RICHARD MCKAY RORTY (October 4, 1931 – June 8, 2007) was an American philosopher . Educated at the University of Chicago and Yale University , he had strong interests and training in both the history of philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy , the latter of which came to comprise the main focus of his work at Princeton University in the 1960s. He subsequently came to reject the tradition of philosophy according to which knowledge involves correct representation (a "mirror of nature") of a world whose existence remains wholly independent of that representation. Rorty had a long and diverse academic career, including positions as Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University , Kenan Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia , and Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford University . Among his most influential books are _ Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature _ (1979), _Consequences of Pragmatism_ (1982), and _ Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity _ (1989).
Rorty saw the idea of knowledge as a "mirror of nature" as pervasive throughout the history of western philosophy . Against this approach, Rorty advocated for a novel form of American pragmatism , sometimes called neopragmatism , in which scientific and philosophical methods form merely a set of contingent "vocabularies " which people abandon or adopt over time according to social conventions and usefulness. Abandoning representationalist accounts of knowledge and language, Rorty believed, would lead to a state of mind he referred to as "ironism ," in which people become completely aware of the contingency of their placement in history and of their philosophical vocabulary. Rorty tied this brand of philosophy to the notion of "social hope"; he believed that without the representationalist accounts, and without metaphors between the mind and the world, human society would behave more peacefully. He also emphasized the reasons why the interpretation of culture as conversation (Bernstein 1971), constitutes the crucial concept of a "postphilosophical " culture determined to abandon representationalist accounts of traditional epistemology, incorporating American pragmatist naturalism that considers the natural sciences as an advance towards liberalism .
* 1 Biography
* 2 Major works
* 2.1 _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ * 2.2 _Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity_ * 2.3 _Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth_ * 2.4 _Essays on Heidegger and Others_ * 2.5 _Achieving Our Country_
* 3 On human rights * 4 Reception and criticism * 5 Select bibliography * 6 See also * 7 Notes * 8 Further reading * 9 External links
"Nothing is sacred to Rorty the ironist. Asked at the end of his life about the 'holy', the strict atheist answered with words reminiscent of the young Hegel : 'My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law.'"
Rorty enrolled at the
University of Chicago shortly before turning
15, where he received a bachelor's and a master's degree in philosophy
Richard McKeon ), continuing at
Yale University for
PhD in philosophy (1952–1956). He married another academic,
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (
Harvard University professor), with whom he
had a son, Jay , in 1954. After two years in the
United States Army ,
he taught at
Wellesley College for three years until 1961. Rorty
divorced his wife and then married
Stanford University bioethicist
Mary Varney Rorty in 1972. They had two children, Kevin and Patricia.
Rorty was a professor of philosophy at Princeton University for 21 years. In 1981, he was a recipient of a MacArthur Fellowship , commonly known as the "Genius Award," in its first year of awarding, and in 1982 he became Kenan Professor of the Humanities at the University Of Virginia . In 1997 Rorty became professor of comparative literature (and philosophy, by courtesy), at Stanford University , where he spent the remainder of his academic career. During this period he was especially popular, and once quipped that he had been assigned to the position of "transitory professor of trendy studies."
Rorty's doctoral dissertation, "The
Pragmatists generally hold that the meaning of a proposition is determined by its use in linguistic practice. Rorty combined pragmatism about truth and other matters with a later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language which declares that meaning is a social-linguistic product, and sentences do not 'link up' with the world in a correspondence relation. Rorty wrote in his _Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity _ (1989):
"Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own unaided by the describing activities of humans cannot."(5)
Views like this led Rorty to question many of philosophy's most basic assumptions—and have also led to him being apprehended as a postmodern/deconstructionist philosopher. Indeed, from the late 1980s through the 1990s, Rorty focused on the continental philosophical tradition , examining the works of Friederich Nietzsche , Martin Heidegger , Michel Foucault , Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida . His work from this period included _Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity_, _Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers_ (1991) and _Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers_ (1998). The latter two works attempt to bridge the dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy by claiming that the two traditions complement rather than oppose each other.
According to Rorty, analytic philosophy may not have lived up to its pretensions and may not have solved the puzzles it thought it had. Yet such philosophy, in the process of finding reasons for putting those pretensions and puzzles aside, helped earn itself an important place in the history of ideas. By giving up on the quest for apodicticity and finality that Edmund Husserl shared with Rudolf Carnap and Bertrand Russell , and by finding new reasons for thinking that such quest will never succeed, analytic philosophy cleared a path that leads past scientism , just as the German idealists cleared a path that led around empiricism .
In the last fifteen years of his life, Rorty continued to publish his writings, including four volumes of his archived philosophical papers, _ Achieving Our Country _ (1998), a political manifesto partly based on readings of Dewey and Walt Whitman in which he defended the idea of a progressive , pragmatic left against what he feels are defeatist, anti-liberal, anti-humanist positions espoused by the critical left and continental school. Rorty felt these anti-humanist positions were personified by figures like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault. Such theorists were also guilty of an "inverted Platonism" in which they attempted to craft overarching, metaphysical, "sublime" philosophies—which in fact contradicted their core claims to be ironist and contingent. Rorty's last works, after his move to Stanford University, focused on the place of religion in contemporary life, liberal communities, comparative literature and philosophy as "cultural politics."
Shortly before his death, he wrote a piece called "The Fire of Life," (published in the November 2007 issue of _Poetry _ magazine), in which he meditates on his diagnosis and the comfort of poetry. He concludes, "I now wish that I had spent somewhat more of my life with verse. This is not because I fear having missed out on truths that are incapable of statement in prose. There are no such truths; there is nothing about death that Swinburne and Landor knew but Epicurus and Heidegger failed to grasp. Rather, it is because I would have lived more fully if I had been able to rattle off more old chestnuts—just as I would have if I had made more close friends. Cultures with richer vocabularies are more fully human—farther removed from the beasts—than those with poorer ones; individual men and women are more fully human when their memories are amply stocked with verses."
On June 8, 2007, Rorty died in his home from pancreatic cancer .
_PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE_
Main article: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
In _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ (1979), Rorty argues that the central problems of modern epistemology depend upon a picture of the mind as trying to faithfully represent (or "mirror") a mind-independent, external reality. If we give up this metaphor, then the entire enterprise of foundationalist epistemology is misguided. A foundationalist believes that in order to avoid the regress inherent in claiming that all beliefs are justified by other beliefs, some beliefs must be self-justifying and form the foundations to all knowledge.
There were two senses of "foundationalism" criticized in _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_. In the epistemological sense, Rorty criticized the attempt to justify knowledge claims by tracing them to a set of foundations (e.g., self-evident premises or noninferential sensations); more broadly, he criticized the claim of philosophy to function foundationally within a culture. The former argument draws on Sellars's critique of the idea that there is a "given" in sensory perception, in combination with Quine's critique of the distinction between analytic sentences (sentences which are true solely in virtue of what they mean) and synthetic sentences (sentences made true by the world). Each critique, taken alone, provides a problem for a conception of how philosophy ought to proceed, yet leaves enough of the tradition intact to proceed with its former aspirations. Combined, Rorty claimed, the two critiques are devastating. With no privileged insight into the structure of belief and no privileged realm of truths of meaning, we have, instead, knowledge as those beliefs that pay their way. The only worthwhile description of the actual process of inquiry, Rorty claimed, was a Kuhnian account of the standard phases of the progress of disciplines, oscillating through normal and abnormal periods, between routine problem-solving and intellectual crises.
After rejecting foundationalism, Rorty argues that one of the few roles left for a philosopher is to act as an intellectual gadfly, attempting to induce a revolutionary break with previous practice, a role that Rorty was happy to take on himself. Rorty suggests that each generation tries to subject all disciplines to the model that the most successful discipline of the day employs. In Rorty's view, the success of modern science has led academics in philosophy and the humanities to mistakenly imitate scientific methods. _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ popularized and extended ideas of Wilfrid Sellars (the critique of the Myth of the given ) and Willard Van Orman Quine (the critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction ) and others who advocate the Wittgensteinian doctrine of "dissolving" rather than solving philosophical problems.
_CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY_
Main article: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
In _Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity_ (1989), Rorty abandons specifically analytic modes of explication in favor of narrative pastiche in order to develop an alternative conceptual vocabulary to that of the "Platonists" he rejects. This schema is based on the belief that there is no worthwhile theory of truth, aside from a boring, non-epistemic semantic one (as Donald Davidson developed out of the work of Alfred Tarski ). Rorty suggests that the task of philosophy should be distinguished along public and private lines. Private philosophers, who provide one with greater abilities to (re)create oneself, a view adapted from Nietzsche and which Rorty also identifies with the novels of Marcel Proust and Vladimir Nabokov , should not be expected to help with public problems. For a public philosophy , one might turn to Rawls or Habermas .
This book also marks his first attempt to specifically articulate a political vision consistent with his philosophy, the vision of a diverse community bound together by opposition to cruelty, and not by abstract ideas such as 'justice' or 'common humanity,' policed by the separation of the public and private realms of life.
In this book, Rorty introduces the terminology of Ironism , which he uses to describe his mindset and his philosophy.
_OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH_
Amongst the essays in _Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1_ (1990), is "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," in which Rorty defends Rawls against communitarian critics. Rorty argues that liberalism can "get along without philosophical presuppositions," while at the same time conceding to communitarians that "a conception of the self that makes the community constitutive of the self does comport well with liberal democracy." For Rorty, social institutions ought to be thought of as "experiments in cooperation rather than as attempts to embody a universal and ahistorical order."
_ESSAYS ON HEIDEGGER AND OTHERS_
In this text, Rorty focuses primarily on the continental philosophers Heidegger and Derrida. He argues that these European "post-Nietzscheans" share much with American pragmatists, in that they critique metaphysics and reject the correspondence theory of truth. When discussing Derrida, Rorty claims that Derrida is most useful when viewed as a funny writer who attempted to circumvent the Western philosophical tradition, rather than the inventor of a philosophical (or literary) "method." In this vein, Rorty criticizes Derrida's followers like Paul de Man for taking deconstructive literary theory too seriously.
_ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY_
Main article: Achieving Our Country
In _Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America_ (1997), Rorty differentiates between what he sees as the two sides of the Left, a cultural Left and a progressive Left. He criticizes the cultural Left, which is exemplified by post-structuralists such as Foucault and postmodernists such as Lyotard, for offering critiques of society, but no alternatives (or alternatives that are so vague and general as to be abdications). Although these intellectuals make insightful claims about the ills of society, Rorty suggests that they provide no alternatives and even occasionally deny the possibility of progress. On the other hand, the progressive Left, exemplified for Rorty by the pragmatist Dewey, Whitman and James Baldwin, makes hope for a better future its priority. Without hope, Rorty argues, change is spiritually inconceivable and the cultural Left has begun to breed cynicism. Rorty sees the progressive Left as acting in the philosophical spirit of pragmatism.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Rorty's notion of human rights is grounded on the notion of sentimentality . He contended that throughout history humans have devised various means of construing certain groups of individuals as inhuman or subhuman. Thinking in rationalist (foundationalist) terms will not solve this problem, he claimed. Rorty advocated the creation of a culture of global human rights in order to stop violations from happening through a sentimental education. He argued that we should create a sense of empathy or teach empathy to others so as to understand others' suffering.
RECEPTION AND CRITICISM
Rorty is among the most widely discussed and controversial contemporary philosophers, and his works have provoked thoughtful responses from many other well-respected figures in the field. In Robert Brandom 's anthology, entitled _Rorty and His Critics_, for example, Rorty's philosophy is discussed by Donald Davidson , Jürgen Habermas , Hilary Putnam , John McDowell , Jacques Bouveresse , and Daniel Dennett , among others. In 2007, Roger Scruton wrote, "Rorty was paramount among those thinkers who advance their own opinion as immune to criticism, by pretending that it is not truth but consensus that counts, while defining the consensus in terms of people like themselves."
John McDowell is strongly influenced by Rorty, particularly by Rorty's _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ (1979). In continental philosophy, authors such as Jürgen Habermas , Gianni Vattimo , Jacques Derrida , Albrecht Wellmer , Hans Joas , Chantal Mouffe , Simon Critchley , Esa Saarinen , and Mike Sandbothe are influenced in different ways by Rorty's thinking. American novelist David Foster Wallace titled a short story in his collection _Oblivion: Stories _ "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature", and critics have accredited Rorty's influence to some of Wallace's writings on Irony.
Susan Haack has been a fierce critic of Rorty's neopragmatism. Haack criticises Rorty's claim to be a pragmatist at all and wrote a short play called _We Pragmatists_, where Rorty and Charles Sanders Peirce have a fictional conversation using only accurate quotes from their own writing. For Haack, the only link between Rorty's neopragmatism and the pragmatism of Peirce is the name. Haack believes Rorty's neopragmatism is both anti-philosophical and anti-intellectual, and exposes people further to rhetorical manipulation.
Although Rorty was an avowed liberal, his political and moral
philosophies have been attacked by commentators from the Left , some
of whom believe them to be insufficient frameworks for social justice.
Rorty was also criticized by others for his rejection of the idea
that science can depict the world. One criticism, especially of
_Contingency, irony, and solidarity_ is that Rorty's philosophical
'hero', the ironist , is an elitist figure. Rorty claims that the
majority of people would be "commonsensically nominalist and
historicist" but not ironist. These people would combine an ongoing
attention to the particular as opposed to the transcendent (nominalism
), with an awareness of their place in a continuum of contingent lived
experience alongside other individuals (historicist ), without
necessarily having continual doubts about the resulting worldview as
the ironist does. An ironist is someone who: 1) "has radical and
continuing doubts about their final vocabulary"; 2) "realizes that
argument phrased in their vocabulary can neither underwrite nor
dissolve these doubts"; and 3) "does not think their vocabulary is
closer to reality than others" (all 73, _Contingency, irony, and
solidarity_). On the other hand, the Italian philosopher Gianni
Vattimo alongside the Spanish philosopher Santiago Zabala in their
2011 book _Hermeneutic Communism: from Heidegger to Marx _ affirm that
Rorty often draws on a broad range of other philosophers to support his views, and his interpretation of their works has been contested. Since Rorty is working from a tradition of re-interpretation, he remains uninterested in 'accurately' portraying other thinkers, but rather in utilizing their work in the same way a literary critic might use a novel. His essay "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres" is a thorough description of how he treats the greats in the history of philosophy. In _Contingency, irony, and solidarity_, Rorty attempts to disarm those who criticize his writings by arguing that their philosophical criticisms are made using axioms that are explicitly rejected within Rorty's own philosophy. For instance, Rorty defines allegations of irrationality as affirmations of vernacular "otherness", and so—Rorty claims—accusations of irrationality can be expected during _any_ argument and must simply be brushed aside.
* _ Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature _. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. ISBN * _Consequences of Pragmatism_. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. ISBN 978-0816610631 * _ Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity _. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. ISBN 978-0-521-35381-6
* _Philosophical Papers_ vols I-IV:
* _Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers I_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. ISBN 978-0521353694 * _Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers II_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. ISBN * _Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers III_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. ISBN * _Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers IV _. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
* _Mind, Language, and Metaphilosophy : Early Philosophical Papers_ Eds. S. Leach and J. Tartaglia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. ISBN 978-1-107-61229-7 . * _ Achieving Our Country : Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America_. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. ISBN 978-0674003118 * _ Philosophy and Social Hope _. New York: Penguin, 2000. ISBN * _Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies: A Conversation with Richard Rorty_. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2002. ISBN * _The Future of Religion_ with Gianni Vattimo Ed. Santiago Zabala. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. ISBN 978-0231134941 * _An Ethics for Today: Finding Common Ground Between Philosophy and Religion_. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. ISBN 978-0-231-15056-9
* _The Linguistic Turn, Essays in Philosophical Method_, (1967), ed. by Richard M. Rorty, University of Chicago press, 1992, ISBN 9780226725697 (an introduction and two retrospective essays) * _Philosophy in History_. ed. by R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 (an essay by R. Rorty, "Historiography of philosophy", pp. 29–76)
New York City
* ^ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/#1 * ^ "Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher". press.uchicago.edu. 1931-10-04. Retrieved 2012-09-26. * ^ Bernstein, Adam (11 June 2007). "Richard Rorty, 75; Leading U.S. Pragmatist Philosopher". washingtonpost.com. Retrieved 26 September 2012. * ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Bruce Kuklick. "Neil Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher." _Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society_ 47.1 (2011):36. * ^ _A_ _B_ "Jürgen Habermas: Philosopher, poet and friend (12/06/2007)". signandsight. Retrieved 2012-09-26. * ^ Marchetti, Giancarlo. "Interview with Richard Rorty." Philosophy Now Volume 43, Oct.-Nov. 2003. * ^ Ryerson, James. "The Quest for Uncertainty Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Pilgrimage." Linguafranca Volume 10, Dec. 2000/Jan. 2001. Web. 21 June 2011. * ^ _A_ _B_ "Richard Rorty, distinguished public intellectual and controversial philosopher, dead at 75" (Stanford's announcement), June 10, 2007 * ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy * ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ "Richard Rorty, Philosopher, Dies at 75" (NY Times Obituary), June 11, 2007 * ^ Ryerson, James. "Essay: Thinking Cheerfully." _The New York Times Book Review _. July 22, 2007: p 27. * ^ Rorty, Richard (November 2007). "The Fire of Life". _Poetry magazine_. * ^ "Richard Rorty," (short obituary), June 9, 2007. * ^ Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 _(1990), p 179_ * ^ Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 _(1990), p 196_ * ^ See Barreto, José-Manuel. "Rorty and Human Rights: Contingency, Emotions and How to Defend Human Rights Telling Stories." Utrecht Law Review, Volume 7 Issue 2 April 2011 * ^ (Last sentence of the introduction) * ^ Amazon.com: Rorty and His Critics (Philosophers and their Critics): Robert B. Brandom: Books * ^ Scruton, Roger (2007-06-12). "Richard Rorty\'s legacy". openDemocracy. Retrieved 2012-09-26. * ^ In the preface to _ Mind and World_ (pp. ix–x) McDowell states that "it will be obvious that Rorty's work is central for the way I define my stance here". * ^ Howard, Jennifer. "The Afterlife of David Foster Wallace". Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved 30 December 2013. * ^ Susan Haack (November 1997). "Vulgar Rortyism". _New Criterion_. * ^ Haack, Susan (1993). "Ch. 9: Vulgar Pragmatism: an Unedifying Prospect". _Evidence and Inquiry_. Oxford UK: Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-11851-9 . * ^ "Objectivity and Action: Wal-Mart and the Legacy of Marx and Nietzsche", A discussion of Terry Eagleton 's attacks on Rorty's philosophy as insufficient in the fight against corporations such as Wal-Mart