with tank-led assaults. However, Aviram's
forces misjudged the Egyptians' flank, and were pinned between
strongholds before they were extracted after several hours. By
nightfall, the Israelis had finished mopping up resistance. Israeli
forces had taken significant losses, with Colonel Gonen later telling
reporters that "we left many of our dead soldiers in Rafah, and many
burnt-out tanks." The Egyptians suffered some 2,000 casualties and
lost 40 tanks.
Advance on Arish
Israeli reconnaissance forces from the "Shaked" unit in
On June 5, with the road open, Israeli forces continued advancing
towards Arish. Already by late afternoon, elements of the 79th Armored
Battalion had charged through the seven-mile long Jiradi defile, a
narrow pass defended by well-emplaced troops of the Egyptian 112th
Infantry Brigade. In fierce fighting, which saw the pass change hands
several times, the Israelis charged through the position. The
Egyptians suffered heavy casualties and tank losses, while Israeli
losses stood at 66 dead, 93 wounded and 28 tanks. Emerging at the
western end, Israeli forces advanced to the outskirts of Arish. As
it reached the outskirts of Arish, Tal's division also consolidated
its hold on
Rafah and Khan Yunis.
The following day, June 6, the Israeli forces on the outskirts of
Arish were reinforced by the 7th Brigade, which fought its way through
the Jiradi pass. After receiving supplies via an airdrop, the Israelis
entered the city and captured the airport at 7:50 am. The
Israelis entered the city at 8:00 am. Company commander Yossi
Peled recounted that "Al-
Arish was totally quiet, desolate. Suddenly,
the city turned into a madhouse. Shots came at us from every alley,
every corner, every window and house." An IDF record stated that
"clearing the city was hard fighting. The Egyptians fired from the
rooftops, from balconies and windows. They dropped grenades into our
half-tracks and blocked the streets with trucks. Our men threw the
grenades back and crushed the trucks with their tanks." Gonen
sent additional units to Arish, and the city was eventually taken.
Brigadier-General Avraham Yoffe's assignment was to penetrate Sinai
south of Tal's forces and north or Sharon's. Yoffe's attack allowed
Tal to complete the capture of the Jiradi defile, Khan Yunis. All of
them were taken after fierce fighting. Gonen subsequently dispatched a
force of tanks, infantry and engineers under Colonel Yisrael Granit to
continue down the Mediterranean coast towards the Suez Canal, while a
second force led by Gonen himself turned south and captured Bir Lahfan
and Jabal Libni.
Mid-front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division
Ariel Sharon during the Battle of Abu-Ageila
Further south, on June 6, the Israeli 38th Armored Division under
Ariel Sharon assaulted Um-Katef, a heavily fortified
area defended by the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division under
Major-General Sa'adi Nagib, and consisting of some 16,000 troops. The
Egyptians also had a battalion of tank destroyers and a tank regiment,
formed of Soviet World War II armour, which included 90 T-34-85 tanks,
SU-100 tank destroyers, and about 16,000 men. The Israelis had
about 14,000 men and 150 post-World War II tanks including the AMX-13,
Centurions, and M50 Super Shermans (modified
M-4 Sherman tanks).
Two armoured brigades in the meantime, under Avraham Yoffe, slipped
across the border through sandy wastes that
Egypt had left undefended
because they were considered impassable. Simultaneously, Sharon's
tanks from the west were to engage Egyptian forces on
and block any reinforcements. Israeli infantry would clear the three
trenches, while heliborne paratroopers would land behind Egyptian
lines and silence their artillery. An armoured thrust would be made at
al-Qusmaya to unnerve and isolate its garrison.
Israeli Armor of the Six Day War: pictured here the AMX 13
As Sharon's division advanced into the Sinai, Egyptian forces staged
successful delaying actions at Tarat Umm, Umm Tarfa, and Hill 181. An
Israeli jet was downed by anti-aircraft fire, and Sharon's forces came
under heavy shelling as they advanced from the north and west. The
Israeli advance, which had to cope with extensive minefields, took a
large number of casualties. A column of Israeli tanks managed to
penetrate the northern flank of Abu Ageila, and by dusk, all units
were in position. The Israelis then brought up ninety 105 mm and
155 mm artillery guns for a preparatory barrage, while civilian
buses brought reserve infantrymen under Colonel
Yekutiel Adam and
helicopters arrived to ferry the paratroopers. These movements were
unobserved by the Egyptians, who were preoccupied with Israeli probes
against their perimeter.
As night fell, the Israeli assault troops lit flashlights, each
battalion a different color, to prevent friendly fire incidents. At
10:00 pm, Israeli artillery began a barrage on Um-Katef, firing
some 6,000 shells in less than twenty minutes, the most concentrated
artillery barrage in Israel's history. Israeli tanks assaulted
the northernmost Egyptian defenses and were largely successful, though
an entire armoured brigade was stalled by mines, and had only one
mine-clearance tank. Israeli infantrymen assaulted the triple line of
trenches in the east. To the west, paratroopers commanded by Colonel
Danny Matt landed behind Egyptian lines, though half the helicopters
got lost and never found the battlefield, while others were unable to
land due to mortar fire. Those that successfully landed on
target destroyed Egyptian artillery and ammunition dumps and separated
gun crews from their batteries, sowing enough confusion to
significantly reduce Egyptian artillery fire. Egyptian reinforcements
from Jabal Libni advanced towards
Um-Katef to counterattack, but
failed to reach their objective, being subjected to heavy air attacks
and encountering Israeli lodgements on the roads. Egyptian commanders
then called in artillery attacks on their own positions. The Israelis
accomplished and sometimes exceeded their overall plan, and had
largely succeeded by the following day. The Egyptians took heavy
casualties, while the Israelis lost 40 dead and 140 wounded.
Yoffe's attack allowed Sharon to complete the capture of the Um-Katef,
after fierce fighting. The main thrust at
Um-Katef was stalled due to
mines and craters. After IDF engineers had cleared a path by
4:00 pm, Israeli and Egyptian tanks engaged in fierce combat,
often at ranges as close as ten yards. The battle ended in an Israeli
victory, with 40 Egyptian and 19 Israeli tanks destroyed. Meanwhile,
Israeli infantry finished clearing out the Egyptian trenches, with
Israeli casualties standing at 14 dead and 41 wounded and Egyptian
casualties at 300 dead and 100 taken prisoner.
Other Israeli forces
Further south, on June 5, the 8th Armored
Brigade under Colonel Albert
Mandler, initially positioned as a ruse to draw off Egyptian forces
from the real invasion routes, attacked the fortified bunkers at
Kuntilla, a strategically valuable position whose capture would enable
Mandler to block reinforcements from reaching
Um-Katef and to join
Sharon's upcoming attack on Nakhl. The defending Egyptian battalion,
outnumbered and outgunned, fiercely resisted the attack, hitting a
number of Israeli tanks. However, most of the defenders were killed,
and only three Egyptian tanks, one of them damaged, survived. By
nightfall, Mendler's forces had taken Kuntilla.
With the exceptions of
Rafah and Khan Yunis, Israeli forces had
initially avoided entering the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan had expressly forbidden entry into the area. After
Palestinian positions in Gaza opened fire on the Negev settlements of
Nirim and Kissufim, IDF Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin overrode Dayan's
instructions and ordered the 11th Mechanized
Brigade under Colonel
Yehuda Reshef to enter the Strip. The force was immediately met with
heavy artillery fire and fierce resistance from Palestinian forces and
remnants of the Egyptian forces from Rafah.
By sunset, the Israelis had taken the strategically vital Ali Muntar
ridge, overlooking Gaza City, but were beaten back from the city
itself. Some 70 Israelis were killed, along with Israeli journalist
Ben Oyserman and American journalist Paul Schutzer. Twelve members of
UNEF were also killed. On the war's second day, June 6, the Israelis
were bolstered by the 35th Paratroopers
Brigade under Colonel Rafael
Eitan, and took
Gaza City along with the entire Strip. The fighting
was fierce, and accounted for nearly half of all Israeli casualties on
the southern front. However, Gaza rapidly fell to the Israelis.
Meanwhile, on June 6, two Israeli reserve brigades under Yoffe, each
equipped with 100 tanks, penetrated the
Sinai south of Tal's division
and north of Sharon's, capturing the road junctions of Abu Ageila, Bir
Lahfan, and Arish, taking all of them before midnight. Two Egyptian
armoured brigades counterattacked, and a fierce battle took place
until the following morning. The Egyptians were beaten back by fierce
resistance coupled with airstrikes, sustaining heavy tank losses. They
fled west towards Jabal Libni.
The Egyptian Army
During the ground fighting, remnants of the Egyptian Air Force
attacked Israeli ground forces, but took losses from the Israeli Air
Force and from Israeli anti-aircraft units. Throughout the last four
days, Egyptian aircraft flew 150 sorties against Israeli units in the
Many of the Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to
prevent the Israelis from reaching the
Suez Canal or engaged in combat
in the attempt to reach the canal. However, when the Egyptian Field
Abdel Hakim Amer
Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of Abu-Ageila, he
panicked and ordered all units in the
Sinai to retreat. This order
effectively meant the defeat of Egypt.
Meanwhile, President Nasser, having learned of the results of the
Israeli air strikes, decided together with Field Marshal Amer to order
a general retreat from the
Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed
instructions were given concerning the manner and sequence of
Next fighting days
This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help
improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources.
Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2017) (Learn
how and when to remove this template message)
Conquest of Sinai. June 7–8, 1967
Newsreel from June 6 about the first Israeli-Egyptian fighting.
An Israeli gunboat passes through the
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran near Sharm El
As Egyptian columns retreated, Israeli aircraft and artillery attacked
them. Israeli jets used napalm bombs during their sorties. The attacks
destroyed hundreds of vehicles and caused heavy casualties. At Jabal
Libni, retreating Egyptian soldiers were fired upon by their own
artillery. At Bir Gafgafa, the Egyptians fiercely resisted advancing
Israeli forces, knocking out three tanks and eight half-tracks, and
killing 20 soldiers. Due to the Egyptians' retreat, the Israeli High
Command decided not to pursue the Egyptian units but rather to bypass
and destroy them in the mountainous passes of West Sinai.
Therefore, in the following two days (June 6 and 7), all three Israeli
divisions (Sharon and Tal were reinforced by an armoured brigade each)
rushed westwards and reached the passes. Sharon's division first went
southward then westward, via An-Nakhl, to
Mitla Pass with air support.
It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's division, while its other
units blocked the Gidi Pass. These passes became killing grounds for
the Egyptians, who ran right into waiting Israeli positions and
suffered heavy losses. According to Egyptian diplomat Mahmoud Riad,
10,000 men were killed in one day alone, and many others died from
hunger and thirst. Tal's units stopped at various points to the length
of the Suez Canal.
Israel's blocking action was partially successful. Only the Gidi pass
was captured before the Egyptians approached it, but at other places,
Egyptian units managed to pass through and cross the canal to safety.
Due to the haste of the Egyptian retreat, soldiers often abandoned
weapons, military equipment, and hundreds of vehicles. Many Egyptian
soldiers were cut off from their units had to walk about 200
kilometers on foot before reaching the
Suez Canal with limited
supplies of food and water and were exposed to intense heat. Thousands
of soldiers died as a result. Many Egyptian soldiers chose instead to
surrender to the Israelis. However, the Israelis eventually exceeded
their capabilities to provide for prisoners. As a result, they began
directing soldiers towards the
Suez Canal and only taking prisoner
high-ranking officers, who were expected to be exchanged for captured
During the offensive, the
Israeli Navy landed six combat divers from
Shayetet 13 naval commando unit to infiltrate
The divers sank an Egyptian minesweeper before being taken prisoner.
Shayetet 13 commandos also infiltrated into
Port Said harbour, but
found no ships there. A planned commando raid against the Syrian Navy
never materialized. Both Egyptian and Israeli warships made movements
at sea to intimidate the other side throughout the war, but did not
engage each other. However, Israeli warships and aircraft did hunt for
Egyptian submarines throughout the war.
On June 7,
Israel began the conquest of Sharm el-Sheikh. The Israeli
Navy started the operation with a probe of Egyptian naval defenses. An
aerial reconnaissance flight found that the area was less defended
than originally thought. At about 4:30 am, three Israeli missile
boats opened fire on Egyptian shore batteries, while paratroopers and
commandos boarded helicopters and
Nord Noratlas transport planes for
an assault on Al-Tur, as Chief of Staff Rabin was convinced it was too
risky to land them directly in Sharm el-Sheikh. However, the city
had been largely abandoned the day before, and reports from air and
naval forces finally convinced Rabin to divert the aircraft to Sharm
el-Sheikh. There, the Israelis engaged in a pitched battle with the
Egyptians and took the city, killing 20 Egyptian soldiers and taking 8
prisoner. At 12:15 pm, Defense Minister Dayan announced that the
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran constituted an international waterway open to all
ships without restriction.
On June 8,
Israel completed the capture of the
Sinai by sending
infantry units to
Ras Sudar on the western coast of the peninsula.
Several tactical elements made the swift Israeli advance possible:
first, the surprise attack that quickly gave the Israeli Air Force
complete air superiority over the Egyptian Air Force; second, the
determined implementation of an innovative battle plan; third, the
lack of coordination among Egyptian troops. These factors would prove
to be decisive elements on Israel's other fronts as well.
See also: Jordanian campaign (1967)
Jordan salient, June 5–7.
Jordan was reluctant to enter the war. Nasser used the confusion of
the first hours of the conflict to convince King Hussein that he was
victorious; he claimed as evidence a radar sighting of a squadron of
Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt, which he said
was an Egyptian aircraft en route to attack Israel. One of the
Jordanian brigades stationed in the
West Bank was sent to the Hebron
area in order to link with the Egyptians. Hussein decided to attack.
The IDF's strategic plan was to remain on the defensive along the
Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign against
Intermittent machine-gun exchanges began taking place in
9:30 am, and the fighting gradually escalated as the Jordanians
introduced mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Under the orders from
General Narkis, the Israelis responded only with small-arms fire,
firing in a flat trajectory to avoid hitting civilians, holy sites or
the Old City. At 10:00 am on June 5, the
Jordanian Army began
shelling Israel. Two batteries of 155 mm Long Tom cannons opened
fire on the suburbs of
Tel Aviv and Ramat David Airbase. The
commanders of these batteries were instructed to lay a two-hour
barrage against military and civilian settlements in central Israel.
Some shells hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv.
By 10:30 am, Eshkol had sent a message via
Odd Bull to King
Hussein promising not to initiate any action against
Jordan if it
stayed out of the war. King Hussein replied that it was too late,
"the die was cast". At 11:15 am, Jordanian howitzers began a
6,000-shell barrage at Israeli Jerusalem. The Jordanians initially
Ramat Rachel in the south and
Mount Scopus in the
north, then ranged into the city center and outlying neighborhoods.
Military installations, the Prime Minister's Residence, and the
Knesset compound were also targeted. Israeli civilian casualties
totalled 20 dead and about 1,000 wounded. Some 900 buildings were
damaged, including Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital.
At 11:50 am, sixteen Jordanian Hawker Hunters attacked Netanya,
Kfar Sirkin and Kfar Saba, killing one civilian, wounding seven and
destroying a transport plane. Three Iraqi Hawker Hunters strafed
civilian settlements in the Jezreel Valley, and an Iraqi Tupolev Tu-16
attacked Afula, and was shot down near the Megiddo airfield. The
attack caused minimal material damage, hitting only a senior citizens'
home and several chicken coops, but sixteen Israeli soldiers were
killed, most of them when the Tupolev crashed.
Israeli cabinet meets
When the Israeli cabinet convened to decide what to do, Yigal Allon
Menahem Begin argued that this was an opportunity to take the Old
City of Jerusalem, but Eshkol decided to defer any decision until
Moshe Dayan and
Yitzhak Rabin could be consulted.
Uzi Narkiss made
a number of proposals for military action, including the capture of
Latrun, but the cabinet turned him down. Dayan rejected multiple
requests from Narkiss for permission to mount an infantry assault
towards Mount Scopus. However, Dayan sanctioned a number of more
limited retaliatory actions.
Shortly before 12:30 pm, the
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Air Force attacked Jordan's
two airbases. The Hawker Hunters were refueling at the time of the
attack. The Israeli aircraft attacked in two waves, the first of which
cratered the runways and knocked out the control towers, and the
second wave destroyed all 21 of Jordan's
Hawker Hunter fighters, along
with six transport aircraft and two helicopters. One Israeli jet was
shot down by ground fire.
Israeli aircraft also attacked H-3, an
Iraqi Air Force
Iraqi Air Force base in western
Iraq. During the attack, 12 MiG-21s, 2 MiG-17s, 5 Hunter F6s, and 3
Il-28 bombers were destroyed or shot down. A Pakistani pilot stationed
at the base shot down an Israeli fighter and a bomber during the raid.
The Jordanian radar facility at
Ajloun was destroyed in an Israeli
Fouga Magister jets attacked the Jordanian 40th
Brigade with rockets as it moved south from the Damiya Bridge. Dozens
of tanks were knocked out, and a convoy of 26 trucks carrying
ammunition was destroyed. In Jerusalem,
Israel responded to Jordanian
shelling with a missile strike that devastated Jordanian positions.
The Israelis used the L missile, a surface-to-surface missile
developed jointly with
France in secret.
Jordanian battalion at Government House
Further information: Battle of Ammunition Hill
A Jordanian battalion advanced up Government House ridge and dug in at
the perimeter of Government House, the headquarters of the United
Nations observers, and opened fire on Ramat Rachel, the
Allenby Barracks and the Jewish section of
Abu Tor with mortars and
recoilless rifles. UN observers fiercely protested the incursion into
the neutral zone, and several manhandled a Jordanian machine gun out
of Government House after the crew had set it up in a second-floor
window. After the Jordanians occupied Jabel Mukaber, an advance patrol
was sent out and approached Ramat Rachel, where they came under fire
from four civilians, including the wife of the director, who were
armed with old Czech-made weapons.
Israeli paratroopers flush out Jordanian soldiers from trenches during
the Battle of Ammunition Hill.
Silhouette of Israeli paratroops advancing on Ammunition Hill.
The immediate Israeli response was an offensive to retake Government
House and its ridge. The
Jerusalem Brigade's Reserve
under Lieutenant-Colonel Asher Dreizin, was given the task. Dreizin
had two infantry companies and eight tanks under his command, several
of which broke down or became stuck in the mud at Ramat Rachel,
leaving three for the assault. The Jordanians mounted fierce
resistance, knocking out two tanks.
The Israelis broke through the compound's western gate and began
clearing the building with grenades, before General Odd Bull,
commander of the UN observers, compelled the Israelis to hold their
fire, telling them that the Jordanians had already fled. The Israelis
proceeded to take the Antenna Hill, directly behind Government House,
and clear out a series of bunkers to the west and south. The fighting,
often conducted hand-to-hand, continued for nearly four hours before
the surviving Jordanians fell back to trenches held by the Hittin
Brigade, which were steadily overwhelmed. By 6:30 pm, the
Jordanians had retreated to Bethlehem, having suffered about 100
casualties. All but ten of Dreizin's soldiers were casualties, and
Dreizin himself was wounded three times.
During the late afternoon of June 5, the Israelis launched an
offensive to encircle Jerusalem, which lasted into the following day.
During the night, they were supported by intense tank, artillery and
mortar fire to soften up Jordanian positions. Searchlights placed atop
the Labor Federation building, then the tallest in Israeli Jerusalem,
exposed and blinded the Jordanians. The
Brigade moved south
of Jerusalem, while the mechanized
Harel Brigade and 55th Paratroopers
Mordechai Gur encircled it from the north.
A combined force of tanks and paratroopers crossed no-man's land near
the Mandelbaum Gate. One of Gur's paratroop battalions approached the
fortified Police Academy. The Israelis used bangalore torpedoes to
blast their way through barbed wire leading up to the position while
exposed and under heavy fire. With the aid of two tanks borrowed from
Jerusalem Brigade, they captured the Police Academy. After
receiving reinforcements, they moved up to attack Ammunition
The Jordanian defenders, who were heavily dug-in, fiercely resisted
the attack. All of the Israeli officers except for two company
commanders were killed, and the fighting was mostly led by individual
soldiers. The fighting was conducted at close quarters in trenches and
bunkers, and was often hand-to-hand. The Israelis captured the
position after four hours of heavy fighting. During the battle, 36
Israeli and 71 Jordanian soldiers were killed.
The battalion subsequently drove east, and linked up with the Israeli
Mount Scopus and its Hebrew University campus. Gur's other
battalions captured the other Jordanian positions around the American
Colony, despite being short on men and equipment and having come under
a Jordanian mortar bombardment while waiting for the signal to
At the same time, the mechanized
Harel Brigade attacked the fortress
at Latrun, which the Jordanians had abandoned due to heavy Israeli
tank fire. The brigade attacked Har Adar, but seven tanks were knocked
out by mines, forcing the infantry to mount an assault without
armoured cover. The Israeli soldiers advanced under heavy fire,
jumping between stones to avoid mines. The fighting was conducted at
close-quarters, often with knives and bayonets.
The Jordanians fell back after a battle that left two Israeli and
eight Jordanian soldiers dead, and Israeli forces advanced through
Beit Horon towards Ramallah, taking four fortified villages along the
way. By the evening, the brigade arrived in Ramallah. Meanwhile, the
Abu Tor following a fierce battle,
severing the Old City from
Bethlehem and Hebron.
Meanwhile, 600 Egyptian commandos stationed in the
West Bank moved to
attack Israeli airfields. Led by Jordanian intelligence scouts, they
crossed the border and began infiltrating through Israeli settlements
Ramla and Hatzor. They were soon detected and sought shelter
in nearby fields, which the Israelis set on fire. Some 450 commandos
were killed, and the remainder escaped to Jordan.
From the American Colony, the paratroopers moved towards the Old City.
Their plan was to approach it via the lightly defended Salah al-Din
Street. However, they made a wrong turn onto the heavily defended
Nablus Road. The Israelis ran into fierce resistance. Their tanks
fired at point-blank range down the street, while the paratroopers
mounted repeated charges. Despite repelling repeated Israeli charges,
the Jordanians gradually gave way to Israeli firepower and momentum.
The Israelis suffered some 30 casualties – half the original force
– while the Jordanians lost 45 dead and 142 wounded.
Meanwhile, the Israeli 71st
Battalion breached barbed wire and
minefields and emerged near Wadi Joz, near the base of Mount Scopus,
from where the Old City could be cut off from
Jericho and East
Jerusalem from Ramallah. Israeli artillery targeted the one remaining
Jerusalem to the West Bank, and shellfire deterred the
Jordanians from counterattacking from their positions at
Augusta-Victoria. An Israeli detachment then captured the Rockefeller
Museum after a brief skirmish.
Afterwards, the Israelis broke through to the Jerusalem-
At Tel al-Ful, the Israelis fought a running battle with up to thirty
Jordanian tanks. The Jordanians stalled the advance and destroyed a
number of half-tracks, but the Israelis launched air attacks and
exploited the vulnerability of the external fuel tanks mounted on the
Jordanian tanks. The Jordanians lost half their tanks, and retreated
towards Jericho. Joining up with the 4th Brigade, the Israelis then
Shuafat and the site of what is now French Hill,
through Jordanian defenses at Mivtar, emerging at Ammunition
An Israeli airstrike near the Augusta-Victoria Hospital
With Jordanian defenses in
Jerusalem crumbling, elements of the
Brigade and an infantry battalion were sent from
Jericho to reinforce Jerusalem. Its original orders were to repel the
Israelis from the
Latrun corridor, but due to the worsening situation
in Jerusalem, the brigade was ordered to proceed to Jerusalem's Arab
suburbs and attack Mount Scopus. Parallel to the brigade were
infantrymen from the Imam Ali Brigade, who were approaching Issawiya.
The brigades were spotted by Israeli aircraft and decimated by rocket
and cannon fire. Other Jordanian attempts to reinforce
beaten back, either by armoured ambushes or airstrikes.
Fearing damage to holy sites and the prospect of having to fight in
built-up areas, Dayan ordered his troops not to enter the Old
City. He also feared that
Israel would be subjected to a fierce
international backlash and the outrage of Christians worldwide if it
forced its way into the Old City. Privately, he told David Ben-Gurion
that he was also concerned over the prospect of
Jerusalem's holy sites, only to be forced to give them up under the
threat of international sanctions.
West Bank (June 7)
On June 7, heavy fighting ensued. Dayan had ordered his troops not to
enter the Old City; however, upon hearing that the UN was about to
declare a ceasefire, he changed his mind, and without cabinet
clearance, decided to capture it. Two paratroop battalions
attacked Augusta-Victoria Hill, high ground overlooking the Old City
from the east. One battalion attacked from Mount Scopus, and another
attacked from the valley between it and the Old City. Another
paratroop battalion, personally led by Gur, broke into the Old City,
and was joined by the other two battalions after their missions were
complete. The paratroopers met little resistance. The fighting was
conducted solely by the paratroopers; the Israelis did not use armour
during the battle out of fear of severe damage to the Old City.
In the north, one battalion from Peled's division was sent to check
Jordanian defenses in the
Jordan Valley. A brigade belonging to
Peled's division captured the western part of the West Bank. One
brigade attacked Jordanian artillery positions around Jenin, which
were shelling Ramat David Airbase. The Jordanian 12th Armored
Battalion, which outnumbered the Israelis, held off repeated attempts
to capture Jenin. However, Israeli air attacks took their toll, and
the Jordanian M48 Pattons, with their external fuel tanks, proved
vulnerable at short distances, even to the Israeli-modified Shermans.
Twelve Jordanian tanks were destroyed, and only six remained
David Rubinger's famed photograph of IDF paratroopers at Jerusalem's
Western Wall shortly after its capture. From left to right: Zion
Karasenti, Yitzhak Yifat, and Haim Oshri.[a]
Just after dusk, Israeli reinforcements arrived. The Jordanians
continued to fiercely resist, and the Israelis were unable to advance
without artillery and air support. One Israeli jet attacked the
Jordanian commander's tank, wounding him and killing his radio
operator and intelligence officer. The surviving Jordanian forces then
withdrew to Jenin, where they were reinforced by the 25th Infantry
Brigade. The Jordanians were effectively surrounded in Jenin.
Jordanian infantry and their three remaining tanks managed to hold off
the Israelis until 4:00 am, when three battalions arrived to
reinforce them in the afternoon. The Jordanian tanks charged, and
knocked out multiple Israeli vehicles, and the tide began to shift.
After sunrise, Israeli jets and artillery conducted a two-hour
bombardment against the Jordanians. The Jordanians lost 10 dead and
250 wounded, and had only seven tanks left, including two without gas,
and sixteen APCs. The Israelis then fought their way into Jenin, and
captured the city after fierce fighting.
After the Old City fell, the
Brigade reinforced the
paratroopers, and continued to the south, capturing
Judea and Gush
Hebron was taken without any resistance. Fearful that Israeli
soldiers would exact retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city's
Jewish community, Hebron's residents flew white sheets from their
windows and rooftops, and voluntarily gave up their weapons.[citation
Harel Brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the Jordan
On June 7, Israeli forces seized Bethlehem, taking the city after a
brief battle that left some 40 Jordanian soldiers dead, with the
remainder fleeing. On the same day, one of Peled's brigades seized
Nablus; then it joined one of Central Command's armoured brigades to
fight the Jordanian forces; as the Jordanians held the advantage of
superior equipment and were equal in numbers to the Israelis.
Again, the air superiority of the IAF proved paramount as it
immobilized the Jordanians, leading to their defeat. One of Peled's
brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming from
Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the
Jordan river crossings
together with the Central Command's 10th. Engineering Corps sappers
blew up the Abdullah and Hussein bridges with captured Jordanian
mortar shells, while elements of the
Harel Brigade crossed the river
and occupied positions along the east bank to cover them, but quickly
pulled back due to American pressure. The Jordanians, anticipating an
Israeli offensive deep into Jordan, assembled the remnants of their
army and Iraqi units in
Jordan to protect the western approaches to
Amman and the southern slopes of the Golan Heights.
No specific decision had been made to capture any other territories
controlled by Jordan. After the Old City was captured, Dayan told his
troops to dig in to hold it. When an armoured brigade commander
West Bank on his own initiative, and stated that he could
see Jericho, Dayan ordered him back. It was only after intelligence
reports indicated that Hussein had withdrawn his forces across the
Jordan River that Dayan ordered his troops to capture the West
Bank. According to Narkis:
First, the Israeli government had no intention of capturing the West
Bank. On the contrary, it was opposed to it. Second, there was not any
provocation on the part of the IDF. Third, the rein was only loosened
when a real threat to Jerusalem's security emerged. This is truly how
things happened on June 5, although it is difficult to believe. The
end result was something that no one had planned.
The Battle of Golan Heights, June 9–10.
In May–June 1967, the Israeli government did everything in its power
to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front. Eshkol and his
colleagues took into account the possibility of some fighting on the
False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli
army and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon be attacking
Tel Aviv influenced Syria's decision to enter the war. Syrian
artillery began shelling northern Israel, and twelve Syrian jets
attacked Israeli settlements in the Galilee. Israeli fighter jets
intercepted the Syrian aircraft, shooting down three and driving off
the rest. In addition, two Lebanese
Hawker Hunter jets, two of
Lebanon had, crossed into Israeli airspace and began
strafing Israeli positions in the Galilee. They were intercepted by
Israeli fighter jets, and one was shot down.
People in a bomb shelter at
A minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plants at
Tel Dan (the
subject of a fierce escalation two years earlier), Dan, and She'ar
Yashuv. These attacks were repulsed with the loss of twenty soldiers
and seven tanks. An Israeli officer was also killed. But a broader
Syrian offensive quickly failed. Syrian reserve units were broken up
by Israeli air attacks, and several tanks were reported to have sunk
Other problems included tanks being too wide for bridges, lack of
radio communications between tanks and infantry, and units ignoring
orders to advance. A post-war Syrian army report concluded:
Our forces did not go on the offensive either because they did not
arrive or were not wholly prepared or because they could not find
shelter from the enemy's planes. The reserves could not withstand the
air attacks; they dispersed after their morale plummeted.
The Syrians abandoned hopes of a ground attack and began a massive
bombardment of Israeli communities in the
Hula Valley instead.
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Air Force attacks the Syrian airfields
On the evening of June 5, the
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Air Force attacked Syrian
Syrian Air Force
Syrian Air Force lost some 32 MiG 21s, 23
MiG-17 fighters, and two
Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, two-thirds of its
fighting strength. The Syrian aircraft that survived the attack
retreated to distant bases and played no further role in the war.
Following the attack,
Syria realised that the news it had received
Egypt of the near-total destruction of the Israeli military could
not have been true.
Israelis debate whether the
Golan Heights should be attacked
On June 7 and 8, the Israeli leadership debated about whether to
Golan Heights as well.
Syria had supported pre-war raids
that had helped raise tensions and had routinely shelled
the Heights, so some Israeli leaders wanted to see Syria
punished. Military opinion was that the attack would be extremely
costly, since it would entail an uphill battle against a strongly
fortified enemy. The western side of the
Golan Heights consists of a
rock escarpment that rises 500 meters (1,700 ft) from the Sea of
Galilee and the
Jordan River, and then flattens to a gently sloping
plateau. Dayan opposed the operation bitterly at first, believing such
an undertaking would result in losses of 30,000 and might trigger
Soviet intervention. Prime Minister Eshkol, on the other hand, was
more open to the possibility, as was the head of the Northern Command,
David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm for and confidence in the
operation may have eroded Dayan's reluctance.
Eventually, the situation on the Southern and Central fronts cleared
up, intelligence estimated that the likelihood of Soviet intervention
had been reduced, reconnaissance showed some Syrian defenses in the
Golan region collapsing, and an intercepted cable revealed that Nasser
was urging the President of
Syria to immediately accept a cease-fire.
At 3 am on June 9,
Syria announced its acceptance of the
cease-fire. Despite this announcement, Dayan became more enthusiastic
about the idea and four hours later at 7 am, "gave the order to
go into action against Syria"[i] without consultation or
The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine
brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armour.
Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (the 8th
Brigade and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the
front at Givat HaEm, and another two (infantry and one of Peled's
brigades summoned from Jenin) in the center. The Golan Heights' unique
terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several
kilometers running east to west), and the general lack of roads in the
area channeled both forces along east-west axes of movement and
restricted the ability of units to support those on either flank. Thus
the Syrians could move north-south on the plateau itself, and the
Israelis could move north-south at the base of the Golan escarpment.
Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected
Eli Cohen (who was captured and executed in Syria
in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions.
Syria had built
extensive defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers,
comparable to the Maginot Line.
As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially
effective in the Golan because the fixed fortifications were so
effective. However, the Syrian forces proved unable to put up
effective defense largely because the officers were poor leaders and
treated their soldiers badly; often officers would retreat from
danger, leaving their men confused and ineffective. The Israelis also
had the upper hand during close combat that took place in the numerous
Syrian bunkers along the Golan Heights, as they were armed with the
Uzi, a submachine gun designed for close combat, while Syrian soldiers
were armed with the heavier
AK-47 assault rifle, designed for combat
in more open areas.
Israeli attack: first day
Israeli tanks advancing on the Golan Heights. June 1967
On the morning of June 9, Israeli jets began carrying out dozens of
sorties against Syrian positions from Mount Hermon to Tawfiq, using
rockets salvaged from captured Egyptian stocks. The airstrikes knocked
out artillery batteries and storehouses and forced transport columns
off the roads. The Syrians suffered heavy casualties and a drop in
morale, with a number of senior officers and troops deserting. The
attacks also provided time as Israeli forces cleared paths through
Syrian minefields. However, the airstrikes did not seriously damage
the Syrians' bunkers and trench systems, and the bulk of Syrian forces
on the Golan remained in their positions.
About two hours after the airstrikes began, the 8th Armored Brigade,
led by Colonel Albert Mandler, advanced into the
Golan Heights from
Givat HaEm. Its advance was spearheaded by Engineering Corps sappers
and eight bulldozers, which cleared away barbed wire and mines. As
they advanced, the force came under fire, and five bulldozers were
immediately hit. The Israeli tanks, with their maneuverability sharply
reduced by the terrain, advanced slowly under fire toward the
fortified village of Sir al-Dib, with their ultimate objective being
the fortress at Qala. Israeli casualties steadily mounted. Part of the
attacking force lost its way and emerged opposite Za'ura, a redoubt
manned by Syrian reservists. With the situation critical, Colonel
Mandler ordered simultaneous assaults on Za'ura and Qala. Heavy and
confused fighting followed, with Israeli and Syrian tanks struggling
around obstacles and firing at extremely short ranges. Mandler
recalled that "the Syrians fought well and bloodied us. We beat them
only by crushing them under our treads and by blasting them with our
cannons at very short range, from 100 to 500 meters." The first three
Israeli tanks to enter Qala were stopped by a Syrian bazooka team, and
a relief column of seven Syrian tanks arrived to repel the attackers.
The Israelis took heavy fire from the houses, but could not turn back,
as other forces were advancing behind them, and they were on a narrow
path with mines on either side. The Israelis continued pressing
forward, and called for air support. A pair of Israeli jets destroyed
two of the Syrian tanks, and the remainder withdrew. The surviving
defenders of Qala retreated after their commander was killed.
Meanwhile, Za'ura fell in an Israeli assault, and the Israelis also
captured the 'Ein Fit fortress.
In the central sector, the Israeli 181st
Battalion captured the
strongholds of Dardara and Tel Hillal after fierce fighting. Desperate
fighting also broke out along the operation's northern axis, where
Brigade attacked thirteen Syrian positions, including the
formidable Tel Fakhr position. Navigational errors placed the Israelis
directly under the Syrians' guns. In the fighting that followed, both
sides took heavy casualties, with the Israelis losing all nineteen of
their tanks and half-tracks. The Israeli battalion commander then
ordered his twenty-five remaining men to dismount, divide into two
groups, and charge the northern and southern flanks of Tel Fakhr. The
first Israelis to reach the perimeter of the southern approach laid
bodily down on the barbed wire, allowing their comrades to vault over
them. From there, they assaulted the fortified Syrian positions. The
fighting was waged at extremely close quarters, often
On the northern flank, the Israelis broke through within minutes and
cleared out the trenches and bunkers. During the seven-hour battle,
the Israelis lost 31 dead and 82 wounded, while the Syrians lost 62
dead and 20 captured. Among the dead was the Israeli battalion
commander. The Golani Brigade's 51st
Battalion took Tel 'Azzaziat, and
Darbashiya also fell to Israeli forces.
Universal Newsreel from June 9 about the war and UN reactions.
By the evening of June 9, the four Israeli brigades had all broken
through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced.
Thousands of reinforcements began reaching the front, those tanks and
half-tracks that had survived the previous day's fighting were
refueled and replenished with ammunition, and the wounded were
evacuated. By dawn, the Israelis had eight brigades in the sector.
Syria's first line of defense had been shattered, but the defenses
beyond that remained largely intact. Mount Hermon and the Banias in
the north, and the entire sector between Tawfiq and Customs House Road
in the south remained in Syrian hands. In a meeting early on the night
of June 9, Syrian leaders decided to reinforce those positions as
quickly as possible, and to maintain a steady barrage on Israeli
Israeli attack: the next day
Throughout the night, the Israelis continued their advance. Though it
was slowed by fierce resistance, an anticipated Syrian counterattack
never materialized. At the fortified village of Jalabina, a garrison
of Syrian reservists, leveling their anti-aircraft guns, held off the
Israeli 65th Paratroop
Battalion for four hours before a small
detachment managed to penetrate the village and knock out the heavy
Meanwhile, the 8th Brigade's tanks moved south from Qala, advancing
six miles to Wasit under heavy artillery and tank bombardment. At the
Banias in the north, Syrian mortar batteries opened fire on advancing
Israeli forces only after Golani
Brigade sappers cleared a path
through a minefield, killing sixteen Israeli soldiers and wounding
On the next day, June 10, the central and northern groups joined in a
pincer movement on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty
territory as the Syrian forces retreated. At 8:30 am, the Syrians
began blowing up their own bunkers, burning documents and retreating.
Several units joined by Elad Peled's troops climbed to the Golan from
the south, only to find the positions mostly empty. When the 8th
Brigade reached Mansura, five miles from Wasit, the Israelis met no
opposition and found abandoned equipment, including tanks, in perfect
working condition. In the fortified Banias village, Golani Brigade
troops found only several Syrian soldiers chained to their
During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre
room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west.
In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after an agreed-upon
cease-fire to occupy strategically strong positions. To the
east, the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This
position later became the cease-fire line known as the "Purple Line".
Time magazine reported: "In an effort to pressure the United Nations
into enforcing a ceasefire,
Damascus Radio undercut its own army by
broadcasting the fall of the city of
Quneitra three hours before it
actually capitulated. That premature report of the surrender of their
headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the
Main article: Israeli Military Governorate
Universal Newsreel from June 13 about the war
By June 10,
Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan
Heights, and a ceasefire was signed the day after.
Israel had seized
the Gaza Strip, the
Sinai Peninsula, the
West Bank of the
(including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. About one
million Arabs were placed under Israel's direct control in the newly
captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300
kilometers in the south, 60 kilometers in the east, and 20 kilometers
of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security asset that would
prove useful in the
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War six years later.
Speaking three weeks after the war ended, as he accepted an honorary
degree from Hebrew University,
Yitzhak Rabin gave his reasoning behind
the success of Israel:
Our airmen, who struck the enemies' planes so accurately that no one
in the world understands how it was done and people seek technological
explanations or secret weapons; our armoured troops who beat the enemy
even when their equipment was inferior to his; our soldiers in all
other branches … who overcame our enemies everywhere, despite the
latter's superior numbers and fortifications—all these revealed not
only coolness and courage in the battle but … an understanding that
only their personal stand against the greatest dangers would achieve
victory for their country and for their families, and that if victory
was not theirs the alternative was annihilation.
In recognition of contributions, Rabin was given the honour of naming
the war for the Israelis. From the suggestions proposed, including the
"War of Daring", "War of Salvation", and "War of the Sons of Light",
he "chose the least ostentatious, the Six-Day War, evoking the days of
Dayan's final report on the war to the Israeli general staff listed
several shortcomings in Israel's actions, including misinterpretation
of Nasser's intentions, overdependence on the United States, and
reluctance to act when
Egypt closed the Straits. He also credited
several factors for Israel's success:
Egypt did not appreciate the
advantage of striking first and their adversaries did not accurately
gauge Israel's strength and its willingness to use it.
In Egypt, according to Heikal, Nasser had admitted his responsibility
for the military defeat in June 1967. According to historian Abd
al-Azim Ramadan, Nasser's mistaken decisions to expel the
international peacekeeping force from the
Sinai Peninsula and close
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran in 1967 led to a state of war with Israel,
despite Egypt's lack of military preparedness.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
Egypt reviewed the causes of its loss
of the 1967 war. Issues that were identified included "the
individualistic bureaucratic leadership"; "promotions on the basis of
loyalty, not expertise, and the army's fear of telling Nasser the
truth"; lack of intelligence; and better Israeli weapons, command,
organization, and will to fight.
See also: Israeli casualties of war
Between 776 and 983 Israelis were killed and 4,517 were wounded.
Fifteen Israeli soldiers were captured. Arab casualties were far
greater. Between 9,800 and 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were listed
as killed or missing in action. An additional 4,338 Egyptian soldiers
were captured. Jordanian losses are estimated to be 700 killed in
action with another 2,500 wounded. The Syrians were estimated
to have sustained between 1,000 and 2,500 killed in
action. Between 367 and 591 Syrians were captured.
Main article: Controversies relating to the Six-Day War
Preemptive strike v. unjustified attack
Further information: Preemptive war
At the commencement of hostilities, both
that they had been attacked by the other country. The Israeli
government later abandoned its initial position, acknowledging Israel
had struck first, claiming that it was a preemptive strike in the face
of a planned invasion by Egypt. On the other hand, the Arab
view was that it was unjustified to attack Egypt. Many
commentators consider the war as the classic case of anticipatory
attack in self-defense.
Allegations of atrocities committed against Egyptian soldiers
It has been alleged that Nasser did not want
Egypt to learn of the
true extent of his defeat and so ordered the killing of Egyptian army
stragglers making their way back to the Suez canal zone. There
have also been allegations from both Israeli and Egyptian sources that
Israeli troops killed unarmed Egyptian
Allegations of military support from the US, UK and Soviet Union
There have been a number of allegations of direct military support of
Israel during the war by the US and the UK, including the supply of
equipment (despite an embargo) and the participation of US forces in
the conflict. Many of these allegations and
conspiracy theories have been disputed and it has been claimed
that some were given currency in the Arab world to explain the Arab
defeat. It has also been claimed that the Soviet Union, in
support of its Arab allies, used its naval strength in the
Mediterranean to act as a major restraint on the US Navy.
America features prominently in
Arab conspiracy theories
Arab conspiracy theories purporting to
explain the June 1967 defeat. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, a confidant of
Nasser, claims that President
Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson was obsessed with
Nasser and that Johnson conspired with
Israel to bring him down.
The reported Israeli troop movements seemed all the more threatening
because they were perceived in the context of a US conspiracy against
Egypt. Salah Bassiouny of the Foreign ministry, claims that Foreign
Ministry saw the reported Israeli troop movements as credible because
Israel had reached the level at which it could find strategic alliance
with the United States. During the war,
Cairo announced that
American and British planes were participating in the Israeli attack.
Nasser broke off diplomatic relations following this allegation.
Nasser's image of the
United States was such that he might well have
believed the worst. However
Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser used this
deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the
United States as a
political cover-up for domestic consumption. Lutfi Abd al-Qadir,
the director of Radio
Cairo during the late 1960s, who accompanied
Nasser to his visits in Moscow, had his conspiracy theory that both
the Soviets and the Western powers wanted to topple Nasser or to
reduce his influence.
USS Liberty incident
Main article: USS Liberty incident
On June 8, 1967, USS Liberty, a
United States Navy
United States Navy electronic
intelligence vessel sailing 13 nautical miles (24 km) off Arish
(just outside Egypt's territorial waters), was attacked by Israeli
jets and torpedo boats, nearly sinking the ship, killing 34 sailors
and wounding 171.
Israel said the attack was a case of mistaken
identity, and that the ship had been misidentified as the Egyptian
vessel El Quseir.
Israel apologized for the mistake, and paid
compensation to the victims or their families, and to the United
States for damage to the ship. After an investigation, the U.S.
accepted the explanation that the incident was friendly fire and the
issue was closed by the exchange of diplomatic notes in 1987. Others
however, including the then
United States Secretary of State
United States Secretary of State Dean
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Naval Operations at the time, Admiral Thomas Moorer,
some survivors of the attack and intelligence officials familiar with
transcripts of intercepted signals on the day, have rejected these
conclusions as unsatisfactory and maintain that the attack was made in
the knowledge that the ship was American.
The political importance of the 1967 War was immense; Israel
demonstrated that it was able and willing to initiate strategic
strikes that could change the regional balance.
Egypt and Syria
learned tactical lessons and would launch an attack in 1973 in an
attempt to reclaim their lost territory.
After following other Arab nations in declaring war, Mauritania
remained in a declared state of war with
Israel until about 1999.
United States imposed an embargo on new arms agreements to all
Middle East countries, including Israel. The embargo remained in force
until the end of the year, despite urgent Israeli requests to lift
Israel and Zionism
Following the war,
Israel experienced a wave of national euphoria, and
the press praised the military's performance for weeks afterward. New
"victory coins" were minted to celebrate. In addition, the world's
Israel grew, and the country's economy, which had been in
crisis before the war, flourished due to an influx of tourists and
donations, as well as the extraction of oil from the Sinai's
wells. The aftermath of the war also saw a baby boom, which
lasted for four years.
The aftermath of the war is also of religious significance. Under
Jordanian rule, Jews were expelled from
Jerusalem and were effectively
barred from visiting the
Western Wall (even though Article VIII of the
1949 Armistice Agreement demanded Israeli Jewish access to the Western
Wall). Jewish holy sites were not maintained, and Jewish
cemeteries had been desecrated. After the annexation to Israel, each
religious group was granted administration over its holy sites. For
the first time since 1948, Jews could visit the Old City of Jerusalem
and pray at the Western Wall, the holiest site where Jews are
permitted to pray. Despite the
Temple Mount being the most
important holy site in Jewish tradition, the al-Aqsa Mosque has been
under sole administration of the Jordanian Muslim Waqf, and Jews are
barred from praying on the Temple Mount, although they are allowed to
visit it. In Hebron, Jews gained access to the Cave of the
Patriarchs (the second most holy site in Judaism, after the Temple
Mount) for the first time since the 14th century (previously Jews were
allowed to pray only at the entrance). Other Jewish holy sites,
Rachel's Tomb in
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, also
The war inspired the Jewish diaspora, which was swept up in
overwhelming support for Israel. According to Michael Oren, the war
enabled American Jews to "walk with their backs straight and flex
their political muscle as never before. American Jewish organizations
which had previously kept
Israel at arms length suddenly proclaimed
their Zionism." Thousands of Jewish immigrants arrived from
Western countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
South Africa after the war. Many of them returned to their
countries of origin after a few years; one survey found that 58% of
American Jews who immigrated to
Israel between 1961 and 1972 returned
to the US. Nevertheless, this immigration to
Israel of Jews from
Western countries, which was previously only a trickle, was a
significant force for the first time. Most notably, the war
stirred Zionist passions among Jews in the Soviet Union, who had by
that time been forcibly assimilated. Many Soviet Jews subsequently
applied for exit visas and began protesting for their right to
immigrate to Israel. Following diplomatic pressure from the West, the
Soviet government began granting exit visas to Jews in growing
numbers. From 1970 to 1988, some 291,000 Soviet Jews were granted exit
visas, of whom 165,000 immigrated to
Israel and 126,000 immigrated to
the United States. The great rise in Jewish pride in the wake of
Israel's victory also fueled the beginnings of the baal teshuva
Jews in Arab countries-Pogroms and expulsion
Main article: Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries
In the Arab nations, populations of minority Jews faced persecution
and expulsion following the Israeli victory. According to historian
and ambassador Michael B. Oren:
Mobs attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia,
and Morocco, burning synagogues and assaulting residents. A pogrom in
Tripoli, Libya, left 18 Jews dead and 25 injured; the survivors were
herded into detention centers. Of Egypt's 4,000 Jews, 800 were
arrested, including the chief rabbis of both
Cairo and Alexandria, and
their property sequestered by the government. The ancient communities
Baghdad were placed under house arrest, their leaders
imprisoned and fined. A total of 7,000 Jews were expelled, many with
merely a satchel.
Antisemitism against Jews in Communist countries
Following the war, a series of antisemitic purges began in Communist
countries. Some 11,200 Jews from Poland immigrated to Israel
1968 Polish political crisis
1968 Polish political crisis and the following year.
Peace and diplomacy
Following the war,
Israel made an offer for peace that included the
return of most of the recently captured territories. According to
On June 19, 1967, the
National Unity Government [of Israel] voted
unanimously to return the
Egypt and the
Golan Heights to
Syria in return for peace agreements. The Golans would have to be
demilitarized and special arrangement would be negotiated for the
Straits of Tiran. The government also resolved to open negotiations
with King Hussein of
Jordan regarding the Eastern border.
The June 19 Israeli cabinet decision did not include the Gaza Strip,
and left open the possibility of
Israel permanently acquiring parts of
the West Bank. On June 25–27,
Israel incorporated East Jerusalem
together with areas of the
West Bank to the north and south into
Jerusalem's new municipal boundaries.
The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the
United States. The U.S. was informed of the decision, but not that it
was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from
Syria, and some historians claim that they may never have received the
In September, the Khartoum Arab Summit resolved that there would be
"no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel". However, as
Avraham Sela notes, the Khartoum conference effectively marked a shift
in the perception of the conflict by the Arab states away from one
centered on the question of Israel's legitimacy, toward one focusing
on territories and boundaries. This was shown on November 22 when
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council Resolution
242. Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations
with Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the
equation that any direct peace talks with
Israel were tantamount to
After the war, the entire Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe (with the
exception of Romania) broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.
The 1967 War laid the foundation for future discord in the region, as
the Arab states resented Israel's victory and did not want to give up
On November 22, 1967, the
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 242, the "land for peace" formula, which called for Israeli
withdrawal "from territories occupied" in 1967 and "the termination of
all claims or states of belligerency". Resolution 242 recognized the
right of "every state in the area to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." Israel
Egypt in 1978, after the Camp David Accords, and
disengaged from the
Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005. Its army
frequently re-enters Gaza for military operations and still retains
control of the seaports, airports and most of the border crossings.
Captured territories and Arab displaced populations
Main article: 1967 Palestinian exodus
There was extensive displacement of populations in the captured
territories: of about one million
Palestinians in the
West Bank and
Gaza, 300,000 (according to the
United States Department of
State) either fled, or were displaced from their homes, to
Jordan, where they contributed to the growing unrest. The other
700,000 remained. In the Golan Heights, an estimated 80,000
Israel allowed only the inhabitants of East
Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights to receive full Israeli citizenship,
applying its law, administration and jurisdiction to these territories
in 1967 and 1981, respectively. The vast majority of the populations
in both territories declined to take citizenship. See also
Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Golan Heights.
In his book Righteous Victims (1999), Israeli "New Historian" Benny
In three villages southwest of
Jerusalem and at Qalqilya, houses were
destroyed "not in battle, but as punishment ... and in order to chase
away the inhabitants ... contrary to government ... policy," Dayan
wrote in his memoirs. In Qalqilya, about a third of the homes were
razed and about 12,000 inhabitants were evicted, though many then
camped out in the environs. The evictees in both areas were allowed to
stay and later were given cement and tools by the Israeli authorities
to rebuild at least some of their dwellings.
But many thousands of other
Palestinians now took to the roads.
Perhaps as many as seventy thousand, mostly from the
fled during the fighting; tens of thousands more left over the
following months. Altogether, about one-quarter of the population of
the West Bank, about 200–250,000 people, went into exile. ... They
simply walked to the
Jordan River crossings and made their way on foot
to the East Bank. It is unclear how many were intimidated or forced
out by the Israeli troops and how many left voluntarily, in panic and
fear. There is some evidence of IDF soldiers going around with
loudspeakers ordering West Bankers to leave their homes and cross the
Jordan. Some left because they had relatives or sources of livelihood
on the East Bank and feared being permanently cut off.
Thousands of Arabs were taken by bus from
East Jerusalem to the
Allenby Bridge, though there is no evidence of coercion. The free
Israeli-organized transportation, which began on June 11, 1967, went
on for about a month. At the bridge they had to sign a document
stating that they were leaving of their own free will. Perhaps as many
as 70,000 people emigrated from the
Gaza Strip to
Egypt and elsewhere
in the Arab world.
On July 2, the Israeli government announced that it would allow the
return of those 1967 refugees who desired to do so, but no later than
August 10, later extended to September 13. The Jordanian authorities
probably pressured many of the refugees, who constituted an enormous
burden, to sign up to return. In practice only 14,000 of the 120,000
who applied were allowed by
Israel back into the
West Bank by the
beginning of September. After that, only a trickle of "special cases"
were allowed back, perhaps 3,000 in all. (328–29)
In addition, between 80,000 and 110,000 Syrians fled the Golan
Heights, of which about 20,000 were from the city of
Quneitra. According to more recent research by the Israeli daily
Haaretz, a total of 130,000 Syrian inhabitants fled or were expelled
from the territory, most of them pushed out by the Israeli army.
Israel made peace with
Egypt following the
Camp David Accords
Camp David Accords of 1978
and completed a staged withdrawal from the
Sinai in 1982. However, the
position of the other occupied territories has been a long-standing
and bitter cause of conflict for decades between
Israel and the
Palestinians, and the Arab world in general.
Egypt eventually withdrew their claims to sovereignty over
West Bank and Gaza, respectively. (The
Sinai was returned to Egypt
on the basis of the
Camp David Accords
Camp David Accords of 1978.)
Israel and Jordan
signed a peace treaty in 1994.
After the Israeli conquest of these newly acquired 'territories', it
launched a large settlement effort in these areas to secure a
permanent foothold. There are now hundreds of thousands of Israeli
settlers in the West Bank. They are a matter of controversy within
Israel, both among the general population and within different
political administrations, supporting them to varying degrees.
Palestinians consider them a provocation. The Israeli settlements in
Gaza were evacuated and destroyed in August 2005 as a part of Israeli
disengagement from Gaza.
Abba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister
Hafez al-Assad, Syrian Defense Minister
Catch 67, a 2017 Israeli philosophy book on the
West Bank occupation
that launched a public dialogue on the war's 50th anniversary
Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet leader
List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
Robert McNamara, U.S. Defense Secretary
Syrian towns and villages depopulated in the Arab–Israeli conflict
U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations
1. ^ Photograph:
It was twenty minutes after the capture of the
Western Wall that David
Rubinger shot his "signature" photograph of three Israeli paratroopers
gazing in wonder up at the wall [Kaniuk, Yoram. "June 10, 1967 –
Israeli paratroopers reach the Western Wall". The Digital Journalist.
Retrieved December 2, 2008. ]. As part of the terms for his
access to the front lines, Rubinger handed the negatives to the
Israeli government, who then distributed this image widely. Although
he was displeased with the violation of his copyright, the widespread
use of his photo made it famous [Silver, Eric (February 16, 2006).
David Rubinger in the picture". The Jewish Chronicle. Retrieved July
17, 2010. ], and it is now considered a defining image of the
conflict and one of the best-known in the history of
Conal (May 6, 2007). "Six days in June". The Observer. Retrieved
December 2, 2008. ]
Israel announced that they had been attacked
by the other country.
Gideon Rafael [Israeli Ambassador to the UN] received a message from
the Israeli foreign office: "Inform immediately the President of the
Sec. Co. that
Israel is now engaged in repelling Egyptian land and air
forces." At 3:10 am, Rafael woke ambassador Hans Tabor, the
Danish President of the Security Council for June, with the news that
Egyptian forces had "moved against Israel". Bailey 1990, p. 225.
[At Security Council meeting of June 5], both
to be repelling an invasion by the other. Bailey 1990, p. 225.
"Egyptian sources claimed that
Israel had initiated hostilities [...]
but Israeli officials – Eban and Evron – swore that
fired first" Oren 2002, p. 196.
"Gideon Rafael phoned Danish ambassador Hans Tabor, Security Council
president for the month of June, and informed him that
responding to a 'cowardly and treacherous' attack from Egypt..." Oren,
4. ^ Lenczowski 1990, pp. 105–15, Citing Moshe Dayan, Story of
My Life, and Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab–Israeli
Confrontation, 1948–1967, p. 375
Israel clearly did not want the US government to know too much about
its dispositions for attacking Syria, initially planned for June 8,
but postponed for 24 hours. It should be pointed out that the attack
on the Liberty occurred on June 8, whereas on June 9 at 3 am,
Syria announced its acceptance of the cease-fire. Despite this, at
7 am, that is, four hours later, Israel's minister of defense,
Moshe Dayan, "gave the order to go into action against Syria."
^ Krauthammer 2007.
^ a b Oren, p. 237
^ "Pakistani Pilots in Arab
Israel War". Opinion Maker. August 10,
2012. Archived from the original on May 12, 2013. Retrieved May 13,
^ a b Tucker 2004, p. 176.
^ a b c Griffin 2006, p. 336.
^ a b
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008.
^ a b c Gawrych 2000, p. 3
^ Zaloga, Steven (1981). Armour of the
Middle East Wars 1948–78
(Vanguard). Osprey Publishing.
^ a b El Gamasy 1993 p. 79.
^ a b Herzog 1982, p. 165.
^ a b c d
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004
^ a b The Six Day War 1967:
Jordan and Syria. Simon Dunstan.
Bloomsbury Publishing. 20 February 2013. Retrieved 6 January
^ Warfare since the Second World War, By Klaus Jürgen Gantzel,
Torsten Schwinghammer, p. 253
^ Wars in the Third World since 1945, (NY 1991) Guy Arnold
^ a b Tucker, Spencer C. (2010). The Encyclopedia of
Middle East Wars.
United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq
Conflicts. ABC-CLIO. p. 1198. ISBN 978-1-85109-947-4.
^ a b Woolf, Alex (2012). Arab–Israeli War Since 1948.
Heinemann-Raintree. p. 27. ISBN 978-1-4329-6004-9.
^ a b Sachar, Howard M. (2013). A History of Israel: From the Rise of
Zionism to Our Time. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8041-5049-1.
^ a b c Oren, pp. 185–87
^ Gerhard, William D.; Millington, Henry W. (1981). "Attack on a
SIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty" (PDF). NSA History Report, U.S.
Cryptologic History series. National Security Agency. partially
declassified 1999, 2003.
^ Both USA and
Israel officially attributed the USS Liberty incident
as being due to mistaken identification.
^ Major General Indar Jit Rikhye (28 October 2013). The
Withdrawal of the
United Nations Emergency Force
United Nations Emergency Force Leading... Taylor
& Francis. pp. 8–. ISBN 978-1-136-27985-0.
^ Ami Gluska (12 February 2007). The Israeli Military and the Origins
of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy
1963–67. Routledge. p. 152. ISBN 978-1-134-16377-9. On the
evening of 22 May, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, accompanied by ...
Egyptian air force base at Bir Gafgafa in
Sinai and addressed the
pilots and officers. ... 'The Jews are threatening war – we say to
them ahlan wa-sahlan (welcome)!
United Nations Emergency Force
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) – Background (Full
text)". Rauschning, Wiesbrock & Lailach 1997, p. 30; Sachar
2007, pp. 504, 507–08.
^ Some sources date the agreement to November 4, others to November 7.
Most sources simply say "November". Gawrych (2000) p. 5
^ Schiff, Zeev, History of the Israeli Army, Straight Arrow Books
(1974) p. 145
^ Churchill & Churchill, The Six Day War, Houghton Mifflin Company
(1967) p. 21
^ Pollack, Kenneth, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991,
University of Nebraska Press (2002), p. 290
^ Segev, 2007, pp.149–52.
^ Hart, 1989 p. 226
^ Oren 2002/2003, p. 312; Burrowes & Douglas 1972,
^ Shemesh, Moshe (2007). Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and
the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's
Descent to War, 1957–1967. Sussex Academic Press. p. 118.
ISBN 1-84519-188-9. The Jordanian leadership's appraisal of the
repercussions of the Samu' raid was a major factor in King Husayn's
decision to join Nasir's war chariot by signing a joint defense pact
Egypt on May 30, 1967. This was the determining factor for
Jordan's participation in the war that would soon break out....
Convinced after the Samu' raid that Israel's strategic goal was the
West Bank, Husayn allied himself to Nasir out of a genuine fear that,
in a comprehensive war,
Israel would invade the
West Bank whether or
Jordan was an active participant.
^ Tessler, Mark (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
John Wiley & Sons. p. 378. ISBN 0-253-20873-4. Towards
the War of June 1967: Growing tensions in the region were clearly
visible long before Israel's November attack on Samu and two other
West Bank towns. An escalating spiral of raid and retaliation had
already been set in motion...
^ Herzog 1982, p. 148
^ John Quigley, The
Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning
the Legal Basis for Preventive War, Cambridge University Press, 2013,
^ Shlaim (2007) p. 238
^ Samir A. Mutawi (18 July 2002).
Jordan in the 1967 War. Cambridge
University Press. p. 93. ISBN 978-0-521-52858-0. Although
Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a
model of moderation. His speech on 21 May demanded that Nasser
withdraw his forces from
Sinai but made no mention of the removal of
UNEF from the Straits nor of what
Israel would do if they were closed
to Israeli shipping. The next day Nasser announced to an astonished
world that henceforth the Straits were, indeed, closed to all Israeli
^ Cohen, Raymond. (1988), p. 12
^ "Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising
free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits
of Tiran will be regarded by
Israel as an attack entitling it to
exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the
Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the
free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the
Straits." "Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir,
1 March 1957".
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – The State of
^ Morris, Benny (1999). Righteous Victims: A History of the
Zionist–Arab Conflict, 1881–1998. Random House. p. 306.
^ Gat, Moshe (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East,
1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing
Group. p. 202. ISBN 0-275-97514-2.
^ Colonomos, Ariel (2013). The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to
Justify Preventive War?. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 25.
^ "LBJ Pledges U.S. to Peace Effort", Eugene Register-Guard (June 19,
1967). See also Johnson, Lyndon. "Address at the State Department's
Foreign Policy Conference for Educators" (June 19, 1967).
^ Churchill po. 52 and 77
^ Reston, James (May 24, 1967). "Washington: Nasser's Reckless
Cairo and Moscow The U.S. Commitment The Staggering Economy
Moscow's Role". The New York Times. p. 46.
^ Quigley, The
Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defence, p. 60. (Cambridge
^ Stone 2004, p. 217.
^ Pollack 2004, p. 294
^ Pollack 2004, p. 59
^ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997, p. 76.
^ Mutawi 2002, p. 42.
^ a b Segev 1967, pp. 82, 175–91.
^ Pollack 2004, pp. 293–94
^ "Air Warriors".
Pakistan Air Force. Retrieved 15 July 2017.
^ "Eagle Biography – Saiful Azam". Air University. Retrieved 15 July
^ Oren, 176; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, 318.
^ Pollack 2004, p. 58.
^ de Mazarrasa, Javier (1994) (in Spanish). Blindados en España 2ª
Parte: La Dificil Postguerra 1939–1960. Valladolid, Spain: Quiron
Ediciones. p. 50. ISBN 84-87314-10-4
^ Perrett, Bryan (1999). Panzerkampfwagen IV medium tank: 1936–1945.
Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey. p. 44. ISBN 978-1-85532-843-3
^ Oren 2002, p. 172
^ Bowen 2003, p. 99 (author interview with Moredechai Hod, May 7,
^ a b Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "The War: Day One, June
^ Bowen 2003, pp. 114–15 (author interview with General Salahadeen
Hadidi who presided over the first court martial of the heads of the
air force and the air defense system after the war).
^ Oren 2002 p. 171
^ Pollack 2005, p. 474.
^ Oren, 176, says 282 out of 420. Morris, 318, says 304 out of 419.
Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
(Indiana, 1994), p. 396, says over 350 planes were destroyed.
^ Long 1984, p. 19, Table 1.
^ a b Oren, p. 178
^ Oren, p. 175
^ a b "Part 4: The 1967 Six Day War". Retrieved April 20, 2011.
^ Pollack 2004, p. 59.
^ a b c d Oren, p. 180
^ Oren, p. 181
^ a b Oren, p. 202
^ "Six Day War". Israeli-weapons. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
^ Oren, p. 182
^ Simon Dunstan,The Six Day War 1967: Sinai, Osprey Publishing, 2012,
^ Leslie Stein,The Making of Modern Israel: 1948–1967, Polity Press,
2013 p. 181.
^ a b Oren, p. 201
^ a b Hammel 1992, p. 239
^ Oren, p. 212
^ Oren, p. 211
^ Mubasher, Abdou (7–13 June 2007). "The road to Naksa". Al-Ahram.
Retrieved 24 May 2017.
^ a b Oren, p. 248
^ Oren 2002, pp. 184–185.
^ "On June 5,
Israel sent a message to Hussein urging him not to open
fire. Despite shelling into West Jerusalem, Netanya, and the outskirts
of Tel Aviv,
Israel did nothing." The Six Day War and Its Enduring
Legacy. Summary of remarks by
Michael Oren at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, May 29, 2002.
^ Donald Neff (1984). Warriors for Jerusalem: the six days that
changed the Middle East. Linden Press/Simon & Schuster.
p. 205. ISBN 978-0-671-45485-2. Odd Bull: "[the message] was
a threat, pure and simple and it is not the normal practice of the
U.N. to pass on threats from one government to another." However, as
"…this message seemed so important… we quickly sent it…and King
Hussein received the message before 10:30 the same morning."
^ a b Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall:
Israel and the Arab World.
pp. 243–244. In May–June 1967 Eshkol's government did
everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian
front. Eshkol and his colleagues took into account the possibility of
some fighting on the Syrian front. But they wanted to avoid having a
Jordan and the inevitable complications of having to deal
with the predominantly Palestinian population of the West Bank. The
fighting on the eastern front was initiated by Jordan, not by Israel.
King Hussein got carried along by a powerful current of Arab
nationalism. On May 30 he flew to
Cairo and signed a defense pact with
Nasser. On June 5,
Jordan started shelling the Israeli side in
Jerusalem. This could have been interpreted either as a salvo to
uphold Jordanian honour or as a declaration of war. Eshkol decided to
give King Hussein the benefit of the doubt. Through General Odd Bull,
the Norwegian commander of UNTSO, he sent the following message the
morning of June 5: "We shall not initiate any action whatsoever
against Jordan. However, should
Jordan open hostilities, we shall
react with all our might, and the king will have to bear the full
responsibility of the consequences." King Hussein told General Bull
that it was too late; the die was cast.
^ a b c Shlaim, 2001, p. 244.
^ a b c Oren, pp. 187–88
United Nations June 5, 1967". United Nations. Archived from the
original on December 26, 2011. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
^ Oren, p. 187
^ a b Shlaim 2001, p. 245.
^ Oren, p. 188–89
^ "Pacifica Military History – Free Samples". Pacificamilitary.com.
June 5, 1967. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
^ a b Oren, pp. 191–92
^ a b c d Oren, p. 222
^ a b c http://www.sixdaywar.org/contest/easternfront.asp[permanent
^ a b c Oren, p. 203
^ a b Oren, pp. 222–23
^ Oren, p. 224
^ Oren, p. 219
^ Shlaim 2001, p. 246.
^ a b c Sachar 1976. p. 642.
^ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "
Damascus and Jerusalem".
^ a b Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "The War: Day Five, June
^ Morris, 2001, p. 325
^ Hammel 1992, p. 387
^ Oren, p.280
^ Oren, pp. 281–82
^ a b c Oren, p. 283
^ Oren, p. 295
^ Video: Cease-Fire. Uneasy Truce In Mid-East, 1967/06/13 (1967).
Universal Newsreel. 1960. Retrieved February 22, 2012.
^ Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "Playing for the Brink".
^ "A Campaign for the Books". Time. September 1, 1967.
Six-Day War –
Middle East ".
^ Sachar 1976. p. 660.
^ a b c Oren 2002, electronic edition, Section "Aftershocks".
^ Elie Podeh; Onn Winckler (1 December 2004). Rethinking Nasserism:
Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt. University Press of
Florida. pp. 110, 111. ISBN 978-0-8130-3137-8. The most
outstanding exponent of the Nasserist narrative was Muhammad Hasanayn
Haykal, who also embodied the revolutionary heritage personally as
Nasser's closest aid and the editor in chief of the state-sponsored
dailies Al-Akhbar and Al-Ahram.... Haykal acknowledged that Nasser had
erred in various fields, noting that he had admitted, for example, his
responsibility for the military defeat in the June 1967 War
^ Elie Podeh; Onn Winckler (1 December 2004). Rethinking Nasserism:
Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt. University Press of
Florida. pp. 105, 106. ISBN 978-0-8130-3137-8. the prominent
historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a series of articles
published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a hook published in
2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult, .... The events leading up
to the nationalization of the
Suez Canal Company, as other events
during Nasser's rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a
rational, responsible leader. ... His decision to nationalize the Suez
Canal was his alone, made without political or military consultation.
... The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser's
inclination to solitary decision making... the revolutionary regime
led by the same individual—Nasser—repeated its mistakes when it
decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai
Peninsula and close the
Straits of Tiran
Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led
to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military
^ Churchill & Churchill 1967, p. 189
^ a b Quigley, John (2005). The Case for Palestine: An International
Law Perspective. London: Duke University Press. p. 163.
^ "BBC Panorama". BBC News. February 6, 2009. Retrieved February 1,
Egypt State Information Service". Sis.gov.eg. Retrieved February 1,
^ UN Security Council meeting 1347 Archived March 19, 2011, at the
Wayback Machine. (June 5, 1967)
^ Kinga Tibori Szabó (22 August 2011). Anticipatory Action in
Self-Defence: Essence and Limits under International Law. Springer
Science & Business Media. pp. 147, 148.
ISBN 978-90-6704-796-8. (p. 147) The sequence of events that led
to the Israeli pre-emptive strike did indeed create a situation where
an armed attack seemed unavoidable. (p. 148 ) Many commentators treat
it (the six day war) as the locus classicus of anticipatory action in
^ John Quigley (17 December 2012). The
Six-Day War and Israeli
Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War.
Cambridge University Press. pp. 135–.
ISBN 978-1-139-62049-9. Terence Taylor…wrote in 2004…that
"many scholars" considered
Israel to have "conducted the (1967) action
in anticipatory of self-defense
^ Churchill & Churchill 1967, p. 179.
^ Bron, Gabby 'Egyptian POWs Ordered to Dig Graves, Then Shot By
Israeli Army' Archived February 19, 2007, at the Wayback Machine.,
Yedioth Ahronoth, August 17, 1995.
^ Bar-Zohar, Michael 'The Reactions of Journalists to the Army's
Murders of POWs', Maariv, August 17, 1995.
^ Prior 1999, pp. 209–10; Bar-On, Morris and Golani 2002;
Fisher, Ronal 'Mass Murder in the 1956 War', Ma'ariv, August 8, 1995.
^ Laub, Karin"Archived copy". Archived from the original on December
11, 2003. Retrieved December 11, 2003. CS1 maint: Unfit url
(link) , Associated Press, August 16, 1995. Retrieved from the Wayback
Machine. October 14, 2005.
Israel Reportedly Killed POWs", August 17, 1995
^ Segev, T., 2007, p. 374
^ Ibrahim, Youssef (September 21, 1995). "
Egypt Says Israelis Killed
P.O.W.'s in '67 War". The New York Times.
^ Mansour 1994, p. 89
^ Green 1984
^ Smith, September 15, 1967
^ Bowen 2003, p. 89.
^ Phythian 2001, pp. 193–94.
^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) pp. 8, 53, 60, 75, 193, 199, 297
Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, pp. 51-62
^ Hattendorf 2000
^ "McNamara: US Near War in '67". The Boston Globe. September 16,
1983. p. 1.
^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 8
^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 60
^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 75
^ Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 199
^ John Crewdson (2 October 2007). "New revelations in attack on
American spy ship". Chicago Tribune.
^ Tim Fischer, 'Six days of war, 40 years of secrecy,'
The Age May 27,
^ John Quigley, The
Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning
the Legal Basis for Preventive War, Cambridge University Press 2013 p.
93. Cf Dean Rusk, As I Saw it: A Secretary of State's Memoirs, W.W.
Norton, 1990 pp. 386–88.
^ Brams & Togman 1998, p. 243; Youngs 2001, p. 12
Amos Oz interview with Phillip Adams, 10 September 1991,
ABC Radio National
ABC Radio National 23 December 2011
^ William B. Quandt (2001). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the
Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967. University of California Press.
p. 42. ISBN 978-0-520-22374-5. once hostilities were under
way, the United states imposed an embargo on new arms agreements to
all countries of the Middle East, including Israel. The embargo
remained in force through the end of the year, despite urgent Israeli
requests to lift it.
^ Oren, p. 309
^ Reuters (March 6, 2007). "HMO Data Show
Lebanon War Triggered Baby
Boom in Israel" – via Haaretz.
^ "Fact Sheet No. 52, Remembering the Six Day War". May 7, 2007.
Archived from the original on May 14, 2008. Retrieved March 28,
^ Tessler, Mark A. (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict. Indiana University Press. p. 326.
^ Aikman, David (1998). Great Souls: Six Who Changed a Century.
Lexington Books. p. 349. ISBN 0-7391-0438-1.
^ The "Status Quo" on the
Temple Mount November–December 2014
Jerusalem in the unholy grip of religious fervor, Times of Israel.
November 6, 2014
Cave of the Patriarchs
Cave of the Patriarchs Archived March 18, 2015, at the Wayback
^ Tom Selwyn. Contested Mediterranean Spaces: The Case of Rachel's
Tomb, Bethlehem, Palestine. Berghahn Books. pp. 276–278.
^ "Archaeology in Israel: Joseph's Tomb".
^ Oren, p. 332
^ The Rise – and Rise – of French Jewry's Immigration to Israel
Judy Maltz, 13 January 2015. haaretz.com
^ "The 40th anniversary of the
Six-Day War / Rate of return". Haaretz.
June 1, 2007. Retrieved October 10, 2014.
^ Tolts, Mark. Post-Soviet Aliyah and Jewish Demographic
^ "The Miracle of '67: Forty Years Since the
Six-Day War (Rabbi Moshe
Goldstein) 2007". www.wherewhatwhen.com. Archived from the original on
December 12, 2007.
^ "American Jews rediscover orthodoxy". The New York Times. 30
September 1984. Retrieved 9 October 2017.
^ Aiken, Lisa (2009). The Baal Teshuva Survival Guide. Rossi
Publications. ISBN 0-9779629-3-8.
^ Oren 2002, pp. 306–07
^ Ringer, Ronald (2006). Excel HSC Modern History. Pascal Press.
p. 390. Retrieved 2013-09-10.
^ Włodzimierz Rozenbaum, CIAO: Intermarium, National Convention of
the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies,
Atlanta, Ga., 8–11 October 1975.
^ Communiqué: Investigation regarding communist state officers who
publicly incited hatred towards people of different nationality.
Institute of National Remembrance, Warsaw. Publication on Polish site
of IPN: July 25, 2007.
^ Herzog 1989, p. 253.
^ Shlaim 2001, p. 254.
^ Sela 1997, p. 108.
^ Itamar Rabinovich; Haim Shaked. From June to October: The Middle
East Between 1967 And 1973. Transaction Publishers. p. 192.
ISBN 978-1-4128-2418-7. In dozens of speeches and statements,
Nasser posited the equation that any direct peace talks with Israel
were tantamount to surrender. His efforts to forestall any movement
toward direct negotiations ...
^ Webman, Esther (2011). The Global Impact of the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion: A Century-Old Myth. Routledge. p. 133.
^ "US State Department".
^ "Right of return: Palestinian dream". UK: BBC News. April 15,
^ "Distribution of the Palestinian Population And Jewish Settlers In
West Bank and Gaza Since 1967". Archived from the original on May
14, 2010. Retrieved July 17, 2010.
^ "Golan Heights". Retrieved October 8, 2005.
^ Morris (2001) p. 327
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 2010. Retrieved
July 18, 2010.
^ Shay Fogelman, "The disinherited", Haaretz, July 30, 2010
al-Qusi, Abdallah Ahmad Hamid. (1999). Al-Wisam fi at-Ta'rikh. Cairo:
Al-Mu'asasa al-'Arabiya al-Haditha. No ISBN available.
Aloni, Shlomo (2001). Arab–Israeli Air Wars 1947–1982. Osprey
Aviation. ISBN 1-84176-294-6
Alteras, Isaac. (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.–Israeli
Relations, 1953–1960, University Press of Florida.
Bailey, Sydney (1990). Four Arab–Israeli Wars and the Peace Process.
London: The MacMillan Press. ISBN 0-312-04649-9.
Bar-On, Mordechai; Morris, Benny & Golani, Motti (2002).
Reassessing Israel's Road to Sinai/Suez, 1956: A "Trialogue". In Gary
A. Olson (Ed.). Traditions and Transitions in
Israel Studies: Books on
Israel, Volume VI (pp. 3–42). SUNY Press.
Bar-On, Mordechai (2006). Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military
History, ISBN 0-275-98158-4
Bard, Mitchell G. (2002, 2008). The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle
East Conflict. NY: Alpha books. ISBN 0-02-864410-7. 4th Edition
ISBN 1-59257-791-1. Chapter 14, "Six Days to Victory" is
reproduced online as The 1967 Six-Day War. at the Jewish Virtual
Library of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise.
Ben-Gurion, David. (1999). Ben-Gurion diary: May–June 1967. Israel
Studies 4(2), 199–220.
Black, Ian (1992). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's
Intelligence Services. Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-3286-3
Bober, Arie (ed.) (1972). The other Israel. Doubleday Anchor.
Boczek, Boleslaw Adam (2005). International Law: A Dictionary.
Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0-8108-5078-8
Borowiec, Andrew. (1998). Modern Tunisia: A Democratic Apprenticeship.
Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-96136-2.
Bowen, Jeremy (2003). Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle
East. London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-3095-7
Brams, Steven J. & Jeffrey M. Togman. (1998). Camp David: Was the
agreement fair? In Paul F. Diehl (Ed.), A Road Map to War: Territorial
Dimensions of International Conflict. Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press. ISBN 0-8265-1329-8.
Brecher, Michael. (1996). Eban and Israeli foreign policy: Diplomacy,
war and disengagement. In A Restless Mind: Essays in Honor of Amos
Perlmutter, Benjamin Frankel (ed.), pp. 104–117. Routledge.
Bregman, Ahron. (2000). Israel's Wars, 1947–1993. Routledge.
Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London:
Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
Burrowes, Robert & Muzzio, Douglas. (1972). The Road to the Six
Day War: Towards an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and
Israel, 1965–67. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 2,
Research Perspectives on the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A Symposium,
Cohen, Raymond. (1988) Intercultural Communication between
Egypt: Deterrence Failure before the Six-Day war. Review of
International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1–16
Christie, Hazel (1999). Law of the Sea. Manchester: Manchester
University Press. ISBN 0-7190-4382-4
Churchill, Randolph & Churchill, Winston. (1967 ). The Six Day
War. Houghton Mifflin Company. ISBN 0-395-07532-7
Colaresi, Michael P. (2005). Scare Tactics: The politics of
international rivalry. Syracuse University Press.
Eban, Abba (1977). Abba Eban: An Autobiography. Random House.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (1997).
Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System. London:
Routledge. ISBN 0-415-15675-0
Feron, James (May 13, 1967). "Israelis Ponder Blow at Syrians; Some
Leaders Decide That Force is the Only Way to Curtail Terrorism Some
Israeli Leaders See Need for Force to Curb Syrians". The New York
El-Gamasy, Mohamed Abdel Ghani. (1993). The October War. The American
Cairo Press. ISBN 977-424-316-1.
Gawrych, George W. (2000). The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and
Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
Wars. Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-31302-4. Available in multiple
PDF files from the
Combat Studies Institute
Combat Studies Institute and the Combined Arms
Research Library, CSI Publications in parts.
Gelpi, Christopher (2002). Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of
Norms in Crisis Bargaining. Princeton University Press.
Gerner, Deborah J. (1994). One Land, Two Peoples. Westview Press.
ISBN 0-8133-2180-8, p. 112
Gerteiny, Alfred G. & Ziegler, Jean (2007). The Terrorist
Conjunction: The United States, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and
Al-Qā'ida. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-99643-3,
Gilbert, Martin. (2008).
Israel – A History. McNally & Loftin
Publishers. ISBN 0-688-12363-5. Chapter available online: Chapter
21: Nasser's Challenge.
Goldstein, Erik (1992). Wars and Peace Treaties, 1816–1991.
Routledge. ISBN 0-415-07822-9
Green, Stephen J. (1984). Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations
With Militant Israel. William Morrow & Co.
Griffin, David J. (2006).
Hawker Hunter 1951 to 2007 Lulu.com, 4
edition. ISBN 1-4303-0593-2.
Haddad, Yvonne. (1992). Islamists and the "Problem of Israel": The
Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2,
Hajjar, Sami G. The Israel-
Middle East Policy, Volume VI,
February 1999, Number 3. Retrieved September 30, 2006.
Hammel, Eric (1992). Six Days in June: How
Israel Won the 1967
Arab–Israeli War. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7434-7535-6
Hattendorf, John B. (2000). Naval Strategy and Power in the
Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future. Taylor & Francis.
Handel, Michael I. (1973). Israel's political-military doctrine.
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Hart, Alan (1989) Arafat, A political biography. Indiana University
Press ISBN 0-253-32711-3.
Herzog, Chaim (1982). The Arab-Israeli Wars. Arms & Armour Press.
Herbert, Nicholas (May 17, 1967). Egyptian Forces On Full Alert: Ready
to fight for Syria. The Times, p. 1; Issue 56943; col E.
Herzog, Chaim (1989). Heroes of Israel: Profiles of Jewish Courage.
Little Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-35901-7.
Higham, Robin. (2003). 100 Years of Air Power and Aviation. TAMU
Press. ISBN 1-58544-241-0.
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (2003). The international politics of the
Middle East. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-5346-7
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). Background on Israeli POWs
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). The
Six-Day War (June
Israel Reportedly Killed POWs in '67 War; Historians Say Deaths of
Hundreds of Egyptians Was Covered Up
Israel Reportedly Killed POWs in
'67 War; Historians Say Deaths of Hundreds of Egyptians Was Covered
Up", The Washington Post, August 17, 1995, p. A.30 (Fee
James, Laura (2005). The Nassar And His Enemies: Foreign Policy
Decision Making In
Egypt On The Eve Of The Six Day War. The Middle
East Review of International Affairs. Volume 9, No. 2, Article 2.
"Israelis Say Tape Shows Nasser Fabricated 'Plot'; Recording Said to
Be of Phone Call to Hussein Gives Plan to Accuse U.S. and Britain".
The New York Times. June 9, 1967. p. 17. Retrieved June 28,
Jia, Bing Bing. (1998). The Regime of Straits in International Law
(Oxford Monographs in International Law). Oxford University Press,
USA. ISBN 0-19-826556-5.
Koboril, Iwao and Glantz, Michael H. (1998). Central Eurasian Water
United Nations University Press. ISBN 92-808-0925-3
Krauthammer, Charles (May 18, 2007). "Prelude to the Six Days". The
Washington Post. pp. A23. ISSN 0740-5421. Retrieved June 20,
Lavoy, Peter R.; Sagan, Scott Douglas & Wirtz, James J. (Eds.)
(2000). Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons. Cornell University Press.
Leibler, Isi (1972). The Case For Israel. Australia: The Executive
Council of Australian Jewry. ISBN 0-9598984-0-9.
Lenczowski, George. (1990). American Presidents and the Middle East.
Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-0972-6.
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. (1994). [permanent dead link]
Transcript, Robert S. McNamara Oral History,
Special Interview I,
March 26, 1993, by Robert Dallek, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
Retrieved July 20, 2010.
"McNamara: US Near War in '67". The Boston Globe. September 16, 1983.
Mansour, Camille. (1994). Beyond Alliance:
Israel and US Foreign
Policy. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-08492-7.
Maoz, Zeev (2006). Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of
Israel's Security & Foreign Policy. The University of Michigan
Press. ISBN 978-0-472-03341-6
Morris, Benny (2001) Righteous Victims New York, Vintage Books.
Miller, Benjamin. (2007). States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The
Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge University Press.
Murakami, Masahiro. (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle
East: Alternative Strategies.
United Nations University Press.
Mutawi, Samir A. (18 July 2002).
Jordan in the 1967 War. Cambridge
University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-52858-0.
Nordeen, Lon & Nicole, David. (1996). Phoenix over the Nile: A
history of Egyptian Air Power 1932–1994. Washington DC: Smithsonian
Institution. ISBN 1-56098-626-3.
"Mediterranean Eskadra". (2000). Federation of American Scientists.
Oren, Michael (2002). Six Days of War. Oxford University Press.
Oren, Michael. (2005). The Revelations of 1967: New Research on the
Six Day War and Its Lessons for the Contemporary Middle East, Israel
Studies, volume 10, number 2. (Subscription required).
Oren, Michael. (2006). "The Six-Day War", in Bar-On, Mordechai (ed.),
Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military History. Greenwood Publishing
Group. ISBN 0-275-98158-4.
Parker, Richard B. (1996). The Six-day War: A Retrospective.
University Press of Florida. ISBN 0-8130-1383-6.
Parker, Richard B. (August 1997). "USAF in the
Sinai in the 1967 War:
Fact or Fiction" (PDF). Journal of Palestine Studies. XXVII (1):
Phythian, Mark (2001). The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964.
Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 0-7190-5907-0
Podeh, Elie (Winter 2004). "The Lie That Won't Die: Collusion, 1967".
Middle East Quarterly. 11 (1).
Pimlott, John. (1983).
Middle East Conflicts: From 1945 to the
Present. Orbis. ISBN 0-85613-547-X.
Pollack, Kenneth (2004). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness,
1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-8783-6
Pollack, Kenneth (2005). Air Power in the Six-Day War. The Journal of
Strategic Studies. 28(3), 471–503.
Prior, Michael (1999). Zionism and the State of Israel: A Moral
Inquiry. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-20462-3
Quandt, William B. (2005). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the
Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Brookings Institution Press and
the University of California Press; 3 edition. ISBN 0-520-24631-4
Quigley, John B. (2005). Case for Palestine: An International Law
Perspective. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-3539-5
Quigley, John B. (1990). Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice.
Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-1023-6
Rabil, Robert G. (2003). Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and
Lebanon. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-58826-149-2
Rabin, Yitzhak (1996). The Rabin Memoirs. University of California
Press. ISBN 0-520-20766-1.
Rauschning, Dietrich; Wiesbrock, Katja & Lailach, Martin (eds.)
(1997). Key Resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly
1946–1996. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-59704-8.
Rikhye, Indar Jit (1980). The
Sinai Blunder. London: Routledge.
Robarge, David S. (2007). Getting It Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Vol. 49 No. 1
Rubenberg, Cheryl A. (1989).
Israel and the American National
Interest. University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-06074-1
Sachar, Howard M. (1976, 2007) A History of
Israel from the Rise of
Zionism to Our Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
ISBN 0-394-48564-5; ISBN 0-375-71132-5.
Sadeh, Eligar (1997). Militarization and State Power in the
Arab–Israeli Conflict: Case Study of Israel, 1948–1982. Universal
Publishers. ISBN 0-9658564-6-1
Sandler, Deborah; Aldy, Emad & Al-Khoshman Mahmoud A. (1993).
Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba. – A regional environmental challenge.
Environmental Law Institute. 0911937463.
Seale, Patrick (1988). Asad: The Struggle for Peace in the Middle
East. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06976-5
Segev, Samuel (1967). A Red Sheet: the Six Day War.
Segev, Tom (2005).
Israel in 1967. Keter.
Segev, Tom (2007). 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that
Middle East Metropolitan Books.
Sela, Avraham (1997). The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle
East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order. SUNY Press.
Shafqat, Saeed (2004). Islamic world and South Asia: Rise of Islamism
and Terror, Causes and Consequences?. In Kaniz F. Yusuf (Ed.) Unipolar
World & The Muslim States. Islamabad:
Pakistan Forum, pp
Shemesh, Moshe (2008). Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the
Six Day War. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 1-84519-188-9.
Shlaim, Avi (2000). The Iron Wall:
Israel and the Arab World. W. W.
Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-32112-6.
Shlaim, Avi (2007) Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and
Peace Vintage Books ISBN 978-1-4000-7828-8
Shlaim, Avi; Louis, William Roger (13 February 2012), The 1967
Arab–Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, Cambridge University
Press ISBN 978-1-107-00236-4
Smith, Hedrick (June 15, 1967). "As the Shock Wears Off; Arab World,
Appraising Its Defeat, Is Split as It Gropes for Strategy". The New
York Times. p. 16. Retrieved June 28, 2006.
Smith, Hedrick (September 15, 1967). "Envoys Say Nasser Now Concedes
Help Israel". The New York Times. pp. Page 1, Col. 5,
Page 3, Col. 1.
Stein, Janice Gross. (1991). The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent
War Through Miscalculated Escalation, in Avoiding War: Problems of
Crisis Management, Alexander L. George, ed. Boulder: Westview Press.
Stephens, Robert H. (1971). Nasser: A Political Biography. London:
Allen Lane/The Penguin Press. ISBN 0-7139-0181-0
Stone, David (2004). Wars of the Cold War. Brassey's.
Tolan, Sandy (June 4, 2007). "Rethinking Israel's David-and-Goliath
past". Salon.com. Retrieved April 29, 2010.
Tucker, Spencer (2004). Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact.
ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-995-3
United Nations (967, June 5). 1347 Security Council MEETING :
June 5, 1967. Provisional agenda (S/PV.1347/Rev.1). On a subpage of
the website of The
United Nations Information System on the Question
of Palestine (UNISPAL).
van Creveld, Martin (2004). Defending Israel: A Controversial Plan
Toward Peace. Thomas Dunne Books. ISBN 0-312-32866-4
Youngs, Tim. (2001). Developments in the
Middle East Peace Process
1991–2000 London: International Affairs and Defence Section, House
of Commons Library. ISSN 1368-8456.
Finkelstein, Norman (2003). Image and Reality of the
Israel–Palestine Conflict. Verso. ISBN 1-85984-442-1.
Barzilai, Gad (1996). Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A
Jewish Democracy in the Middle East. New York University Press.
Cristol, A Jay (2002). Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on
the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-536-7
Finkelstein, Norman (June 2017). Analysis of the war and its
aftermath, on the 50th anniversary of the June 1967 war (3 parts, each
about 30 min)
Gat, Moshe (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East,
1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Praeger/Greenwood.
Hammel, Eric (October 2002). "
Sinai air strike: June 5, 1967".
Military Heritage. 4 (2): 68–73.
Hopwood, Derek (1991). Egypt: Politics and Society. London: Routledge.
Jordan (1969). My "War" with Israel. London: Peter Owen.
Katz, Samuel M. (1991) Israel's Air Force; The Power Series.
Motorbooks International Publishers & Wholesalers, Osceola, WI.
Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq.
University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21439-0
Morris, Benny (1997). Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829262-7
Pressfield, Steven (2014). The Lion's Gate: On the Front Lines of the
Six Day War. Sentinel HC, 2014. ISBN 1-59523-091-2
Rezun, Miron (1990). "
Iran and Afghanistan." In A. Kapur (Ed.).
Diplomatic Ideas and Practices of Asian States (pp. 9–25).
Brill Academic Publishers. ISBN 90-04-09289-7
Smith, Grant (2006). Deadly Dogma. Institute for Research: Middle
Eastern Policy. ISBN 0-9764437-4-0
Oren, Michael (April 2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making
of the Modern Middle East. Oxford University Press.
Wikimedia Commons has media related to 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
The Photograph: A Search for June 1967. Retrieved July 17, 2010.
The three soldiers – background to that photograph
Six Day War Personal recollections & Timeline
Video Clip: Sandhurst military historian analysing how King Hussein
became involved in the Six Day War. on YouTube
Video Clip: Analysis of Israel's
Sinai Campaign in 1967 by Sandhurst
military historian. on YouTube
Video Clip: Military analysis of the attack on
Jerusalem and the
Jordanian defence. on YouTube
Six-Day War Encyclopaedia of the Orient
All State Department documents related to the crisis
David Ben-Gurion on the
Six-Day War Shapell Manuscript
UN Resolution 242. Retrieved July 17, 2010.
The status of Jerusalem, United Nations, New York, 1997 (Prepared for,
and under the guidance of, the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People)
Status of Jerusalem: Legal Aspects. Retrieved July 22, 2014.
Legal Aspects The Six Day War – June 1967 and Its Aftermath –
Professor Gerald Adler
Uzi Narkiss – A historic radio interview with General Uzi
Narkiss taken on June 7 – one day after the Six-Day War, describing
the battle for Jerusalem
Liberation of the
Temple Mount and
Western Wall by
Forces – Historic Live Broadcast on Voice of
Israel Radio, June 7,
How The USSR Planned To Destroy
Israel in 1967 by Isabella Ginor.
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)
Journal Volume 7, Number 3 (September 2003)
Position of Arab forces May 1967. Retrieved July 22, 2014.
Israeli wars and conflicts
Arab–Israeli War (1948–49)
Reprisal operations (1951–56)
Suez Crisis (1956)
Six-Day War (1967)
War of Attrition
War of Attrition (1967–70)
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War (1973)
Operation Litani (1978)
Lebanon War (1982–85)
Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)
First Intifada (1987–93)
Second Intifada (2000–05)
Lebanon War (2006)
Gaza War (2008–09)
Operation Pillar of Defense
Operation Pillar of Defense (2012)
Israel–Gaza conflict (2014)
Palestinian National Authority
Abu Nidal Organization
al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Arab Liberation Front
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Guardians of the Cedars
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Palestine Liberation Front
Palestine Liberation Organization
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command
Popular Resistance Committees
Arab Higher Committee
Arab Liberation Army
Holy War Army
Japanese Red Army
United Arab Emirates
United Arab Republic
1920 Battle of Tel Hai
1936–39 Arab revolt
1944 Operation ATLAS
1947–48 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine
1948–49 Arab–Israeli War
1950s Palestinian Fedayeen attacks (Reprisal operations)
1956 Suez Crisis
1966 Operation Shredder
1967 Six-Day War
1967–70 War of Attrition
1968 Battle of Karameh
Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon
1968 Operation Gift
1973 Yom Kippur War
in South Lebanon
1972 Operation Isotope / Lod Airport massacre / Munich
Operation Wrath of God (Airstrike, Spring of Youth)
1973 Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114
1974 Ma'alot massacre
1975 Savoy Operation
1976 Operation Entebbe
1978 Coastal Road massacre / Operation Litani
1980 Misgav Am hostage crisis
1981 Operation Opera
1984 Bus 300 affair
1985 Operation Wooden Leg
1987–93 First Intifada
1988 Mothers' Bus rescue / Tunis raid
1992 Operation Bramble Bush
1993–2008 Palestinian suicide attacks
1993 Operation Accountability
1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath
2000–05 Al-Aqsa Intifada (Second Intifada)
2000–06 Shebaa Farms conflict
2001–present Rocket and mortar attacks on southern Israel
2003 Ain es Saheb airstrike
2006 Operation Bringing Home the Goods / Operation Summer
Rains / Operation Autumn Clouds /
2007–08 Operation Hot Winter
2008–09 Gaza War
2007–present Lebanese rocket attacks
2010 Adaisseh skirmish / Palestinian militancy campaign
Israel cross-border attacks
2012 Operation Returning Echo / Operation Pillar of Defense
2014 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict
Israeli–Palestinian conflict (2015–2016)
Diplomacy and peace proposals
1915 McMahon–Hussein Correspondence
1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement
1917 Balfour Declaration
1918 Declaration to the Seven / Anglo-French Declaration
1919 Faisal–Weizmann Agreement
1920 San Remo conference
1922 Churchill White Paper
1937 Peel Commission
1939 White Paper
1947 UN Partition Plan
1948 American trusteeship proposal
1948 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 194
1949 Armistice agreements / Lausanne Conference
1950 Tripartite Declaration
1964 Palestinian National Covenant
1967 Khartoum Resolution / UN Security Council (UNSC)
1973 UNSC Resolution 338 / UNSC Resolution 339
Syria disengagement agreement / UNSC
1978 UNSC Resolution 425 / Camp David Accords
1979 UNSC Resolution 446 / Egypt–
Treaty / UNSC Resolution 452
1980 UNSC Resolution 478
1981 UNSC Resolution 497
1991 Madrid Conference
1993 Oslo Accords
Jericho Agreement / Israel–
Jordan peace treaty
1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement
1998 Wye River Memorandum
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
2000 Camp David Summit / Clinton Parameters
2001 Taba Summit
2002 Beirut Summit and peace initiative / Road map
2003 Geneva Initiative
2004 UNSC Resolution 1559 / UNSC Resolution 1566
2005 UNSC Resolution 1583 /
Sharm el-Sheikh Summit /
Israeli disengagement from Gaza / Agreement on Movement and
2006 UNSC Resolution 1701
2007 Annapolis Conference
2010 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks
2013 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks
Cold War II
Guerrilla war in the Baltic states
Occupation of the Baltic states
Division of Korea
Operation Blacklist Forty
Iran crisis of 1946
Greek Civil War
Corfu Channel incident
Turkish Straits crisis
Restatement of Policy on Germany
First Indochina War
Asian Relations Conference
May 1947 Crises
1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état
Chinese Civil War
Chinese Civil War (Second round)
Egyptian Revolution of 1952
1953 Iranian coup d'état
Uprising of 1953 in East Germany
Dirty War (Mexico)
1954 Guatemalan coup d'état
Partition of Vietnam
First Taiwan Strait Crisis
Geneva Summit (1955)
Poznań 1956 protests
Hungarian Revolution of 1956
"We will bury you"
Arab Cold War
Syrian Crisis of 1957
Iraqi 14 July Revolution
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
1959 Tibetan uprising
1960 U-2 incident
Bay of Pigs Invasion
1960 Turkish coup d'état
Berlin Crisis of 1961
Portuguese Colonial War
Angolan War of Independence
Guinea-Bissau War of Independence
Mozambican War of Independence
Cuban Missile Crisis
Communist insurgency in Sarawak
Iraqi Ramadan Revolution
Eritrean War of Independence
Yemen Civil War
1963 Syrian coup d'état
Guatemalan Civil War
1964 Brazilian coup d'état
Dominican Civil War
South African Border War
Transition to the New Order
Laotian Civil War
1966 Syrian coup d'état
Korean DMZ conflict
Greek military junta of 1967–74
Years of Lead (Italy)
USS Pueblo incident
War of Attrition
Protests of 1968
1968 Polish political crisis
Communist insurgency in Malaysia
Invasion of Czechoslovakia
Iraqi Ba'athist Revolution
Sino-Soviet border conflict
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Black September in Jordan
Corrective Movement (Syria)
Cambodian Civil War
1971 Turkish military memorandum
Corrective Revolution (Egypt)
Four Power Agreement on Berlin
Bangladesh Liberation War
1972 Nixon visit to China
Yemen Border conflict of 1972
Yemenite War of 1972
Eritrean Civil Wars
1973 Chilean coup d'état
Yom Kippur War
1973 oil crisis
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Rhodesian Bush War
Angolan Civil War
Mozambican Civil War
Ethiopian Civil War
Lebanese Civil War
Dirty War (Argentina)
1976 Argentine coup d'état
Korean Air Lines Flight 902
Yemenite War of 1979
Grand Mosque seizure
New Jewel Movement
1979 Herat uprising
Seven Days to the River Rhine
Struggle against political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union
1980 and 1984 Summer Olympics boycotts
1980 Turkish coup d'état
Ugandan Bush War
Lord's Resistance Army insurgency
Eritrean Civil Wars
1982 Ethiopian–Somali Border War
United States invasion of Grenada
Able Archer 83
1986 Black Sea incident
1988 Black Sea bumping incident
Yemen Civil War
Bougainville Civil War
Central American crisis
Korean Air Lines Flight 007
People Power Revolution
Afghan Civil War
United States invasion of Panama
1988 Polish strikes
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989
Revolutions of 1989
Fall of the Berlin Wall
Mongolian Revolution of 1990
Fall of communism in Albania
Breakup of Yugoslavia
Dissolution of the Soviet Union
Dissolution of Czechoslovakia
Sino-Indian border dispute
North Borneo dispute
Sovereignty of Puerto Rico during the Cold War
Crusade for Freedom
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Voice of America
Voice of Russia
Nuclear arms race
Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War
Soviet espionage in the United States
United States relations
Russian espionage in the United States
American espionage in the
Soviet Union and Russian Federation
CIA and the Cultural Cold War
Cold War II
List of conflicts