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The Info List - India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement



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The 123 AGREEMENT signed between the United States of America and the Republic of India
India
is known as the U.S.–INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT or INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL. The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush , under which India
India
agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
Atomic Energy Act of 1954
, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India- IAEA
IAEA
safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India
India
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group , an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those nuclear facilities that India
India
has identified as "civil" and permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of "sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA
IAEA
safeguards. On August 18, 2008 the IAEA
IAEA
Board of Governors approved, and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. After India
India
brought this agreement into force, inspections began in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India
India
has identified in its Separation Plan. The deal is seen as a watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect to international nonproliferation efforts. On August 1, 2008, the IAEA
IAEA
approved the safeguards agreement with India, after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group] (NSG) to grant a waiver to India
India
to commence civilian nuclear trade. The 48-nation NSG granted the waiver to India
India
on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver made India
India
the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the bill to approve the deal on September 28, 2008. Two days later, India
India
and France inked a similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have such an agreement with India. On October 1, 2008 the U.S. Senate
U.S. Senate
also approved the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India
India
to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from—and sell them to—the United States. U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S. Congress , into law, now called the UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT, on October 8, 2008. The agreement was signed by then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Condoleezza Rice
, on October 10.

In 2015, the agreement had still not been fully implemented.

In 2016, the countries agreed to build 6 US-designed reactors in India. See timeline below.

CONTENTS

* 1 Overview * 2 Background

* 3 Rationale behind the agreement

* 3.1 Nuclear non-proliferation
Nuclear non-proliferation
* 3.2 Economic considerations * 3.3 Nuclear technology * 3.4 Strategic

* 4 Passing of Agreement * 5 Hyde Act Passage in the U.S. * 6 Political opposition in India
India
* 7 Indian parliament vote * 8 IAEA
IAEA
approval

* 9 NSG waiver

* 9.1 Versions of U.S. draft exemption * 9.2 Initial support and opposition

* 9.3 Reactions following the waiver

* 9.3.1 Indian reactions

* 9.4 Other reactions over the issue

* 10 Consideration by U.S. Congress

* 10.1 Passage in Congress

* 11 Formal signing of the deal * 12 Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal * 13 See also * 14 References * 15 External links

OVERVIEW

The Henry J. Hyde United States- India
India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the U.S. domestic law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India
India
and in particular to negotiate a 123 Agreement to operationalize the 2005 Joint Statement. As a domestic U.S. law, the Hyde Act is binding on the United States. The Hyde Act cannot be binding on India's sovereign decisions although it can be construed as prescriptive for future U.S. reactions. As per the Vienna
Vienna
Convention , an international agreement such as the 123 Agreement cannot be superseded by an internal law such as the Hyde Act.

The 123 agreement defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, and requires separate approvals by the U.S. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. The agreement will also help India
India
meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by 2020.

After the terms of the 123 agreement were concluded on July 27, 2007, it ran into trouble because of stiff opposition in India
India
from the communist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance . The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275–256 votes in the backdrop of defections by some parties . The deal also had faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, and some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Condoleezza Rice
said that any agreement would be "consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act". The bill was signed on October 8, 2008.

BACKGROUND

Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. Separately, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors and fuel. Those guidelines condition such exports on comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency , which are designed to verify that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful use to weapons programs. Though neither India, Israel, nor Pakistan have signed the NPT, India
India
argues that instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, who alone are free to possess and multiply their nuclear stockpiles. India
India
insists on a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame and has also adopted a voluntary "no first use policy".

Led by the U.S., other states have set up an informal group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. Consequently, India
India
was left outside the international nuclear order, which forced India
India
to develop its own resources for each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and power generation, including next generation reactors such as fast breeder reactors and a thorium breeder reactor known as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor . In addition to impelling India
India
to achieve success in developing these new reactor technologies, the sanctions also provided India
India
with the impetus to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a specific goal of achieving self-sufficiency for all key components for weapons design, testing and production.

Given that India
India
is estimated to possess reserves of about 80,000–112,369 tons of uranium , India
India
has more than enough fissile material to supply its nuclear weapons program, even if it restricted Plutonium production to only 8 of the country's 17 current reactors, and then further restricted Plutonium production to only 1/4 of the fuel core of these reactors. According to the calculations of one of the key advisers to the US Nuclear deal negotiating team, Ashley Tellis:

Operating India’s eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in such a regime would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135–13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023–2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal. Although no Indian analyst, let alone a policy maker, has ever advocated any nuclear inventory that even remotely approximates such numbers, this heuristic exercise confirms that New Delhi has the capability to produce a gigantic nuclear arsenal while subsisting well within the lowest estimates of its known uranium reserves.

However, because the amount of nuclear fuel required for the electricity generation sector is far greater than that required to maintain a nuclear weapons program, and since India's estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of the world's known uranium reserves, the NSG's uranium export restrictions mainly affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity. Specifically, the NSG sanctions challenge India's long term plans to expand and fuel its civilian nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4GWe (GigaWatt electricity) to a power output of 20GWe by 2020; assuming the planned expansion used conventional Uranium/Plutonium fueled heavy water and light water nuclear power plants.

Consequently, India's nuclear isolation constrained expansion of its civil nuclear program, but left India
India
relatively immune to foreign reactions to a prospective nuclear test. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to continued unchecked covert nuclear and missile proliferation activities between Pakistan, China and North Korea, India
India
conducted five more nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran
Pokhran
.

India
India
was subject to international sanctions after its May 1998 nuclear tests. However, due to the size of the Indian economy and its relatively large domestic sector, these sanctions had little impact on India, with Indian GDP growth increasing from 4.8% in 1997–1998 (prior to sanctions) to 6.6% (during sanctions) in 1998–1999. Consequently, at the end of 2001, the Bush Administration decided to drop all sanctions on India. Although India
India
achieved its strategic objectives from the Pokhran
Pokhran
nuclear tests in 1998, it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated internationally.

RATIONALE BEHIND THE AGREEMENT

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India's "de facto" status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India
India
arguing that it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework by formally recognizing India's strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT . The former Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal said "India's trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can’t say that about Pakistan." when asked whether the U.S. would offer a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the lines of the Indo-U.S. deal. Mohamed ElBaradei
Mohamed ElBaradei
, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency , which would be in charge of inspecting India's civilian reactors has praised the deal as "it would also bring India
India
closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime". The reaction in the U.S. led academic community was mixed. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India
India
closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India
India
too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India
India
for continuously refusing to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share. It is India's stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,780 MWe to 20,000 MWe by 2020. India\'s parliament passed The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages bill on August 25, 2010, which allows the operator to sue the supplier in case of an accident due to technical defects in the plant. After the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, issues relating to the safety of operating nuclear power plants, compensation in the event of a radiation-leak accident, disaster clean-up costs, operator responsibility and supplier liability has once again come into the spot-light.

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, PhD. , former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory , observed while testifying before a U.S. Senate Committee in 2008 that the United States might benefit from access to Indian nuclear technology: "I found that whereas sanctions slowed progress in nuclear energy, they made India
India
self-sufficient and world leaders in fast reactor technologies. While much of the world’s approach to India
India
has been to limit its access to nuclear technology, it may well be that today we limit ourselves by not having access to India’s nuclear technology developments. Such technical views should help to advice the diplomatic efforts with India."

Because India's nuclear program was developed mostly indigenously, the country used unique techniques that other countries can learn from.

STRATEGIC

Since the end of the Cold War
Cold War
, The Pentagon , along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill , has requested increased strategic ties with India
India
and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India, i.e. having separate policies toward India
India
and Pakistan rather than just an "India-Pakistan" policy. The United States also sees India
India
as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China, and a potential client and job creator.

While India
India
is self-sufficient in thorium , possessing 25% of the world's known and economically viable thorium, it possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves. Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centers on the issue of obtaining a steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centers on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle .

PASSING OF AGREEMENT

On March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July 2005 summit in Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation.

Heavily endorsed by the White House
White House
, the agreement is thought to be a major victory to George W. Bush 's foreign policy initiative and was described by many lawmakers as a cornerstone of the new strategic partnership between the two countries.

On August 3, 2007, both the countries released the full text of the 123 agreement. Nicholas Burns, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal, said the U.S. has the right to terminate the deal if India
India
tests a nuclear weapon and that no part of the agreement recognizes India
India
as a nuclear weapons state (which would be contrary to the NPT).

HYDE ACT PASSAGE IN THE U.S.

On December 18, 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming 359–68 in the United States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85–12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support.

The House version (H.R. 5682 ) and Senate version (S. 3709 ) of the bill differed due to amendments each had added before approving, but the versions were reconciled with a House vote of 330–59 on December 8 and a Senate voice-vote on December 9 before being passed on to President G.W. Bush for final approval. The White House
White House
had urged Congress to expedite the reconciliation process during the end-2006 lame duck session , and recommended removing certain amendments which would be deemed deal-killers by India.

In response to the language Congress used in the Act to define U.S. policy toward India, President Bush, stated "Given the Constitution's commitment to the authority of the presidency to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory," going on to cite sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the bill. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy."

POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN INDIA

Main article: Opposition to the Indo-US civilian agreement in India

The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress(I)
Congress(I)
supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Rashtriya Janata Dal its realization ran into difficulties in the face of stiff political opposition in India. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal. However, opposition and criticism continued at political levels. The Samajwadi Party (SP) which was with the Left Front in opposing the deal changed its stand after discussing with ex-president of India
India
and scientist Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam . The SP then supported the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by 275–256 after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute. Incidentally, results showed ten MPs belonging to the opposing BJP party cross-voting in the favor of the government.

As details were revealed about serious inconsistencies between what the Indian parliament was told about the deal, and the facts about the agreement that were presented by the Bush administration to the US Congress, opposition grew in India
India
against the deal. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India
India
a fuel supply or allowing India
India
to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement in parliament is totally at variance with the Bush Administration's communication to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which says India
India
will not be allowed to stockpile such nuclear fuel stocks as to undercut American leverage to re-impose sanctions. To drive home this point, it says the 123 Agreement is not inconsistent with the Hyde Act's stipulation—the little-known 'Barack Obama Amendment' – that the supply of nuclear fuel should be "commensurate with reasonable operating requirements". The 'strategic reserve' that is crucial to India's nuclear program is, therefore, a non-starter.

Furthermore, the agreement, as a result of its compliance with the Hyde Act, contained a direct linkage between shutting down US nuclear trade with India
India
and any potential future Indian nuclear weapons test, a point that was factually inconsistent with explicit reassurances made on this subject by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during final parliamentary debate on the nuclear deal. As professor Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic affairs and one of the authors of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, explained:

While the Hyde Act’s bar on Indian testing is explicit, the one in the NSG waiver is implicit, yet unmistakable. The NSG waiver is overtly anchored in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of “an explosion of a nuclear device”. The waiver’s Section 3(e) refers to this key paragraph, which allows a supplier to call for a special NSG meeting, and seek termination of cooperation, in the event of a test or any other “violation of a supplier-recipient understanding”. The recently leaked Bush administration letter to Congress has cited how this Paragraph 16 rule will effectively bind India
India
to the Hyde Act's conditions on the pain of a U.S.-sponsored cut-off of all multilateral cooperation. India will not be able to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers.

INDIAN PARLIAMENT VOTE

Further information: 2008 Lok Sabha vote of confidence and Notes-for-Vote scandal
Notes-for-Vote scandal

On July 9, 2008, India
India
formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA. This development came after the Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
returned from the 34th G8 summit
34th G8 summit
meeting in Hokkaido
Hokkaido
, Japan, where he met with U.S. President George W. Bush. On June 19, 2008, news media reported that Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Left Front , whose support was crucial for the ruling United Progressive Alliance to prove its majority in the Indian parliament , continued to oppose the nuclear deal and he described their stance as irrational and reactionary. According to The Hindu , External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee ’s earlier statement said “I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority,” implying that United Progressive Alliance government would not put its signature on any deal with IAEA
IAEA
if it lost the majority in either a 'opposition-initiated no-confidence motion' or if failing to muster a vote of confidence in Indian parliament after being told to prove its majority by the president. On July 8, 2008, Prakash Karat
Prakash Karat
announced that the Left Front is withdrawing its support to the government over the decision by the government to go ahead on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests.

On July 22, 2008 the UPA faced its first confidence vote in the Lok Sabha after the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led Left Front withdrew support over India
India
approaching the IAEA
IAEA
for Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The UPA won the confidence vote with 275 votes to the opposition's 256, (10 members abstained from the vote) to record a 19-vote victory.

IAEA
IAEA
APPROVAL

The IAEA
IAEA
Board of Governors approved the safeguards agreement on August 1, 2008, and the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers Group next had to approve a policy allowing nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. President Bush can then make the necessary certifications and seek final approval by the U.S. Congress. There were objections from Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria at the IAEA meeting.

NSG WAIVER

On September 6, 2008 India
India
was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna
Vienna
, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) The Indian team who worked on the deal includes Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
, Pranab Mukherjee , Shivshankar Menon
Shivshankar Menon
, Shyam Saran , M. K. Narayanan
M. K. Narayanan
, Anil Kakodkar
Anil Kakodkar
, Ravi Grover , and DB Venkatesh Varma.

VERSIONS OF U.S. DRAFT EXEMPTION

On August 2008 U.S. draft exemption would have granted India
India
a waiver based on the "steps that India
India
has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime". Based on these steps, and without further conditions, the draft waiver would have allowed for the transfer to India
India
of both trigger list and dual-use items (including technology), waiving the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines.

A September 2008 waiver would have recognized additional "steps that India
India
has voluntarily taken." The waiver called for notifying the NSG of bilateral agreements and for regular consultations; however, it also would have waived the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines without further conditions.

The U.S. draft underwent further changes in an effort to make the language more acceptable to the NSG.

INITIAL SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Russia, and Germany. After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia, Switzerland, and Canada expressing their support for the deal. Selig S. Harrison, a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post , has said the deal may represent a tacit recognition of India
India
as a nuclear weapon state, while former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph says the "U.S. State Department made it very clear that we will not recognize India
India
as a nuclear-weapon state".

Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India
India
at the IAEA
IAEA
did not mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. New Zealand, which is a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA
IAEA
Board of Governors, cautioned that its support should not be taken for granted. Ireland, which launched the non-proliferation treaty process in 1958 and signed it first in 1968, doubted India's nuclear trade agreement with the U.S. Russia, a potentially large nuclear supplier to India, expressed reservations about transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to India. China argued the agreement constituted "a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime". New Zealand said it would like to see a few conditions written in to the waiver: the exemption ceasing if India
India
conducts nuclear tests, India
India
signing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) additional protocol, and placing limits on the scope of the technology that can be given to India
India
and which could relate to nuclear weapons. Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries proposed similar amendments. The nuclear deal was opposed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter
, who opined that the U.S. would be making "a dangerous deal with India"

After the first NSG meeting in August 2008, diplomats noted that up to 20 of the 45 NSG states tabled conditions similar to the Hyde Act for India's waiver to do business with the NSG. "There were proposals on practically every paragraph," a European diplomat said. A group of seven NSG members suggested including some of the provisions of the U.S. Hyde Act in the final waiver. Daryll Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association , said the NSG should at a minimum "make clear that nuclear trade with India
India
shall be terminated if it resumes testing for any reason. If India
India
cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India
India
is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge."

REACTIONS FOLLOWING THE WAIVER

After India
India
was granted the waiver on September 6, the United Kingdom said that the NSG's decision would make a "significant contribution" to global energy and climate security. U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "this is a historic achievement that strengthens global non-proliferation principles while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner. The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India
India
into the global non-proliferation community. We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward." New Zealand praised the NSG consensus and said that it got the best possible deal with India. One of India's strongest allies Russia said in a statement, "We are convinced that the exemption made for India reflects Delhi's impeccable record in the non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports to India." Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said that the NSG granted waiver because of "India's rise as a global power" and added, "If such a request was made for another country, I don't think it would have been cleared by the NSG members." During his visit to India
India
in September 2008, Smith said that Australia "understood and respected India's decision not to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty". German Foreign Ministry spokesman Jens Ploetner called India
India
a "special case" and added, "Does this agreement send an approving message to Iran? No, it absolutely does not."

Initially, there were reports of the People's Republic of China analyzing the extent of the opposition against the waiver at the NSG and then revealing its position over the issue. On September 1, 2008, prominent Chinese newspaper People\'s Daily expressed its strong disapproval of the civilian agreement with India. India's National Security Advisor remarked that one of the major opponents of the waiver was China and said that he would express Indian government's displeasure over the issue. It was also revealed that China had abstained during the final voting process, indicating its non-approval of the nuclear agreement. In a statement, Chinese delegation to the NSG said the group should address the aspirations of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan. There were also unconfirmed reports of India
India
considering the cancellation of a state visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
Yang Jiechi
. However, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the Chinese Foreign Minister will be welcomed "as an honored guest". The Times of India noted that China's stance could have a long-term implication on Sino-Indian relations.

There were some other conflicting reports on China's stance, however. The Hindu reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final draft, they had informed India
India
about their intention to back the agreement. In an interview to the Hindustan Times , Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that "China understands India's needs for civil nuclear energy and related international cooperation." Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told India's CNN-IBN , "We didn't do anything to block it . We played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards agreement was reached, so facts speak louder ... than some reports". During a press conference in New Delhi, Yang added, "The policy was set much before that. When consensus was reached, China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the statement." Highlighting the importance of Sino-Indian relations, Yang remarked, "let us work together to move beyond doubts to build a stronger relationship between us."

Indian Reactions

Indian PM Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
visited Washington D.C. on September 26, 2008 to celebrate the conclusion of the agreement with U.S. President George W. Bush. He also visited France to convey his appreciation for the country's stance. India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed his deep appreciation for India's allies in the NSG, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, South Africa and Brazil for helping India
India
achieve NSG's consensus on the nuclear deal.

Bharatiya Janata Party 's Yashwant Sinha
Yashwant Sinha
, who also formerly held the post of India's External Affairs Minister, criticized the Indian government's decision to seek NSG's consensus and remarked that "India has walked into the non-proliferation trap set by the U.S., we have given up our right to test nuclear weapons forever, it has been surrendered by the government". However, another prominent member of the same party and India's former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra supported the development at the NSG and said that the waiver granted made "no prohibition" on India
India
to conduct nuclear tests in the future.

A leading advocate of the agreement was India's most eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam
K. Subrahmanyam
, also known for his long and controversial championing of an Indian nuclear deterrent . He argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations forced such a remarkable gesture from the US, overturning its decades-long stand on non-proliferation , and that it would be unwise on India's part to spurn such an overture. He also argued that not recognizing new geo-political realities would be even more foolhardy on the part of the Indian elite.

Former President of India and noted Indian scientist, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam , also supported the agreement and remarked that New Delhi may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest". However, analyst M K Bhadrakumar demurred. He said that the consensus at NSG was achieved on the "basis" of Pranab Mukherjee's commitment to India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and by doing so, India
India
has entered into a "multilateral commitment" bringing it within "the ambit of the CTBT and NPT".

The NSG consensus was welcomed by several major Indian companies. Major Indian corporations like Videocon Group
Videocon Group
, Tata Power and Jindal Power saw a US$40 billion nuclear energy market in India
India
in the next 10–15 years. On a more optimistic note, some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited , National Thermal Power Corporation
National Thermal Power Corporation
and Larsen however, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Condoleezza Rice
said that any nuclear test by India
India
would result in the “most serious consequences,” including automatic cut-off of U.S. cooperation as well as a number of other sanctions.

After Senate approval, US President George W. Bush said the deal would "strengthen our global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India
India
in meeting its growing energy needs in a responsible manner." Then-US presidential candidates Barack Obama
Barack Obama
and John McCain , as well as then-Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden , voted in support of the bill.

FORMAL SIGNING OF THE DEAL

There was speculation the Indo-US deal would be signed on October 4, 2008 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Condoleezza Rice
was in India. The deal was to be inked by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two leaders were to sign the deal at 2 pm at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi. But Mr. Mukherjee announced that India
India
would wait for the U.S. President to sign the 123 agreement legislation first into law and address India’s concerns on fuel supply guarantees and the legal standing of the 123 agreement in the accompanying signing statement.

Ms Rice was aware of the Indian decision before she left Washington. But she was very hopeful that the deal would be signed as the U.S. State Department had said that the President's signature was not prerequisite for Rice to ink the deal. Rice had earlier said that there were still a number of administrative details to be worked out even as she insisted that the US would abide by the Hyde Act on the testing issue: Secretary Rice and Indian Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee after signing the 123 agreement in Washington on October 10, 2008

"There are a lot of administrative details that have to be worked out. This (the deal) was only passed in our Congress two days ago. The President is looking forward to signing the bill, sometime, I hope, very soon, because we'll want to use it as an opportunity to thank all of the people who have been involved in this", said Rice.

In Washington, a Senate Democratic aide said that such a delay was not that unusual because legislation needed to be carefully reviewed before being sent to the White House.

US President George W. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8. The new law, called the UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT, was signed by President Bush at a brief White House function in the presence of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries. The final administrative aspect of the deal was completed after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Condoleezza Rice
and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the bilateral instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on October 10 paving the way for operationalization of the deal between the two countries.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL

JULY 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington.

MARCH 1, 2006: Bush visits India
India
for the first time.

MARCH 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.

JULY 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the 'Henry J Hyde United States- India
India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt it from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

JULY 28, 2006: In India, the Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament.

NOVEMBER 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to India."

DECEMBER 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy.

JULY 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India
India
conclude.

AUG 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both governments.

AUG 13, 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament.

AUG 17, 2007: The CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat
Prakash Karat
says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but the marriage can go on'.

SEPT 4, 2007: In India, the UPA-Left committee to discuss nuclear deal set up.

FEB 25, 2008: Left parties in India
India
say the ruling party would have to choose between the deal and its government's stability.

MARCH 3–6, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences' if the nuclear deal is operationalised and set a deadline asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it.

MARCH 7–14, 2008: The CPI writes to the Prime Minister Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
government not to go with the deal.

APRIL 23, 2008: The Indian Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress.

JUNE 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.

JUNE 30, 2008: The Indian Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal.

JULY 8, 2008: Left parties in India
India
withdraw support to government.

JULY 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with the IAEA
IAEA
circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for approval.

JULY 10, 2008: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament.

JULY 14, 2008: The IAEA
IAEA
says it will meet on August 1 to consider the India-specific safeguards agreement.

JULY 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon
Shivshankar Menon
briefs the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in Vienna
Vienna
on the safeguards agreement.

JULY 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised, says Prime Minister Singh.

JULY 22, 2008: The UPA government led by Manmohan Singh
Manmohan Singh
wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha in India.

JULY 24, 2008: India
India
dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent.

JULY 24, 2008: India
India
launches full blast lobbying among the 45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce.

JULY 25, 2008: IAEA
IAEA
secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement.

AUG 1, 2008: IAEA
IAEA
Board of Governors adopts India- specific safeguards agreement unanimously.

AUG 21–22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India
India
waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries.

SEP 4–6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India
India
after marathon parleys.

SEPT 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123 Agreement to the US Congress for final approval.

SEPT 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were only political commitments and not legally binding.

SEPT 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's growing energy requirements and strengthen the non- proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.

SEPT 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal.

SEPT 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to India
India
are a "political commitment" and the government cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel.

SEPT 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks. financial crisis in the country.

SEPT 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White House, but were not able to sign the nuclear deal as the Congress did not approve it.

SEPT 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117 voted against.

OCT 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against.

OCT 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India
India
and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared.

OCT 4, 2008: White House
White House
announces that President Bush will sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on October 8.

OCT 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US- India
India
civilian nuclear agreement.

OCT 10, 2008: The 123 Agreement between India
India
and US is finally operationalized between the two countries after the deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Condoleezza Rice
in Washington D C. Jun 8, 2016 NPCI and Westinghouse agree to conclude contractual arrangements for 6 reactors by June 2017.

SEE ALSO

* Energy portal

* India\'s three-stage nuclear power programme * India–United States relations
India–United States relations
* Energy policy of India
Energy policy of India
* Nuclear Liability Act * Energy security
Energy security
* Foreign relations of India
Foreign relations of India
* Nuclear power
Nuclear power
in India
India

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