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Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
(Sanskrit: Madhyamaka, Chinese: 中觀见; pinyin: Zhōngguān Jìan; also known as Śūnyavāda) refers primarily to the later schools of Buddhism
Buddhism
philosophy[1] founded by Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
(150 CE to 250 CE). According to Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
all phenomena (dharmas) are empty (śūnya) of "nature,"[2] a "substance" or "essence" (svabhāva) which gives them "solid and independent existence,"[3] because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.[4][5][6]

Contents

1 Etymology 2 Emptiness

2.1 Dependent Origination 2.2 Svabhava
Svabhava
- essence 2.3 Two truths 2.4 The emptiness of emptiness 2.5 Essentialism and nihilism 2.6 The limits of language 2.7 Liberation

3 Origins and development

3.1 Origins

3.1.1 Sutta Nipata 3.1.2 Abhidharma 3.1.3 Prajñāpāramitā 3.1.4 Pyrrhonism

3.2 Indian Madhyamaka

3.2.1 Nāgārjuna 3.2.2 Āryadeva 3.2.3 Buddhapālita
Buddhapālita
and Bhāvaviveka 3.2.4 Candrakīrti 3.2.5 Śāntideva 3.2.6 Shantarakshita

3.3 Tibetan Buddhism

3.3.1 Tibetan classification of schools 3.3.2 Svātantrika 3.3.3 Prāsaṅgika

3.3.3.1 Tsongkhapa

3.3.4 Shentong
Shentong
- Jonangpa

3.4 Chán/Zen 3.5 Western Buddhism

3.5.1 Thich Nhat Hanh 3.5.2 Modern Madhyamaka

4 Influence on Advaita Vedanta 5 Understanding in modern scholarship

5.1 Kalupahana 5.2 Hayes 5.3 Magee

6 See also 7 Notes 8 References

8.1 Published references 8.2 Web references

9 Sources 10 Further reading 11 External links

Etymology[edit] Madhya is a Sanskrit
Sanskrit
word meaning "middle". It is cognate with Latin med-iu-s and English mid. The -ma suffix is a superlative, giving madhyama the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The -ka suffix is used to form adjectives, thus madhyamaka means "middleling". The -ika suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus mādhyamika mean "belonging to the mid-most" (the -ika suffix regularly causes a lengthening of the first vowel and elision of the final -a). In a Buddhist context these terms refer to the "middle path" (madhyama pratipada) between the extremes of annihilationism (ucchedavāda) and eternalism (śassatavāda), for example:

ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamya madhyamayā pratipadā tathāgato dharmaṃ deśayati - Kātyāyana Sūtra. Thus, the Tathāgata
Tathāgata
teaches the Dharma
Dharma
by a middle path avoiding both these extremes.

Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
refers to the school of thought associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators. Mādhyamika refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
school.

Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable. Emptiness[edit] Main article: Svatantrika- Prasaṅgika
Prasaṅgika
distinction Central to Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
philosophy is śūnyatā, "emptiness." The term refers to the "emptiness" of inherent existence: all phenomena are empty of "substance" or "essence" (Sanskrit: svabhāva) or inherent existence, because they are dependently co-arisen. At a conventional level, "things" do exist, but ultimately they are "empty" of inherent existence. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.[4][5][6] Dependent Origination[edit] Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
further develops the notion of dependent arising, arguing that every dharma, or every "thing", does not exist on its own, but depending on other "things" and causes:

Whatever is dependent arising We declared that to be emptiness. That is dependent designation, And is itself the middle way.

— Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
24:18

Svabhava
Svabhava
- essence[edit] Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
follows his own logic to its end, wondering what the subsequent consequences are of his propositions. Since all "things" are dependently arisen, how then can a non-existing "thing" cause another "thing" to come into being? In Chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
centers on the words svabhava [note 1] parabhava[note 2] bhava [note 3] and abhava:[note 4]

Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature[note 5] (Mk. ch. 15) argues that anything which arises according to conditions, as all phenomena do, can have no inherent nature, for what is depends on what conditions it. Moreover, if there is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' (para-bhava), i.e. something which is dependent for its existence and nature on something else which has own-nature. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature, there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature (bhava). If there is no true existent, then there can be no non-existent (abhava).[13]

In chapter 15 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, " Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
is playing on the word 'thing'".[web 1][note 6] Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
uses the ambivalence inherent in the term svabhava:

[T]he word "svabhava" can be interpreted in two different ways. It can be rendered either as identity [...] or as causal independence.[14]

This ambiguity is easily lost in translation:

When one reads Nagarjuna's argument in Sanskrit, it is not immediately obvious that the argument has taken advantage of an ambiguity in the key term. But when one tries to translate his argument into some other language, such as English or Tibetan, one finds that it is almost impossible to translate his argument in a way that makes sense in translation. This is because the terms in the language of translation do not have precisely the same range of ambiguities as the words in the original Sanskrit. In English, we are forced to disambiguate, and in disambiguating, we end up spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument.[14]

The doctrine of dependent arising cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance".[11] Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
refutes "the commentarial doctrine of the 'own-being' of principles as contrary to the Tripitaka":[7]

Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
had no objection to the Abhidhamma
Abhidhamma
formulation of causal relations so long as the relata are not regarded as having a unique nature or substance (svabhava).[8]

The rejection of inherent existence does not imply that there is no existence at all.[10] What it does mean is that there is no "unique nature or substance (svabhava)"[8] in the "things" we perceive. This may not necessarily be in contrast to the Abhidhamma
Abhidhamma
point of view, given the ambivalence in the terms used by Nagarjuna:

What Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
is saying is that no being has a fixed and permanent nature. What the abhidarmikas maintained was that every thing has features that distinguish it from other things.[15][note 7]

Two truths[edit] Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
discerns two levels of truth, conventional truth and ultimate truth,[4] to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence. Ultimately, we realize that all phenomena are sunyata, empty of concrete existence. Conventionally, we do perceive concrete objects which we are aware of.[17] Yet, this perceived reality is an experiential reality, not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.[17] The ultimate truth of sunyata does not refer to "nothingness" or "non-existence"; it refers to the absence of inherent existence.[18] According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material and intellectual.[19] Insight into the emptiness of "things' is part of developing wisdom, seeing things as they are. Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. Buddhapalita
Buddhapalita
says:

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them. — Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2[20]

The emptiness of emptiness[edit] Ultimate truth also does not refer to "absolute truth," some absolute reality above or beyond the "relative reality."[4] On the contrary, emptiness itself is "empty" of inherent existence:[5]

Ultimate truth does not point to a transcendent reality, but to the transcendence of deception. It is critical to emphasize that the ultimate truth of emptiness is a negational truth. In looking for inherently existent phenomena it is revealed that it cannot be found. This absence is not findable because it is not an entity, just as a room without an elephant in it does not contain an elephantless substance. Even conventionally, elephantlessness does not exist. Ultimate truth or emptiness does not point to an essence or nature, however subtle, that everything is made of.[web 2][note 8]

Essentialism and nihilism[edit] What remains is the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism:[11]

The object of the critique is to show that the eternalist view is untenable and further to show that the 'own-being' theory adopted by some Buddhists did not really differ, when its implications were strictly worked out, from the eternalist theory of Brahmanism
Brahmanism
(the theory of an eternal 'soul' and other eternal 'substances').[10]

These two views are considered to be the two extreme views:

Essentialism[21] or eternalism (sastavadava)[10] - a belief that things inherently exist and are therefore efficacious objects of craving and clinging;[21] Nihilism[21] or annihilationism (ucchedavada)[10] - views that lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions. Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.[21]

Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
represents the Middle way
Middle way
between them. The limits of language[edit] Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts.[4][22] This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey its teachings:

This dynamic philosophical tension—a tension between the Madhyamika accounts of the limits of what can be coherently said and its analytical ostension of what cannot be said without paradox but must be understood—must constantly be borne in mind in reading the text. It is not an incoherent mysticism, but it is a logical tightrope act at the very limits of language and metaphysics.[22]

Liberation[edit] The ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but to gain a liberated mind which does not dwell upon concepts. To realize this, meditation on emptiness may proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of both self, objects and mental states,[23] culminating in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom."[24][note 9] Origins and development[edit]

Nagarjuna

The Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
school is usually considered to have been founded by Nāgārjuna, though it may have existed earlier. [25] The name of the school is perhaps related to its close adherence to Nāgārjuna’s main work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The term Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
is related to 'madhya' ('the middle'). Madhyamaka-thought had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahayana
Mahayana
Buddhist tradition, although often in interaction with, and also in opposition to, the other two major streams of Mahayana
Mahayana
Buddhist thought, namely Yogacara
Yogacara
and Buddha-nature. It had a major impact on Tibetan Buddhism, where it became the orthodox standard in the Gelugpa tradition, in opposition to Jonangpa's "Mahā-Mādhyamaka". Lama
Lama
Je Tsongkhapa, of the Gelugpa, claimed there were two division in Indian Madhyamika, creating the Svatantrika- Prasaṅgika
Prasaṅgika
distinction.[26] It also influenced the Zen tradition,[4] although this influence is less often discerned in comparison to the Buddha-nature
Buddha-nature
thought. The present day schools of Tiantai, Tendai, Sanron,[27] are also influenced by the Mādhyamaka tradition, forming an East Asian Mādhyamaka
East Asian Mādhyamaka
tradition. Contemporary western Buddhism
Buddhism
is less acquainted with Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
thought, although some implications have been recognized by western teachers. Origins[edit] Sutta Nipata[edit] The Aṭṭhakavagga (Pali, "Octet Chapter") and the Pārāyanavagga (Pali, "Way to the Far Shore Chapter") are two small collections of suttas within the Pāli Canon
Pāli Canon
of Theravada
Theravada
Buddhism.[note 10] They are among the earliest existing Buddhist literature, and place considerable emphasis on the rejection of, or non-attachment to, all views. Gomez compared them to later Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
philosophy, which in its Prasaṅgika
Prasaṅgika
form especially makes a method of rejecting others' views rather than proposing its own.[28] Tillman Vetter, although agreeing overall with Gomez's observations, suggests some refinements on historical and doctrinal grounds.[29] First, he notes that neither of these short collections of suttas are homogeneous and hence are not all amenable to Gomez' proposals. According to Vetter, those suttas which do lend support to Gomez probably originated with a heterodox ascetic group that pre-dated the Buddha, and were integrated into the Buddhist Sangha
Sangha
at an early date, bringing with them some suttas that were already in existence and also composing further suttas in which they tried to combine their own teachings with those of the Buddha.[29] Paul Fuller has rejected the arguments of Gomez and Vetter.[30] He finds that

... the Nikayas and the Atthakavagga present the same cognitive attitude toward views, wrong or right.[31]

Alexander Wynne also rejects both of Vetter's claims that the Parayanavagga shows a chronological stratification, and a different attitude toward mindfulness and liberating insight than do other works.[32][note 11] Abhidharma[edit] The Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
school has been perhaps simplistically regarded as a reaction against the development of the Abhidharma, especially the Sarvāstivādin. In the Abhidharma, dharmas are characterized by defining traits (lakṣaṇa) or own-existence (svabhāva), whose ontological status is not dependent upon concepts. The problem with the Abhidharma
Abhidharma
is not that things are 'independently existent' (a position that most Abhidharma
Abhidharma
schools would not accept), but rather (from a Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
perspective) that they are independent from notions. For the Madhyamaka, dharmas are notionally dependent, and further more, their notional dependence entails existential dependence and hence lack of ultimate, true existence. The relationship between Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
and Abhidharma
Abhidharma
is complex; Abhidharmic analysis figures prominently in most Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
treatises, and authoritative commentators like Candrakīrti
Candrakīrti
emphasize that Abhidharmic categories function as a viable (and favored) system of conventional truths - they are more refined than ordinary categories, and they are not dependent on either the extreme of eternalism or on the extreme view of the discontinuity of karma, as the non-Buddhist categories of the time did. It may be therefore important to understand that Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
constitutes a continuation of the Abhidharma
Abhidharma
type of analysis, extending the range of dependent arising to entail (and focus upon) notional dependence. The dependent arising of concepts based on other concepts, rather than the true arising of really existent causes and effects, becomes here the matrix of any possible convention. Prajñāpāramitā[edit] Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
thought is also closely related to a number of Mahāyāna sources; traditionally, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are the literature most closely associated with Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
– understood, at least in part, as an exegetical complement to those Sūtras. Traditional accounts also depict Nāgārjuna
Nāgārjuna
as retrieving some of the larger Prajñāpāramitāsūtras from the world of the Nāgas (explaining in part the etymology of his name). Prajñā or ‘higher cognition’ is a recurrent term in Buddhist texts, explained as a synonym of Abhidharma, ‘insight’ (vipaśyanā) and ‘analysis of the dharmas’ (dharmapravicaya). Within a specifically Mahāyāna context, Prajñā figures as the most prominent in a list of Six Pāramitās (‘perfections’ or ‘perfect masteries’) that a Bodhisattva
Bodhisattva
needs to cultivate in order to eventually achieve Buddhahood. Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
offers conceptual tools to analyze all possible elements of existence, allowing the practitioner to elicit through reasoning and contemplation the type of view that the Sūtras express more authoritatively (being considered word of the Buddha) but less explicitly (not offering corroborative arguments). The vast Prajñāpāramitā literature emphasizes the development of higher cognition in the context of the Bodhisattva
Bodhisattva
path; thematically, its focus on the emptiness of all dharmas is closely related to the Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
approach. Pyrrhonism[edit] Because of the high degree of similarity between Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
and Pyrrhonism,[33] Thomas McEvilley[34] and Matthew Neale[35] suspect that Nāgārjuna
Nāgārjuna
was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India. Pyrrho
Pyrrho
of Elis (c. 360-c. 270 BCE), who is credited with founding this school of skeptical philosophy, was himself influenced by Buddhist philosophy
Buddhist philosophy
during his stay in India with Alexander the Great's army. Indian Madhyamaka[edit] Nāgārjuna[edit] Kalupahana has argued that Nāgārjuna's intention was not to establish an ontology or epistemology, but to free the Buddhist soteriology from essentialist notions which obscured the Buddhist Middle Way:[36] Āryadeva[edit] Nāgārjuna's pupil Āryadeva
Āryadeva
(3rd century CE) emphasized the Bodhisattva-ideal. His works are regarded as a supplement to Nāgārjuna's,[37] on which he commented.[38] Āryadeva
Āryadeva
also refuted the theories of non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.[38] Buddhapālita
Buddhapālita
and Bhāvaviveka[edit] Buddhapālita
Buddhapālita
(470–550) has been understood as the origin of the prāsaṅgika approach.[39] He was criticized by Bhāvaviveka (ca.500–ca.578), who argued for the use of syllogisms "to set one's own doctrinal stance".[40] Bhāvya/ Bhāvaviveka
Bhāvaviveka
was influenced by the Yogācāra
Yogācāra
school. The opposing approaches of Buddhapālita
Buddhapālita
and Bhāvya are explained by later Tibetan doxographers as the origin of a subdivision of Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
into two schools, the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika. Candrakīrti[edit] Candrakīrti
Candrakīrti
(600–c. 650) wrote the Prasannapadā (Clear Words), a highly influential commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. This commentary is central in the understanding of Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
in Tibetan Buddhism. Śāntideva[edit] Śāntideva (end 7th century – first half 8th century) is well known for his Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life. He united "a deep religiousness and joy of exposure together with the unquestioned Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
orthodoxy".[41] Shantarakshita[edit] A Yogācāra
Yogācāra
and Mādhyamaka synthesis was posited by Shantarakshita in the 8th century[note 12] and may have been common at Nalanda University at that time. Like the Prāsaṅgika, this view approaches ultimate truth through the prasaṅga method, yet when speaking of conventional reality they may make autonomous statements like the earlier Svātantrika
Svātantrika
and Yogācāra
Yogācāra
approaches. This was different from the earlier Svatantrika
Svatantrika
in that the conventional truth was described in terms of the theory of consciousness-only instead of the tenets of Svatantrika, though neither was used to analyze for ultimate truth. For example, they may assert that all phenomena are nothing but the "play of mind" and hence empty of concrete existence—and that mind is in turn empty of defining characteristics. But in doing so, they're careful to point out that any such example would be an approximate ultimate and not the true ultimate. By making such autonomous statements, Yogācāra-Svatantrika- Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
is often mistaken as a Svātantrika
Svātantrika
or Yogācāra
Yogācāra
view, even though a Prāsaṅgika approach was used in analysis.[42] This view is thus a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Tibetan Buddhism[edit] Tibetan classification of schools[edit] Main article: Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika_distinction Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
thought has been categorized variously in India and Tibet.[note 13] In Tibetan Buddhism
Tibetan Buddhism
a major difference is being made between "Svātantrika-Madhyamaka" and "Prasaṅgika-Madhyamaka." Yet, the classification is more complicated, and is described by Guy Newman as follows:

Rangtong, a term introduced by Dolpopa, which rejects any inherent existing self or nature.[43] This includes:

Svātantrika

Sautrantika Svātantrika
Svātantrika
Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
- Bhāviveka Yogācāra
Yogācāra
Svātantrika
Svātantrika
Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
- Śāntarakṣita
Śāntarakṣita
and Kamalaśīla, the oldest Buddhist teachings to be introduced in Tibet[44]

Prasaṅgika, based on Buddhapālita
Buddhapālita
and Candrakīrti. Within prasangika, a further division can be made:

Intellectual emptiness, which is realized by mere negation. This is the view of Tsong Khapa and the Gelugpa school, which rejects any statements on an absolute reality beyond mere emptiness.[45] Experiential emptiness, which is realized when the understanding of intellectual emptiness gives way to the recognition of the true nature of mind, c.q. rigpa. This is the view of Nyingma
Nyingma
(Dzogchen) and Sakya.[45]

Shentong, systematised by Dolpopa, and based on Buddha-nature teachings and influenced by Śāntarakṣita's Yogacara-Madhyamaka. It states that the nature of mind shines through when emptiness has been realized. This approach is dominant in the Jonang
Jonang
school, and can also be found in the Kagyu
Kagyu
(Mahamudra) tradition.[46][47][48]

The Madhyamika philosophy obtained a central position in all the Tibetan schools, but with two distinct variations, namely shentong, and the later Gelugpa emphasis on a strict Prasangika
Prasangika
interpretation of emptiness. Shentong
Shentong
is a further developed Yogacara-Madhyamaka which incorporates Buddha-nature
Buddha-nature
teachings, and states that the reality which is laid bare by understanding emptiness is luminous awareness and truly existing. Shentong
Shentong
teachings are still transmitted in the Nyingma, Kagyu, and Jonang
Jonang
school. Tsongkhapa, and the subsequent Gelugpa tradition, opposes this notion of self-luminous awareness, and sees its own interpretation as the final truth on sunyata. Although presented as a divide in doctrines, the major difference between svātantrika and prasangika may be between two style of reasoning and arguing, while the division itself is exclusively Tibetan. Tibetan scholars were aware of alternative Madhyamaka sub-classifications, but later Tibetan doxography emphasizes the nomenclature of prāsaṅgika versus svātantrika. No conclusive evidence can show the existence of an Indian antecedent, and it is not certain to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances. Both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas cited material in the āgamas in support of their arguments.[49] Svātantrika[edit] Main article: Svatantrika Bhavaviveka
Bhavaviveka
(c. 500 – c. 578) is the first person to whom this view is attributed, as they are laid out in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna and his critiques of Buddhapalita. Svātantrika
Svātantrika
in Sanskrit
Sanskrit
refers to autonomy and was translated back into Sanskrit
Sanskrit
from the equivalent Tibetan term.[50] The Svātantrika
Svātantrika
states that conventional phenomena are understood to have a conventional essential existence, but without an ultimately existing essence. In this way they believe they are able to make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic because they are able to share a subject that is established as appearing in common - the proponent and opponent use the same kind of valid cognition to establish it. The name comes from this quality of being able to use autonomous arguments in debate.[50] Ju Mipham
Ju Mipham
explained that using positive assertions in logical debate may serve a useful purpose, either while debating with non-Buddhist schools or to move a student from a coarser to a more subtle view. Similarly, discussing an approximate ultimate helps students who have difficulty using only prasaṅga methods move closer to the understanding of the true ultimate. Ju Mipham
Ju Mipham
felt that the ultimate non-enumerated truth of the Svatantrika
Svatantrika
was no different from the ultimate truth of the Prāsaṅgika. He felt the only difference between them was with respect to how they discussed conventional truth and their approach to presenting a path.[50] Prāsaṅgika[edit] Main article: Prasaṅgika The central technique avowed by Prasaṅgika
Prasaṅgika
Mādhyamaka is to show by prasaṅga (or reductio ad absurdum) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nāsti", "it is", or "it is not") or view regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional (saṃvṛti or lokavyavahāra). The Prāsaṅgika hold that it is not necessary for the proponent and opponent to use the same kind of valid cognition to establish a common subject; indeed it is possible to change the view of an opponent through a reductio argument. Buddhapalita
Buddhapalita
and Candrakirti
Candrakirti
are noted as the main proponents of this approach. Tibetan teacher Longchen Rabjam
Longchen Rabjam
noted in the 14th century that Candrakirti
Candrakirti
favored the prasaṅga approach when specifically discussing the analysis for ultimacy, but otherwise he made positive assertions. His central text, Madhyamakavatāra, is structured as a description of the paths and results of practice, which is made up of positive assertions. Therefore, even those most attributed to the Prāsaṅgika view make positive assertions when discussing a path of practice but use prasaṅga specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.[50] Tsongkhapa[edit] See also: Prasaṅgika
Prasaṅgika
according to Tsongkhapa The Gelug
Gelug
school was founded by Je Tsongkhapa's reforms to Atisha's Kadam tradition in the 14th century.[note 14] Tsongkhapa emphasized compassion and insight into emptiness. In his Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa comments on the Mulamadhyamakakarika.[51] According to Tsongkhapa, Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
uses the term svabhava to refer to sunyata as the nature of reality:[52]

Their nature of emptiness is their reality nature.[53]

This is in line with the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra:

Subhuti, since the five aggregates are without nature, they have a nature of emptiness.[53]

Although Tsongkhapa argued in favour of Yogacara
Yogacara
views early in his career[54] his later understanding is derived from Candrakirti,[55] who states that conventionally there are entities with distinguishing characteristics, but ultimately those qualities are not independent essences. But since this emptiness is true for everything that exists, this emptiness may also be regarded as an essence, though not in the sense of an independent essence. Candrakirti
Candrakirti
formulates a final negation by stating that even the denial of svabhava implies ...

...that either oneself or one's audience is not entirely free from the belief in svabhava. Therefore, ultimate truth, truth as it is for those who are free from misknowledge, cannot be expressed by asserting either the existence or nonexistence of svahbava.[56]

Shentong
Shentong
- Jonangpa[edit] Dolpopa, the founder of the Jonangpa
Jonangpa
school, called his synthesis the Mahā-Mādhyamaka, the "Great Middle Way".[57] He regarded the tathagatagarbha to be the true emptiness. This view was opposed by Tsongkhapa. [58] Chán/Zen[edit] See also: Sengzhao The Chán/Zen-tradition emulated Madhyamaka-thought via the San-lun Buddhists, influencing its supposedly "illogical" way of communicating "absolute truth."[4] Western Buddhism[edit] Thich Nhat Hanh[edit] Thich Nhat Hanh
Thich Nhat Hanh
explains the Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
concept of emptiness through the related concept of interdependence. In this analogy, there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs. Instead, all things are dependent on innumerable causes and conditions that are themselves dependent on innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including the self, is a helpful way to undermine mistaken views about inherence, or that one's self is inherently existent. It is also a helpful way to discuss Mahayana
Mahayana
teachings on motivation, compassion, and ethics. The comparison to interdependence has produced recent discussion comparing Mahayana
Mahayana
ethics to environmental ethics.[59] Modern Madhyamaka[edit] Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
forms an alternative to the Perennialist and essentialist (neo-)Advaita understanding of nondualism or modern spirituality.[web 3][web 4][web 5] The classical Madhyamaka-teachings are complemented with western (post-modern) philosophy,[web 6] critical sociology,[web 7] and social constructionism.[web 8] These approaches stress that there is no transcendental reality beyond this phenomenal world,[web 9] and in some cases even explicitly distinguish themselves from (neo-)Advaita approaches.[web 10] Influence on Advaita Vedanta[edit] Main articles: Advaita Vedanta
Advaita Vedanta
and Ajativada Gaudapada, who was strongly influenced by Buddhism, borrowed the concept of "ajāta" from Nagajurna's Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
philosophy,[60][61] which uses the term "anutpāda":[62]

"An" means "not", or "non" "Utpāda" means "genesis", "coming forth", "birth"[web 11]

Taken together "anutpāda" means "having no origin", "not coming into existence", "not taking effect", "non-production".[web 12] The Buddhist tradition usually uses the term "anutpāda" for the absence of an origin[60][62] or sunyata.[63][note 15] "Ajātivāda" is the fundamental philosophical doctrine of Gaudapada.[67] According to Gaudapada, the Absolute is not subject to birth, change and death. The Absolute is aja, the unborn eternal.[67] The empirical world of appearances is considered unreal, and not absolutely existent.[67] Gaudapada's perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna.[68] Gaudapada's perspective is based on the Mandukya Upanishad.[68] In the Mandukya Karika, Gaudapada's commentary on the Mandukya Upanishad, Gaudapada
Gaudapada
sets forth his perspective. According to Gaudapada, Brahman cannot undergo alteration, so the phenomenal world cannot arise from Brahman. If the world cannot arise, yet is an empirical fact, then the world has to be an unreal[note 16] appearance of Brahman. And if the phenomenal world is an unreal appearance, then there is no real origination or destruction, only apparent origination or destruction. From the level of ultimate truth (paramārthatā) the phenomenal world is Maya.[68] As stated in Gaudapada’s Karika Chapter II Verse 48:[web 13]

No jiva ever comes into existence. There exists no cause that can produce it. The supreme truth is that nothing ever is born.[web 14]

Understanding in modern scholarship[edit] Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of Madhyamaka:

Over the past half-century the doctrine of the Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
school, and in particular that of Nāgārjuna
Nāgārjuna
has been variously described as nihilism, monism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism, scepticism, criticism, dialectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value.[69]

Jay L. Garfield likewise rephrases Ruegg:

"Modern interpreters differ among themselves about the correct way to read it as least as much as canonical interpreters. Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
has been read as an idealist (Murti 1960), a nihilist (Wood 1994), a skeptic (Garfield 1995), a pragmatist (Kalupahana 1986), and as a mystic (Streng 1967). He has been regarded as a critic of logic (Inada 1970), as a defender of classical logic (Hayes 1994), and as a pioneer of paraconsistent logic (Garfield and Priest 2003)".[70]

These interpretations "reflect almost as much about the viewpoints of the scholars involved as do they reflect the content of Nāgārjuna's concepts".[71] Most recent western scholarship (Garfield,[72] Napper,[73] Hopkins,[74] Huntington, and others) have, after investigation, tended to adopt one or another of the Gelugpa collegiate interpretations of Madhyamaka. Kalupahana[edit] Kalupahana's interpretation sees Madhyamaka, along with Yogacara, as an antidote against essentialist biases in Mahayana
Mahayana
Buddhist thought.[75][76] Hayes[edit] Richard P. Hayes is critical of the works of Nagarjuna:

Nagarjuna’s writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy. Despite his apparent attempts to discredit some of the most fundamental concepts of abhidharma, abhidharma continued to flourish for centuries, without any appreciable attempt on the part of abhidharmikas to defend their methods of analysis against Nagarjuna’s criticisms.[77]

According to Hayes, Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
makes use of two different possible meanings of the word svabhava, and uses those two meanings to make statements which are not logical.[78] In doing so, Hayes regards Nagarjuna...

[A] relatively primitive thinker whose mistakes in reasoning were eventually uncovered as the knowledge of logic in India became more sophisticated in subsequent centuries.[79]

Magee[edit] William Magee strongly disagrees with Hayes. He points out the influence of Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
in Tibetan Buddhism, and refers to Tsonghkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
to argue that

Hayes is misidentifying Nagarjuna's intended meaning of svabhava. In contradistinction to Hayes' belief that Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
speaks equivocably of an identity nature and a causally independent, non-existent nature, Dzong-ka-ba feels that in chapter XV.1-2 Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
uses the term svabhava to refer to an existent emptiness nature.[80]

According to Magee, both Candrakirti
Candrakirti
and Dzong-ka-ba "see Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
as consistently referring to emptiness with the word svabhava".[81] See also[edit]

Buddha-nature Candrakīrti Consciousness-only Materialism Mentalism Nagarjuna

Mulamadhyamakakarika

Schools of Buddhism

Prasangika Svatantrika Yogacara East Asian Mādhyamaka

Śūnyatā Tathagata Two Truths Doctrine

Notes[edit]

^ 'Own-beings',[7] unique nature or substance,[8] an identifying characteristic; an identity; an essence,[9] ^ A differentiating characteristic,[9] the fact of being dependent,[9] ^ 'Being',[10] 'self-nature or substance'[11] ^ Not being present; absence:[12] ^ svabhava ^ Stephen Batchelor, Verses from the Centre, Chapter 15 (Investigation of Essences), note for verse 3: "There is a problem here with the Tibetan translation from Sanskrit. Svabhava
Svabhava
is translated as rang bzhin, but parabhava rather clumsily as gzhan gyi dngos po [the term first appears in I:3]. A Tibetan reader would thus lose the etymological connection between "own-thing" (svabhava) and "other-thing" (parabhava), which then link up with "thing" (bhava) and no-thing (abhava). Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
is playing on the word "thing".[web 1] ^ Warder: "From Nagarjuna's own day onwards his doctrine was subject to being misunderstood as nihilistic: because he rejected 'existence' of beings and spoke of their 'emptiness' (of own-being), careless students (and critics who were either not very careful or not very scrupulous) have concluded that he maintained that ultimately the universe was an utter nothingness. In fact, his rejection of 'non-existence' is as emphatic as his rejection of 'existence', and must therefore lead us to the conclusion that what he is attacking are the notions or assertions themselves as metaphysical concepts imposed on ultimate reality, which is entirely beyond any possible concept or definition.[16] ^ Susan Kahn further explains: "The emptiness of emptiness refutes ultimate truth as yet another argument for essentialism under the guise of being beyond the conventional or as the foundation of it. To realize emptiness is not to find a transcendent place or truth to land in but to see the conventional as merely conventional. Here lies the key to liberation. For to see the deception is to be free of deception, like a magician who knows the magic trick. When one is no longer fooled by false appearances, phenomena are neither reified nor denied. They are understood interdependently, as ultimately empty and thus, as only conventionally real. This is the Middle Way."[web 2] ^ See also Atthakavagga and Parayanavagga, for early, Madhyamaka-like texts from the Buddhist canon on freedom from views. ^ In the Pali
Pali
canon, these chapters are the fourth and fifth chapters of the Khuddaka Nikaya's Sutta Nipata, respectively. ^ Wynne devotes a chapter to the Parayanavagga. ^ Alex Trisoglio: "In the 8th century, Shantarakshita
Shantarakshita
went to Tibet and founded the monastery at Samyé. He was not a direct disciple of Bhavaviveka, but the disciple of one of his disciples. He combined the Madhyamika- Svatantrika
Svatantrika
and Cittamatra schools, and created a new school of Madhyamika called Svatantrika-Yogachara-Madhyamika. His disciple Kamalashila, who wrote The Stages of Meditation upon Madhyamika (uma’i sgom rim), developed his ideas further, and together they were very influential in Tibet."Khyentse Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang (2003). "Introduction". In Alex Trisoglio. Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary (PDF) (1st ed.). Dordogne, France: Khyentse Foundation. p. 8. Retrieved 7 January 2013.  ^ In his Tattvaratnāvalī, the Indian scholar Advayavajra classified Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
into "those who uphold non-duality from the simile of illusion" (māyopamādvayavādin) and "those who uphold non-placement into any dharma" (sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin); furthermore, in the Madhyamakaṣaṭka he envisaged a specifically Vajrayāna type of Madhyamaka.[citation needed] ^ Alexander Berzin: There was a very famous Nyingma
Nyingma
lama at the time called Lhodrag Namka-gyeltsen, and this Nyingma
Nyingma
lama had, continually, visions of Vajrapani. And he invited Tsongkhapa, and they became mutual teacher and disciple. It is from this Nyingma
Nyingma
lama that Tsongkhapa got his main lam-rim transmissions from the Kadam tradition — two of the main Kadam lineages. There are three Kadampa
Kadampa
lineages that had split. He got two of them from this Nyingma
Nyingma
lama and one from a Kagyu
Kagyu
lama. The Kadampa
Kadampa
was divided into three: One was the lam-rim teachings, one was the textual teachings, and one was the oral guideline teachings. So he got the lam-rim and the oral guideline lineages from this Nyingma
Nyingma
lama, and the textual tradition from a Kagyu
Kagyu
lama. This I find very interesting. One always thinks that he got them from Kadampa
Kadampa
lamas; he didn’t. And that Gelugpa was so separate from all these other traditions; it wasn’t. Look at this Kagyu
Kagyu
lama, Lama
Lama
Umapa, that Tsongkhapa studied Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
with; he had studied Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
with Sakya. The Sakyas were the main Madhyamaka people of those days.Berzin, Alexander (December 2003). "The Life of Tsongkhapa". Munich, Germany. Retrieved 20 June 2016.  ^ The term is also used in the Lankavatara Sutra.[64] According to D.T Suzuki, "anutpada" is not the opposite of "utpada", but transcends opposites. It is the seeing into the true nature of existence,[65] the seeing that "all objects are without self-substance".[66] ^ C.q. "transitory"

References[edit] Published references[edit]

^ Williams 2000, p. 140. ^ Brunholzl 2004, p. 70. ^ Brunholzl 2004, p. 590. ^ a b c d e f g Cheng 1981. ^ a b c Garfield 1994. ^ a b Garfield 2012. ^ a b Warder 2000, p. 360. ^ a b c Kalupahana 1994, p. 162. ^ a b c Hayes 1994, p. 317. ^ a b c d e Warder 2000, p. 361. ^ a b c Kalupahana 1994, p. 165. ^ Hayes 1994, p. 316. ^ Harvey 1995, p. 97. ^ a b Hayes 2003, p. 4. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 10. ^ Warder 2000, p. 363. ^ a b Brunholzl 2004, p. 73. ^ Chenh 1981. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 8-9. ^ Tsong Khapa 2002. ^ a b c d Garfield 1995, p. 88 footnote. ^ a b Garfield 1995, p. 102. ^ Brunholzl 2004, p. 295-310. ^ Brunholzl 2004, p. 310. ^ Warder 2000, p. 358. ^ Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 P116 ^ Ng 1990, p. 1. ^ Gomez 1976. ^ a b Vetter 1988. ^ Fuller 2005. ^ Fuller 2005, p. 151. ^ Wynne 2007, p. 75. ^ Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism
Buddhism
2008 ^ Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought 2002 pp499-505 ^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMZwyPdY7eg&t=52s ^ Kalupahana 1994, p. 169. ^ Warder 2000, p. 368. ^ a b Rizzi 1988, p. 2. ^ Rizzi 1988, p. 3. ^ Rizzi 1988, p. 4. ^ Rizzi 1988, p. 5. ^ Shantarakshita
Shantarakshita
2005, p. 117-122. ^ Cornu 2001, p. 146-147. ^ Cornu 2001, p. 138. ^ a b Cornu 2001, p. 145. ^ Hookam 1991. ^ Brunnhölzl 2004. ^ Cornu 2001. ^ Gombrich 1996, p. 27-28. ^ a b c d Shantarakshita
Shantarakshita
2005, p. 131-141. ^ rJe Tsong Kha Pa 2006. ^ Magee 1999, p. 125-127. ^ a b Magee 1999, p. 32. ^ Tsongkhapa 1993. ^ Magee 1999. ^ Rizzi 1988, p. 19. ^ Magee 1999, p. 103. ^ Magee 1999, p. 103-115. ^ Thich Nhat Hanh
Thich Nhat Hanh
1988. ^ a b Renard 2010, p. 157. ^ Comans 2000, p. 35-36. ^ a b Bhattacharya 1943, p. 49. ^ Renard 2010, p. 160. ^ Suzuki 1999. ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 123-124. ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 168. ^ a b c Sarma 1996, p. 127. ^ a b c Comans 2000, p. 36. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 2. ^ Garfield and Samten 2006, p. xx. ^ Daye 1971, p. 77. ^ Garfield 1995. ^ Napper 1989. ^ Hopkins 1996. ^ Kalupahana 1992. ^ Kalupahana 1994. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 2. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 3-5. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 7. ^ Magee 1999, p. 126. ^ Magee 1999, p. 127.

Web references[edit]

^ a b Stephen Batchelor: Verses from the Center. Romanization and Literal English Translation of the Tibetan Text ^ a b Susan Kahn, The Two Truths of Buddhism
Buddhism
and The Emptiness of Emptiness. ^ Emptiness. Buddhist and Beyond ^ The Non-Buddhist ^ Emptiness teachings ^ Review of Richard Rorty's "Philosophy and Social Hope" ^ Patrick jennings (2014), Tsongkhapa: In Praise of Relativity; The Essence of Eloquence Archived 2015-05-18 at the Wayback Machine. ^ emptiness.co, Review of Kenneth J. Gergen's "An Invitation to Social Construction" ^ Susan Kahn, The Two Truths of Buddhism
Buddhism
and The Emptiness of Emptiness. ^ emptiness.co, Coming from the Advaitic/Awareness Teachings? Special Pointers ^ Sanskrit
Sanskrit
Dictionary for Spoken Sanskrit, Utpāda ^ Sanskrit
Sanskrit
Dictionary for Spoken Sanskrit, Anutpāda ^ Dr. Vemuri Ramesam, A Critique Of John Wheeler’s “You Were Never Born” ^ Mandukya Upanishad
Mandukya Upanishad
with Gaudapada's Karika

Sources[edit]

Arena, Leonardo Vittorio (2012), Nonsense as the Meaning, ebook  Arnold, Dan (2010). Nāgārjuna’s ‘Middle Way’: A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Selflessness. In:Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 64, no.253: 367-395 Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara (1943), Gauḍapādakārikā, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass  Brunnholzl, Karl (2004), Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
in the Kagyu
Kagyu
Tradition, Snow Lion Publications  Cheng, Hsueh-Li (1981), "The Roots of Zen
Zen
Buddhism", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8: 451–478, doi:10.1111/j.1540-6253.1981.tb00267.x  Comans, Michael (2000), The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass  Cornu, Philippe (2001), "Nawoord", Schijn en werkelijkheid. De twee waarheden in de vier boeddhistische leerstelsels, KunchabPublicaties  Daye, Douglas D. (1971), Major Schools of the Mahayana: Madhyamaka. In:Charles S. Prebisch, Buddhism, A Modern Perspective. Pages 76-96., ISBN 978-0-271-01195-0  Fuller, Paul (2005), The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View (PDF), Routledge, archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-12-02  Garfield, Jay L. (1994), "Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagarjuana start with causation?", Philosophy East & West, 44 (2)  Garfield, Jay L. (1995), The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Oxford: Oxford University Press  Garfield, Jay L. (2012), Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
is not emptiness (PDF), smith College, University of melbourne  Gomez, Luis O. (1976), "Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon", Philosophy East and West, 26 (2): 137–165, doi:10.2307/1398186  Harvey, Peter (1995), An introduction to Buddhism. Teachings, history and practices, Cambridge University Press  Hayes, Richard P. (1994), Nagarjuna's appeal. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 299-378  Hayes, Richard P. (2003), Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox,Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies? (PDF)  Hookham, S.K. (1991), The Buddha within : Tathagatagarbha doctrine according to the Shentong
Shentong
interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791403587  Hopkins, Jeffrey; Napper, Elizabeth (1996), Meditation on Emptiness  Kalupahana, David J. (1992), The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, Delhi: ri Satguru Publications  Kalupahana, David J. (1994), A History of Buddhist philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited  Loy, David (2006), Second Buddha : Nagarjuna
Nagarjuna
- Buddhism's Greatest Philosopher. In: Winter 2006 edition of Tricycle : The Buddhist Review  Magee, William (1999), The Nature of Things. Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion  Napper, Elizabeth (1989), Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, ISBN 0-86171-057-6  Ng, Yu-kwan (1990), Chih-i and Madhyamika, Hamilton, Ontario: dissertation, McMaster University, p. 1, archived from the original on February 3, 2014  Renard, Philip (2010), Non-Dualisme. De directe bevrijdingsweg, Cothen: Uitgeverij Juwelenschip  Rizzi, Cesare (1988), Candrakirti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited  Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1981), The literature of the Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
school of philosophy in India (A History of Indian literature), Harrassowitz, ISBN 978-3-447-02204-0  Sarma, Chandradhar (1996), The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass  Shantarakshita; Ju Mipham
Ju Mipham
(2005), The Adornment of the Middle Way, Padmakara Translation, ISBN 1-59030-241-9  Suzuki, Daisetz Teitarō (1999), Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass  Thich Nhat Hanh
Thich Nhat Hanh
(1988), The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita
Prajnaparamita
Heart Sutra  Tsongkhapa, Lobsang Dragpa; Sparham, Gareth, trans.; in collaboration with Shotaro Iida (1993). Kapstein, Matthew, ed. Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogacara
Yogacara
Doctrine of Mind (in Tibetan and English) (1་ ed.). Albany, NY: State University of New York. ISBN 0791414795. Retrieved 18 December 2012.  Tsong Khapa (2002), The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment: Volume 3, Snow Lion Publications, ISBN 1-55939-166-9  rJe Tsong Kha Pa; Garfield (tr.), Jay L.; Samten (tr.), Ngawang (2006), Ocean of Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-514733-9  Vetter, Tilmann (1988), The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism
Buddhism
(PDF), BRILL, ISBN 90-04-08959-4  Warder, A. K. (2000), Indian Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers  Williams, Paul (2000), Buddhist Thought, Routledge  Wynne, Alexander (2007), The Origin of Buddhist Meditation, Routledge 

Further reading[edit]

Brunnholzl, Karl (2004), Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
in the Kagyu
Kagyu
Tradition, Snow Lion Publications  Della Santina, Peter (1986), Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
Schools in India, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass  Harris, Ian Charles (1991), The Continuity of Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana
Mahayana
Buddhism, New York: E. J.Brill  His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama
Lama
(Tenzin Gyatso) (2009), The Middle Way: Faith Grounded in Reason, Boston: Wisdom Publications  Huntington, C. W., Jr. (1989). The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Madhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press Jones, Richard H. (2014), Nagarjuna: Buddhism's Most Important Philosopher, New York: Jackson Square Books  Jones, Richard H. (2012), Indian Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna, 2 vols., New York: Jackson Square Books  Narain, Harsh. The Mādhyamika mind. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1997. Newland, Guy (2008), Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path, Boston: Snow Lion  Ruegg, David S. (1981), The Literature of the Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
School in India, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz  Westeroff, Jan. (2009), Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press 

External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Madhyamaka.

The Mādhyamika or the Śūnyavāda school, Surendranath Dasgupta, 1940 " Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
Buddhism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  "Nagarjuna". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Middle Way thezensite: articles on Nagarjuna Introduction to the Middle Way
Middle Way
A contemporary commentary based on the teachings of Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Madhyamaka Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nagarjuna

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