Iran Air Flight 655

Iran Air Flight 655 was a scheduled passenger flight from Tehran to Dubai via Bandar Abbas that was shot down on 3July 1988 by two SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles fired by the , a guided-missile cruiser of the United States Navy. The aircraft, an Airbus A300, was destroyed and all 290 people on board were killed. The jet was hit while flying over Iran's territorial waters in the Persian Gulf, along the flight's usual route, shortly after departing Bandar Abbas International Airport, the flight's stopover location. The attack occurred during the Iran–Iraq War, which had been continuing for nearly eight years. ''Vincennes'' had entered Iranian territory after one of its helicopters drew warning fire from Iranian speedboats operating within Iranian territorial limits.

The reason for the downing has been disputed between the governments of the two countries. According to the U.S., the ''Vincennes'' crew had incorrectly identified the Airbus as an attacking F-14 Tomcat, a U.S.-made jet fighter that had been part of the Iranian Air Force inventory since the 1970s. While the F-14s had been supplied to Iran in an air-to-air configuration, the ''Vincennes'' crew had been briefed that the Iranian F-14s were equipped with air-to-ground ordnance. The US military asserts that the ''Vincennes'' had made ten attempts to contact the aircraft both on military and on civilian frequencies, but had received no response. According to Iran, the cruiser negligently shot down the aircraft, which was transmitting IFF squawks in Mode III, a signal that identified it as a civilian aircraft, and not Mode II as used by Iranian military aircraft. The event generated a great deal of criticism of the United States. Some analysts blamed the captain of ''Vincennes'', William C. Rogers III, for overly aggressive behavior in a tense and dangerous environment. In the days immediately following the incident, President Ronald Reagan issued a written diplomatic note to the Iranian government, expressing deep regret. When Reagan was directly asked if he considered the statement an apology, he replied, "Yes." However, the U.S. continued to insist that ''Vincennes'' was acting in "self-defense".

In 1996, during the Clinton Administration, the governments of the U.S. and Iran reached a settlement at the International Court of Justice which included the statement "...the United States recognized the aerial incident of 3July 1988 as a terrible human tragedy and expressed deep regret over the loss of lives caused by the incident..." As part of the settlement, even though the U.S. government did not admit legal liability or formally apologize to Iran, it agreed to pay US$61.8 million on an ''ex gratia'' basis in compensation to the families of the Iranian victims. The shootdown was the deadliest aviation disaster involving an Airbus A300, as well as the deadliest aviation disaster in 1988. It was also the deadliest airliner shootdown incident until 2014, when Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over Ukraine.

Background

In 1984, the war between Iraq and Iran had expanded to include air attacks against oil tankers and merchant shipping of neighboring countries, some of whom were providing aid to Iraq by shipping Iraqi oil. The Flight 655 incident occurred a year after the USS Stark incident, during which the Iraqi Air Force attacked the U.S. Navy guided missile frigate on 17 May 1987, killing 37 American sailors. U.S. naval forces had also exchanged gunfire with Iranian gunboats in late 1987, and the guided missile frigate had struck an Iranian sea mine in April 1988. Two months before the incident, the U.S. had engaged in Operation Praying Mantis, resulting in the sinkings of the Iranian frigate ''Sahand'', the Iranian fast attack craft ''Joshan'' and three Iranian speedboats. Also, the Iranian frigate ''Sabalan'' was crippled, two Iranian platforms were destroyed and an Iranian fighter was damaged. A total of at least 56 Iranian crew were killed, while the U.S. suffered the loss of only one helicopter, which crashed apparently by accident, and its two pilots were killed. Tensions were high in the Strait of Hormuz at the time of the incident with Flight 655.

In response to the pattern of attacks on shipping, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a NOTAM on 8September 1987, warning all Persian Gulf countries that civilian aircraft must monitor the 121.5 MHz VHF International Air Distress or the 243.0 MHz UHF Military Air Distress frequencies and be prepared to identify themselves to U.S. Navy ships and state their intentions.

On 29 April 1988, the U.S. expanded the scope of its navy's protection to all friendly neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf outside declared exclusion zones, which set the stage for the shootdown. At about the same time, ''Vincennes'' was rushed to the area on a short-notice deployment, as a result of high-level decisions, to compensate for the lack of AWACS coverage, which was hampering U.S. monitoring of the southern Persian Gulf. ''Vincennes'' was fitted with the then-new Aegis Combat System and under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III at the time of the shootdown.

As the Strait of Hormuz at its narrowest is wide, in order to traverse the strait, ships must stay within sea lanes that pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under the transit passage provisions of customary Law of the Sea. It is normal for ships, including warships, entering or leaving the Persian Gulf to transit Iranian territorial waters. During the Iran–Iraq War the Iranian forces frequently boarded and inspected neutral cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz in search of contraband destined for Iraq. While legal under international law, these inspections added to the tensions in the area.

Shootdown of Flight 655

The plane, an Airbus A300 ( registered as ), was under the control of 37-year-old Captain Mohsen Rezaian (a veteran pilot with 7,000 hours of flight time), 31-year-old First Officer Kamran Teymouri, and 33-year-old Flight Engineer Mohammad Reza Amini. It left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 Iran time ( UTC+03:30), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It should have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a -wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to , cruise, and descend into Dubai. The airliner was transmitting the correct transponder "squawk" code typical of a civilian aircraft and maintained radio contact in English with appropriate air traffic control facilities.

On the morning of 3 July 1988, USS ''Vincennes'' was passing through the Strait of Hormuz returning from an escort duty. A helicopter deployed from the cruiser reportedly received small arms fire from Iranian patrol vessels as it observed from high altitude. ''Vincennes'' moved to engage the Iranian vessels, in the course of which they all violated Omani waters and left after being challenged and ordered to leave by a Royal Navy of Oman warship. ''Vincennes'' then pursued the Iranian gunboats, entering Iranian territorial waters. Two other U.S. Navy ships, and , were nearby. Admiral Crowe said the cruiser's helicopter was over international waters when the gunboats first fired upon it.

Flight 655 was first detected by ''Vincennes'' immediately after takeoff when it received a short IFF Mode II, possibly leading the crew of ''Vincennes'' to believe the airliner was an Iranian F-14 Tomcat (capable of carrying unguided bombs since 1985) diving into an attack profile. Contrary to the accounts of various ''Vincennes'' crew members, the cruiser's Aegis Combat System recorded that the airliner was climbing at the time and its radio transmitter was squawking on only the Mode III civilian frequency, and not on the military Mode II.

Since the USS ''Stark'' incident, all aircraft in the area had to monitor 121.5 MHz, the International Air Distress (IAD) radio frequency. A total of 10 attempts were made to warn the airliner, seven on the Military Air Distress (MAD) frequency, and three on the IAD frequency. There were no responses.

At 10:24:22, after receiving no responses, ''Vincennes'' fired two SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles, one of which hit the airliner at 10:24:43. The plane disintegrated immediately and crashed into the water soon after. None of the 290 passengers and crew on board survived. The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder were never found.

At the time the missiles were launched, the ''Vincennes'' was located at , placing it within the twelve mile limit of Iranian territorial seas. The location of ''Vincennes'' in Iranian territorial waters at the time of the incident was admitted by the U.S. government in legal briefs and publicly by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, on '' Nightline''.Transcript of ''Nightline'' episode
. 1 July 1992. (Annotated with analysis, commentary, and opinion. From th
personal blog of Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
)

Nationalities of the victims

According to the documents Iran submitted to the International Court of Justice, the aircraft was carrying 290 people: 274 passengers and a crew of 16. Of these 290, 254 were Iranian, 13 were Emiratis, 10 were Indians, six were Pakistanis, six were Yugoslavs and one was an Italian.

U.S. government accounts

Pentagon officials initially said ''Vincennes'' had shot down an Iranian F-14, but issued a retraction within hours and confirmed Iranian reports that the target was instead a civilian Airbus. According to the U.S. government, ''Vincennes'' mistakenly identified the airliner as an attacking military fighter and misidentified its flight profile as being similar to that of an F-14A Tomcat during an attack run; however, the cruiser's Aegis Combat System recorded the plane's flight plan as climbing (not descending as in an attack run) at the time of the incident. The flight had originated at Bandar Abbas which served both as a base for Iranian F-14 operations and as a hub for commercial flights. According to the same reports, ''Vincennes'' unsuccessfully tried to contact the approaching aircraft, seven times on the military emergency frequency and three times on the civilian emergency frequency. The civilian aircraft was not equipped to receive military frequencies and the messages on the civilian emergency channel could have been directed at any aircraft. More confusion arose as the hailed speed was the ground speed, while the pilot's instruments displayed airspeed, a difference.

This was admitted in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled ''Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3July 1988'' (the "Fogarty report"). The Fogarty report stated, "The data from USS ''Vincennes'' tapes, information from USS ''Sides'' and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that ran Air Flight 655was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from takeoff at Bandar Abbas to shoot-down."

The Fogarty report also stated, "Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy by hazarding one of their civilian airliners by allowing it to fly a relatively low altitude air route in close proximity to hostilities that had been ongoing."

When questioned in a 2000 BBC
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