1 Libertarianism 2 Hard determinism
2.1 Moral implications
3 Hard incompatibilism 4 Experimental research 5 See also 6 References 7 External links
Libertarianism Main article: libertarianism (metaphysics) Metaphysical libertarianism argues that free will is real and that determinism is false. Such dualism risks an infinite regress however; if any such mind is real, an objection can still be raised using the standard argument against free will[clarification needed] that it is shaped by a necessity or chance.[clarification needed] Libertarian Robert Kane (among others) presented an alternative model: Robert Kane (editor of the Oxford Handbook of Free Will) is a leading incompatibilist philosopher in favour of free will. Kane seeks to hold persons morally responsible for decisions that involved indeterminism in their process. Critics maintain that Kane fails to overcome the greatest challenge to such an endeavor: "the argument from luck". Namely, if a critical moral choice is a matter of luck (indeterminate quantum fluctuations), then on what grounds can we hold a person responsible for their final action? Moreover, even if we imagine that a person can make an act of will ahead of time, to make the moral action more probable in the upcoming critical moment, this act of 'willing' was itself a matter of luck. Libertarianism in the philosophy of mind is unrelated to the like-named political philosophy. It suggests that we actually do have free will, that it is incompatible with determinism, and that therefore the future is not determined. For example, at this moment, one could either continue reading this article if one wanted, or cease. Under this assertion, being that one could do either, the fact of how the history of the world will continue to unfold is not currently determined one way or the other. One famous proponent of this view was Lucretius, who asserted that the free will arises out of the random, chaotic movements of atoms, called "clinamen". One major objection to this view is that science has gradually shown that more and more of the physical world obeys completely deterministic laws, and seems to suggest that our minds are just as much part of the physical world as anything else. If these assumptions are correct, incompatibilist libertarianism can only be maintained as the claim that free will is a supernatural phenomenon, which does not obey the laws of nature (as, for instance, maintained by some religious traditions). However, many libertarian view points now rely upon an indeterministic view of the physical universe, under the assumption that the idea of a deterministic, "clockwork" universe has become outdated since the advent of quantum mechanics. By assuming an indeterministic universe libertarian philosophical constructs can be proposed under the assumption of physicalism. There are libertarian view points based upon indeterminism and physicalism, which is closely related to naturalism. A major problem for naturalistic libertarianism is to explain how indeterminism can be compatible with rationality and with appropriate connections between an individual's beliefs, desires, general character and actions. A variety of naturalistic libertarianism is promoted by Robert Kane, who emphasizes that if our character is formed indeterministically (in "self-forming actions"), then our actions can still flow from our character, and yet still be incompatibilistically free. Alternatively, libertarian view points based upon indeterminism have been proposed without the assumption of naturalism. At the time C. S. Lewis wrote Miracles, quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality (noting that, under a physicalist point of view, the non-physical entity must be independent of the self-identity or mental processing of the sentient being). Lewis mentions this only in passing, making clear that his thesis does not depend on it in any way. Others may use some form of Donald Davidson's anomalous monism to suggest that although the mind is in fact part of the physical world, it involves a different level of description of the same facts, so that although there are deterministic laws under the physical description, there are no such laws under the mental description, and thus our actions are free and not determined. Hard determinism
Schopenhauer said "Man is free to do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills" The Hard Determinist says that obviously, then, there is no 'free will'
Main article: hard determinism
Those who reject free will and accept determinism are variously known
as "hard determinists", hard incompatibilists, free will skeptics,
illusionists, or impossibilists. They believe that there is no 'free
will' and that any sense of the contrary is an illusion. Of course,
hard determinists do not deny that one has desires, but say that these
desires are causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior
occurrences. According to this philosophy, no wholly random,
spontaneous, mysterious, or miraculous events occur. Determinists
sometimes assert that it is stubborn to resist scientifically
motivated determinism on purely intuitive grounds about one's own
sense of freedom. They reason that the history of the development of
science suggests that determinism is the logical method in which
Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves Daniel Dennett's Elbow Room Frankfurt cases Indeterminism Lucretius's On the Nature of Things Molinism Philosophical zombie Tychism
^ Libertarian free will asserts that human actions do not have causes
and are chosen consciously - i.e. are not random. This begs the
question: what causes these actions? Since they can't be chosen at
random by, as explained above, this question can be asked for each
subsequent answer to it, thus forming an infinite regress. Similarly,
in the 20th century, in the Frankfurt's concept of hierarchical mesh.
Similarly, G. Strawson (1998, 2004), Free will, Routledge Encyclopedia
^ Williams, Peter S. (Summer 2002). "Why Naturalists Should Mind about
Physicalism, and Vice Versa". Quodlibet. 4 (2–3).
^ summary of Kane's views by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
^ Kane, Robert. “Free Will: New Directions for an Ancient
Problem.” (2003). In Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.) (2003) Malden, MA:
^ Lewis, C.S. (1947). Miracles. p. 24.
^ Sosa -- Free Mental Causation! (MS Word)
^ Saul Smilansky, Free Will and Illusion, Oxford, 2000
^ William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, p.153
^ Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living without Free Will. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
^ Pereboom, Derk (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
^ Derk Pereboom, "Defending Hard incompatibilism," Midwest Studies 29
(2005), pp. 228-47.
^ Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner.
"You don't have free will", Jerry Coyne, Vancouve