Hannibal Barca (Punic language: 𐤇𐤍𐤁𐤏𐤋 𐤁𐤓𐤒
ḥnb‘l brq; 247 – between 183 and 181 BC),[n 1] was a
Carthaginian general, considered one of the greatest military
commanders in history. His father
Hamilcar Barca was the leading
Carthaginian commander during the First Punic War. His younger
brothers were Mago and Hasdrubal, and he was brother-in-law to
Hasdrubal the Fair.
Hannibal lived during a period of great tension in the western
Mediterranean Basin, when the
Roman Republic established its supremacy
over other great powers such as ancient Carthage, the Etruscans,
Samnites and the Greek kingdom of Syracuse. One of his most famous
achievements was at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, when he
marched an army which included war elephants from Iberia over the
Pyrenees and the
Alps into Italy. In his first few years in Italy, he
won three dramatic victories—the Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae,
in which he distinguished himself for his ability to determine his and
his opponent's respective strengths and weaknesses, and to plan the
battle accordingly—and won over many allies of Rome. Hannibal
occupied much of
Italy for 15 years but was unable to march on Rome.
An enemy counter-invasion of
North Africa forced him to return to
Carthage, where he was decisively defeated by
Scipio Africanus at the
Battle of Zama. Scipio had studied Hannibal's tactics and brilliantly
devised some of his own, and finally defeated Rome's nemesis at Zama,
having previously driven Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal out of the
After the war,
Hannibal successfully ran for the office of sufet. He
enacted political and financial reforms to enable the payment of the
war indemnity imposed by Rome; however, Hannibal's reforms were
unpopular with members of the Carthaginian aristocracy and in Rome,
and he fled into voluntary exile. During this time, he lived at the
Seleucid court, where he acted as military advisor to Antiochus III
the Great in his war against Rome. Antiochus met defeat at the Battle
of Magnesia and was forced to accept Rome's terms, and
again, making a stop in the Kingdom of Armenia. His flight ended in
the court of Bithynia, where he achieved an outstanding naval victory
against a fleet from Pergamon. He was afterwards betrayed to the
Romans and committed suicide by poisoning himself.
Hannibal is often regarded as one of the greatest military strategists
in history and one of the greatest generals of Mediterranean
antiquity, together with Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great,
Julius Caesar, and Scipio Africanus.
Plutarch states that
questioned by Scipio as to who was the greatest general, and Hannibal
replied either Alexander or Pyrrhus, then himself, or, according to
another version of the event, Pyrrhus, Scipio, then himself.
Theodore Ayrault Dodge
Theodore Ayrault Dodge called
Hannibal the "father
of strategy", because his greatest enemy, Rome, came to adopt
elements of his military tactics in its own strategic arsenal. This
praise has earned him a strong reputation in the modern world, and he
was regarded as a great strategist by
Napoleon and others.
2 Background and early career
Second Punic War
Second Punic War in
Italy (218–204 BC)
3.1 Overland journey to Italy
3.2 Battle of Trebia
3.3 Battle of Lake Trasimene
3.4 Battle of Cannae
3.6 Hannibal's retreat in Italy
4 Conclusion of the
Second Punic War
Second Punic War (203–201 BC)
4.1 Return to Carthage
4.2 Battle of Zama
5 Later career
Carthage (200–196 BC)
5.2 Exile (after 195 BC)
5.3 Death (183 to 181 BC)
6.1 Legacy to the ancient world
6.2 Military history
8 See also
11 Further reading
12 External links
The English form of the name is derived from the Latin. Greek
historians rendered the name as Anníbas Bárkas (Ἀννίβας
Hannibal was his given name. Hannibal's name was recorded in
Carthaginian sources as ḤNBʻL (in Punic: 𐤇𐤍𐤁𐤏𐤋).
Its precise vocalization remains a matter of debate. Suggested
readings include Ḥannibaʻl or Ḥannibaʻal, meaning "grace
of Baʻal", "Ba'al is gracious", or "Ba'al has been
gracious"; or Ḥannobaʻal, with the same meaning.
Barca (𐤁𐤓𐤒, brq) was the surname of his aristocratic
family, meaning "shining" or "lightning". It is thus equivalent to
Arabic name Barq or the
Hebrew name Barak or the ancient Greek
epithet keraunos, which was commonly given to military commanders in
the Hellenistic period.
In English, his clan are sometimes collectively known as the Barcids.
As with Greek and Roman practice, patronymics were a common part of
Carthaginian nomenclature, so that
Hannibal would also have been known
Hannibal son of Hamilcar".
Background and early career
A Carthaginian coin depicting
Hasdrubal Barca (245–207 BC), one of
Hannibal's younger brothers, wearing a diadem
A Carthaginian shekel, dated 237–227 BC, depicting the Punic god
Melqart (equivalent of Hercules/Heracles), most likely with the
features of Hamilcar Barca, father of
Hannibal Barca; on the reverse
is a man riding an elephant
Hannibal was one of the sons of Hamilcar Barca, a Carthaginian leader.
He was born in what is present day Tunisia. He had several sisters and
two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago. His brothers-in-law were Hasdrubal
the Fair and the Numidian king Naravas. He was still a child when his
sisters married, and his brothers-in-law were close associates during
his father's struggles in the
Mercenary War and the Punic conquest of
the Iberian Peninsula. In light of Hamilcar Barca's cognomen,
historians refer to Hamilcar's family as the Barcids. However, there
is debate as to whether the cognomen Barca (meaning "thunderbolt") was
applied to Hamilcar alone or was hereditary within his family. If the
Hannibal and his brothers also bore the name "Barca".
After Carthage's defeat in the First Punic War, Hamilcar set out to
improve his family's and Carthage's fortunes. With that in mind and
supported by Gades, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of
the Iberian Peninsula.
Carthage at the time was in such a poor state
that its navy was unable to transport his army; instead, Hamilcar had
to march it towards the Pillars of
Hercules and then cross the Strait
of Gibraltar.
According to Polybius,
Hannibal much later said that when he came upon
his father and begged to go with him, Hamilcar agreed and demanded
that he swear that as long as he lived he would never be a friend of
Rome. There is even an account of him at a very young age (9 years
old) begging his father to take him to an overseas war. In the story,
Hannibal's father took him up and brought him to a sacrificial
chamber. Hamilcar held
Hannibal over the fire roaring in the chamber
and made him swear that he would never be a friend of Rome. Other
sources report that
Hannibal told his father, "I swear so soon as age
will permit...I will use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of
Rome." According to the tradition, Hannibal's oath took place
in the town of Peñíscola, today part of the Valencian Community,
Hannibal's father went about the conquest of Hispania. When his father
drowned in battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair
succeeded to his command of the army with
Hannibal (then 18 years old)
serving as an officer under him. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of
consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests, even signing a treaty
Carthage would not expand north of the
Ebro so long
Rome did not expand south of it. Hasdrubal also endeavoured to
consolidate Carthaginian power through diplomatic relationships with
Upon the assassination of Hasdrubal in 221 BC,
Hannibal (now 26
years old) was proclaimed commander-in-chief by the army and confirmed
in his appointment by the Carthaginian government. Livy, a Roman
scholar, gives a depiction of the young Carthaginian: "No sooner had
he arrived...the old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar in his youth
given back to them; the same bright look; the same fire in his eye,
the same trick of countenance and features. Never was one and the same
spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey, or to
After he assumed command,
Hannibal spent two years consolidating his
holdings and completing the conquest of Hispania, south of the
Ebro. In his first campaign,
Hannibal attacked and stormed the
Olcades' strongest centre, Alithia, which promptly led to their
surrender, and brought Punic power close to the River Tagus. His
following campaign in 220 BC was against the
Vaccaei to the west,
where he stormed the Vaccaen strongholds of Helmantice and Arbucala.
On his return home, laden with many spoils, a coalition of Spanish
tribes, led by the Carpetani, attacked, and
Hannibal won his first
major battlefield success and showed off his tactical skills at the
battle of the River Tagus. However, Rome, fearing the growing
Hannibal in Iberia, made an alliance with the city of
Saguntum, which lay a considerable distance south of the River Ebro
and claimed the city as its protectorate.
Hannibal not only perceived
this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal, but as he was
already planning an attack on Rome, this was his way to start the war.
So he laid siege to the city, which fell after eight months. Rome
reacted to this apparent violation of the treaty and demanded justice
from Carthage. In view of Hannibal's great popularity, the
Carthaginian government did not repudiate Hannibal's actions, and the
war he sought was declared at the end of the year.
Hannibal was now
determined to carry the war into the heart of
Italy by a rapid march
Hispania and southern Gaul.
Second Punic War
Second Punic War in
Italy (218–204 BC)
Main article: Second Punic War
Overland journey to Italy
Main article: Hannibal's crossing of the Alps
Hannibal´s route of invasion given by the Department of History,
United States Military Academy. There is a mistake in the scale.
This journey was originally planned by Hannibal's brother-in-law
Hasdrubal the Fair, who became a Carthaginian general in the Iberian
Peninsula in 229 BC. He maintained this post for eight years
until 221 BC. Soon the Romans became aware of an alliance between
Carthage and the
Celts of the
Po Valley in Northern Italy. The Celts
were amassing forces to invade farther south in Italy, presumably with
Carthaginian backing. Therefore, the Romans preemptively invaded the
Po region in 225 BC. By 220 BC, the Romans had annexed the
area as Cisalpine Gaul. Hasdrubal was assassinated around the same
time (221 BC), bringing
Hannibal to the fore. It seems that the
Romans lulled themselves into a false sense of security, having dealt
with the threat of a Gallo-Carthaginian invasion, and perhaps knowing
that the original Carthaginian commander had been killed.
Hannibal departed New
Carthage in late spring of 218 BC. He
fought his way through the northern tribes to the foothills of the
Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mountain tactics and
stubborn fighting. He left a detachment of 20,000 troops to garrison
the newly conquered region. At the Pyrenees, he released 11,000
Iberian troops who showed reluctance to leave their homeland. Hannibal
Gaul with 40,000-foot soldiers and 12,000
Hannibal recognized that he still needed to cross the Pyrenees, the
Alps, and many significant rivers. Additionally, he would have to
contend with opposition from the Gauls, whose territory he passed
through. Starting in the spring of 218 BC, he crossed the
Pyrenees and reached the
Rhône by conciliating the Gaulish chiefs
along his passage before the Romans could take any measures to bar his
advance, arriving at the
Rhône in September. Hannibal's army numbered
38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 38 elephants, almost none of which
would survive the harsh conditions of the Alps.
Hannibal and his men crossing the Alps.
Hannibal outmaneuvered the natives who had tried to prevent his
crossing, then evaded a Roman force marching from the Mediterranean
coast by turning inland up the valley of the Rhône. His exact route
Alps has been the source of scholarly dispute ever since
(Polybius, the surviving ancient account closest in time to Hannibal's
campaign, reports that the route was already debated). The most
influential modern theories favor either a march up the valley of the
Drôme and a crossing of the main range to the south of the modern
highway over the
Col de Montgenèvre
Col de Montgenèvre or a march farther north up the
valleys of the Isère and Arc crossing the main range near the present
Mont Cenis or the Little St Bernard Pass. Recent numismatic
evidence suggests that Hannibal's army may have passed within sight of
By Livy's account, the crossing was accomplished in the face of huge
Hannibal surmounted with ingenuity, such as
when he used vinegar and fire to break through a rockfall.
According to Polybius, he arrived in
Italy accompanied by 20,000-foot
soldiers, 4,000 horsemen, and only a few elephants. The fired rockfall
event is mentioned only by Livy;
Polybius is mute on the subject and
there is no evidence of carbonized rock at the only two-tier
rockfall in the Western Alps, located below the Col de la Traversette
(Mahaney, 2008). If
Polybius is correct in his figure for the number
of troops that he commanded after the crossing of the Rhône, this
would suggest that he had lost almost half of his force. Historians
such as Serge Lancell have questioned the reliability of the figures
for the number of troops that he had when he left Hispania. From
the start, he seems to have calculated that he would have to operate
without aid from Hispania.
Hannibal's vision of military affairs was derived partly from the
teaching of his Greek tutors and partly from experience gained
alongside his father, and it stretched over most of the Hellenistic
World of his time. Indeed, the breadth of his vision gave rise to his
grand strategy of conquering
Rome by opening a northern front and
subduing allied city-states on the peninsula, rather than by attacking
Rome directly. Historical events which led to the defeat of Carthage
First Punic War
First Punic War when his father commanded the Carthaginian
Army also led
Hannibal to plan the invasion of
Italy by land across
The task was daunting, to say the least. It involved the mobilization
of between 60,000 and 100,000 troops and the training of a
war-elephant corps, all of which had to be provisioned along the way.
The alpine invasion of
Italy was a military operation that would shake
the Mediterranean World of 218 BC with repercussions for more
than two decades.
Battle of Trebia
Main article: Battle of the Trebia
A diagram depicting the tactics used in the Battle of the Trebia
Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory and
frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on
foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the
Gauls of the Po
Valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their new
allegiance to the Romans before the Romans could take steps to check
Publius Cornelius Scipio
Publius Cornelius Scipio was the consul who commanded
the Roman force sent to intercept
Hannibal (he was also Scipio
Africanus' father). He had not expected
Hannibal to make an attempt to
cross the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to fight the war in the
Iberian Peninsula. With a small detachment still positioned in Gaul,
Scipio made an attempt to intercept Hannibal. He succeeded, through
prompt decision and speedy movement, in transporting his army to Italy
by sea in time to meet Hannibal. Hannibal's forces moved through the
Po Valley and were engaged in the Battle of Ticinus. Here, Hannibal
forced the Romans to evacuate the plain of Lombardy, by virtue of his
superior cavalry. The victory was minor, but it encouraged the
Gauls and Ligurians to join the Carthaginian cause, whose troops
bolstered his army back to around 40,000 men. Scipio was severely
injured, his life only saved by the bravery of his son who rode back
onto the field to rescue his fallen father. Scipio retreated across
the Trebia to camp at Placentia with his army mostly intact.
The other Roman consular army was rushed to the Po Valley. Even before
news of the defeat at Ticinus had reached Rome, the Senate had ordered
Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus to bring his army back from Sicily
to meet Scipio and face Hannibal. Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, was
in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between
Placentia and Arminum, by which Sempronius would have to march to
reinforce Scipio. He then captured Clastidium, from which he drew
large amounts of supplies for his men. But this gain was not without
loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal's watchfulness, slipped around
his flank, and joined his colleague in his camp near the Trebia River
near Placentia. There
Hannibal had an opportunity to show his
masterful military skill at the Trebia in December of the same year,
after wearing down the superior Roman infantry, when he cut it to
pieces with a surprise attack and ambush from the flanks.
Battle of Lake Trasimene
Main article: Battle of Lake Trasimene
Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose
support for him had abated. In the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal
decided to find a more reliable base of operations farther south.
Gnaeus Servilius and
Gaius Flaminius (the new consuls of Rome) were
Hannibal to advance on Rome, and they took their armies to
block the eastern and western routes that
Hannibal could use.
Battle of Lake Trasimene, 217 BC.
From the Department of History, United States Military Academy
The only alternative route to central
Italy lay at the mouth of the
Arno. This area was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be
overflowing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal
knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the
surest and certainly the quickest way to central Italy. Polybius
claims that Hannibal's men marched for four days and three nights,
"through a land that was under water", suffering terribly from fatigue
and enforced want of sleep. He crossed without opposition over both
the Apennines (during which he lost his right eye because of
conjunctivitis) and the seemingly impassable Arno, but he lost a large
part of his force in the marshy lowlands of the Arno.
He arrived in
Etruria in the spring of 217 BC and decided to lure
the main Roman army under Flaminius into a pitched battle by
devastating the region that Flaminius had been sent to protect. As
Polybius recounts, "he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the
camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly
for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) would
be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country
but would spontaneously follow him... and give him opportunities for
attack." At the same time,
Hannibal tried to break the allegiance
of Rome's allies by proving that Flaminius was powerless to protect
them. Despite this, Flaminius remained passively encamped at Arretium.
Hannibal marched boldly around Flaminius' left flank, unable to draw
him into battle by mere devastation, and effectively cut him off from
Rome (thus executing the first recorded turning movement in military
history). He then advanced through the uplands of Etruria, provoking
Flaminius into a hasty pursuit and catching him in a defile on the
shore of Lake Trasimenus. There
Hannibal destroyed Flaminius' army in
the waters or on the adjoining slopes, killing Flaminius as well (see
Battle of Lake Trasimene). This was the most costly ambush that the
Romans ever sustained until the
Battle of Carrhae
Battle of Carrhae against the Parthian
Hannibal had now disposed of the only field force that could check his
advance upon Rome, but he realized that, without siege engines, he
could not hope to take the capital. He preferred to exploit his
victory by entering into central and southern
Italy and encouraging a
general revolt against the sovereign power.
The Romans appointed
Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus
Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus as their
dictator. Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the
strategy named after him, avoiding open battle while placing several
Roman armies in Hannibal's vicinity in order to watch and limit his
Apulia but was unable to bring Fabius to battle, so
he decided to march through
Samnium to Campania, one of the richest
and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would
draw Fabius into battle. Fabius closely followed Hannibal's path of
destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn out of the
defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed
that it was a form of cowardice.
Hannibal decided that it would be unwise to winter in the already
devastated lowlands of Campania, but Fabius had ensured that all the
passes were blocked out of Campania. To avoid this,
the Romans into thinking that the Carthaginian army was going to
escape through the woods. As the Romans moved off towards the woods,
Hannibal's army occupied the pass, and then made their way through the
pass unopposed. Fabius was within striking distance but in this case
his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly), he
stayed put. For the winter,
Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the
Apulian plain. What
Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as
Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding
its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being
used by later military manuals". This was a severe blow to Fabius'
prestige and soon after this his period of dictatorial power ended.
Battle of Cannae
Destruction of the Roman army (red), courtesy of The Department of
History, United States Military Academy
Main article: Battle of Cannae
In the spring of 216 BC,
Hannibal took the initiative and seized
the large supply depot at
Cannae in the Apulian plain. By capturing
Hannibal had placed himself between the Romans and their
crucial sources of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their
consular elections in 216 BC, they appointed Gaius Terentius
Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus as consuls. In the meantime, the
Romans hoped to gain success through sheer strength and weight of
numbers, and they raised a new army of unprecedented size, estimated
by some to be as large as 100,000 men, but more likely around
The Romans and allied legions resolved to confront
marched southward to Apulia. They eventually found him on the left
bank of the Aufidus River, and encamped six miles (9.7 km) away.
On this occasion, the two armies were combined into one, the consuls
having to alternate their command on a daily basis. Varro was in
command on the first day, a man of reckless and hubristic nature
(according to Livy) and determined to defeat Hannibal. Hannibal
capitalized on the eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by
using an envelopment tactic. This eliminated the Roman numerical
advantage by shrinking the combat area.
Hannibal drew up his least
reliable infantry in a semicircle in the center with the wings
composed of the Gallic and Numidian horse. The Roman legions
forced their way through Hannibal's weak center, but the Libyan
mercenaries on the wings, swung around by the movement, menaced their
flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible.
Hannibal's chief cavalry commander
Maharbal led the mobile Numidian
cavalry on the right, and they shattered the Roman cavalry opposing
them. Hannibal's Iberian and Gallic heavy cavalry, led by Hanno on the
left, defeated the Roman heavy cavalry, and then both the Carthaginian
heavy cavalry and the
Numidians attacked the legions from behind. As a
result, the Roman army was hemmed in with no means of escape.
Due to these brilliant tactics,
Hannibal managed to surround and
destroy all but a small remnant of his enemy, despite his own inferior
numbers. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that
50,000–70,000 Romans were killed or captured. Among the dead were
Roman Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, as well as two consuls for the
preceding year, two quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight
military tribunes, and an additional eighty senators (at a time when
the Roman Senate was composed of no more than 300 men, this
constituted 25%–30% of the governing body). This makes the battle
one of the most catastrophic defeats in the history of Ancient Rome,
and one of the bloodiest battles in all of human history (in terms of
the number of lives lost within a single day).
After Cannae, the Romans were very hesitant to confront
pitched battle, preferring instead to weaken him by attrition, relying
on their advantages of interior lines, supply, and manpower. As a
Hannibal fought no more major battles in
Italy for the rest of
the war. It is believed that his refusal to bring the war to Rome
itself was due to a lack of commitment from
Carthage of men, money,
and material — principally siege equipment. Whatever the
reason, the choice prompted
Maharbal to say, "Hannibal, you know how
to gain a victory, but not how to use one."
Hannibal counting the signet rings of Roman nobles killed during the
battle, statue by Sébastien Slodtz, 1704, Louvre
As a result of this victory, many parts of
Italy joined Hannibal's
Polybius notes, "How much more serious was the defeat of
Cannae, than those that preceded it can be seen by the behavior of
Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained
unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they
despaired of Roman Power." During that same year, the Greek cities
in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control,
while Macedonian King Philip V pledged his support to
Hannibal – thus initiating the
First Macedonian War
First Macedonian War against
Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed tyrant
Hieronymus of Syracuse. It is often argued that, if
received proper material reinforcements from Carthage, he might have
succeeded with a direct attack upon Rome. Instead, he had to content
himself with subduing the fortresses that still held out against him,
and the only other notable event of 216 BC was the defection of
certain Italian territories, including Capua, the second largest city
of Italy, which
Hannibal made his new base. However, only a few of the
Italian city-states defected to him that he had expected to gain as
The war in
Italy settled into a strategic stalemate. The Romans used
the attritional strategy that Fabius had taught them, and which, they
finally realized, was the only feasible means of defeating
Hannibal. Indeed, Fabius received the surname "Cunctator" ("the
Delayer") because of his policy of not meeting
Hannibal in open battle
but through guerilla, scorched earth tactics. The Romans deprived
Hannibal of a large-scale battle and instead assaulted his weakening
army with multiple smaller armies in an attempt to both weary him and
create unrest in his troops. For the next few years,
forced to sustain a scorched earth policy and obtain local provisions
for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout southern Italy.
His immediate objectives were reduced to minor operations centered
mainly round the cities of Campania.
The forces detached to his lieutenants were generally unable to hold
their own, and neither his home government nor his new ally Philip V
of Macedon helped to make up his losses. His position in southern
Italy, therefore, became increasingly difficult and his chance of
Rome grew ever more remote.
Hannibal still won a
number of notable victories: completely destroying two Roman armies in
212 BC, and killing two consuls (including the famed Marcus
Claudius Marcellus) in a battle in 208 BC. However, Hannibal
slowly began losing ground—inadequately supported by his Italian
allies, abandoned by his government (either because of jealousy or
Carthage was overstretched), and unable to match Rome's
resources. He was never able to bring about another grand decisive
victory that could produce a lasting strategic change.
Carthaginian political will was embodied in the ruling oligarchy.
There was a Carthaginian Senate, but the real power was with the inner
"Council of 30 Nobles" and the board of judges from ruling families
known as the "Hundred and Four". These two bodies came from the
wealthy, commercial families of Carthage. Two political factions
operated in Carthage: the war party, also known as the "Barcids"
(Hannibal's family name); and the peace party led by Hanno II the
Great. Hanno had been instrumental in denying Hannibal's requested
reinforcements following the battle at Cannae.
Hannibal started the war without the full backing of Carthaginian
oligarchy. His attack of Saguntum had presented the oligarchy with a
choice of war with
Rome or loss of prestige in Iberia. The oligarchy,
not Hannibal, controlled the strategic resources of Carthage. Hannibal
constantly sought reinforcements from either Iberia or North Africa.
Hannibal's troops who were lost in combat were replaced with less
well-trained and motivated mercenaries from
Italy or Gaul. The
commercial interests of the Carthaginian oligarchy dictated the
reinforcement and supply of Iberia rather than
Hannibal throughout the
Hannibal's retreat in Italy
Scipio Africanus from the Villa of the Papyri
In 212 BC,
Hannibal captured Tarentum but he failed to obtain
control of its harbour. The tide was slowly turning against him, and
in favor of Rome.
The Romans then mounted two sieges of Capua, which fell in
211 BC, and completed their conquest of Syracuse and destruction
of the Carthaginian army in Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the Romans
pacified Sicily and entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League
to counter Philip V of Macedon. Philip, who attempted to exploit
Rome's preoccupation in
Italy to conquer Illyria, now found himself
under attack from several sides at once and was quickly subdued by
Rome and her Greek allies. Meanwhile,
Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at
the battle of Herdonia in Apulia, but lost Tarentum the following
In 210 BC,
Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by
inflicting a severe defeat at Herdonia (modern Ordona) in
a proconsular army and, in 208 BC, destroyed a Roman force
engaged in the siege of Locri. But with the loss of Tarentum in
209 BC and the gradual reconquest by the Romans of
Lucania, his hold on south
Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC, he
succeeded in making his way again into Apulia, where he waited to
concert measures for a combined march upon
Rome with his brother
Hasdrubal Barca. On hearing, however, of his brother's defeat and
death at the battle of the Metaurus, he retired to Calabria, where he
maintained himself for the ensuing years. His brother's head had been
cut off, carried across Italy, and tossed over the palisade of
Hannibal's camp as a cold message of the iron-clad will of the Roman
Republic. The combination of these events marked the end to Hannibal's
success in Italy. With the failure of his brother Mago in Liguria
(205–203 BC) and of his own negotiations with Phillip V, the
last hope of recovering his ascendancy in
Italy was lost. In
203 BC, after nearly fifteen years of fighting in Italy, and with
the military fortunes of
Carthage rapidly declining,
Carthage to direct the defense of his native country
against a Roman invasion under Scipio Africanus.
Conclusion of the
Second Punic War
Second Punic War (203–201 BC)
Return to Carthage
Final act of the
Second Punic War
Second Punic War with the battle of Zama (202 BC)
In 203 BC,
Hannibal was recalled from
Italy by the war party in
Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition engraved in Punic
and Greek upon bronze tablets in the temple of Juno Lacinia at
Crotona, he sailed back to Africa. His arrival immediately
restored the predominance of the war party, which placed him in
command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from
Italy. In 202 BC,
Hannibal met Scipio in a fruitless peace
conference. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due to
Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring to the breach of
protocols that ended the
First Punic War
First Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on
Saguntum, and a Carthaginan attack on a stranded Roman fleet. Scipio
Carthage had worked out a peace plan, which was approved by Rome.
The terms of the treaty were quite modest, but the war had been long
for the Romans.
Carthage could keep its African territory but would
lose its overseas empire.
Masinissa (Numidia) was to be independent.
Carthage was to reduce its fleet and pay a war indemnity. But
Carthage then made a terrible blunder. Its long-suffering citizens had
captured a stranded Roman fleet in the
Gulf of Tunis
Gulf of Tunis and stripped it
of supplies, an action that aggravated the faltering negotiations.
Meanwhile, Hannibal, recalled from
Italy by the Carthaginian Senate,
had returned with his army. Fortified by both
Hannibal and the
supplies, the Carthaginians rebuffed the treaty and Roman protests.
The decisive battle of Zama soon followed; the defeat removed
Hannibal's air of invincibility.
Battle of Zama
Main article: Battle of Zama
Unlike most battles of the Second Punic War, at Zama, the Romans were
superior in cavalry and the Carthaginians had the edge in infantry.
This Roman cavalry superiority was due to the betrayal of Masinissa,
who had earlier assisted
Carthage in Iberia, but changed sides in
206 BC with the promise of land and due to his personal conflicts
with Syphax, a Carthaginian ally. Although the aging
suffering from mental exhaustion and deteriorating health after years
of campaigning in Italy, the Carthaginians still had the advantage in
numbers and were boosted by the presence of 80 war elephants.
Engraving of the
Battle of Zama
Battle of Zama by Cornelis Cort, 1567. Note that
Asian elephants are illustrated rather than the very small North
African elephants used by Carthage.
The Roman cavalry won an early victory by swiftly routing the
Carthaginian horse, and standard Roman tactics for limiting the
effectiveness of the Carthaginian war elephants were successful,
including playing trumpets to frighten the elephants into running into
the Carthaginian lines. Some historians say that the elephants routed
the Carthaginian cavalry and not the Romans, whilst others suggest
that it was actually a tactical retreat planned by Hannibal.
Whatever the truth, the battle remained closely fought. At one point,
it seemed that
Hannibal was on the verge of victory, but Scipio was
able to rally his men, and his cavalry, having routed the Carthaginian
cavalry, attacked Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged attack caused the
Carthaginian formation to collapse.
With their foremost general defeated, the Carthaginians had no choice
but to surrender.
Carthage lost approximately 20,000 troops with an
additional 15,000 wounded. In contrast, the Romans suffered only 2,500
casualties. The last major battle of the
Second Punic War
Second Punic War resulted in
a loss of respect for
Hannibal by his fellow Carthaginians. The
conditions of defeat were such that
Carthage could no longer battle
for Mediterranean supremacy.
Carthage (200–196 BC)
A Carthaginian coin possibly depicting
Hannibal was still only 46 at the conclusion of the Second Punic War
in 201 BC and soon showed that he could be a statesman as well as a
soldier. Following the conclusion of a peace that left Carthage
stripped of its formerly mighty empire,
Hannibal prepared to take a
back seat for a time. However, the blatant corruption of the oligarchy
Hannibal a chance to re-emerge and he was elected suffete (chief
magistrate). The office had become rather insignificant, but Hannibal
restored its power and authority. The oligarchy, always jealous of
him, had even charged him with having betrayed the interests of his
country while in Italy, for neglecting to take
Rome when he might have
done so. So effectively did
Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy
tribute imposed by
Rome could be paid by installments without
additional and extraordinary taxation. He also reformed the Hundred
and Four, stipulating that its membership be chosen by direct election
rather than co-option. He also used citizen support to change the term
of office in the
Hundred and Four from life to a year, with a term
limit of two years.
Exile (after 195 BC)
Seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed by
Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's surrender. Hannibal
thereupon went into voluntary exile. He journeyed to Tyre, the mother
city of Carthage, and then to Ephesus, where he was honorably received
Antiochus III of Syria, who was preparing for war with Rome.
Hannibal soon saw that the king's army was no match for the Romans. He
advised equipping a fleet and landing a body of troops in the south of
Italy, offering to take command himself. But he could not make much
impression on Antiochus, who listened to his courtiers and would not
Hannibal with any important office. According
to Cicero, while at the court of Antiochus,
Hannibal attended a
lecture by Phormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics.
When Phormio finished a discourse on the duties of a general, Hannibal
was asked his opinion. He replied, "I have seen during my life many
old fools; but this one beats them all." Another story, according to
Aulus Gellius, is that when
Antiochus III showed off the gigantic and
elaborately equipped army he had created to invade Greece to Hannibal,
he asked him if they would be enough for the Roman Republic, to which
Hannibal replied, "I think all this will be enough, yes, quite enough,
for the Romans, even though they are most avaricious." In
191 BC, the Romans under Manius Acilius Glabrio routed Antiochus
at the battle of Thermopylae and obliged him to withdraw to Asia. The
Romans followed up their success by attacking Antiochus in Anatolia
Seleucid Empire was decisively defeated at the battle of
Magnesia in 190 BC by Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus.
In 190 BC,
Hannibal was placed in command of a Seleucid fleet but
was defeated in the battle of the Eurymedon. According to
Hannibal also received hospitality at the Armenian royal
court of Artaxias I. The authors add an apocryphal story of how
Hannibal planned and supervised the building of the new royal capital
Artaxata. When Antiochus seemed prepared to surrender him to the
Hannibal fled to Crete, but he soon went back to
sought refuge with Prusias I of Bithynia, who was engaged in warfare
with Rome's ally, King
Eumenes II of Pergamon.
Hannibal went on to
serve Prusias in this war. During one of the naval victories he gained
Hannibal had large pots filled with venomous snakes
thrown onto Eumenes' ships.
Hannibal also went on to defeat
Eumenes in two other battles on land until the Romans interfered and
Bithynia into giving up Hannibal.
Death (183 to 181 BC)
Prusias agreed to give
Hannibal up, but the general was determined not
to fall into his enemy's hands. The precise year and cause of
Hannibal's death are unknown. Pausanias wrote that Hannibal's death
occurred when mounting his horse, his finger becoming wounded by his
drawn sword resulted in a fever and then his death three days
Juvenal asserts that his death was at
Libyssa on the
eastern shore of the Sea of Marmara, after having taken poison, which,
it was said, he had long carried about with him in a ring. Before
dying, he left behind a letter declaring, "Let us relieve the Romans
from the anxiety they have so long experienced, since they think it
tries their patience too much to wait for an old man's death".
In his Annales,
Titus Pomponius Atticus reports that Hannibal's death
occurred in 183 BC, and
Livy implies the same. Polybius, who
wrote nearest the event, gives 182 BC. Sulpicius Blitho
records the death under 181 BC.
See also: Cultural depictions of Hannibal
Legacy to the ancient world
Hannibal caused great distress to many in Roman society. Hannibal
became such a figure of terror that whenever disaster struck, the
Roman senators would exclaim "
Hannibal ante portas" ("
Hannibal is at
the gates!") to express their fear or anxiety. This famous Latin
phrase became a common expression that is often still used when a
client arrives through the door or when one is faced with
The works of Roman writers such as Livy, Frontinus, and
Juvenal show a
grudging admiration for Hannibal. The Romans even built statues of the
Carthaginian in the very streets of
Rome to advertise their defeat of
such a worthy adversary. It is plausible to suggest that Hannibal
engendered the greatest fear
Rome had towards an enemy. Nevertheless,
they grimly refused to admit the possibility of defeat and rejected
all overtures for peace; they even refused to accept the ransom of
prisoners after Cannae.
During the war there are no reports of revolutions among the Roman
citizens, no factions with the Senate desiring peace, no
pro-Carthaginian Roman turncoats, no coups. Indeed, throughout
the war Roman aristocrats ferociously competed with each other for
positions of command to fight against Rome's most dangerous enemy.
Hannibal's military genius was not enough to really disturb the Roman
political process and the collective political and military capacity
of the Roman people. As Lazenby states,
It says volumes, too, for their political maturity and respect for
constitutional forms that the complicated machinery of government
continued to function even amidst disaster—there are few states in
the ancient world in which a general who had lost a battle like Cannae
would have dared to remain, let alone would have continued to be
treated respectfully as head of state.
According to the historian Livy, the Romans feared Hannibal's military
genius, and during Hannibal's march against
Rome in 211 BC "a
messenger who had travelled from Fregellae for a day and a night
without stopping created great alarm in Rome, and the excitement was
increased by people running about the City with wildly exaggerated
accounts of the news he had brought. The wailing cry of the matrons
was heard everywhere, not only in private houses but even in the
temples. Here they knelt and swept the temple-floors with their
dishevelled hair and lifted up their hands to heaven in piteous
entreaty to the gods that they would deliver the City of
Rome out of
the hands of the enemy and preserve its mothers and children from
injury and outrage." In the Senate the news was "received with
varying feelings as men's temperaments differed," so it was
decided to keep
Capua under siege, but to send 15,000 infantry and
1,000 cavalry as reinforcements to Rome.
According to Livy, the land occupied by Hannibal's army outside Rome
in 211 BC was sold at the very time of its occupation and for the
same price. This may not be true but as Lazenby states, "could
well be, exemplifying as it does not only the supreme confidence felt
by the Romans in ultimate victory, but also the way in which something
like normal life continued." After
Cannae the Romans showed a
considerable steadfastness in adversity. An undeniable proof of Rome's
confidence is demonstrated by the fact that after the
she was left virtually defenseless, but the Senate still chose not to
withdraw a single garrison from an overseas province to strengthen the
city. In fact, they were reinforced and the campaigns there maintained
until victory was secured; beginning first in Sicily under the
direction of Claudius Marcellus, and later in
Hispania under Scipio
Africanus. Although the long-term consequences of Hannibal's
war are debatable, this war was undeniably Rome's "finest
Most of the sources available to historians about
Hannibal are from
Romans. They considered him the greatest enemy
Rome had ever faced.
Livy gives us the idea that he was extremely cruel. Even Cicero, when
he talked of
Rome and its two great enemies, spoke of the "honourable"
Pyrrhus and the "cruel" Hannibal. Yet a different picture is sometimes
revealed. When Hannibal's successes had brought about the death of two
Roman consuls, he vainly searched for the body of
Gaius Flaminius on
the shores of Lake Trasimene, held ceremonial rituals in recognition
of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and sent Marcellus' ashes back to his
family in Rome. Any bias attributed to Polybius, however, is more
troublesome, since he was clearly sympathetic towards Hannibal.
Polybius spent a long period as a hostage in
relied heavily on Roman sources, so there remains the possibility that
he reproduced elements of Roman propaganda.
The material of legend: in Snow Storm:
Hannibal and his Army Crossing
J. M. W. Turner
J. M. W. Turner envelops
Hannibal's crossing of the Alps
Hannibal's crossing of the Alps in
Hannibal is generally regarded as one of the best military strategists
and tacticians of all time, the double envelopment at
enduring legacy of tactical brilliance. According to Appian, several
years after the Second Punic War,
Hannibal served as a political
advisor in the Seleucid Kingdom and Scipio was sent there on a
diplomatic mission from Rome.
It is said that at one of their meetings in the gymnasium Scipio and
Hannibal had a conversation on the subject of generalship, in the
presence of a number of bystanders, and that Scipio asked Hannibal
whom he considered the greatest general, to which the latter replied,
"Alexander of Macedonia".
To this Scipio assented since he also yielded the first place to
Alexander. Then he asked
Hannibal whom he placed next, and he replied,
"Pyrrhus of Epirus", because he considered boldness the first
qualification of a general; "for it would not be possible", he said,
"to find two kings more enterprising than these".
Scipio was rather nettled by this, but nevertheless he asked Hannibal
to whom he would give the third place, expecting that at least the
third would be assigned to him; but
Hannibal replied, "to myself; for
when I was a young man I conquered
Hispania and crossed the
an army, the first after Hercules."
As Scipio saw that he was likely to prolong his self-laudation he
said, laughing, "where would you place yourself, Hannibal, if you had
not been defeated by me?" Hannibal, now perceiving his jealousy,
replied, "in that case I should have put myself before Alexander".
Hannibal continued his self-laudation, but flattered Scipio in an
indirect manner by suggesting that he had conquered one who was the
superior of Alexander.
At the end of this conversation
Hannibal invited Scipio to be his
guest, and Scipio replied that he would be so gladly if
not living with Antiochus, who was held in suspicion by the Romans.
Thus did they, in a manner worthy of great commanders, cast aside
their enmity at the end of their wars.
Military academies all over the world continue to study Hannibal's
exploits, especially his victory at Cannae.
Hannibal's celebrated feat in crossing the
Alps with war elephants
passed into European legend: detail of a fresco by Jacopo Ripanda, ca.
1510, Capitoline Museums, Rome.
Maximilian Otto Bismarck Caspari, in his article in the Encyclopædia
Britannica Eleventh Edition, praises
Hannibal in these words:
As to the transcendent military genius of
Hannibal there cannot be two
opinions. The man who for fifteen years could hold his ground in a
hostile country against several powerful armies and a succession of
able generals must have been a commander and a tactician of supreme
capacity. In the use of strategies and ambuscades he certainly
surpassed all other generals of antiquity. Wonderful as his
achievements were, we must marvel the more when we take into account
the grudging support he received from Carthage. As his veterans melted
away, he had to organize fresh levies on the spot. We never hear of a
mutiny in his army, composed though it was of North Africans, Iberians
and Gauls. Again, all we know of him comes for the most part from
hostile sources. The Romans feared and hated him so much that they
could not do him justice.
Livy speaks of his great qualities, but he
adds that his vices were equally great, among which he singles out his
more than Punic perfidy and an inhuman cruelty. For the first there
would seem to be no further justification than that he was
consummately skillful in the use of ambuscades. For the latter there
is, we believe, no more ground than that at certain crises he acted in
the general spirit of ancient warfare. Sometimes he contrasts most
favorably with his enemy. No such brutality stains his name as that
perpetrated by Claudius Nero on the vanquished Hasdrubal Barca.
Polybius merely says that he was accused of cruelty by the Romans and
of avarice by the Carthaginians. He had indeed bitter enemies, and his
life was one continuous struggle against destiny. For steadfastness of
purpose, for organizing capacity and a mastery of military science he
has perhaps never had an equal.
Even the Roman chroniclers acknowledged Hannibal's supreme military
leadership, writing that, "he never required others to do what he
could and would not do himself". According to
Polybius 23, 13,
It is a remarkable and very cogent proof of Hannibal's having been by
nature a real leader and far superior to anyone else in statesmanship,
that though he spent seventeen years in the field, passed through so
many barbarous countries, and employed to aid him in desperate and
extraordinary enterprises numbers of men of different nations and
languages, no one ever dreamt of conspiring against him, nor was he
ever deserted by those who had once joined him or submitted to him.
A bust of Hannibal, 17th century, Museum of Antiquities (Saskatoon)
Alfred von Schlieffen
Alfred von Schlieffen developed his eponymously titled
"Schlieffen Plan" (1905/1906) from his military studies, with a
particularly heavy emphasis on the envelopment technique which
Hannibal employed to surround and destroy the Roman army in the battle
George S. Patton
George S. Patton believed himself a reincarnation
Hannibal as well as of many other people, including a Roman
legionary and a Napoleonic soldier. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.,
the commander of the Coalition of the Gulf War, claimed, "The
technology of war may change, the sophistication of weapons certainly
changes. But those same principles of war that applied to the days of
Hannibal apply today."
According to the military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge,
Hannibal excelled as a tactician. No battle in history is a finer
sample of tactics than Cannae. But he was yet greater in logistics and
strategy. No captain ever marched to and fro among so many armies of
troops superior to his own numbers and material as fearlessly and
skillfully as he. No man ever held his own so long or so ably against
such odds. Constantly overmatched by better soldiers, led by generals
always respectable, often of great ability, he yet defied all their
efforts to drive him from Italy, for half a generation. Excepting in
the case of Alexander, and some few isolated instances, all wars up to
the Second Punic War, had been decided largely, if not entirely, by
battle-tactics. Strategic ability had been comprehended only on a
minor scale. Armies had marched towards each other, had fought in
parallel order, and the conqueror had imposed terms on his opponent.
Any variation from this rule consisted in ambuscades or other
stratagems. That war could be waged by avoiding in lieu of seeking
battle; that the results of a victory could be earned by attacks upon
the enemy's communications, by flank-maneuvers, by seizing positions
from which safely to threaten him in case he moved, and by other
devices of strategy, was not understood... [However] For the first
time in the history of war, we see two contending generals avoiding
each other, occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching about
each other's flanks to seize cities or supplies in their rear,
harassing each other with small-war, and rarely venturing on a battle
which might prove a fatal disaster—all with a well-conceived purpose
of placing his opponent at a strategic disadvantage... That it did so
was due to the teaching of Hannibal.
Timeline of Hannibal's life (248 BC–c. 183 BC)
Military of Carthage
^ See death below.
^ "Plutarch, and when asked what his choices would be if he had beaten
Scipio, he replied that he would be the best of them all" Life of
Titus Flamininus 21.3–4.
^ Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus 8.2.
^ a b c d e Ayrault Dodge, Theodore (1995). Hannibal: A History of the
Art of War Among the Carthaginians and Romans Down to the Battle of
Pydna, 168 BC. Da Capo Press.
^ a b Benz, Franz L. 1982. Personal Names in the Phoenician and Punic
^ a b Baier, Thomas. 2004. Studien zu Plautus' Poenulus. P.174
^ Friedrich, Johannes, Wolfgang Röllig, Maria Giulia Amadasi, and
Werner R. Mayer. 1999. Phönizisch-Punische Grammatik. P.53.
^ Brown, John Pairman. 2000. Israel and Hellas: Sacred institutions
with Roman counterparts. P.126–128
^ Sullivan, Robert Joseph, A Dictionary of the English Language,
p. 489 .
^ S. Lancel,
^ Ameling, Walter Karthago: Studien zu Militär, Staat und
Gesellschaft pp. 81–2.
^ Lancel, S.
^ Reverse Spins Patton, the Second Coming of Hannibal.
^ Hilowitz, Beverley (1974). A Horizon guide: great historic places of
Europe. American Heritage Pub. Co., p. 119. ISBN 0-07-028915-8
^ "Hamilcar Barca". Retrieved 6 June 2011.
^  The History of Rome: Vol III, by Livy
^ Dodge, Theodore Ayrault (2004). Hannibal: A History of the Art of
War Among the Carthaginians and Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna,
168 B.C., with a Detailed Account of the Second Punic War. Da Capo
Press. ISBN 978-0-306-81362-7. , page 143
^ Hoyos, D. Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western
Mediterranean, 247–183 BC, pp. 89–91, 2003
^ Fagan, Garret G. "The History of Ancient Rome". Lecture 13: "The
Second Punic War". Teaching Company, "Great Courses" series.
^ Lancel, Serge (1999). Hannibal. Wiley.
ISBN 978-0-631-21848-7. , p. 225
^ Prevas, John (1 March 2009).
Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion
Italy and the Punic Wars. Perseus Books Group.
ISBN 978-0-7867-3121-3. , p. 86
^ Mahaney, W. C. (2008). Hannibal's Odyssey: Environmental Background
to the Alpine Invasion of Italia. Gorgias Press.
ISBN 978-1-59333-951-7. , page 221
^ Lancel, Serge (1999). Hannibal. Wiley.
ISBN 978-0-631-21848-7. , p. 60]
^ Montgenèvre: Peter Connolly,
Hannibal and the Enemies of Rome
(1978); (extensive summary); Col de la Traversette: Gavin de Beer,
Alps and Elephants and
Napoleon III; Mahaney 2008, "Hannibal's
Odyssey; Environmental Background to the Alpine Invasion of Italia";
Mont Cenis: Denis Proctor, Hannibal's March in History. Other theories
Col de Clapier
Col de Clapier (Serge Lancel,
Hannibal (1995) and the Col
du Petit Saint Bernard (Barthold Niebuhr).
^ McMenamin, M. (2012). "Depiction of the
Alps on Punic coins from
Campania, Italy". Numismatics International Bulletin. 41 (1-2):
Livy History of
Livy History of Rome, Book 21 sections 32–36
^ Mahaney, W.C., et al., 2009. "The Traversette rockfall:
geomorphological reconstruction and importance in interpreting
classical history." Archaeometry, v. 52, no. 1, pp. 156–172.
^ S. Lancel,
Hannibal (1995; English translation 1999) page 60.
^ a b Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal. Cambridge Massachusetts: De Capo
Press, 1891 ISBN 0-306-81362-9
^ Polybius, Histories, Book III, 77
^ John Selby Watson; Marcus Junianus; Justinus, Cornelius; Nepos,
Eutropius (1853). Justin, Cornelius Nepos, and Eutropius: Literally
Translated, with Notes. H. G. Bohn. p. 420. Retrieved 23 July
^ Polybius, Histories, Book III, p74
^ Liddell Hart, B. H., Strategy, New York City, New York, Penguin
^ USAWC Comparing Strategies of the 2nd Punic War by James Parker.
View as HTML
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian K. The Roman Army at War 100 BC — AD 200,
^ "Internet Ancient History Sourcebook".
^ a b c d Cottrell, Leonard, Enemy of Rome, Evans Bros, 1965,
^ Prevas, John,
Hannibal Crosses the Alps, p. xv
^ Chaplin, Jane Dunbar, Livy's Exemplary History, p. 66
^ Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, 2 Vols., trans. Evelyn S.
Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), I. 264–275.
^ Prevas, John,
Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of
the Second Punic War, p. 200
^ Pliny, tr. by Mary Beagon, The Elder Pliny on the Human Animal, p
^ "28.46". Gutenberg.org. 11 June 2004. Retrieved 6 June 2013.
^ Scullard, H.H. Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, p. 150,
1970. Gabriel, Richard. Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General, p.
^ Aulus Gellius. Noctes Atticae, book V. v. 5. "Satis, plane satis
esse credo Romanis haec omnia, etiamsi avarissimi sunt."
^ Bournoutian, George A. (2006). A Concise History of the Armenian
People: From Ancient Times to the Present. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, p.
29. ISBN 1-56859-141-1.
^ Cornelius Nepos,
Hannibal 10 and 11.
^ Cornelius Nepos,
^ Pausanias. "Description of Greece, 8.11.11". Perseus Digital
Library. Retrieved 10 April 2016.
^ Cornelius Nepos,
Hannibal 12.5; Juvenal, Satires X.164
^ Mellor, Ronald (1999). The Roman historians. Routledge. p. 70.
^ a b Cornelius Nepos,
^ An otherwise unknown author; see The Fragments of the Roman
Historians: Introduction. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. 2013.
ISBN 978-0-199-27705-6. , page 429]
^ Alan Emrich, Practical Latin Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback
Rome and her Enemies 8
^ Livy, The War With
^ Lazenby, Hannibal's War 237–8
^ Goldsworthy, The Fall of
^ J. F. Lazenby, The Hannibalic War, 254
^ a b c d "Livy's History of Rome". Mcadams.posc.mu.edu. Retrieved 6
^ Livy, The War with Hannibal, 26.11
^ J.F. Lazenby, The Hannibalic War, p. 254
^ Bagnall, The Punic Wars 203
^ Lazenby, Hannibal's War 235
^ Lazenby Hannibal's War 254
^ Goldsworthy The Fall of
^ Appian, History of the Syrian Wars, §10 and §11 at Livius.org
Hannibal – New World Encyclopedia". www.newworldencyclopedia.org.
^ Caspari, M.O.B. (1911). "
Hannibal (general)". In Chisholm,
Hugh. Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University
Hannibal Archived 1 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine. at
^ Daly, Gregory (2003). Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second
Punic War. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0-415-32743-5. , p. x
^ Cottrell, Leonard (1992). Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. Perseus Books
Group. ISBN 978-0-306-80498-4. , p. 134
^ "Any man who thinks he is the reincarnation of
Hannibal or some such
isn't quite possessed of all his buttons", quoted by D'Este, Carlo
(1996). Patton: Genius for War, A. HarperCollins.
ISBN 978-0-06-092762-2. , p. 815
^ Hirshson, Stanley,
General Patton: A Soldier's Life, p. 163
^ Carlton, James, The Military Quotation Book, New York City, New
York, Thomas Dunne Books, 2002
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