* Da Chu (1127) * Da Qi (1133–37)
Co-belligerents: Western Xia (1225–27)
* v * t * e
* Battles: Jingkang * Huangtiandang * De\'an * Yancheng * Caishi * Tangdao
The JIN–SONG WARS were a series of conflicts between the Jurchen
Jin dynasty (1115–1234) and
Surprised by the news of an invasion, the Song general stationed in
Taiyuan retreated from the city, which was besieged and later
captured. As the second Jin army approached the capital, Emperor
Huizong of the Song abdicated and fled south. A new emperor, Qinzong ,
was enthroned. The Jurchens began a siege against
The Jurchens tried to conquer southern China in the 1130s, but they
were bogged down by a pro-Song insurgency in the north and a
counteroffensive by the Song generals
Yue Fei ,
Han Shizhong , and
others. The generals regained some territories but retreated on the
orders of the
Southern Song emperor, who supported a peaceful
resolution to the war. The
Treaty of Shaoxing in 1142 settled the
boundary between the two empires along the
Huai River , but conflicts
between the two dynasties continued until the fall of the Jin in 1234.
A campaign against the Song by the fourth Jin emperor,
(the Prince of Hailing) , was unsuccessful. He lost the Battle of
Caishi (1161) and was later assassinated by his own disaffected
officers. An invasion of the Jin motivated by Song revanchism
(1206–1208) was also unsuccessful. A decade later, the Jin launched
an abortive military campaign against the Song in 1217 to compensate
for the territory that they had lost to the invading
The wars engendered an era of technological, cultural, and demographic changes in China. Battles between the Song and Jin brought about the introduction of various gunpowder weapons . The siege of De\'an in 1132 was the first recorded use of the fire lance , an early ancestor of firearms . There were also reports of battles fought with primitive gunpowder bombs like the incendiary _huopao_ or the exploding _tiehuopao_, incendiary arrows , and other related weapons. In northern China, the Jurchen tribes were the ruling minority of an empire that was predominantly inhabited by former subjects of the Northern Song. Jurchen migrants settled in the conquered territories and assimilated with the local culture. The Jin government instituted a centralized imperial bureaucracy modeled on previous Chinese dynasties, basing their legitimacy on Confucian philosophy . Song refugees from the north resettled in southern China. The north was the cultural center of China, and its conquest by the Jin diminished the international stature of the Song dynasty. The Southern Song, however, quickly returned to economic prosperity, and trade with the Jin was lucrative despite decades of warfare. The capital of the Southern Song, Hangzhou, expanded into a major city for commerce.
* 1 The fragile Song–Jin alliance
* 2 War against the
* 2.1 The collapse of the Song–Jin alliance
* 2.2 First campaign
* 2.3 Second campaign
* 2.3.1 Second siege of
* 2.4 Reasons for Song failure
* 3 Wars with the Southern Song
* 3.1 Southern retreat of the Song court
* 3.1.1 The enthronement of Emperor Gaozong * 3.1.2 The move south
* 3.2 Da Qi invades the Song * 3.3 Song counteroffensive and the peace process * 3.4 Treaty of Shaoxing
* 3.5 Further campaigns
* 3.5.1 Prince of Hailing\'s campaign
* 3.5.2 Song revanchism
* 3.5.3 Song–Jin war during the rise of the
* 4 Historical significance
* 4.1 Cultural and demographic changes
* 5 See also
* 6 References
* 6.1 Citations * 6.2 Bibliography
THE FRAGILE SONG–JIN ALLIANCE
The Jurchens were a Tungusic-speaking group of semi-agrarian tribes
inhabiting areas of northeast Asia that are now part of Northeast
China . Many of the Jurchen tribes were vassals of the Liao dynasty
(907–1125), an empire ruled by the nomadic Khitans that included
most of modern
In 1114, the chieftain
Because the land routes between the Song and Jin were controlled by
the Liao, diplomatic exchanges had to occur by traveling across the
Bohai Sea . Negotiations for an alliance began secretly under the
pretense that the Song wanted to acquire horses from the Khitans. Song
diplomats traveled to the Jin court to meet Aguda in 1118, while
Jurchen envoys arrived in the Song capital
The joint attack against the Liao had been planned for 1121, but it was rescheduled for 1122. In February 23 of that year, the Jin captured the Liao Central Capital as promised. The Song delayed their entry into the war because it diverted resources to fighting the Western Xia in the northwest and suppressing a large popular rebellion led by Fang La in the south. When a Song army under Tong Guan's command finally attacked Yanjing in May 1122, the smaller forces of the weakened Liao repelled the invaders with ease. Another attack failed in the fall. Both times, Tong was forced to retreat back to Kaifeng. After the first attack, Aguda changed the terms of the agreement and only promised Yanjing and six other prefectures to the Song. In early 1123 it was Jurchen forces that easily took the Liao Southern Capital. They sacked it and enslaved its population.
The quick collapse of the Liao led to more negotiations between the Song and the Jin. Jurchen military success and their effective control over the Sixteen Prefectures gave them more leverage. Aguda grew increasingly frustrated as he realized that despite their military failures the Song still intended to seize most of the prefectures. In the spring of 1123 the two sides finally set the terms of the first Song–Jin treaty. Only seven prefectures (including Yanjing) would be returned to the Song, and the Song would pay an annual indemnity of 300,000 packs of silk and 200,000 taels of silver to the Jin, as well as a one-time payment of one million strings of copper coins to compensate the Jurchens for the tax revenue they would have earned had they not returned the prefectures. In May 1123 Tong Guan and the Song armies entered the looted Yanjing.
WAR AGAINST THE NORTHERN SONG
See also: History of the
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SONG–JIN ALLIANCE
Barely one month after the Song had recovered Yanjing, Zhang Jue (張覺), who had served as military governor of the Liao prefecture of Pingzhou about 200 kilometres (120 mi) east of Yanjing, killed the main Jin official in that city and turned it over to the Song. The Jurchens defeated his armies a few months later and Zhang took refuge in Yanjing. Even though the Song agreed to execute him in late 1123, this incident put tension between the two states, because the 1123 treaty had explicitly forbidden both sides from harboring defectors. In 1124, Song officials further angered the Jin by asking for the cession of nine more border prefectures. The new Jin emperor Taizong (r. 1123–1135), Aguda's brother and successor, hesitated, but warrior princes Wanyan Zonghan and Wanyan Zongwang (完颜宗望) vehemently refused to give them any more territory. Taizong eventually granted two prefectures, but by then the Jin leaders were ready to attack their southern neighbor.
Before they could invade the Song, the Jurchens reached a peace
agreement with their western neighbors the Tangut
Western Xia in 1124.
The following year near the
Ordos Desert , they captured Tianzuo , the
last emperor of the Liao, putting an end to the
In November 1125 Taizong ordered his armies to attack the Song. The defection of Zhang Jue two years earlier served as the _casus belli _. Two armies were sent to capture the major cities of the Song.
Siege Of Taiyuan
The western army, led by
Wanyan Zonghan, departed from
Taiyuan through the mountains of
First Siege Of Kaifeng
Meanwhile, the eastern army, commanded by
Wanyan Zongwang, was
dispatched towards Yanjing (modern Beijing) and eventually the Song
capital Kaifeng. It did not face much armed opposition. Zongwang
easily took Yanjing, where Song general and former Liao governor Guo
Yaoshi (郭藥師) switched his allegiances to the Jin. When the Song
had tried to reclaim the
Sixteen Prefectures , they had faced fierce
resistance from the
Han Chinese population, yet when the Jurchens
invaded that area, the
Han Chinese did not oppose them at all. By the
end of December 1125, the Jin army had seized control of two
prefectures and re-established Jurchen rule over the Sixteen
Prefectures. The eastern army was nearing
Fearing the approaching Jin army, Song emperor Huizong planned to
retreat south. The emperor deserting the capital would have been
viewed as an act of capitulation, so court officials convinced him to
abdicate. There were few objections. Rescuing an empire in crisis
from destruction was more important than preserving the rituals of
imperial inheritance. In January 1126, a few days before the New Year
, Huizong abdicated in favor of his son and was demoted to the
ceremonial role of Retired Emperor . The Jurchen forces reached the
With little prospect of help from afar arriving, infighting broke out in the Song court between the officials who supported the Jin offer and those who opposed it. Opponents of the treaty like Li Gang (李剛; 1083–1140) rallied around the proposal of remaining in defensive positions until reinforcements arrived and Jurchen supplies ran out. They botched an ambush against the Jin that was carried out at night, and were replaced by officials who supported peace negotiations. The failed attack pushed Qinzong into meeting the Jurchen demands, and his officials convinced him to go through with the deal. The Song recognized Jin control over the three prefectures. The Jurchen army ended the siege in March after 33 days.
Almost as soon as the Jin armies had left Kaifeng, Emperor Qinzong reneged on the deal and dispatched two armies to repel the Jurchen troops attacking Taiyuan and bolster the defenses of Zhongshan and Hejian. An army of 90,000 soldiers and another of 60,000 were defeated by Jin forces by June. A second expedition to rescue Taiyuan was also unsuccessful.
Accusing the Song of violating the agreement and realizing the
weakness of the Song, the Jin generals launched a second punitive
campaign, again dividing their troops into two armies. Wanyan
Zonghan, who had withdrawn from
Taiyuan after the
Second Siege Of Kaifeng
After the defeat of several Song armies in the north, Emperor Qinzong
wanted to negotiate a truce with the Jin, but he committed a massive
strategic blunder when he commanded his remaining armies to protect
prefectural cities instead of Kaifeng. Neglecting the importance of
the capital, he left
The Jin assault commenced in mid December 1126. Even as fighting raged on, Qinzong continued to sue for peace, but Jin demands for territory were enormous: they wanted all provinces north of the Yellow River. After more than twenty days of heavy combat against the besieging forces, Song defenses were decimated and the morale of Song soldiers was on the decline. On January 9, 1127, the Jurchens broke through and started to loot the conquered city. Emperor Qinzong tried to appease the victors by offering the remaining wealth of the capital. The royal treasury was emptied and the belongings of the city's residents were seized. The Song emperor offered his unconditional surrender a few days later.
Qinzong, the former emperor Huizong, and members of the Song court
were captured by the Jurchens as hostages. They were taken north to
REASONS FOR SONG FAILURE
A painting by Emperor Huizong. Huizong's excessive interest in the arts may have played a role in the fall of the northern Song.
Many factors contributed to the Song's repeated military blunders and
subsequent loss of northern China to the Jurchens. Traditional
accounts of Song history held the venality of Huizong's imperial court
responsible for the decline of the dynasty. These narratives
condemned Huizong and his officials for their moral failures. Early
Song emperors were eager to enact political reforms and revive the
ethical framework of
Confucianism , but the enthusiasm for reforms
gradually died after the reformist
A modern analysis by Ari Daniel Levine places more of the blame on deficiencies in the military and bureaucratic leadership. The loss of northern China was not inevitable. The military was overextended by a government too assured of its own military prowess. Huizong diverted the state's resources to failed wars against the Western Xia. The Song insistence on a greater share of Liao territory only succeeded in provoking their Jin allies. Song diplomatic oversights underestimated the Jin and allowed the unimpeded rise of Jurchen military power. The state had plentiful resources, with the exception of horses, but managed its assets poorly during battles. Unlike the expansive Han and Tang empires that preceded the Song, the Song did not have a significant foothold in Central Asia where a large proportion of its horses could be bred or procured. As Song general Li Gang noted, without a consistent supply of horses the dynasty was at a significant disadvantage against Jurchen cavalry : "the Jin were victorious only because they used iron-shielded cavalry , while we opposed them with foot soldiers. It is only to be expected that were scattered and dispersed."
WARS WITH THE SOUTHERN SONG
SOUTHERN RETREAT OF THE SONG COURT
The Enthronement Of Emperor Gaozong
See also: Da Chu
The Jin leadership had not expected or desired the fall of the Song dynasty. Their intention was to weaken the Song in order to demand more tribute, and they were unprepared for the magnitude of their victory. The Jurchens were preoccupied with strengthening their rule over the areas once controlled by Liao. Instead of continuing their invasion of the Song, an empire with a military that outnumbered their own, they adopted the strategy of "using Chinese to control the Chinese". The Jin hoped that a proxy state would be capable of administering northern China and collecting the annual indemnity without requiring Jurchen interventions to quell anti-Jin uprisings. In 1127, the Jurchens installed a former Song official, Zhang Bangchang (張邦昌; 1081–1127), as the puppet emperor of the newly established " Da Chu " (Great Chu) dynasty. The puppet government did not deter the resistance in northern China, but the insurgents were motivated by their anger towards the Jurchens' looting rather than by a sense of loyalty towards the inept Song court. A number of Song commanders, stationed in towns scattered across northern China, retained their allegiance to the Song, and armed volunteers organized militias opposed to the Jurchen military presence. The insurgency hampered the ability of the Jin to exert control over the north.
Meanwhile, one Song prince, Zhao Gou, had escaped capture. He had
been held up in Cizhou while on a diplomatic mission, and never made
it back to Kaifeng. He was not present in the capital when the city
fell to the Jurchens. The future Emperor Gaozong managed to evade the
Jurchen troops tailing him by moving from one province to the next,
traveling across Hebei,
Henan , and
After reigning for barely one month, Zhang Bangchang was persuaded by
the Song to step down as emperor of the Great Chu and to recognize the
legitimacy of the Song imperial line. Li Gang pressured Gaozong to
execute Zhang for betraying the Song. The emperor relented and Zhang
was coerced into suicide. The killing of Zhang showed that the Song
was willing to provoke the Jin, and that the Jin had yet to solidify
their control over the newly conquered territories. The submission
and abolition of Chu meant that
The descendant of
The Move South
The Song disbandment of the Great Chu and execution of Zhang
Bangchang antagonized the Jurchens and violated the treaty that the
two parties had negotiated. The Jin renewed their attacks on the Song
and quickly reconquered much of northern China. In late 1127 Gaozong
moved his court further south from Yingtianfu to
From 1127 to 1129, the Song sent thirteen embassies to the Jin to
discuss peace terms and to negotiate the release of Gaozong's mother
and Huizong, but the Jin court ignored them. In December 1129, the
Jin started a new military offensive, dispatching two armies across
Huai River in the east and west. On the western front, an army
Meanwhile, on the eastern front,
Wuzhu commanded the main Jin army.
He crossed the Yangtze southwest of Jiankang and took that city when
Du Chong surrendered.
Wuzhu set out from Jiankang and advanced
rapidly to try to capture Gaozong. The Jin seized
After the Jin incursion that almost captured Gaozong, the sovereign
ordered pacification commissioner Zhang Jun (1097–1164), who was in
The Song court returned to
DA QI INVADES THE SONG
Qin Hui , an official of the Song court, recommended a peaceful solution to the conflict in 1130, saying that, "If it is desirable that there will be no more conflicts under Heaven , it is necessary for the southerners to stay in the south and the northerners in the north." Gaozong, who considered himself a northerner, initially rejected the proposal. There were gestures toward peace in 1132, when the Jin freed an imprisoned Song diplomat, and in 1133, when the Song offered to become a Jin vassal, but a treaty never materialized. The Jin requirement that the border between the two states be moved south from the Huai River to the Yangtze was too large of a hurdle for the two sides to reach an agreement.
The continuing insurgency of anti-Jin forces in northern China
hampered the Jurchen campaigns south of the Yangtze. Reluctant to let
the war drag on, the Jin decided to create Da Qi (the "Great Qi"),
their second attempt at a puppet state in northern China. The
Jurchens believed that this state, nominally ruled by someone of Han
Chinese descent, would be able to attract the allegiance of
disaffected members of the insurgency. The Jurchens also suffered from
a shortage of skilled manpower, and controlling the entirety of
northern China was not administratively feasible. In the final months
of 1129, Liu Yu (劉豫; 1073–1143) won the favor of the Jin emperor
Taizong. Liu was a Song official from
The Jin granted Qi more autonomy than the first puppet government of
Chu, but Liu Yu was obligated to obey the orders of the Jurchen
generals. With Jin support, Da Qi invaded the Song in November 1133.
Li Cheng, a Song turncoat who had joined the Qi, led the campaign.
Xiangyang and nearby prefectures fell to his army. The capture of
Xiangyang on the Han River gave the Jurchens a passage into the
central valley of the Yangtze River. Their southward push was halted
by the general Yue Fei. In 1134,
Yue Fei defeated Li and retook
Xiangyang and its surrounding prefectures. Later that year, however,
Qi and Jin initiated a new offensive further east along the Huai
River. For the first time, Gaozong issued an edict officially
condemning Da Qi. The armies of Qi and Jin won a series of victories
in the Huai valley, but were repelled by
Han Shizhong near Yangzhou
Yue Fei at Luzhou (廬州, modern
Hefei ). Their sudden
withdrawal in 1135 in response to the death of Jin Emperor Taizong
gave the Song time to regroup. The war recommenced in late 1136 when
Da Qi attacked the
Huainan circuits of the Song. Qi lost a battle at
Outang (藕塘), in modern
SONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE AND THE PEACE PROCESS
Qin Hui in 1138 and put him in charge of
deliberations with the Jin. Yue Fei, Han Shizhong, and a large number
of officials at court criticized the peace overtures. Aided by his
control of the
Censorate , Qin purged his enemies and continued
negotiations. In 1138 the Jin and Song agreed to a treaty that
Emperor Gaozong supported settling a peace treaty with the Jurchens and sought to rein in the assertiveness of the military. The military expeditions of Yue Fei and other generals were an obstacle to peace negotiations. The government weakened the military by rewarding Yue Fei, Han Shizhong, and Zhang Jun (1086–1154) with titles that relieved them of their command over the Song armies. Han Shizhong, a critic of the treaty, retired. Yue Fei also announced his resignation as an act of protest. In 1141 Qin Hui had him imprisoned for insubordination. Charged with treason, Yue Fei was poisoned in jail on Qin's orders in early 1142. Jurchen diplomatic pressure during the peace talks may have played a role, but Qin Hui's alleged collusion with the Jin has never been proven.
After his execution, Yue Fei's reputation for defending the Southern Song grew to that of a national folk hero. Qin Hui was denigrated by later historians, who accused him of betraying the Song. The real Yue Fei differed from the later myths based on his exploits. Contrary to traditional legends, Yue was only one of many generals who fought against the Jin in northern China. Traditional accounts have also blamed Gaozong for Yue Fei's execution and submitting to the Jin. Qin Hui, in a reply to Gaozong's gratitude for the success of the peace negotiations, told the emperor that "the decision to make peace was entirely Your Majesty's. Your servant only carried it out; what achievement was there in this for me?"
TREATY OF SHAOXING
On October 11, 1142, after about a year of negotiations, the Treaty of Shaoxing was ratified, ending the conflict between the Jin and the Song. By the terms of the treaty, the Huai River , north of the Yangtze, was designated as the boundary between the two empires. The Song agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 packs of silk to the Jin.
The treaty reduced the Southern Song's status to that of a Jin vassal. The document designated the Song as the "insignificant state", while the Jin was recognized as the "superior state". The text of the treaty has not survived in Chinese records, a sign of its humiliating reputation. The contents of the agreement were recovered from a Jurchen biography. Once the treaty had been settled, the Jurchens retreated north and trade resumed between the two empires. The peace ensured by the Shaoxing treaty lasted for the next seventy years, but was interrupted twice. One campaign was initiated by the Song and the other by the Jin.
Prince Of Hailing\'s Campaign
Main article: Battle of Caishi See also: History of the Song dynasty § Defeat of Jin invasion, 1161
Wanyan Liang (the Prince of Hailing) led a coup against Emperor
Xizong and became fourth emperor of the Jin dynasty in 1150. Wanyan
Liang presented himself as a Chinese emperor, and planned to unite
China by conquering the Song. In 1158,
Wanyan Liang provided a _casus
belli_ by announcing that the Song had broken the 1142 peace treaty by
acquiring horses. He instituted an unpopular draft that was the
source of widespread unrest in the empire. Anti-Jin revolts erupted
among the Khitans and in Jin provinces bordering the Song. Wanyan
Liang did not allow dissent, and opposition to the war was severely
punished. The Song had been notified beforehand of
plan. They prepared by securing their defenses along the border,
mainly near the Yangtze River, but were hampered by Emperor Gaozong's
indecisiveness. Gaozong's desire for peace made him averse to
provoking the Jin.
Wanyan Liang began the invasion in 1161 without
formally declaring war. Jurchen armies personally led by
The Song official
Yu Yunwen was in command of the army defending the
river. The Jurchen army was defeated while attacking Caishi between
November 26 and 27 during the
Battle of Caishi . The paddle-wheel
ships of the Song navy , armed with trebuchets that fired gunpowder
bombs, overwhelmed the light ships of the Jin fleet. Jin ships were
unable to compete because they were smaller and hastily constructed.
The bombs launched by the Song contained mixtures of gunpowder, lime,
scraps of iron, and a poison that was likely arsenic . Traditional
Chinese accounts consider this the turning point of the war,
characterizing it as a military upset that secured southern China from
the northern invaders. The significance of the battle is said to have
rivaled a similarly revered victory at the
Battle of Fei River
A modern analysis of the battlefield has shown that it was a minor battle, although the victory did boost Song morale. The Jin lost, but only suffered about 4,000 casualties and the battle was not fatal to the Jurchen war effort. It was Wanyan Liang's poor relationships with the Jurchen generals, who despised him, that doomed the chances of a Jin victory. On December 15, Wanyan Liang was assassinated in his military camp by disaffected officers. He was succeeded by Emperor Shizong (r. 1161–1189). Shizong was pressured into ending the unpopular war with the Song, and ordered the withdrawal of Jin forces in 1162. Emperor Gaozong retired from the throne that same year. His mishandling of the war with Wanyan Liang was one of many reasons for his abdication. Skirmishes between the Song and Jin continued along the border, but subsided in 1165 after the negotiation of a peace treaty. There were no major territorial changes. The treaty dictated that the Song still had to pay the annual indemnity, but the indemnity was renamed from "tribute", which had implied a subordinate relationship, to "payment".
Jurchen warrior with a bow on an early 17th-century woodblock print
The Jin were weakened by the pressure of the rising
Song armies led by general Bi Zaiyu (畢再遇; d. 1217) captured the barely defended border city of Sizhou 泗州 (on the north bank of the Huai River across from modern Xuyi County ) but suffered large losses against the Jurchens in Hebei. The Jin repelled the Song and moved south to besiege the Song town of Chuzhou 楚州 on the Grand Canal just south of the Huai River. Bi defended the town, and the Jurchens withdrew from the siege after three months. By the fall of 1206, however, the Jurchens had captured multiple towns and military bases. The Jin initiated an offensive against Song prefectures in the central front of the war, capturing Zaoyang and Guanghua (光化; on the Han River near modern Laohekou ). By the fall of 1206, the Song offensive had already failed disastrously. Soldier morale sank as weather conditions worsened, supplies ran out, and hunger spread, forcing many to desert. The massive defections of Han Chinese in northern China that the Song had expected never materialized.
A notable betrayal did occur on the Song side, however: Wu Xi (吳曦; d. 1207), the governor-general of Sichuan, defected to the Jin in December 1206. The Song had depended on Wu's success in the west to divert Jin soldiers away from the eastern front. He had attacked Jin positions earlier in 1206, but his army of about 50,000 men had been repelled. Wu's defection could have meant the loss of the entire western front of the war, but Song loyalists assassinated Wu on March 29, 1207, before Jin troops could take control of the surrendered territories. An Bing (安丙; d. 1221) was given Wu Xi's position, but the cohesion of Song forces in the west fell apart after Wu's demise and commanders turned on each other in the ensuing infighting.
Fighting continued in 1207, but by the end of that year the war was at a stalemate. The Song was now on the defensive, while the Jin failed to make gains in Song territory. The failure of Han Tuozhou's aggressive policies led to his demise. On December 15, 1207, Han was beaten to death by the Imperial Palace Guards. His accomplice Su Shidan (蘇師旦) was executed, and other officials connected to Han were dismissed or exiled. Since neither combatant was eager to continue the war, they returned to negotiations. A peace treaty was signed on November 2, 1208, and the Song tribute to the Jin was reinstated. The Song annual indemnity increased by 50,000 taels of silver and 50,000 packs of fabric. The treaty also stipulated that the Song had to present to the Jin the head of Han Tuozhou, who the Jin held responsible for starting the war. The heads of Han and Su were severed from their exhumed corpses, exhibited to the public, then delivered to the Jin.
Song–Jin War During The Rise Of The Mongols
A second Jin campaign in late 1217 did marginally better than the
first. In the east, the Jin made little headway in the Huai River
valley, but in the west they captured Xihezhou and Dasan Pass
(大散關; modern Shaanxi) in late 1217. The Jin tried to captured
Suizhou in Jingxi South circuit again in 1218 and 1219, but failed. A
Song counteroffensive in early 1218 captured Sizhou and in 1219 the
Jin cities of
Dengzhou and Tangzhou were pillaged twice by a Song army
commanded by Zhao Fang (趙方; d. 1221). In the west, command of the
Song forces in
Main article: Siege of Caizhou
In February 1233, the
CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES
Jurchen migrants from the northeastern reaches of Jin territory settled in the Jin-controlled lands of northern China. Constituting less than ten percent of the total population, the two to three million ruling Jurchens were a minority in a region that was still dominated by 30 million Han Chinese. The southward expansion of the Jurchens caused the Jin to transition their decentralized government of semi-agrarian tribes to a bureaucratic Chinese-style dynasty. A medallion with writing in the Jurchen script , which was one of the Jin empire's three working languages
The Jin government initially promoted an independent Jurchen culture
alongside their adoption of the centralized Chinese imperial
bureaucracy, but the empire was gradually sinicized over time. The
Jurchens became fluent in the Chinese language, and the philosophy of
Confucianism was used to legitimize the ruling government. Confucian
state rituals were adopted during the reign of Emperor Xizong
(1135–1150). The Jin implemented imperial exams on the Confucian
Classics , first regionally and then for the entire empire. The
Classics and other works of
The emperor's political reforms were connected with his desire to conquer all of China and to legitimize himself as a Chinese emperor. The prospect of conquering southern China was cut short by Wanyan Liang's assassination. Wanyan Liang's successor, Emperor Shizong, was less enthusiastic about sinicization and reversed several of Wanyan Liang's edicts. He sanctioned new policies with the intent to slow the assimilation of the Jurchens. Shizong's prohibitions were abandoned by Emperor Zhangzong (r. 1189–1208), who promoted reforms that transformed the political structure of the dynasty closer to that of the Song and Tang dynasties. Despite cultural and demographic changes, military hostilities between the Jin and the Song persisted until the fall of the Jin.
In the south, the retreat of the
The new capital
The loss of northern China, the cultural center of Chinese
civilization, diminished the international status of the Song dynasty.
After the Jurchen conquest of the north,
Main article: Science and technology of the
The battles between the Song and the Jin spurred the invention and
use of gunpowder weapons. There are reports that the fire lance , one
of the earliest ancestors of the firearm , was used by the Song
against the Jurchens besieging De\'an (德安; modern
Anlu in eastern
Hubei) in 1132, during the Jin invasion of
Early rudimentary bombs like the _huopao_ fire bomb (火礮) and the
_huopao_ (火砲) bombs propelled by trebuchet were also in use as
incendiary weapons. The defending Song army used _huopao_ (火礮)
during the first Jin siege of
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