The SECURITY SERVICE, also
MI5 (Military Intelligence, Section 5 ),
United Kingdom 's domestic counter-intelligence and security
agency and is part of its intelligence machinery alongside the Secret
Intelligence Service (MI6), Government Communications Headquarters
Defence Intelligence (DI).
MI5 is directed by the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the service is bound by the Security
Service Act 1989 . The service is directed to protect British
parliamentary democracy and economic interests, and counter terrorism
and espionage within the UK.
Within the civil service community the service is colloquially known
as Box 500 (after its official wartime address of
PO Box 500; its
current address is
PO Box 3255,
London SW1P 1AE ).
The service has had a national headquarters at
Thames House on
London since 1995, drawing together personnel from a
number of locations into a single HQ facility.
Thames House was, until
March 2013, shared with the
Northern Ireland Office
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and is also
home to the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre , a subordinate
organisation to the Security Service. The service has offices across
United Kingdom including an HQ in
Northern Ireland .
Details of the northern operations centre in
Greater Manchester were
revealed by the firm who built it. Plans to open the northern
operations centre were reported by
The Manchester Evening News in
February 2005, and plans to open a permanent Scottish office in
Glasgow were reported by
The Scotsman in January of that year.
* 1 Organisation
* 2 History
* 2.1 Early years
* 2.2 Inter-war period
Second World War
Second World War
* 2.4 Post-war
* 2.5 The Security Service\'s role in counter-terrorism
* 2.6 Serious crime
* 2.7 Surveillance
* 3 Buildings
* 4 Directors General of the Security Service
* 5 Past names of the Security Service
* 6 See also
* 7 References
* 8 Further reading
* 9 External links
The Security Service comes under the authority of the Home Secretary
within the Cabinet . The service is headed by a Director General at
the grade of a
Permanent Secretary of the
British Civil Service
British Civil Service who is
directly supported by an internal security organisation, secretariat,
legal advisory branch and information services branch. The Deputy DG
is responsible for the operational activity of the service, being
responsible for four branches; international counter-terrorism,
National Security Advice Centre (counter proliferation and counter
espionage), Irish and domestic counter-terrorism and technical and
The service is directed by the Joint Intelligence Committee for
intelligence operational priorities. It liaises with SIS, GCHQ, DIS,
and a number of other bodies within the British government and
industrial base. It is overseen by the Intelligence and Security
Committee of Members of Parliament, who are directly appointed by the
Prime Minister , by the
Interception of Communications Commissioner ,
and by the
Intelligence Services Commissioner . Judicial oversight of
the service's conduct is exercised by the Investigatory Powers
Operations of the service are required to be proportionate and
compliant with British legislation including the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 , the
Data Protection Act 1998 , and
various other items of legislation. Information held by the service is
exempt from disclosure under section 23 of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 .
All employees of the service are bound by the Official Secrets Act .
The current Director General is Andrew Parker , who succeeded
Jonathan Evans on 22 April 2013.
The service marked its centenary in 2009 by publishing an official
history, written by Christopher Andrew , Professor of Modern and
Contemporary History at Cambridge University .
The Security Service is derived from the
Secret Service Bureau
Secret Service Bureau ,
founded in 1909 and concentrating originally on the activities of the
Imperial German government as a joint initiative of the
War Office . The Bureau was split into naval and army sections
which, over time, specialised in foreign target espionage and internal
counter-espionage activities respectively. This specialisation was a
result of the
Admiralty intelligence requirements related to the
maritime strength of the Imperial German Navy. This specialisation was
formalised prior to 1914 and the beginning of
World War I
World War I , with the
two sections undergoing a number of administrative changes and the
home section becoming Directorate of Military Intelligence Section 5
(MI5), the name by which it is still known in popular culture.
The founding head of the Army section was
Vernon Kell of the South
Staffordshire Regiment, who remained in that role until the early part
Second World War
Second World War . Its role was originally quite restricted;
existing purely to ensure national security through counter-espionage.
With a small staff and working in conjunction with the
of the Metropolitan Police , the service was responsible for overall
direction and the identification of foreign agents, whilst Special
Branch provided the manpower for the investigation of their affairs,
arrest and interrogation.
On the day after the declaration of World War I, the Home Secretary,
Reginald McKenna , announced that "within the last twenty-four hours
no fewer than twenty-one spies, or suspected spies, have been arrested
in various places all over the country, chiefly in important military
or naval centres, some of them long known to the authorities to be
spies", a reference to arrests directed by the service. These arrests
have provoked recent historical controversy. According to the official
history of MI5, the actual number of agents identified was 22 and Kell
had started sending out letters to local police forces on 29 July
giving them advance warning of arrests to be made as soon as war was
declared. Portsmouth Constabulary jumped the gun and arrested one on 3
August, and not all of the 22 were in custody by the time that McKenna
made his speech, but the official history regards the incident as a
devastating blow to
Imperial Germany which deprived them of their
entire spy ring, and specifically upset the Kaiser.
This view has been challenged by Nicholas Hiley who has asserted that
it is a complete fabrication. In 2006 his article "Entering the Lists"
was published in the journal Intelligence and National Security
outlining the products of his research into recently opened files.
Hiley was sent an advance copy of the official history and objected to
the retelling of the story. He later wrote another article,
"Re-entering the Lists", which asserted that the list of those
arrested published in the official history was concocted from later
After this auspicious start, the history of
MI5 becomes darker. It
was consistently successful throughout the rest of the 1910s and 1920s
in its core counter-espionage role. Throughout World War I, Germany
continued trying to infiltrate Britain but
MI5 was able to identify
most, if not all, of the agents dispatched.
MI5 used a method that
depended on strict control of entry and exit to the country and,
crucially, large-scale inspection of mail. In post-war years,
attention turned to attempts by the
Soviet Union and the
surreptitiously support revolutionary activities within Britain. MI5's
expertise, combined with the early incompetence of the Soviets, meant
the bureau was successful once more in correctly identifying and
closely monitoring these activities.
However, in the meantime, MI5's role had been substantially enlarged.
Due to the spy hysteria,
MI5 had been formed with far more resources
than it actually needed to track down German spies. As is common
within governmental bureaucracies, this caused the service to expand
its role, to use its spare resources.
MI5 acquired many additional
responsibilities during the war. Most significantly, its strict
counter-espionage role blurred considerably. It became a much more
political role, involving the surveillance not merely of foreign
agents but also of pacifist and anti-conscription organisations, and
of organised labour . This was justified through the common belief
that foreign influence was at the root of these organisations. Thus,
by the end of the World War I,
MI5 was a fully-fledged investigating
force (although it never had powers of arrest), in addition to being a
counter-espionage agency. The expansion of this role continued after a
brief post-war power struggle with the head of the
Special Branch ,
Basil Thomson .
After World War I, Kell's department was considered unnecessary by
budget-conscious politicians. In 1919, MI5's budget was slashed from
£100,000 and over 800 officers to just £35,000 and 12 officers. At
the same time, Sir
Basil Thomson of
Special Branch was appointed
Director of Home Intelligence, in supreme command of all domestic
counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence investigations.
Consequently, as official
MI5 historian Christopher Andrew has noted
in his official history "Defence of the Realm" (2010),
MI5 had no
clearly defined role in the Anglo-Irish War. And to add insult to
injury, several of Kell's officers defected to Thomson's new Agency,
the Home Intelligence Directorate.
MI5 therefore undertook no tangible
intelligence operations of consequence during the Irish War of
MI5 did undertake the training of
British Army Case
Officers from the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) for the
Army's so-called "Silent Section" otherwise known as M04(x). Quickly
MI5 veterans at Hounslow Barracks, outside London, these
freshly minted M04(x) Army case officers were deployed to Dublin
beginning in the Spring of 1919. Over time, 175 officers were trained
and dispatched to Ireland. In Ireland, they came under the command of
General Romer and his Deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Searles
In April 1919, Colonel Walter Wilson of DMI arrived in Dublin to take
over the day-to-day management of these 175 Army intelligence
officers, and the unit was designated as the "Dublin District Special
Branch" (DMI/MO4(x)/DDSB) because it operated exclusively within the
confines of the Army's Dublin Military District. Royal Marine Colonel
Hugh Montgomery of the Department of Naval Intelligence, was also
seconded to Romer's intelligence staff at this time. British Army
after-action reports and contemporary accounts indicate that
M04(x)/DDSB was considered a highly amateurish outfit. Serious cover
constraints, coupled with alcohol abuse and social fraternization with
local prostitutes would prove to be the downfall of several of these
The intelligence staff of Michael Collins Irish Republican Army
penetrated the unit. Using DMP detectives
Ned Broy and David Nelligan
, Michael Collins was able to learn the names and lodgings of the
M04(x) agents, referred to by IRA operatives as "The Cairo Gang". On
Bloody Sunday , Collins ordered his
Counter-intelligence Unit, The
Squad , to assassinate 25 M04(x) agents, several British Courts
Martial Officers, at least one agent reporting to Basil Thomson, and
several intelligence officers attached to the Royal Irish Constabulary
Auxiliary Division, at their lodgings throughout Dublin. Although the
shooting of 14 British officers had the desired effect on British
morale, in many ways Bloody Sunday was a botched job. Three of
Collins's men were apprehended after engaging in a shoot-out on the
street, and at least 2 of the wounded British officers had no
connection whatsoever to British Intelligence. Moreover, with MO4(x)
having fielded a total of 175 agents of the DDSB, Collins's operation
only temporarily slowed British momentum. Within days, the remaining
160-odd M04(x) agents were re-established in secure quarters inside
solidly Loyalist hotels in Dublin, from where they continued to pursue
Collins and the IRA relentlessly right up until the Truce. In December
1920 the entire DDSB was transferred from
British Army Command to
civil command under Deputy Police Commissioner General Ormonde Winter,
and thereafter was known as "D Branch" within Dublin Castle. By
January 1921, the highly experienced
MI6 operative David Boyle arrived
at Dublin Castle to take over the day-to-day management of D Branch.
The unit's former commander, Colonel Wilson, resigned in protest for
having had his command taken from him. D Branch thrived under Boyle's
leadership. The net impact of Collins's strike of Bloody Sunday,
November 21, 1920, was therefore quite negligible—even though the
IRA had not gone up against
MI5 professionals but instead only a
quickly trained outfit of amateur army "D-Listers."
That afternoon, a mixed force of the
British Army , the Royal Irish
Constabulary , and the
Black and Tans retaliated by indiscriminately
shooting dead 14 civilians at a
Gaelic Football match at
Croke Park .
In 1921, Sir Warren Fisher, the Government inspector general for
civil service affairs, conducted a thorough review of the operations
and expenditures of Basil Thomson's Home Intelligence Directorate. He
issued a scathing report, accusing Thomson of wasting both money and
resources and conducting redundant as well as ineffectual operations.
Shortly thereafter, in a private meeting with
Prime Minister David
Lloyd George, Sir
Basil Thomson was sacked, and the Home Intelligence
Directorate was formally abolished. With Thomson out of the way,
Special Branch was returned to the command of the Commissioner of The
Criminal Investigation Division at Scotland Yard. Only then was Vernon
Kell able once again to rebuild
MI5 and regain its former place as
Britain's chief domestic spy agency.
MI5 operated in Italy during inter-war period.
MI5 helped Benito
Mussolini get his start in politics with the £100 weekly wage.
MI5's decline in counter-espionage efficiency began in the 1930s. It
was, to some extent, a victim of its own success. It was unable to
break the ways of thinking it had evolved in the 1910s and 1920s. In
particular, it was unable to adjust to the new methods of the Soviet
intelligence services the
NKVD and GRU . It continued to think in
terms of agents who would attempt to gather information simply through
observation or bribery, or to agitate within labour organisations and
the armed services, while posing as ordinary citizens. The NKVD,
however, had evolved more sophisticated methods; it began to recruit
agents from within the
British nobility , most notably from Cambridge
University , who were seen as a long-term investment. They succeeded
in gaining positions within the Government (and, in
Kim Philby 's
case, within British intelligence itself), from where they were able
to provide the
NKVD with sensitive information. The most successful of
these agents—Harold "Kim" Philby , Donald Maclean ,
Guy Burgess ,
Anthony Blunt and
John Cairncross —went undetected until after the
Second World War
Second World War , and were known as the
Cambridge Five .
SECOND WORLD WAR
MI5 experienced further failure during the
Second World War
Second World War . It was
chronically unprepared, both organisationally and in terms of
resources, for the outbreak of war, and utterly unequal to the task
which it was assigned—the large-scale internment of enemy aliens in
an attempt to uncover enemy agents. The operation was poorly handled
and contributed to the near-collapse of the agency by 1940. One of the
earliest actions of
Winston Churchill on coming to power in early 1940
was to sack the agency's long-term head,
Vernon Kell . He was replaced
initially by the ineffective Brigadier A.W.A. Harker, as Acting
Director General. Harker in turn was quickly replaced by David Petrie
, an SIS man, with Harker as his deputy. With the ending of the Battle
of Britain and the abandonment of invasion plans (correctly reported
by both SIS and the
Bletchley Park Ultra project), the spy scare
eased, and the internment policy was gradually reversed. This eased
pressure on MI5, and allowed it to concentrate on its major wartime
success, the so-called "double-cross" system .
This was a system based on an internal memo drafted by an
in 1936, which criticised the long-standing policy of arresting and
sending to trial all enemy agents discovered by MI5. Several had
offered to defect to Britain when captured; before 1939, such requests
were invariably turned down. The memo advocated attempting to "turn"
captured agents wherever possible, and use them to mislead enemy
intelligence agencies. This suggestion was turned into a massive and
well-tuned system of deception during the Second World War.
Beginning with the capture of an agent named Owens, codenamed Snow ,
MI5 began to offer enemy agents the chance to avoid prosecution (and
thus the possibility of the death penalty) if they would work as
British double-agents. Agents who agreed to this were supervised by
MI5 in transmitting bogus "intelligence" back to the German secret
Abwehr . This necessitated a large-scale organisational
effort, since the information had to appear valuable but actually be
misleading. A high-level committee, the Wireless Board, was formed to
provide this information. The day-to-day operation was delegated to a
subcommittee, the Twenty Committee (so called because the Roman
numerals for twenty, XX, form a double cross).
The system was extraordinarily successful. A postwar analysis of
German intelligence records found that of the 115 or so agents
targeted against Britain during the war, all but one (who committed
suicide) had been successfully identified and caught, with several
"turned" to become double agents. The system played a major part in
the massive campaign of deception which preceded the
designed to give the Germans a false impression of the location and
timings of the landings (see
Operation Fortitude ).
All foreigners entering the country were processed at the London
Reception Centre (LRC) at the Royal Patriotic School which was
MI5 subsection B1D, 30,000 were inspected at LRC. Captured
enemy agents were taken to
Camp 020 ,
Latchmere House , for
interrogation. This was commanded by Colonel Robin Stephens. There was
a Reserve Camp, Camp 020R, at Huntercombe which was used mainly for
long term detention of prisoners.
The Prime Minister's personal responsibility for the Service was
delegated to the
Home Secretary Maxwell-Fyfe in 1952, with a directive
issued by the
Home Secretary setting out the role and objectives of
the Director General. The service was subsequently placed on a
statutory basis in 1989 with the introduction of the Security Service
Act. This was the first government acknowledgement of the existence of
The post-war period was a difficult time for the Service with a
significant change in the threat as the
Cold War began, being
challenged by an extremely active
KGB and increasing incidence of the
Northern Ireland conflict and international terrorism . Whilst little
has yet been released regarding the successes of the service there
have been a number of intelligence failures which have created
embarrassment for both the service and the government. For instance in
1983 one of its officers,
Michael Bettaney , was caught trying to sell
information to the
KGB . He was subsequently convicted of espionage.
Michael Bettaney case,
Philip Woodfield was appointed
as a staff counsellor for the security and intelligence services. His
role was to be available to be consulted by any member or former
member of the security and intelligence services who had "anxieties
relating to the work of his or her service" that it had not been
possible to allay through the ordinary processes of management-staff
relations, including proposals for publications.
The Service was instrumental in breaking up a large Soviet spy ring
at the start of the 1970s, with 105 Soviet embassy staff known or
suspected to be involved in intelligence activities being expelled
from the country in 1971.
One episode involving
MI5 and the BBC came to light in the mid-1980s.
Ronnie Stonham had an office in the BBC and took part in
Controversy arose when it was alleged that the service was monitoring
trade unions and left-wing politicians. A file was kept on Labour
Harold Wilson from 1945, when he became an MP ,
although the agency's official historian, Christopher Andrew maintains
that his fears of
MI5 conspiracies and bugging were unfounded. As
Home Secretary, the Labour MP
Jack Straw discovered the existence of
his own file dating from his days as a student radical .
One of the most significant and far reaching failures was an
inability to conclusively detect and apprehend the "
Cambridge Five "
spy ring which had formed in the inter-war years and achieved great
success in penetrating the government, and the intelligence agencies
themselves. Related to this failure were suggestions of a high-level
penetration within the service,
Peter Wright (especially in his
Spycatcher ) and others believing that evidence
implicated the former Director General,
Roger Hollis or his deputy
Graham Mitchell . The Trend inquiry of 1974 found the case unproven of
that accusation, and that view was later supported by the former KGB
Oleg Gordievsky . Another spy ring, the
Portland Spy Ring ,
exposed after a tip-off by Soviet defector
Michael Goleniewski , led
to an extensive
MI5 surveillance operation.
There have been strong accusations leveled against
MI5 for having
failed in its obligation to provide care for former police agents who
had infiltrated the Provisional IRA during the Troubles . The two most
notable of the agents,
Martin McGartland and
Raymond Gilmour , are
presently residing in England using false identities and in 2012
launched test cases against the agency. Both men claimed to journalist
Liam Clarke in the Belfast Telegraph that they were abandoned by MI5
and were "left high and dry despite severe health problems as a result
of their work and lavish promises of life-time care from their former
Intelligence bosses". Both men suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress
THE SECURITY SERVICE\'S ROLE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM
The end of the
Cold War resulted in a change in emphasis for the
operations of the service, assuming responsibility for the
investigation of all Irish republican activity within Britain and
increasing the effort countering other forms of terrorism,
particularly in more recent years the more widespread threat of
Whilst the British security forces in
Northern Ireland have provided
support in the countering of both republican and loyalist paramilitary
groups since the early 1970s, republican sources have often accused
these forces of collusion with loyalists. In 2006, an Irish government
committee inquiry found that there was widespread collusion between
British security forces and loyalist terrorists in the 1970s, which
resulted in eighteen deaths. In 2012, a document based review by Sir
Desmond de Silva QC into the 1989 murder of Belfast solicitor Patrick
Finucane found that
MI5 had colluded with the Ulster Defence
Association (UDA). The review disclosed that
MI5 assessments of UDA
intelligence consistently noted that the majority came from MI5
sources with an assessment in 1985 finding 85% came from MI5. Prime
David Cameron accepted the findings and apologised on behalf
of the British government and acknowledged significant levels of
collusion with Loyalists in its state agencies.
On 10 October 2007, the lead responsibility for national security
Northern Ireland returned to the Security Service from
the Police Service of
Northern Ireland that had been devolved in 1976
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) during
Ulsterisation . During
April 2010 the
Real IRA detonated a 120 lb. car bomb outside Palace
County Down which is the headquarters of
MI5 in Northern
Ireland and also home to the 2nd Battalion
The Mercian Regiment .
MI5 is understood to have a close working relationship with the
Republic of Ireland
Republic of Ireland 's
Special Detective Unit (SDU), the
counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence section of the Garda
Síochána (national police), particularly with regards to threats
from dissident republican terrorism and
Islamic terrorism .
Executive Liaison Groups enable
MI5 to safely share secret,
sensitive, and often raw intelligence with the police, on which
decisions can be made about how best to gather evidence and prosecute
suspects in the courts. Each organisation works in partnership
throughout the investigation, but
MI5 retain the lead for collecting,
assessing and exploiting intelligence. The police take lead
responsibility for gathering evidence, obtaining arrests and
preventing risks to the public.
In 1996, legislation formalised the extension of the Security
Service's statutory remit to include supporting the law enforcement
agencies in their work against serious crime. Tasking was reactive,
acting at the request of law enforcement bodies such as the National
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), for whom
MI5 agents performed
electronic surveillance and eavesdropping duties during Operation
Trinity . This role has subsequently been passed to the Serious
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and then the
National Crime Agency .
In 2001, after the
September 11 attacks
September 11 attacks in the U.S.,
collecting bulk telephone communications data under a little
understood general power of the
Telecommunications Act 1984 (instead
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which would have
brought independent oversight and regulation). This was kept secret
until announced by the
Home Secretary in 2015.
In July 2006, parliamentarian
Norman Baker accused the British
Government of "hoarding information about people who pose no danger to
this country", after it emerged that
MI5 holds secret files on 272,000
individuals—equivalent to one in 160 adults. It had previously been
revealed that a "traffic light " system operates:
* Green: active—about 10% of files
* Amber: enquiries prohibited, further information may be
added—about 46% of files.
* Red: enquiries prohibited, substantial information may not be
added—about 44% of files
MI5 was based at
Leconfield House (1945–1976) and 140 Gower Street
(1976–1994, since demolished) before moving to
Thames House in
DIRECTORS GENERAL OF THE SECURITY SERVICE
Director General of MI5
* 1909–1940: Sir
Vernon Kell (b. 1873–d. 1942)
Oswald Allen Harker (b. 1886–d. 1968)
* 1941–1946: Sir
David Petrie (b. 1879–d. 1961)
* 1946–1953: Sir
Percy Sillitoe (b. 1888–d. 1962)
Dick White (b. 1906–d. 1993)
Roger Hollis (b. 1905–d. 1973)
Martin Furnival Jones (b. 1912–d. 1997)
Michael Hanley (b. 1918–d. 2001)
* 1979–1981: Howard Smith (b. 1919–d. 1996)
* 1981–1985: John Jones (b. 1923–d. 1998)
Antony Duff (b. 1920–d. 2000)
* 1988–1992: Patrick Walker (b. 1932)
Stella Rimington (b. 1935)
Stephen Lander (b. 1947)
Eliza Manningham-Buller (b. 1948)
* 2007–2013: Jonathan Evans (b. 1958)
* From April 2013: Andrew Parker (b. 1962)
PAST NAMES OF THE SECURITY SERVICE
Although commonly referred to as "MI5", this was the Service's
official name for only thirteen years (1916–29). However, as an
acknowledgment of popular thought, "MI5" is used as a sub-title on the
various pages of the official Security Service website (see links,
* October 1909: Founded as the HOME SECTION OF THE SECRET SERVICE
* April 1914: Became a subsection of the
War Office DIRECTORATE OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS, SECTION 5 (MO5)—MO5(g).
* September 1916: Became MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION 5—MI5.
* 1929: Renamed the DEFENCE SECURITY SERVICE.
* 1931: Renamed the SECURITY SERVICE.
Annie Machon –
Club de Berne – a European intelligence sharing forum
Terrorism Command – of London's Metropolitan Police
David Shayler –
Terrorism Analysis Centre
* Spooks – a BBC television drama about the work of a group of MI5
officers (renamed MI-5 in the United States)
* ^ House of Commons (5 July 2016). Intelligence and Security
Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2015–2016, page 11. Retrieved
23 October 2016.
* ^ House of Commons (5 July 2016). Intelligence and Security
Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2015–2016, page 10. Retrieved
12 January 2017.
* ^ "What\'s in a name?" MI5. Retrieved 14 May 2014.
* ^ Timothy Gerraty, The Irish War.
* ^ "Intelligence,
Counter-terrorism and Trust" (Press release).
MI5. 2007-11-05. Retrieved 2015-01-08.
* ^ Martin Fletcher Updated 54 minutes ago. "The Times UK News,
World News and Opinion". Timesonline.co.uk. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
* ^ David Thame, Don Frame and Ian Craig (2005-02-15). "
MI5 to set
up base in the city Manchester Evening News". menmedia.co.uk.
* ^ Kirkup, James (20 January 2005). "
MI5 plans Scottish base to
The Scotsman . Retrieved 2007-09-27.
* ^ Security Service Act of 1989.
Intelligence Services Act 1994 .
* ^ "Freedom of Information Act, section 23". Office of Public
Sector Information . Retrieved 2009-02-03.
* ^ R. Leach, W. Coxall, L. Robin - British Politics, p.341
Palgrave Foundations Series, Palgrave Macmillan 17 Aug 2011 (revised),
480 pages, ISBN 0230344224 Retrieved 2015-07-11
* ^ "Appointment of the new Director General of the Security
Service". Home Office. 28 March 2013. Retrieved 20 August 2013.
MI5 1990 to Present Archived 30 September 2013 at the Wayback
* ^ Hansard, HC 5ser vol 65 col 1986.
* ^ Christopher Andrew, "The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised
History of MI5", Allen Lane, 2009, pp. 49-52.
* ^ Nicholas Hiley, "Entering the Lists: MI5\'s great spy round-up
of August 1914, Intelligence and National Security, vol 21, issue 1,
2006, pp. 46-76.
* ^ Christopher Andrew, "The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised
History of MI5", Allen Lane, 2009, note 112 on pp. 873-5.
* ^ Nicholas Hiley, "Re-entering the Lists: MI5\'s Authorized
History and the August 1914 Arrests, Intelligence and National
Security, vol 25, issue 4, 2010, pp. 415-52.
* ^ "Basil Thomson". Archived from the original on 20 May 2012.
Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ A B C J.B.E. Hittle, Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish War:
Britain's Failed Counterinsurgency, Potomac Books, Inc, 2011.
* ^ T. Ryle Dwyer, The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of
Mercier Press .
* ^ "Croke Park: Queen in emotionally charged visit". BBC. 18 May
2011. Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ Kington, Tom (2009-10-13). "Recruited by MI5: the name\'s
Benito Mussolini Documents reveal Italian dictator got
start in politics in 1917 with help of £100 weekly wage from MI5".
London: Guardian. Retrieved 2009-10-14.
* ^ A B "The Cambridge Spies". BBC. Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ A B C D Masterman, John C (1972) . The Double-Cross System in
the War of 1939 to 1945. Australian National University Press. ISBN
* ^ Oliver Hoare, Camp 020:
MI5 and the Nazi Spies — The Official
History of MI5's Wartime Interrogation Centre, PRO 2000 ISBN
* ^ "Security Service Act 1989". Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ A B Harrison, David (11 November 2007). "
Cold War rivals play
at spy game". The Telegraph. Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ HC Debs., 2 November 1987, col. 312.
* ^ Official Report, 21 December 1988; Vol. 144, c. 538.
* ^ See Mark Hollingsworth and Richard Norton-Taylor Blacklist: The
Inside Story of Political Vetting, 1988, Hogarth Press, p. 104. The
relevant extract (Chapter 5) is online
MI5 kept file on former PM Wilson, BBC News, 3 October 09
* ^ Schaefer, Sarah (22 January 1999). "Parliament & Politics:
Straw will not see his
MI5 file". The Independent. Retrieved 1 July
* ^ Bamford, James (18 November 1990). "Gordievsky\'s People". New
York Times. Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ Lewis, Jason; Wynne-Jones, Jonathan (18 June 2011). "MI5
labelled the Archbishop of Canterbury a subversive over anti-Thatcher
campaigns". Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 1 July 2012.
* ^ "Two ex-spies target
MI6 in landmark legal battle over
payouts". Belfast Telegraph. Liam Clarke. 14 September 2012. retrieved
7 January 2013
* ^ "7 Tied to Faction of the I.R.A. Face
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