Amin al-Husseini (Arabic: محمد أمين
الحسيني; c. 1897 – 4 July 1974) was a Palestinian
Arab nationalist and
Muslim leader in Mandatory Palestine.
Al-Husseini was the scion of a family of Jerusalemite notables, who
trace their origins to the eponymous grandson of Muhammad. After
receiving an education in Islamic, Ottoman, and Catholic schools, he
went on to serve in the Ottoman army in World War I. At war's end he
stationed himself in
Damascus as a supporter of the Arab Kingdom of
Syria. Following the
Franco-Syrian War and the collapse of Arab
Hashemite rule in Damascus, his early position on pan-Arabism shifted
to a form of local nationalism for Palestinian Arabs and he moved back
to Jerusalem. From as early as 1920 he actively opposed Zionism, and
was implicated as a leader of the 1920 Nebi Musa riots. Al-Husseini
was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for incitement but was
pardoned by the British. In 1921 the British High Commissioner
appointed him Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem, a position he used to promote
Islam while rallying a non-confessional
Arab nationalism against
Zionism. During the period 1921-36 he was considered an
important ally by the British Mandatory authorities.
His opposition to the British peaked during the 1936–1939 Arab
revolt in Palestine. In 1937, evading an arrest warrant, he fled
Palestine and took refuge successively in the French Mandate of
Lebanon and the Kingdom of Iraq, until he established himself in
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. During
World War II
World War II he collaborated
with both Italy and Germany by making propagandistic radio broadcasts
and by helping the Nazis recruit Bosnian Muslims for the
the ground that they shared four principles: family, order, the leader
and faith). Also, as he told the recruits, Germany had not colonized
any Arab country while Russia and England had. On meeting Adolf
Hitler he requested backing for Arab independence and support in
opposing the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home. At
the end of the war he came under French protection, and then sought
Cairo to avoid prosecution for war crimes.
In the lead-up to the 1948 Palestine war, Husseini opposed both the
1947 UN Partition Plan
1947 UN Partition Plan and King Abdullah's designs to annex the Arab
part of British
Mandatory Palestine to Jordan, and, failing to gain
command of the 'Arab rescue army' (jaysh al-inqadh al-'arabi) formed
under the aegis of the Arab League, formed his own militia, al-jihad
al-muqaddas. In September 1948 he participated in the establishment of
an All-Palestine Government. Seated in Egyptian-ruled Gaza, this
government won limited recognition by Arab states but was eventually
dissolved by Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1959. After the
war and subsequent Palestinian exodus, his claims to leadership were
wholly discredited and he was eventually sidelined by the Palestine
Liberation Organization, losing most of his residual political
influence. He died in Beirut,
Lebanon in July 1974. Husseini was
and remains a highly controversial figure. Historians dispute whether
his fierce opposition to
Zionism was grounded in nationalism or
antisemitism or a combination of both. Opponents of Palestinian
nationalism have used Husseini's wartime residence and propaganda
activities in Nazi Germany to associate the Palestinian national
movement with European-style anti-Semitism. While his ideological
influence on post-war
Palestinian nationalism is minimal, al-Husayni's
legacy is of interest to modern scholars of Political
Islam for his
role in introducing radical antisemitism into Islamic
1 Early life
2 World War I
3 Early political activism
Mufti of Jerusalem
Haram ash-Sharif and the Western Wall
4.2 1929 Palestine riots
4.3 Political activities, 1930–1935
4.4 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine
5 Ties with the Axis Powers during World War II
5.2 Al-Husseini in Iraq
5.3 In Nazi-occupied Europe
5.4 The Holocaust
5.4.1 Al-Husseini and the Holocaust
5.4.2 Al-Husseini's attempts to block Jewish refugees
5.5 Intervention in Palestine and Operation Atlas
6 Activities after World War II
6.1 Arrest and flight
6.2 Post-War Palestinian Political Leadership
6.3 1948 Palestine war
6.3.1 The U.N. Partition Resolution
6.3.2 The war
6.3.3 Establishment of All-Palestine Government
6.4 Exile from Palestine
Amin al-Husseini and antisemitism
8 Evaluations of Husseini's historical significance
9 See also
12 External links
Amin al-Husseini was born around 1897 in Jerusalem, the son of the
mufti of that city and prominent early opponent of Zionism, Tahir
al-Husayni. The al-Husseini clan consisted of wealthy landowners
in southern Palestine, centered around the district of Jerusalem.
Thirteen members of the clan had been Mayors of
Jerusalem between 1864
and 1920. Another member of the clan and Amin's half-brother,
Kamil al-Husayni, also served as
Mufti of Jerusalem. In
al-Husseini attended a Qur'an school (kuttub), and Ottoman government
secondary school (rüshidiyye) where he learnt Turkish, and a Catholic
secondary school run by French missionaries, the Catholic Frères,
where he learnt French. He also studied at the Alliance Israélite
Universelle with its non-Zionist Jewish director Albert Antébi.
In 1912 he studied Islamic law briefly at
Al-Azhar University in Cairo
and at the Dar al-Da'wa wa-l-Irshad, under Rashid Rida, a salafi
intellectual, who was to remain Amin's mentor till his death in
1935. Though groomed to hold religious office from youth, his
education was typical of the Ottoman effendi at the time, and he only
donned a religious turban in 1921 after being appointed mufti.
In 1913, approximately at the age of 16, al-Husseini accompanied his
mother Zainab to
Mecca and received the honorary title of Hajj. Prior
to World War I, he studied at the School of Administration in
Constantinople, the most secular of Ottoman institutions.
World War I
With the outbreak of
World War I
World War I in 1914, al-Husseini received a
commission in the Ottoman Army as an artillery officer and was
assigned to the Forty-Seventh Brigade stationed in and around the city
of Izmir. In November 1916 he obtained a three-month disability leave
from the army and returned to Jerusalem. He was recovering from an
illness there when the city was captured by the British a year
later. The British and Sherifian armies, for which some 500
Palestinian Arabs were estimated to have volunteered, completed their
conquest of Ottoman-controlled Palestine and
Syria in 1918. As
a Sherifian officer, al-Husseini recruited men to serve in Faisal bin
Al Hussein bin Ali El-Hashemi's army during the Arab Revolt, a task he
undertook while employed as a recruiter by the British military
Jerusalem and Damascus. The post-war Palin Report
noted that the English recruiting officer, Captain C. D. Brunton,
found al-Husseini, with whom he cooperated, very pro-British, and
that, via the diffusion of War Office pamphlets dropped from the air
promising them peace and prosperity under British rule, 'the recruits
(were) being given to understand that they were fighting in a national
cause and to liberate their country from the Turks'. Nothing in
his early career to this point suggests he had ambitions to serve in a
religious office: his interests were those of an Arab nationalist.
Early political activism
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In 1919, al-Husseini attended the Pan-Syrian Congress held in Damascus
where he supported Emir Faisal for King of Syria. That year
al-Husseini founded the pro-British
Jerusalem branch of the
Syrian-based 'Arab Club' (Al-Nadi al-arabi), which then vied with the
Nashashibi-sponsored 'Literary Club' (al-Muntada al-Adabi) for
influence over public opinion, and he soon became its
president. At the same time, he wrote articles for the Suriyya
al-Janubiyya (Southern Syria). The paper was published in Jerusalem
beginning in September 1919 by the lawyer
Muhammad Hassan al-Budayri,
and edited by Aref al-Aref, both prominent members of al-Nadi
Al-Husseini was a strong supporter of the short-living Arab Kingdom of
Syria, established in March 1920. In addition to his support to
pan-Arabist policies of King Faisal I, al-Husseini tried to
destabilize the British rule in Palestine, which was declared to be
part of the Arab Kingdom, even though no authority was exercised in
During the annual
Nabi Musa procession in
Jerusalem in April 1920,
violent rioting broke out in protest at the implementation of the
Balfour Declaration which supported the establishment in Palestine of
a homeland for the Jewish people. Much damage to Jewish life and
property was caused. The Palin Report laid the blame for the explosion
of tensions on both sides. Ze'ev Jabotinsky, organiser of Jewish
paramilitary defences, received a 15-year sentence. Al-Husseini,
then a teacher at the Rashidiya school, near
Herod's Gate in East
Jerusalem, was charged with inciting the Arab crowds with an
inflammatory speech and sentenced in absentia to 10-years imprisonment
by a military court, since by then he had fled to Syria. It was
asserted soon after, by
Chaim Weizmann and British army Lieutenant
Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, that al-Husseini had been put up to
inciting the riot by British
Field-marshal Allenby's Chief of Staff,
Colonel Bertie Harry Waters-Taylor, to demonstrate to the world that
Arabs would not tolerate a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
The assertion was never proven, and Meinertzhagen was dismissed.
After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional
rivalry between the Husseini and
Nashashibi clans into a serious
rift, with long-term consequences for al-Husseini and Palestinian
nationalism. According to
Sir Louis Bols, great pressure was brought
to bear on the military administration from Zionist leaders and
officials such as David Yellin, to have the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa
Kazim Pasha al-Husayni, dismissed, given his presence in the
demonstration of the previous March. Colonel Storrs, the Military
Governor of Jerusalem, removed him without further inquiry, replacing
Raghib al-Nashashibi of the rival
Nashashibi clan. This,
according to the Palin report, 'had a profound effect on his
co-religionists, definitely confirming the conviction they had already
formed from other evidence that the Civil Administration was the mere
puppet of the Zionist Organization.'
Until late 1920, al-Husseini focused his efforts on
the ideology of aGreater
Syria in particular, with Palestine
understood as a southern province of an Arab state, whose capital was
to be established in Damascus. Greater
Syria was to include territory
of the entire Levant, now occupied by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan,
Palestinian Authority and Israel. The struggle for Greater Syria
France defeated the Arab forces in Battle of Maysalun
in July 1920. The French army entered
Damascus at that time, overthrew
King Faisal and put an end to the project of a Greater Syria, put
under the French Mandate in accordance with the prior Sykes-Picot
Agreement. Palestinian notables responded to the disaster by a series
of resolutions at the 1921
Haifa conference, which set down a
Palestinian framework and passed over in silence the earlier idea of a
south confederated with Syria. This framework set the tone of
Palestinian nationalism for the ensuing decades.
Al-Husseini, like many of his class and period, then turned from
Pan-Arabism to a specifically Palestinian ideology,
centered on Jerusalem, which sought to block Jewish immigration to
Mandatory Palestine. The frustration of pan-Arab aspirations lent
an Islamic colour to the struggle for independence, and increasing
resort to the idea of restoring the land to Dar al-Islam. From his
Mufti until 1923, al-Husseini exercised total control over
the secret society, Al-Fida’iyya (The Self-Sacrificers), which,
together with al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf (Brotherhood and Purity), played
an important role in clandestine anti-British and anti-Zionist
activities, and, via members in the gendarmerie, had engaged in
riotous activities as early as April 1920.
Mufti of Jerusalem
Sir Herbert Samuel, recently appointed British High Commissioner,
declared a general amnesty for those convicted of complicity in the
riots of 1920, excluding only Amin and Al Aref. During a visit later
that year to the Bedouin tribes of Transjordan who harboured the two
political refugees, Samuel offered a pardon to both and al- Al Aref
accepted with alacrity. Husseini initially rebuffed the offer, on the
grounds that he was not a criminal. He accepted the pardon only in the
wake of the death of his half-brother, the mufti Kamil al-Husayni, in
March 1921. Elections were then held, and of the four candidates
running for the office of Mufti, al-Husseini received the least number
of votes, the first three being
Nashashibi candidates. Nevertheless,
Samuel was anxious to keep a balance between the al-Husseinis and
their rival clan the Nashashibis. A year earlier the British had
Musa al-Husayni as Mayor of
Jerusalem with Ragheb
al-Nashashibi. They then moved to secure for the Husseini clan a
compensatory function of prestige by appointing one of them to the
position of mufti, and, with the support of Ragheb al-Nashashibi,
prevailing upon the
Sheikh Hussam ad-Din
Jarallah, to withdraw. This automatically promoted
Amin al-Husseini to
third position, which, under Ottoman law, allowed him to qualify, and
Samuel then chose him as Mufti. His initial appointment was as
Mufti, but when the Supreme
Muslim Council was created in the
following year, Husseini demanded and received the title Grand Mufti
that had earlier been created, perhaps on the lines of Egyptian
usage, by the British for his half-brother Kamil. The
position came with a life tenure.
In 1922, al-Husseini was elected president of the Supreme Muslim
Council which had been created by Samuel in 1921. Matthews argues
that the British considered the combinations of his profile as an
Arab nationalist and a scion of a noble
'made it advantageous to align his interests with those of the British
administration and thereby keep him on a short tether.'. The
Council controlled the
Waqf funds, worth annually tens of thousands of
pounds and the orphan funds, worth annually about £50,000, as
compared to the £600,000 in the Jewish Agency's annual budget. In
addition, he controlled the Islamic courts in Palestine. Among other
functions, these courts were entrusted with the power to appoint
teachers and preachers.
The British initially balanced appointments to the Supreme Muslim
Council between the Husseinis and their supporters (known as the
majlisiya, or council supporters) and the Nashashibis and their allied
clans (known as the mu'aridun, the opposition). The mu'aridun,
were more disposed to a compromise with the Jews, and indeed had for
some years received annual subventions from the Jewish Agency.
During most of the period of the British mandate, bickering between
these two families seriously undermined any Palestinian Arab unity. In
1936, however, they achieved a measure of concerted policy when all
the Palestinian Arab groups joined to create a permanent executive
organ known as the
Arab Higher Committee
Arab Higher Committee under al-Husseini's
Haram ash-Sharif and the Western Wall
Muslim Council and its head al-Husseini, who regarded
himself as guardian of one of the three holy sites of Islam, launched
an international campaign in
Muslim countries to gather funds to
restore and improve the
Haram ash-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) or Temple
Mount, and particularly the
Al-Aqsa Mosque and the shrine Dome of the
Rock (which houses the holiest site in Judaism). The whole area
required extensive restoration, given the disrepair into which it had
fallen from neglect in Ottoman times.
Jerusalem was the original
direction towards which Muslims prayed, until the
Mohammed in the year 624. Al-Husseini
commissioned the Turkish architect Mimar Kemalettin. In restoring
the site, al-Husseini was also assisted by the Mandatory power's
Catholic Director of Antiquities, Ernest Richmond. Under
Richmond's supervision, the Turkish architect drew up a plan, and the
execution of the works gave a notable stimulus to the revival of
traditional artisan arts like mosaic tesselation, glassware
production, woodcraft, wickerwork and iron-mongering.
Al-Husseini's vigorous efforts to transform the Haram into a symbol of
Palestinian nationalism were intended to rally Arab
support against the postwar influx of Jewish immigrants. In his
campaigning, al-Husseini often accused Jews of planning to take
possession of the
Western Wall of Jerusalem, which belonged to the
Abu Madyan as an inalienable property, and rebuild the Temple
over the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He took certain statements, for example,
Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Palestine, Abraham Isaac Kook
regarding the eventual return in time of the
Temple Mount back to
Jewish hands, and turned them to a concrete political plot to seize
control of the area. Al-Husseini's intensive work to refurbish the
shrine as a cynosure for the
Muslim world, and Jewish endeavours to
improve their access to, and establish a ritually appropriate ambiance
on the plaza by the Western Wall, led to increased conflict between
the two communities, each seeing the site only from their own
traditional perspective and interests. Zionist narratives
pinpointed al-Husseini's works on, and publicity about, the site and
threats to it, as attempts to restore his own family's waning
prestige. Arab narratives read the heightened agitation of certain
Jewish groups over the Wall as an attempt to revive diaspora interest
Zionism after some years of relative decline, depression and
emigration. Each attempt to make minor alterations to the status
quo, still governed by Ottoman law, was bitterly protested before the
British authorities by the
Muslim authorities. If Muslims could cite
an Ottoman regulation of 1912 specifically forbidding objects like
seating to be introduced, the Jews could cite testimonies to the fact
that before 1914 certain exceptions had been made to improve their
access and use of the Wall. The decade witnessed several such
episodes of strong friction, and the simmering tensions came to a head
in late 1928, only to erupt, after a brief respite, into an explosion
of violence a year later.
1929 Palestine riots
Main article: 1929 Palestine riots
Arab protest delegations against British policy in Palestine during
On 10 August 1928, a constituent assembly convened by the French in
Syria was rapidly adjourned when calls were made for a reunification
with Palestine. Al-Husseini and
Awni Abd al-Hadi
Awni Abd al-Hadi met with the
Syrian nationalists and they made a joint proclamation for a
unified monarchical state under a son of Ibn Sa'ud. On the 26th.
the completion of the first stage of restoration work on the Haram's
mosques was celebrated with great pomp, in the presence of
representatives from the
Muslim countries which had financed the
project, the Mandatory authorities, and Abdullah, Emir of Transjordan.
A month later, an article appeared in the Jewish press proposing the
purchase and destruction of houses in the Moroccan quarter bordering
on the wall to improve pilgrim access and thereby further the
'Redemption of Israel.' Soon after, on 23 September, Yom
Kippur, a Jewish beadle introduced a screen to separate male and
female worshippers at the Wall. Informed by residents in the
neighbouring Mughrabi quarter, the waqf authority complained to Harry
Luke, acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Palestine, that this
virtually changed the lane into a synagogue, and violated the status
quo, as had the collapsible seats in 1926. British constables,
encountering a refusal, used force to remove the screen, and a
jostling clash ensued between worshippers and police.
Zionist allegations that disproportionate force had been employed
during what was a solemn occasion of prayer created an outcry
throughout the diaspora. Worldwide Jewish protests remonstrated with
Britain for the violence exercised at the Wall. The Jewish National
Vaad Leumi ‘demanded that British administration expropriate
the wall for the Jews’. In reply, the Muslims organized a
Defence Committee for the Protection of the Noble Buraq, and huge
crowd rallies took place on the Al-Aqsa plaza in protest. Work, often
noisy, was immediately undertaken on a mosque above the Jewish prayer
site. Disturbances such as opening a passage for donkeys to pass
through the area, angered worshippers. After intense negotiations,
the Zionist organisation denied any intent to take over the whole
Haram Ash-Sharif, but demanded the government expropriate and raze the
Moroccan quarter. A law of 1924 allowed the British authorities to
expropriate property, and fear of this in turn greatly agitated the
Muslim community, though the laws of donation of the waqf explicitly
disallowed any such alienation. After lengthy deliberation, a White
Paper was made public on 11 December 1928 in favour of the status
After the nomination of the new
Sir John Chancellor
Lord Plumer in December 1928, the question was re-examined,
and in February 1929 legal opinion established that the mandatory
authority was within its powers to intervene to ensure Jewish rights
of access and prayer. Al-Husseini pressed him for a specific
clarification of the legal status quo regarding the Wall. Chancellor
mulled weakening the SMC and undermining al-Husseini's authority by
making the office of mufti elective. The
Nabi Musa festival of April
that year passed without incident, despite al-Husseini's warnings of
possible incidents. Chancellor thought his power was waning, and after
conferring with London, admitted to al-Husseini on 6 May that he was
impotent to act decisively in the matter. Al-Husseini replied that,
unless the Mandatory authorities acted, then, very much like Christian
monks protecting their sacred sites in Jerusalem, the sheikhs would
have to take infringements of the status quo into their own hands, and
personally remove any objects introduced by Jews to the area.
Chancellor asked him to be patient, and al-Husseini offered to stop
works on the Mount on condition that this gesture not be taken as a
recognition of Jewish rights. A change of government in Britain in
June led to a new proposal: only
Muslim works in the sector near where
Jews prayed should be subject to mandatory authorisation: Jews could
employ ritual objects, but the introduction of seats and screens would
be subject to
Muslim authorisation. Chancellor authorised the Muslims
to recommence their reconstructive work, while, responding to further
Zionist complaints, prevailed on the SMC to stop the raucous Zikr
ceremonies in the vicinity of the wall. He also asked the Zionist
representatives to refrain from filling their newspapers with attacks
on the government and
Muslim authorities. Chancellor then departed for
Europe where the Mandatory Commission was deliberating.
With Chancellor abroad, and the Zionist Commission itself, with its
leader Colonel Frederick Kisch, in
Zurich for the 16th Zionist
Congress (attended also by Ze'ev Jabotinsky), the SMC resumed works,
confidentially authorised, on the Haram only to be met with outcries
from the Jewish press. The administration rapidly published the new
rules on 22 July, with a serious error in translation that fueled
Zionist reports of a plot against Jewish rights. A protest in
London led to a public declaration by a member of the Zionist
Commission that Jewish rights were bigger than the status quo, a
statement which encouraged in turn Arab suspicions that local
agreements were again being overthrown by Jewish intrigues abroad.
News that the
Zurich Congress, in creating the
Jewish Agency on 11
August., had brought unity among Zionists and the world Jewish
community, a measure that would greatly increase Jewish investment in
British Palestine, set off alarm bells. On 15 August, Tisha B'Av,
a day memorializing the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem, the
Betar movement, despite Pinhas Rutenberg's plea on 8
August to the acting
Harry Luke to stop such groups
from participating, rallied members from
Tel Aviv to join them in
the religious commemoration. Kisch, before leaving, had banned Jewish
demonstrations in Jerusalem's Arab quarters. The
Betar youth gave the
ceremony a strong nationalist tinge by singing the Hatikvah, waving
the flag of Israel, and chanting the slogan 'The Wall is
Ours'. The following day coincided with mawlid (or mawsin
al-nabi), the anniversary of the birth of Islam's prophet,
Muslim worshippers, after prayers on the esplanade of the
Haram, passed through the narrow lane by the Wailing Wall and ripped
up prayer books, and kotel notes (wall petitions), without harming
however three Jews present. Contacted by Luke, al-Husseini undertook
to do his best to maintain calm on the Haram, but could not stop
demonstrators from gathering at the Wall.
On 17 August a young Jewish boy was stabbed to death by Arabs while
retrieving a football, while an Arab was badly wounded in a brawl with
Palestinian Jews. Strongly tied to the anti-
and attacked by supporters of Abdullah in Transjordan for misusing
funds marked out for campaigning against France, al-Husseini asked for
a visa for himself and
Awni Abd al-Hadi
Awni Abd al-Hadi to travel to Syria, where the
leadership of the Syrian anti-French cause was being contested.
Averse to his presence in Syria, the French asked him to put off the
journey. Meanwhile, despite Harry Luke's lecturing journalists to
avoid reporting such material, rumors circulated in both communities,
of an imminent massacre of Jews by Muslims, and of an assault on the
Haram ash-Sharif by Jews. On 21 August a funeral cortège, taking the
form of a public demonstration for the dead Jewish boy, wound its way
through the old city, with the police blocking attempts to break into
the Arab quarters. On the 22nd, Luke convoked representatives of both
parties to calm things down, and undersign a joint declaration. Awni
Abd al-Hadi and
Jamal al-Husayni were ready to recognize Jewish
visiting rights at the Wall in exchange for Jewish recognition of
Islamic prerogatives at the Buraq. The Jewish representative, Yitzhak
Ben-Zvi, considered this beyond his brief—which was limited to an
appeal for calm—and the Arabs in turn refused. They agreed to pursue
their dialogue the following week.
On 23 August, a Friday, two or three Arabs were murdered in the Jewish
quarter of Mea Shearim. It was also a day of
Muslim prayer. A
large crowd, composed of many people from outlying villages, thronged
into Jerusalem, many armed with sticks and knives. It is not known
whether this was organized by al-Husseini or the result of spontaneous
mobilisation. The sermon at Al-Aqsa was to be delivered by another
preacher, but Luke prevailed on al-Husseini to leave his home and go
to the mosque, where he was greeted as 'the sword of the faith' and
where he instructed the preacher to deliver a pacific sermon, while
sending an urgent message for police reinforcements around the Haram.
Deluded by the lenitive address, extremists harangued the crowd,
accusing al-Husseini of being an infidel to the
Muslim cause. The same
violent accusation was launched in
Jaffa against sheikh Muzaffir, an
otherwise radical Islamic preacher, who gave a sermon calling for calm
on the same day. An assault was launched on the Jewish quarter.
Violent mob attacks on Jewish communities, fueled by wildfire hearsay
about ostensible massacres of Arabs and attempts to seize the Wall,
took place over the following days in Hebron, Safed and Haifa. In all,
in the killings and subsequent revenge attacks, 136 Arabs and 135 Jews
died, while 340 of the latter were wounded, as well as an estimated
Two official investigations were subsequently conducted by the British
and the League of Nations's Mandatory Commission. The former, The Shaw
Report, concluded that the incident on 23 August consisted of an
attack by Arabs on Jews, but rejected the view that the riots had been
premeditated. Al-Husseini certainly played an energetic role in Muslim
demonstrations from 1928 onwards, but could not be held responsible
for the August riots, even if he had 'a share in the responsibility
for the disturbances'. He had nonetheless collaborated from the
23rd. of that month in pacifying rioters and reestablishing order. The
worst outbreaks occurred in areas, Hebron, Safed, Jaffa, and Haifa
where his Arab political adversaries were dominant. The root cause of
the violent outbreaks lay in the fear of territorial
dispossession. In a Note of Reservation, Mr. Harry Snell, who had
apparently been swayed by
Sir Herbert Samuel's son, Edwin Samuel
states that, although he was satisfied that the
Mufti was not directly
responsible for the violence or had connived at it, he believed the
Mufti was aware of the nature of the anti-Zionist campaign and the
danger of disturbances. He therefore attributed to the
greater share of the blame than the official report had. The Dutch
Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, M. Van Rees,
argued that 'the disturbances of August 1929, as well as the previous
disturbances of a similar character, were, in brief, only a special
aspect of the resistance offered everywhere in the East, with its
traditional and feudal civilisation, to the invasion of a European
civilisation introduced by a Western administration' but concluded
that in his view 'the responsibility for what had happened must lie
with the religious and political leaders of the Arabs'.
Many observers saw al-Husseini as the mastermind behind the riots,
accusing him of dispatching secret emissaries to inflame regional
passions [citation]. In London, Lord Melchett demanded his arrest for
orchestrating all anti-British unrest throughout the Middle East.
Consular documentation discarded the plot thesis rapidly, and
identified the deeper cause as political, not religious, namely in
what the Palin report had earlier identified as profound Arab
discontent over Zionism. Arab memoirs on the fitna (troubles) follow a
contemporary proclamation for the Defence of the Wall on 31 August,
which justified the riots as legitimate, but nowhere mention a
coordinated plan. Izzat Darwaza, an
Arab nationalist rival of
al-Husseini, alone asserts, without details, that al-Husseini was
responsible. Al-Husseini in his Judeophobic memoirs (Mudhakkirat)
never claimed to have played such a role.
High Commissioner received al-Husseini twice officially on 1
October 1929 and a week later, and the latter complained of
pro-Zionist bias in an area where the Arab population still viewed
Great Britain favorably. Al-Husseini argued that the weakness of the
Arab position was that they lacked political representation in Europe,
whereas for millennia, in his view, the Jews dominated with their
genius for intrigue. He assured Chancellor of his cooperation in
maintaining public order.
Political activities, 1930–1935
Al-Husseini (center) in a visit to
Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s. To
his left is Hashim al-Atassi, who later became president of
to al-Husseini's right is Shakib Arslan, an Arab nationalist
philosopher from Lebanon.
By 1928–1929 a coalition of a new Palestinian nationalist group
began to challenge the hegemony so far exercised by al-Husseini. The
group, more pragmatic, hailed from the landed gentry and from business
circles, and was intent on what they considered a policy of more
realistic accommodation to the Mandatory government. From this period
on, a rift emerged, that was to develop into a feud between the
directive elite of Palestinian Arabs.
In 1931, al-Husseini founded the World Islamic Congress, on which he
was to serve as president. Versions differ as to whether or not
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam when he undertook
clandestine activities against the British Mandate authorities. His
appointment as imam of the al-Istiqlal mosque in
Haifa had been
approved by al-Husseini. Lachman argues that he secretly encouraged,
and perhaps financed al-Qassam at this period. Whatever their
relations, the latter's independent activism, and open challenge to
the British authorities appears to have led to a rupture between the
two. He vigorously opposed the Qassamites' exactions against the
Christian and Druze communities.
In 1933, according to Alami, the mufti expressed interest in Ben
Gurion's proposal of a Jewish-Palestine as part of a larger Arab
By 1935 al-Husseini did take control of one clandestine organization,
of whose nature he had not been informed until the preceding
year, which had been set up in 1931 by Musa Kazim al-Husayni's
Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni
Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and recruited from the Palestinian Arab
Boy Scout movement, called the 'Holy Struggle' (al-jihad
al-muqaddas). This and another paramilitary youth organization,
al-Futuwwah, paralleled the clandestine Jewish Haganah. Rumours, and
occasional discovery of caches and shipments of arms, strengthened
military preparations on both sides.
1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine
Main article: 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine
On 19 April 1936, a wave of protest strikes and attacks against both
the British authorities and Jews was unleashed in Palestine.
Initially, the riots were led by Farhan al-Sa'di, a militant sheik of
the northern al-Qassam group, with links to the Nashashibis. After the
arrest and execution of Farhan, al-Husseini seized the initiative by
negotiating an alliance with the al-Qassam faction. Apart from
some foreign subsidies, including a substantial amount from Fascist
Italy, he controlled waqf and orphan funds that generated annual
income of about 115,000 Palestine pounds. After the start of the
revolt, most of that money was used to finance the activities of his
representatives throughout the country. To Italy's Consul-General in
Jerusalem, Mariano de Angelis, he explained in July that his decision
to get directly involved in the conflict arose from the trust he
reposed in Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's backing and
promises. Upon al-Husseini's initiative, the leaders of
Palestinian Arab clans formed the
Arab Higher Committee
Arab Higher Committee under the
Mufti's chairmanship. The Committee called for nonpayment of taxes
after 15 May and for a general strike of Arab workers and businesses,
demanding an end to the Jewish immigration. The British High
Commissioner for Palestine,
Sir Arthur Wauchope, responded by engaging
in negotiations with al-Husseini and the Committee. The talks,
however, soon proved fruitless. Al-Husseini issued a series of
warnings, threatening the 'revenge of God Almighty' unless the Jewish
immigration were to stop, and the general strike began, paralyzing the
government, public transportation, Arab businesses and
As the time passed, by autumn the Arab middle class had exhausted its
resources. Under these circumstances, the Mandatory government
was looking for an intermediary who might help persuade the Arab
Higher Committee to end the rebellion. Al-Husseini and the Committee
rejected King Abdullah of Transjordan as mediator because of his
dependence on the British and friendship with the Zionists, but
accepted the Iraqi Foreign Minister Nuri as-Said. As Wauchope warned
of an impending military campaign and simultaneously offered to
dispatch a Royal Commission of Inquiry to hear the Arab complaints,
Arab Higher Committee
Arab Higher Committee called off the strike on 11 October.
When the promised Royal Commission of Inquiry arrived in Palestine in
November, al-Husseini testified before it as chief witness for the
In July 1937, British police were sent to arrest al-Husseini for his
part in the Arab rebellion, but, tipped off, he managed to escape to
the sanctuary of asylum in the Haram. He stayed there for three
months, directing the revolt from within. Four days after the
assassination of the Acting District Commissioner for that area Lewis
Yelland Andrews by Galilean members of the al-Qassam group on 26
September, al-Husseini was deposed from the presidency of the Muslim
Supreme Council, the
Arab Higher Committee
Arab Higher Committee was declared illegal, and
warrants for the arrest of its leaders were issued, as being at least
'morally responsible', though no proofs existed for their
complicity. Of them only
Jamal al-Husayni managed to escape to
Syria: the remaining five were exiled to the Seychelles. Al-Husseini
was not among the indicted but, fearing imprisonment, on 13–14
October, after sliding under cover of darkness down a rope from the
Haram's wall, he himself fled via
Jaffa to Lebanon, disguised as a
Bedouin, where he reconstituted the committee under his
leadership. Al-Husseini's tactics, his abuse of power to punish
other clans, and the killing of political adversaries he considered
'traitors', alienated many Palestinian Arabs. One local leader,
Abu Shair, told Da'ud al-Husayni, an emissary from
Damascus who bore a
list of people to be assassinated during the uprising "I don’t work
for Husayniya ('Husayni-ism') but for wataniya (nationalism)." He
Lebanon for two years, under French surveillance in the
Christian village of Zouk, but, in October 1939, his
deteriorating relationship with the French and Syrian authorities led
him to withdraw to the Kingdom of Iraq. By June 1939, after the
disintegration of the revolt, Husseini's policy of killing only proven
turncoats changed to one of liquidating all suspects, even members of
his own family, according to one intelligence report.
The rebellion itself had lasted until March 1939, when it was finally
quelled by British troops. It forced Britain to make substantial
concessions to Arab demands. Jewish immigration was to continue but
under restrictions, with a quota of 75,000 places spread out over the
following five years. On the expiry of this period further Jewish
immigration would depend on Arab consent. Besides local unrest,
another key factor in bringing about a decisive change in British
policy was Nazi Germany's preparations for a European war, which would
develop into a worldwide conflict. In British strategic thinking,
securing the loyalty and support of the Arab world assumed an
importance of some urgency. While Jewish support was
unquestioned, Arab backing in a new global conflict was by no means
assured. By promising to phase out Jewish immigration into Palestine,
Britain hoped to win back support from wavering Arabs. Husseini,
allied to radical elements in exile, hailing from provincial
Palestinian families, convinced the AHC, against moderate Palestinian
families who were minded to accept it, to reject the
White Paper of
1939, which had recommended an Arab-majority state and an end to
building a Jewish national home. The rejection was based on its
perceived failure to promise an end to immigration; the land policy it
advocated was thought to provide imperfect remedies: and the promised
independence appeared to depend on Jewish assent and cooperation.
Husseini, who also had personal interests threatened by these
arrangements, also feared that acceptance would strengthen the
hand of his political opponents in the Palestine national movement,
such as the Nashashibis. Schwanitz and Rubin argued that
Husseini was a great influence on Hitler and that his rejectionism
was, ironically, the real causal factor for the establishment of the
state of Israel, a thesis Mikics, who regards Husseini as a 'radical
anti-semite, finds both 'astonishing' and 'silly', since it would
logically entail the collateral thesis that the Zionist movement
triggered the Holocaust.
Neve Gordon writes that al-Husseini regarded all alternative
nationalist views as treasonous, opponents became traitors and
collaborators, and patronizing or employing Jews of any description
Beirut he continued to issue directives. The
price for murdering opposition leaders and peace leaders rose by July
to 100 Palestine pounds: a suspected traitor 25 pounds, and a Jew 10.
Notwithstanding this, ties with the Jews were reestablished by leading
families such as the Nashashibis, and by the Fahoum of Nazareth.
Ties with the Axis Powers during World War II
Throughout the interwar period, Arab nationalists bore Germany no
ill-will, despite its earlier support for the Ottoman Empire. Like
many Arab countries, it was perceived as a victim of the post-World
War I settlement. Hitler himself often spoke of the 'infamy of
France and Great Britain it had not exercised
imperial designs on the Middle East, and its past policy of
non-intervention was interpreted as a token of good will. While
the scholarly consensus is that Husseini's motives for supporting the
Axis powers and his alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were
deeply inflected by anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist ideology from the
outset, some scholars, notably Renzo De Felice, deny that the
relationship can be taken to reflect a putative affinity of Arab
nationalism with Nazi/Fascist ideology, and that men like Husseini
chose them as allies for purely strategic reasons, on the grounds
that, as Husseini later wrote in his memoirs, 'the enemy of your enemy
is your friend'. When Husseini eventually met with Hitler and
Ribbentrop in 1941, he assured Hitler that 'The Arabs were Germany's
natural friends because they had the same enemies... namely the
English, the Jews, and the Communists'.
In 1933, within weeks of Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the German
Jerusalem for Palestine, Heinrich Wolff,
sent a telegram to
Berlin reporting al-Husseini's belief that
Palestinian Muslims were enthusiastic about the new regime and looked
forward to the spread of Fascism throughout the region. Wolff met
al-Husseini and many sheikhs again, a month later, at Nabi Musa. They
expressed their approval of the anti-Jewish boycott in Germany and
asked Wolff not to send any Jews to Palestine. Wolff subsequently
wrote in his annual report for that year that the Arabs' political
naïvety led them to fail to recognize the link between German Jewish
policy and their problems in Palestine, and that their enthusiasm for
Nazi Germany was devoid of any real understanding of the
phenomenon. The various proposals by Palestinian Arab notables
like al-Husseini were rejected consistently over the years out of
concern to avoid disrupting Anglo-German relations, in line with
Germany's policy of not imperilling their economic and cultural
interests in the region by a change in their policy of neutrality, and
respect for British interests. Hitler's Englandpolitik essentially
precluded significant assistance to Arab leaders. Italy also made
the nature of its assistance to the Palestinian contingent on the
outcome of its own negotiations with Britain, and cut off aid when it
appeared that the British were ready to admit the failure of their
pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. Al-Husseini's adversary, Ze'ev
Jabotinsky had at the same time cut off
Irgun ties with Italy after
the passage of antisemitic racial legislation.
Though Italy did offer substantial aid, some German assistance also
trickled through. After asking the new German Consul-General, Hans
Döhle on 21 July 1937 for support, the
Abwehr briefly made an
exception to its policy and gave some limited aid. But this was aimed
to exert pressure on Britain over Czechoslovakia. Promised arms
shipments never eventuated. This was not the only diplomatic
front on which al-Husseini was active. A month after his visit to
Döhle, he wrote to the American Consul George Wadsworth (August
1937), to whom he professed his belief that America was remote from
imperialist ambitions and therefore able to understand that Zionism
'represented a hostile and imperialist aggression directed against an
inhabited country’. In a meeting with Wadsworth on 31 August, he
expressed his fears that Jewish influence in the United States might
persuade the country to side with Zionists. In the same period he
courted the French government by expressing a willingness to assist
them in the region.
Al-Husseini in Iraq
See also: 1941 Iraqi coup d'état, Anglo-Iraqi War, and Anglo-Soviet
invasion of Persia
With the outbreak of the
Second World War
Second World War in September 1939 the Iraqi
Government complied with a British request to break off diplomatic
relations with Germany, interned all German nationals, and introduced
emergency measures putting
Iraq on a virtual war-footing. A
circle of 7 officers opposed this decision and the measures taken.
With Nuri as-Said's agreement—he wished to persuade al-Husseini of
the value of the British
White Paper of 1939—they invited
Iraq in October 1939, and he was to play an influential
role there in the following two years. A quadrumvirate of four
younger generals among the seven, three of whom had served with
al-Husseini in World War I, were hostile to the idea of subordinating
Iraqi national interests to Britain's war strategy and
requirements. In March 1940, the nationalist
Rashid Ali replaced
Nuri as-Said. Ali made covert contacts with German representatives in
the Middle East, though he was not yet an openly pro-Axis supporter,
and al-Husseini's personal secretary Kemal Hadad acted as a liaison
Axis powers and these officers. As the European
situation for the Allies deteriorated, Husseini advised
Iraq to adhere
to the letter to their treaty with Great Britain, and avoid being
drawn into the war in order to conserve her energies for the
liberation of Arab countries. Were Russia, Japan and Italy to side
with Germany however, Iraqis should proclaim a revolt in
In mid May 1940, despairing of their ability to secure control of
Iraq's oil fields and deny access to Germany, the British turned to
the extremist Irgun, approaching one of its commanders, David Raziel,
whom they had imprisoned in Mandatory Palestine. They asked him if he
would undertake to destroy Iraq's oil refineries, and thus turn off
the spigots to Germany. Raziel agreed on condition he be allowed to
"acquire" (kidnap) the
Mufti and bring him back to Palestine. The
mission plan was changed at the last moment, however, and Raziel was
killed by a bomb dropped from a German plane.
Al-Husseini used his influence and ties with the Germans to promote
Arab nationalism in Iraq. He was among the key promoters of the
pan-Arab Al-Muthanna Club, and supported the coup d'état by Rashid
Ali in April 1941. The situation of Iraq's Jews rapidly deteriorated,
with extortions and sometimes murders taking place. When the
Anglo-Iraqi War broke out, al-Husseini used his influence to issue a
fatwa for a holy war against Britain. As the British advanced on the
Farhud pogrom in Baghdad, led by members of the
Al-Muthanna Club, which had served as a conduit for German
propaganda funding, erupted in June 1941, following the Iraqi
defeat and the collapse of Rashid Ali's government. The pogrom was
rooted in antisemitic incitement during the preceding decade against
the backdrop of the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.
When the war failed for the Iraqis—given its paucity, German and
Italian assistance played a negligible role in the
war—al-Husseini escaped to Persia (together with Rashid Ali),
where he was granted legation asylum first by Japan, and then by
Italy. On 8 October, after the occupation of Persia by the Allies and
after the new Persian government of
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi severed
diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, al-Husseini was taken under
Italian protection and conveyed through
Turkey to Axis
Europe in an operation organized by Italian Military
Intelligence (Servizio Informazioni Militari, or SIM).
In Nazi-occupied Europe
Al-Husseini arrived in
Rome on 10 October 1941. He outlined his
proposals before Alberto Ponce de Leon. On condition that the Axis
powers 'recognize in principle the unity, independence, and
sovereignty, of an Arab state, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and
Transjordan', he offered support in the war against Britain and stated
his willingness to discuss the issues of 'the Holy Places, Lebanon,
the Suez Canal, and Aqaba'. The Italian foreign ministry approved
al-Husseini's proposal, recommended giving him a grant of one million
lire, and referred him to Benito Mussolini, who met al-Husseini on 27
October. According to al-Husseini's account, it was an amicable
meeting in which Mussolini expressed his hostility to the Jews and
Back in the summer of 1940 and again in February 1941, al-Husseini
submitted to the Nazi German Government a draft declaration of
German-Arab cooperation, containing a clause
Germany and Italy recognize the right of the Arab countries to solve
the question of the Jewish elements, which exist in Palestine and in
the other Arab countries, as required by the national and ethnic
(völkisch) interests of the Arabs, and as the Jewish question was
solved in Germany and Italy.
Encouraged by his meeting with the Italian leader, al-Husseini
prepared a draft declaration, affirming the Axis support for the Arabs
on 3 November. In three days, the declaration, slightly amended by the
Italian foreign ministry, received the formal approval of Mussolini
and was forwarded to the German embassy in Rome. On 6 November,
al-Husseini arrived in Berlin, where he discussed the text of his
Ernst von Weizsäcker
Ernst von Weizsäcker and other German officials. In
the final draft, which differed only marginally from al-Husseini's
original proposal, the
Axis powers declared their readiness to approve
the elimination (Beseitigung) of the Jewish National Home in
Amin al-Husseini meeting with
Adolf Hitler (28 November 1941).
On 20 November, al-Husseini met the German Foreign Minister Joachim
von Ribbentrop and was officially received by
Adolf Hitler on 28
November. He asked
Adolf Hitler for a public declaration that
'recognized and sympathized with the Arab struggles for independence
and liberation, and that would support the elimination of a national
Jewish homeland'. Hitler refused to make such a public
announcement, saying that it would strengthen the
the Vichy France, but asked al-Husseini "to lock ...deep in his
heart" the following points, which
Christopher Browning summarizes as
Germany has resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after
the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time, direct
a similar appeal to non-European nations as well'. When Germany had
defeated Russia and broken through the Caucasus into the Middle East,
it would have no further imperial goals of its own and would support
Arab liberation... But Hitler did have one goal. "Germany’s
objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element
residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power".
(Das deutsche Ziel würde dann lediglich die Vernichtung des im
arabischen Raum unter der Protektion der britischen Macht lebenden
Judentums sein). In short, Jews were not simply to be driven out of
the German sphere but would be hunted down and destroyed even beyond
Al-Husseini meeting with
Muslim volunteers, including the Azerbaijani
Legion, at the opening of the Islamic Central Institute in
18 December 1942, during the
Muslim festival Eid al-Adha.
A separate record of the meeting was made by Fritz Grobba, who until
recently had been the German ambassador to Iraq. His version of the
crucial words reads "when the hour of Arab liberation comes, Germany
has no interest there other than the destruction of the power
protecting the Jews". Al-Husseini's own account of this point, as
recorded in his diary, is very similar to Grobba's. According to
Amin's account, however, when Hitler expounded his view that the Jews
were responsible for World War I, Marxism and its revolutions, and
this was why the task of Germans was to persevere in a battle without
mercy against the Jews, he replied: "We Arabs think that Zionism, not
the Jews, is the cause of all of these acts of sabotage."
In December 1942, al-Husseini held a speech at the celebration of the
opening of the Islamic Central Institute (Islamisches Zentralinstitut)
in Berlin, of which he served as honorary chair. In the speech, he
harshly criticised those he considered as aggressors against Muslims,
namely "Jews, Bolsheviks and Anglo-Saxons." At the time of the opening
of the Islamic Central Institute, there were an estimated 3,000
Muslims in Germany, including 400 German converts. The Islamic Central
Institute gave the Muslims in Germany institutional ties to the 'Third
Fritz Grobba This is cited in confirmation of the view that an
associate of al-Husseini's together with three associates of the
Prime Minister certainly did visit the Sachsenhausen
concentration camp as part of a German secret police "training course"
in July 1942. At the time, the Sachsenhausen camp housed large numbers
of Jews, but was only transformed into a death camp in the following
year. Their tour through the camp presented it as a
re-educational institution, and they were shown the high quality of
objects made by inmates, and happy Russian prisoners who, reformed to
fight Bolshevism, were paraded, singing, in sprightly new uniforms.
They left the camp very favourably impressed by its programme of
educational indoctrination. In his memoirs, he recalls Himmler
telling him how shocked he was to observe Jewish kapos abusing fellow
Jews and that Himmler claimed he had the culprits punished.
Al-Husseini and the Holocaust
Much of the case against Husseini's role in
The Holocaust emerged in
the immediate aftermath of WW2, with those collecting evidence working
Jewish Agency in the context of an intensive public relations
exercise to establish a Jewish state in Mandatory Palestine.
Husseini has been described by the
American Jewish Congress
American Jewish Congress as
"Hitler's henchman" and some scholars, such as Schwanitz and
Rubin, have argued that Husseini made the
Final Solution inevitable by
shutting out the possibility of Jews escaping to Palestine.
Although some historians have questioned al-Husseini's knowledge of
the Holocaust while it was in progress,
Wolfgang G. Schwanitz
Wolfgang G. Schwanitz notes
that in his memoirs Husseini recalled that Heinrich Himmler, in the
summer of 1943, while confiding some German war secrets, inveighed
against Jewish "war guilt", and revealed the ongoing extermination (in
Arabic, abadna) of the Jews.
Gilbert Achcar, referring to this meeting with Himmler, observes:
Mufti was well aware that the European Jews were being wiped out;
he never claimed the contrary. Nor, unlike some of his present-day
admirers, did he play the ignoble, perverse, and stupid game of
Holocaust denial... . His amour-propre would not allow him to
justify himself to the Jews... .gloating that the Jews had paid a
much higher price than the Germans... he cites... : "Their losses
Second World War
Second World War represent more than thirty percent of the
total number of their people ...". Statements like this, from a man
who was well placed to know what the Nazis had done ... constitute a
powerful argument against Holocaust deniers. Husseini reports that
Heinrich Himmler ... told him in summer 1943 that the
Germans had "already exterminated more than three million" Jews: "I
was astonished by this figure, as I had known nothing about the matter
until then." ... Thus. in 1943, Husseini knew about the
The memoir then continues:-
Himmler asked me on the occasion: "How do you propose to settle the
Jewish question in your country?" I replied: "All we want from them is
that they return to their countries of origin." He (Himmler) replied:
"We shall never authorize their return to Germany."
Wolfgang G. Schwanitz
Wolfgang G. Schwanitz doubts the sincerity of his surprise since, he
argues, Husseini had publicly declared that Muslims should follow the
example Germans set for a "definitive solution to the Jewish
Mufti declared in November 1943
It is the duty of Muhammadans [Muslims] in general and Arabs in
particular to ... drive all Jews from Arab and Muhammadan
countries... . Germany is also struggling against the common foe
who oppressed Arabs and Muhammadans in their different countries. It
has very clearly recognized the Jews for what they are and resolved to
find a definitive solution [endgültige Lösung] for the Jewish danger
that will eliminate the scourge that Jews represent in the world.
At the Nuremberg trials, one of Adolf Eichmann's deputies, Dieter
Wisliceny, stated that al-Husseini had actively encouraged the
extermination of European Jews, and that al-Husseini had a meeting
with Eichmann at his office, during which Eichmann gave him a view of
the current state of the "Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe"
by the Third Reich. The allegation is dismissed by most serious
historians. A single affidavit by
Rudolf Kastner reported that
Wisliceny told him that he had overheard Husseini say he had visited
Auschwitz incognito in Eichmann's company. Eichmann denied this
at his trial in
Jerusalem in 1961. He had been invited to Palestine in
1937 with his superior Hagen by a representative of the Haganah,
Feival Polkes, Polkes supported German foreign policy in the Near
East and offered to work for them in intelligence. Eichmann and Hagen
spent one night in
Haifa but were refused a visa to stay any
longer. They met Polkes in
Cairo instead. Eichmann
stated that he had only been introduced to al-Husseini during an
official reception, along with all other department heads, and there
is no evidence, despite intensive investigations, that show the mufti
to have been a close collaborator of Eichmann, exercising influence
over him or accompanying on visits to death camps. The Jerusalem
court accepted Wisliceny's testimony about a key conversation between
Eichmann and the mufti, and found as proven that al-Husseini had
aimed to implement the Final Solution. Hannah Arendt, who was
present at the trial, concluded in her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A
Report on the Banality of Evil, that the evidence for an Eichmann-
al-Husseini connection was based on rumour and unfounded.
Rafael Medoff concludes that 'actually there is no evidence that the
Mufti's presence was a factor at all; the Wisliceny hearsay is not
merely uncorroborated, but conflicts with everything else that is
known about the origins of the Final Solution.' Bernard Lewis
also called Wisliceny's testimony into doubt: 'There is no independent
documentary confirmation of Wisliceny's statements, and it seems
unlikely that the Nazis needed any such additional encouragement from
the outside.' Bettina Stangneth called Wisliceny's claims
"colourful stories" that "carry little weight".
Al-Husseini's attempts to block Jewish refugees
Mufti opposed all immigration of Jews into Palestine, and during
the war he campaigned against the transfer of Jewish refugees to
Palestine. No evidence has been forthcoming to show he was opposed to
transferring Jews to countries outside the Middle East. The
Mufti’s numerous letters appealing to various governmental
authorities to prevent Jewish refugees from emigrating to Palestine
have been republished and widely cited as documentary evidence of his
participative support for the Nazi genocide. For instance, Husseini
intervened on 13 May 1943, before the meeting with Himmler when he was
informed of the Holocaust, with the German Foreign Office to
block possible transfers of Jews from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to
Palestine, after reports reached him that 4,000 Jewish children
accompanied by 500 adults had managed to reach Palestine. He asked
that the Foreign Minister "to do his utmost" to block all such
proposals and this request was complied with. According to Idith
Zertal, none of the documents presented at Eichmann's trial prove that
it was the Mufti's interference, in these 'acts of total evil,' that
prevented the children's rescue. In June 1943 the Mufti
recommended to the Hungarian minister that it would be better to send
Jews in Hungary to concentration camps in Poland rather than let them
find asylum in Palestine. A year later, on 25 July 1944 he wrote to
the Hungarian foreign minister to register his objection to the
release of certificates for 900 Jewish children and 100 adults for
transfer from Hungary, fearing they might end up in Palestine. He
suggested that if such transfers of population were deemed necessary,
I ask your Excellency to permit me to draw your attention to the
necessity of preventing the Jews from leaving your country for
Palestine, and if there are reasons which make their removal
necessary, it would be indispensable and infinitely preferable to send
them to other countries where they would find themselves under active
control, for example, in Poland, thus avoiding danger and preventing
Amin al-Husseini meeting with
Heinrich Himmler (1943).
Amin al-Husseini and Nazi collaborator
Mile Budak in occupied
Achcar quotes the Mufti’s memoirs about these efforts to influence
Axis powers to prevent emigration of Eastern European Jews to
We combatted this enterprise by writing to Ribbentrop, Himmler, and
Hitler, and, thereafter, the governments of Italy, Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, and other countries. We succeeded in foiling this
initiative, a circumstance that led the Jews to make terrible
accusations against me, in which they held me accountable for the
liquidation of four hundred thousand Jews who were unable to emigrate
to Palestine in this period. They added that I should be tried as a
war criminal in Nurenberg.
In November, 1943 the
It is the duty of Muhammadans in general and Arabs in particular to
… drive all Jews from Arab and Muhammadan countries….Germany is
also struggling against the common foe who oppressed Arabs and
Muhammadans in their different countries. It has very clearly
recognized the Jews for what they are and resolved to find a
definitive solution [endgültige Lösung] for the Jewish danger that
will eliminate the scourge that Jews represent in the world. ….
In September 1943, intense negotiations to rescue 500 Jewish children
Arbe concentration camp
Arbe concentration camp collapsed due to the objection of
al-Husseini who blocked the children's departure to
they would end up in Palestine.
Intervention in Palestine and Operation Atlas
Mufti collaborated with the Germans in numerous sabotage and
commando operations in Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine, and
repeatedly urged the Germans to bomb Tel Aviv and
order to injure Palestinian Jewry and for propaganda purposes in the
Arab world', as his Nazi interlocutors put it. The proposals were
rejected as unfeasible. The Italian Fascists envisaged a project
to establish him as head of an intelligence centre in North Africa,
and he agreed to act as commander of both regular and irregular forces
in a future unit flanking Axis troops to carry out sabotage operations
behind enemy lines.
Operation ATLAS was one such joint operation. A special commando unit
of the Waffen SS was created, composed of three members of the Templer
religious sect in Palestine, and two Palestinian Arabs recruited from
the Mufti's associates,
Hasan Salama and Abdul Latif (who had edited
Berlin radio addresses). It has been established that
the mission, briefed by al-Husseini before departure, aimed at
establishing an intelligence-gathering base in Palestine, radioing
information back to Germany, and buying support among Arabs in
Palestine, recruiting and arming them to foment tensions between Jews
and Arabs, disrupting the Mandatory authorities and striking Jewish
targets. The plan ended in fiasco: they received a cold reception
in Palestine, three of the five infiltrators were quickly rounded
up, and the matériel seized. Their air-dropped cargo was found by the
British, and consisted of submachine guns, dynamite, radio equipment,
5,000 Pound sterling, a duplicating machine, a German-Arabic
dictionary, and a quantity of poison.
Michael Bar-Zohar and
Eitan Haber, report that the mission included a plan to poison the Tel
Aviv water supply, There is no trace of this poison plot in the
standard biographies, Palestinian and Israeli, of Husseini.
Bosniak soldiers of the SS 13 Division, reading Husseini's pamphlet
Islam and Judaism
Throughout World War II, al-Husseini worked for the Axis Powers as a
broadcaster in propaganda targeting Arab public opinion. He was
thereby joined by other Arabs such as Fawzi al-Qawuqji and Hasan
Mufti was paid "an absolute fortune" of 50,000 marks a
month (when a German field marshal was making 25,000 marks a
year), the equivalent today of $12,000,000 a year. Walter
Winchell called him "the Arabian Lord Haw-Haw".
Mufti also wrote a pamphlet for the 13th SS Handschar division,
Islam i Zidovstvo (
Islam and Judaism) which closed with
a quotation from Bukhari-
Muslim by Abu Khurreira that states: "The Day
of Judgement will come, when the Muslims will crush the Jews
completely: And when every tree behind which a Jew hides will say:
'There is a Jew behind me, Kill him!". Some accounts have alleged
that the Handschar was responsible for killing 90% of Bosnian Jews.
However, Handschar units were deployed only after most of the Jews in
Croatia had been deported or exterminated by the Ustase regime. One
report, however, of a Handschar patrol murdering some Jewish civilians
Zvornik in April 1944 after their real identity was revealed, is
On 1 March 1944, while speaking on Radio Berlin, al-Husseini said:
'Arabs, rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the
Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion.
This saves your honor. God is with you.'
November 1943 al-Husseini greeting Bosnian
Waffen-SS volunteers with a
Nazi salute. At right is SS General Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig.
Haj Amin el-Husseini reviewing SS 13th Division soldiers from a car
Among the Nazi leadership, the greatest interest in the idea of
Muslim units under German command was shown by Heinrich
Himmler, who viewed the Islamic world as a potential ally against the
British Empire and regarded the Nazi-puppet Independent State of
Croatia as a 'ridiculous state'. Himmler had a romantic vision of
Islam as a faith ‘fostering fearless soldiers’, and this probably
played a significant role in his decision to raise three
Muslim divisions under German leadership in the
Balkans from Bosnian
Muslims and Albanians: the 13th Handschar, the 21st
Skanderbeg, and the 23rd Kama (Shepherd's dagger). Riven by
interethnic conflict, the region's Jewish, Croat, Roma, Serb and
Muslim communities suffered huge losses of life, Bosnian
Muslims losing around 85,000 from a genocidal Chetnik ethnic cleansing
operations alone. The Muslims had three options: to join the
Croatian Ustaše, or the Yugoslav partisans, or to create local
defense units. Following a tradition of service in the old Bosnian
regiments of the former Austro-Hungarian army, they chose an alliance
with Germany, which promised them autonomy. Husseini, having been
petitioned by the Bosnian
Muslim leaders, was well informed of their
plight. Dissatisfied with low enlistenment, Himmler asked the
mufti to intervene. Husseini negotiated, made several requests,
mostly ignored by the SS, and conducted several visits to the
area. His speeches and charismatic authority proved instrumental
in improving enlistment notably. In one speech he declared that
Those lands suffering under the British and Bolshevist yoke
impatiently await the moment when the Axis (powers) will emerge
victorious. We must dedicate ourselves to unceasing struggle against
Britain - that dungeon of peoples - and to the complete destruction of
the British Empire. We must dedicate ourselves to unceasing struggle
against Bolshevist Russia because communism is incompatible with
One SS officer reporting on impressions from the mufti's Sarajevo
speech said Husseini was reserved about fighting Bolshevism, his main
enemies being Jewish settlers in Palestine and the English.
During a visit in July 1943 the
Mufti said: "The active cooperation of
the world's 400 million Muslims with their loyal friends, the German,
can be of decisive influence upon the outcome of the war. You, my
Bosnian Muslims, are the first Islamic division [and] serve as an
example of the active collaboration....My enemy's enemy is my friend."
 Himmler in addressing the unit on another occasion declared
"Germany [and] the Reich have been friends of
Islam for the past two
centuries, owing not to expediency but to friendly conviction. We have
the same goals."
In an agreement signed by Husseini and Himmler on 19 May 1943, it was
specified that no synthesis of
Nationalism was to take
place. Husseini asked that
Muslim divisional operations to
be restricted to the defense of the Moslem heartland of Bosnia and
Herzegovina; that partisans be amnestied if they laid down their arms;
that the civilian population not be subject to vexations by
troops;that assistance be offered to innocents injured by operations;
and that harsh measures like deportations, confiscations of goods, or
executions be governed in accordance with the rule of law. The
Handschar earned a repute for brutality in ridding north-eastern
Bosnia of Serbs and partisans: many local Muslims, observing the
violence, were driven to go over to the communist partisans.
Once redeployed outside Bosnia, and as the fortunes of war turned,
mass defections and desertions took place, and
drafted to replace the losses. The mufti blamed the mass
desertions on German support for the Četniks. Many Bosnians in
these divisions who survived the war sought asylum in Western and Arab
countries, and of those settling in the Middle East, many fought in
Palestine against the new state of Israel. Reacting to the
formation by Great Britain of a special Jewish legion in the Allied
cause, Husseini urged Germany to raise a similar Arab legion.
Husseini helped organize Arab students and North African emigres in
Germany into the "Arabisches Freiheitkorps", an
Arab Legion in the
German Army that hunted down Allied parachutists in the
fought on the Russian front.
Activities after World War II
Arrest and flight
After the end of the Second World War, al-Husseini attempted to obtain
Switzerland but his request was refused. He was taken
into custody at
Konstanz by the French occupying troops on 5 May 1945,
and on 19 May, he was transferred to the Paris region and put under
At around this time, the British head of Palestine’s Criminal
Investigation Division told an American military attaché that the
Mufti might be the only person who could unite the Palestinian Arabs
and 'cool off the Zionists'.
Henri Ponsot, a former ambassador of
France in Syria, led the
discussions with him and had a decisive influence on the events.
The French authorities expected an improvement in France's status in
the Arab world through his intermediaries and accorded him "special
detention conditions, benefits and ever more important privileges and
constantly worried about his well-being and that of his
entourage". In October, he was even given permission to buy a car
in the name of one of his secretaries and enjoyed some freedom of
movement and could also meet whoever he wanted. Al-Husseini
proposed to the French two possibilities of cooperation: 'either an
action in Egypt,
Iraq and even Transjordan to calm the anti-French
excitement after the events in
Syria and because of its domination in
North Africa; or that he would take the initiative of provocations in
[Palestine], in Egypt and in
Iraq against Great Britain', so that the
Arabs countries will pay more attention to British policy than to that
of France. Al-Husseini was very satisfied with his situation in
France and stayed there for a full year.
As early as 24 May, Great Britain requested al-Husseini's extradition,
arguing that he was a British citizen who had collaborated with the
Nazis. Despite the fact that he was on the list of war criminals,
France decided to consider him as a political prisoner and refused to
comply with the British request.
France refused to extradite him to
Yugoslavia where the government wanted to prosecute him for the
massacres of Serbs. Poussot believed al-Husseini's claims that
the massacre of Serbs had been performed by General Mihailovic and not
by him. Al-Husseini also explained that 200,000 Muslims and 40,000
Christians had been assassinated by the Serbs and that he had
established a division of soldiers only after Bosnian Muslims had
asked for his help, and that Germans and Italians had refused to
provide any support to them. In the meantime, Zionist
representatives—fearing that al-Husseini would escape—backed
Yugoslavia's request for extradition. They stated that al-Husseini was
also responsible for massacres in Greece and pointed out his action
against the Allies in
Iraq in 1941; additionally they requested the
support of the United States in the matter.
The reputation of Haj
Amin al-Husseini among Jews in the immediate
postwar period is indicated by the observation by
Raul Hilberg that
when culpability for the destruction of the European Jews was debated
in 1945, al-Husseini was the only specific individual singled out to
be put on trial. In June 1945,
Yishuv leaders decided to
eliminate al-Husseini. Although al-Husseini was located by Jewish Army
members who began to plan an assassination, the mission was canceled
in December by
Moshe Sharett or by David Ben Gurion, probably because
they feared turning the Grand
Mufti into a martyr.
A campaign of intimidation was launched to convince the mufti that at
Léon Blum's request he would be handed over to the British. In
September, the French decided to organize his transfer to an Arab
Saudi Arabia or Yemen were considered and diplomatic
contacts were made with their authorities and with the Arab
On 29 May, after an influential Moroccan had organized his escape, and
the French police had suspended their surveillance, al-Husseini left
France on a TWA flight for
Cairo using travel papers supplied by a
Syrian politician who was close to the
Muslim Brotherhood. It took
more than 12 days for the French foreign minister to realize he had
fled, and the British were not able to arrest him in Egypt, after that
country granted him political asylum.
On 12 August 1947, al-Husseini wrote to French foreign minister
Georges Bidault, thanking
France for its hospitality and suggesting
France continue this policy to increase its prestige in the eyes
of all Muslims. In September, a delegation of the Arab Higher
Committee went to Paris and proposed that Arabs would adopt a neutral
position on the North African question in exchange of France's support
in the Palestinian question.
Post-War Palestinian Political Leadership
In November 1945, at the initiative of the Arab League, the 'Arab
Higher Committee' (AHC) was reestablished as the supreme executive
body that represented the Arabs in Mandatory Palestine. This 12-member
AHC included Husseini supporters and some members of political parties
that opposed the Grand
Mufti and his allies. The dispute between
Husseini-supporters and their opposition was inflamed by the return of
Jamal al Husseini to the
Middle East and his resumption of political
activity. In March 1946 the AHC was disbanded, and then Jamal
reconstituted it as an organization exclusively staffed by Husseini
political allies and family-members. The
Arab League foreign ministers
intervened in June 1948 by replacing both the AHC and the opposing
'Arab Higher Front' with the 'Arab Higher Executive' (AHE) to
represent Palestinian Arabs. Haj Amin al Husseini was the chairman of
the AHE, even though he was absent, and Jamal acted as Vice-Chairman.
The Husseini faction dominated the nine-member AHE. Subsequently, Haj
Amin returned to Egypt and began his practical leadership of the
Palestinian Arabs while residing in Cairo. The name of the AHE was
changed back to AHC in January, 1947.
1948 Palestine war
1948 Palestine war
1948 Palestine war and All-Palestine Government
A leaflet, distributed after the U.N partition resolution, by the
Mufti High Command, which calls the Arabs to attack and conquer all of
Palestine, to ignite all of the middle east and to curtail the U.N
Amin al-Husseini meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the future
Egyptian president in 1948
The U.N. Partition Resolution
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine delivered its
recommendations for the partition of Palestine, the High Commissioner
Alan Cunningham sent emissaries to
Cairo to sound out
the Mufti, though transferring any power of state to him was
Musa Alami surmised that the mufti would agree to
partition if he were promised that he would rule the future Arab
state". According to Issa Khalaf there are no indications to
substantiate this claim.
The wartime reputation of Haj
Amin al-Husseini was employed as an
argument for the establishment of a Jewish State during the
deliberations at UN in 1947.
The Nation Associates under Freda
Kirchwey prepared a nine-page pamphlet with annexes for the United
Nations entitled The Arab Higher Committee, Its Origins, Personnel and
Purposes. This booklet included copies of communications between Haj
Amin al-Husseini and high ranking Nazis (e.g. Heinrich Himmler, Franz
von Papen, Joseph Goebbels), the Mufti's diary account of meeting
Hitler, several letters to German officials in several countries where
he requested that Jews never be permitted to emigrate from Europe to a
Jewish Home in Palestine, and many photographs of the Mufti, Rashid
Ali, and other Arab politicians in the company of Nazis and their
Italian and Japanese allies. It claimed to demonstrate that German
Nazis and Palestinian politicians (some of whom were requesting
recognition at the UN in 1947 as representatives of the Palestinian
Arab population) had made common cause during
World War II
World War II in their
opposition to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. In May
1948, the Israeli government thanked Kirchwey for "having a good and
honorable share of our success", at least partly as a consequence of
distributing information on al-Husseini to the UN
On the eve of the United Nations' partition of Mandatory Palestine,
King Abdullah, who shared with Zionists a hostility to Palestinian
nationalism, reached a secret entente with
Golda Meir to thwart the
mufti and annex the part of Palestine in exchange for Jordan's
dropping its opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state. The
meeting, in Shlaim's words, 'laid the foundations for a partition of
Palestine along lines radically different from the ones eventually
envisaged by the United Nations'. Husseini's popularity in the
Arab world had risen during his time with the Nazis, and Arab leaders
rushed to greet him on his return, and the masses accorded him an
enthusiastic reception, an attitude which was to change rapidly after
the defeat of 1948. Elpeleg writes that 'to a certain extent' Husseini
was chosen as the 'scapegoat' for this defeat.
On 31 December 1947, Macatee, the American consul general in
Jerusalem, reported that terror ruled Palestine, and that partition
was the cause of this terror. According to Macatee, the Palestinian
Arabs did not dare to oppose Haj Amin, but they did not rally en masse
around his flag in the war against the Zionists.
From his Egyptian exile, al-Husseini used what influence he had to
encourage the participation of the
Egyptian military in the 1948
Arab–Israeli War. He was involved in some high level negotiations
between Arab leaders—before and during the War—at a meeting held
Damascus in February 1948, to organize Palestinian Field Commands
and the commanders of the Holy War Army.
Hasan Salama and Abd al-Qadir
al-Husayni (Amin al-Husseini's nephew), were allocated the Lydda
Jerusalem respectively. This decision paved the way for
undermining the Mufti's position among the Arab States. On 9 February
1948, four days after the
Damascus meeting, he suffered a severe
setback at the Arab League's
Cairo session, when his demands for more
Palestinian self-determination in areas evacuated by the British, and
for financial loans were rejected. His demands included, the
appointment of a Palestinian Arab representative to the League's
General Staff, the formation of a Palestinian Provisional Government,
the transfer of authority to local National Committees in areas
evacuated by the British, and both a loan for Palestinian
administration and an appropriation of large sums to the Arab Higher
Executive for Palestinian Arabs entitled to war damages.
Arab League blocked recruitment to al-Husseini's
forces, and they collapsed following the death
of one of his most charismatic commanders, Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, on
8 April 1948.
Anwar Nusseibeh, a supporter of the Mufti, said the
Mufti refused to
issue arms to anyone except his loyal supporters and only recruited
loyal supporters for the forces of the Holy War Army. This partially
accounts for the absence of an organized Arab force and for the
insufficient amount of arms, which plagued the Arab defenders of
Establishment of All-Palestine Government
Following rumors that
King Abdullah I
King Abdullah I of Transjordan was reopening the
bilateral negotiations with
Israel that he had previously conducted
clandestinely with the Jewish Agency, the Arab League—led by
Egypt—decided to set up the
All-Palestine Government in Gaza on 8
September 1948, under the nominal leadership of al-Husseini. Avi
The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the
feeble attempt to create armed forces under its control, furnished the
members of the
Arab League with the means of divesting themselves of
direct responsibility for the prosecution of the war and of
withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against
popular outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government
of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived by its Egyptian
sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to Abdullah and
serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate the
Arab regions with Transjordan.
All-Palestine Government was declared in Gaza on 22 September, in
a way as a countermeasure against Jordan. According to Moshe Ma'oz
this was "a mere tool to justify Cairo’s occupation of the Gaza
Strip". Pre-conference by the
Arab League obtained an agreement
to have Ahmad Hilmi Pasha preside over the government, while giving
al-Husseini a nominal role, devoid of responsibilities. A Palestinian
National Council was convened in Gaza on 30 September 1948, under the
chairmanship of Amin al-Husseini. On 30 September, al-Husseini was
elected unanimously as President, but had no authority outside the
areas controlled by Egypt. The council passed a series of resolutions
culminating on 1 October 1948 with a declaration of independence over
the whole of Palestine, with
Jerusalem as its capital.
All-Palestine Government was hence born under the nominal
leadership of Amin al-Husseini, the
Mufti of Jerusalem, named as its
president. Ahmed Hilmi Abd al-Baqi was named Prime Minister.
Hilmi's cabinet consisted largely of relatives and followers of Amin
al-Husseini, but also included representatives of other factions of
the Palestinian ruling class.
Jamal al-Husayni became foreign
minister, Raja al-Husayni became defense minister, Michael Abcarius
was finance minister, and
Anwar Nusseibeh was secretary of the
cabinet. Twelve ministers in all, living in different Arab countries,
headed for Gaza to take up their new positions. The decision to set up
All-Palestine Government made the Arab Higher Committee
Amin al-Husseini continued to exercise an influence on
Palestinian affairs.
Jordan's Abdullah retaliated on 2 October by organizing a Palestinian
congress, which countermanded the decision taken in Gaza. Abdullah
regarded the attempt to revive al-Husseini's
Holy War Army
Holy War Army as a
challenge to his authority and on 3 October, his minister of defense
ordered all armed bodies operating in the areas controlled by the Arab
Legion to be disbanded.
Glubb Pasha carried out the order ruthlessly
and efficiently. Nonetheless, Egypt, which manipulated its
formation, recognized the
All-Palestine Government on 12 October,
Lebanon on 13 October,
Saudi Arabia the 14th and
Yemen on the 16th. Iraq's decision to the same was made formally on
the 12th, but was not made public. Both Great Britain and the US
backed Jordan, the US saying that the mufti's role in World War II
could be neither forgotten nor pardoned. The sum effect was that:
The leadership of al-
Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Arab Higher
Committee, which had dominated the Palestinian political scene since
the 1920s, was devastated by the disaster of 1948 and discredited by
its failure to prevent it.
The nakba narratives, according to Hillel Cohen, tend to ignore the
open resistance to al-Husseini by many influential Palestinians. A
member of the Darwish family on expressing dissent with Husseini's war
objective in favour of negotiation was told by the mufti: idha takalam
al-seif, uskut ya kalam—'when the sword talks, there is no place for
talking. Many recalled his policy of assassinating mukhtars in
the Revolt of 1936–39 and viewed Husseini and his kind as 'an
assembly of traitors'. The opposition of a relevant percentage of
the Palestinian society to al-Husseini goes back to an earlier period
and was also connected to the British way of dealing with the local
majority: 'The present administration of Palestine', lamented for
example the representatives of the Palestine Arab Delegation in a
letter to British public opinion in 1930, 'is appointed by His
Majesty’s Government and governs the country through an autocratic
system in which the population has no say'.
Exile from Palestine
Although al-Husseini had been removed from the Supreme
and other administrative roles by the British government in 1937, they
did not remove him from the post of mufti of Jerusalem. They
later explained this as due to the lack of legal procedure or
precedent. However, on 20 December 1948, Abdullah announced his
replacement as mufti by his long-term rival Husam Al-din
The king was assassinated on 20 July 1951, on the eve of projected
secret talks with Israel, by a militant, Mustafa Ashu, of the jihad
al-muqaddas, while entering the
Haram ash-Sharif to pray. There is no
evidence al-Husseini was involved, though
Musa al-Husayni was among
the six indicted and executed after a disputed verdict. Abdullah
was succeeded by King Talal—who refused to allow al-Husseini entry
into Jerusalem. Abdullah's grandson, Hussein, who had been present at
the murder, eventually lifted the ban in 1967, receiving al-Husseini
as an honoured guest in his
Jerusalem royal residence after uprooting
PLO from Jordan.
The Palestinian Government was entirely relocated to
Cairo in late
October 1948 and became a government-in-exile, gradually losing any
importance. Having a part in the All-Palestine Government, al-Husseini
also remained in exile at Heliopolis in Egypt throughout much of the
1950s. As before 1948, when the
Yishuv believed the ex-Mufti's hand
could be detected 'behind every anti-Jewish pogrom, murder, and act of
Israel persisted in asserting that al-Husseini was
behind many border raids from Jordanian and Egyptian-held territory,
and Egypt expressed a readiness to deport him if evidence were
forthcoming to substantiate the charges. The All-Palestine
Government was eventually dissolved in 1959 by Nasser himself, who
United Arab Republic
United Arab Republic embracing Syria, Egypt and Palestine.
That year he moved to Lebanon. He refused requests to lend his support
to the emergent
PLO after the
Six Day War
Six Day War of 1967, was opposed to
the creation of a Palestinian state on the west Bank after 1967.
and his closest collaborator, Emil Ghuri, continued to work for the
Jordanian monarchy even after the Jordanian Civil War there in
Al-Husseini died in Beirut, on 4 July 1974. He had wished to be buried
Haram ash-Sharif in Jerusalem. However,
Israel had captured
Jerusalem during the 1967 Six-Day War. The Supreme
asked the Israeli government permission to bury him there but
permission was refused. Three days later, al-Husseini was buried in
Beirut. Within two years, the
Christian Lebanese Phalange sacked his
villa, and stole his files and archives. His granddaughter
married Ali Hassan Salameh, the founder of PLO's Black September, who
was later killed by
Mossad for his involvement in the Munich massacre.
According to Zvi Elpeleg, almost all trace of his memory thereafter
vanished from Palestinian awareness, and
Palestinians have raised no
monument to his memory, or written books commemorating his deeds.
Amin al-Husseini and antisemitism
Al-Husseini's first biographer, Moshe Pearlman, described him as
virulently antisemitic, as did, a decade and a half later, Joseph
Schechtman. There is no doubt Husseini became robustly
judeophobic and convinced himself, using arguments based on Biblical,
Talmudic, and Quranic passages, that Jews were enemies of God, engaged
in a global conspiracy, and practicing the ritual use of Christian
blood. More recent biographers like
Philip Mattar and Elpeleg,
writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, began to emphasize his
nationalism. While the Palestinian historian Mattar blames him as
the main culprit for sowing the seeds of the Arab–Israeli
conflict, Elpeleg compares him to Chaim Weizmann, David
Ben-Gurion, and even to Theodor Herzl. Peter Wien judges that his
World War II
World War II deserved the image among Zionists of him as
an 'arch villain', but adds that Israeli and Zionist leaders have long
since used this to denigrate the Palestinian resistance against the
Israeli occupation as inspired by Nazism from the beginning and thus
Scholarly opinion is divided on the issue, with many scholars viewing
him as a staunch antisemite while some deny the appropriateness
of the term, or argue that he became antisemitic. Robert Kiely
sees Husseini as moving "incrementally toward anti-Semitism as he
opposed Jewish ambitions in the region." Historian Zvi Elpeleg,
who formerly governed both the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while
rehabilitating him from other charges, concludes his chapter
concerning al-Husseini's involvement in the extermination of the Jews
'[i]n any case, there is no doubt that Haj Amin's hatred was not
limited to Zionism, but extended to Jews as such. His frequent, close
contacts with leaders of the Nazi regime cannot have left Haj Amin any
doubt as to the fate which awaited Jews whose emigration was prevented
by his efforts. His many comments show that he was not only delighted
that Jews were prevented from emigrating to Palestine, but was very
pleased by the Nazis' Final Solution'.
Walter Laqueur, Benny Morris,
Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin
Cüppers, the evidential basis for whose claims in their book,
translated as "Nazi Palestine" were questioned by
Michael Sells as
based on selective statements by a few writers taken at face
value, share the view that al-Husseini was biased against Jews,
not just against Zionists. Morris, for instance, notes that
al-Husseini saw the Holocaust as German revenge for a putative Jewish
sabotaging of their war effort in World War I, and has written
Amin al-Husseini was an antisemite. This is clear from his
writings. I am not saying he was just an anti-Zionist, he hated the
Jews, 'Jews were evil'". In a study dedicated to the role and use
of the Holocaust in Israeli nationalist discourse, Idith Zertal
reexamining al-Husseini's antisemitism, states that "in more correct
proportions, [he should be pictured] as a fanatic
nationalist-religious Palestinian leader".
Evaluations of Husseini's historical significance
Robert Fisk, discussing the difficulties of describing al-Husseini's
life and its motivations, summarized the problem in the following way:
(M)erely to discuss his life is to be caught up in the Arab–Israeli
propaganda war. To make an impartial assessment of the man's
career—or, for that matter, an unbiased history of the
Arab–Israeli dispute—is like trying to ride two bicycles at the
Philip Mattar suggests that in 1939 al-Husseini should have accepted
White Paper of 1939, or compromise with the Zionists.
Mufti adapted a strategy of active and futile opposition and
rejection, which contributed to the ultimate defeat of the
Peter Novick has argued that the post-war historiographical depiction
of al-Husseini reflected complex geopolitical interests that distorted
The claims of Palestinian complicity in the murder of the European
Jews were to some extent a defensive strategy, a preemptive response
to the Palestinian complaint that if
Israel was recompensed for the
Holocaust, it was unjust that Palestinian Muslims should pick up the
bill for the crimes of European Christians. The assertion that
Palestinians were complicit in the Holocaust was mostly based on the
case of the
Mufti of Jerusalem, a pre-
World War II
World War II Palestinian
nationalist leader who, to escape imprisonment by the British, sought
refuge during the war in Germany. The
Mufti was in many ways a
disreputable character, but post-war claims that he played any
significant part in the Holocaust have never been sustained. This did
not prevent the editors of the four-volume Encyclopedia of the
Holocaust from giving him a starring role. The article on the
more than twice as long as the articles on Goebbels and Göring,
longer than the articles on Himmler and
Heydrich combined, longer than
the article on Eichmann—of all the biographical articles, it is
exceeded in length, but only slightly, by the entry for
In October 2015, Israeli
Benjamin Netanyahu claimed
that Hitler at the time was not thinking of exterminating the Jews,
but only of expelling them, and that it was al-Husseini who inspired
Hitler to embark on a programme of genocide to prevent them from
coming to Palestine. The official German transcript of the
meeting with Hitler contains no support for Netanyahu's
assertion. Netanyahu's remarks were broadly criticized, and
dismissed by Holocaust scholars from
Christopher Browning called the claim a
"blatantly mendacious attempt to exploit the Holocaust politically",
"shameful and indecent" as well as fraudulent, aimed at stigmatizing
and delegitimizing "any sympathy or concern for Palestinian rights and
The official German transcript of the meeting with Hitler contains no
support for Netanyahu's assertion. In his memoirs, he recalls
Himmler telling him how shocked he was to observe Jewish kapos abusing
fellow Jews and that Himmler claimed he had the culprits
Simon Wiesenthal alleged that Eichmann had accompanied
Husseini on an inspection tour of both
Auschwitz and Majdanek, and
that the mufti had praised the hardest workers at the crematoria. His
claim was unsourced. The charge was recycled with added colour by
Quentin Reynolds, unfounded on any evidence, at the time of the trial
of Adolf Eichmann. Various sources have repeatedly alleged that
he visited other concentration camps, and also the death camps of
Treblinka and Mauthausen, but according to Höpp
there is little conclusive documentary evidence to substantiate these
other visits. The one exception is late testimony taken by
Emerson Vermaat, in what circumstances is unknown. A survivor of the
Monowitz camp (
Auschwitz III) told him in 2008 that he had observed 50
strangely dressed men accompanied by the SS and was told by an SS
officer that they were the
Mufti and his retinue who wanted to see how
the Jews were killed by work, so he could adopt the practice in
Gilbert Achcar sums up al-Husseini's significance:
One must note in passing that Amin al-Husseini's memoirs are an
antidote against Holocaust denial: He knew that the genocide took
place and boasted of having been perfectly aware of it from 1943 on. I
believe he is an architect of the
Nakba (the defeat of 1948 and the
departure of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians who had been driven
out of their lands) in the sense that he bears a share of
responsibility for what has happened to the Palestinian people.
Palestinian political violence
Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948
Relations between Nazi Germany and the Arab world
Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II
^ The Continuum political encyclopedia of the Middle East, p. 360,
Avraham Sela - 2002
^ A Discourse on Domination in Mandate Palestine, Zeina B. Ghandour -
2009, p. 140
^ World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia - Volume 1 - Page 497,
Cyprian Blamires, Paul Jackson - 2006
^ Israel/Palestine and the Politics of a Two-State Solution, p. 134,
Thomas G. Mitchell - 2013
^ "Husseini" is the French transliteration preferred by the family
itself, from the time when French was the dominant Western language
taught in the Ottoman Empire. Laurens 1999, p. 19[not in citation
^ Mattar 1998, p. 156. Mattar, writing on the uncertainty of
al-Husseini's birthdate, notes that he wrote both 1895 and 1896 on
official documents between 1921 and 1934, which Mattar suggests was
due to both years corresponding to 1313 A.H. in the Islamic calendar.
Mattar found no documentary evidence for Husseini's claim, written
later in life, that he was born in 1897.
^ Laurens 2002, p. 624, n.5. Laurens argues that 1897 was his
likely date of birth, suggesting he was induced by circumstances to
assert that he was older when giving various dates for his birth,
ranging from 1893 to 1897.
^ Peretz 1994, p. 290
^ Gelvin 2007, p. 109:'the scion of one [of] the most influential
notable families of Jerusalem.'
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 1.
^ Elpeleg, 2007 & pp6-7.
^ Kohn, p. 53
^ Tschirgi 2004, p. 192:'the leading Palestinian political group
that developed during the mandate was very largely dominated by
Islamic discourse and led by the
Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin
al-Husseini. However, it long found its basic support in
^ Khalidi 2001, p. 23: "There is an element of amnesiac
historiography in the vilification of the mufti, influenced by his
subsequent career after 1936. In fact, Husayni served the British
exceedingly well for the decade and a half after his appointment, at
least until 1936 when he felt obliged to align himself with a growing
popular rebellion against his former British masters. One indication
of how valuable the British perceived the mufti to be is the
willingness of the notoriously tight-fisted Mandatory administration
to subsidize him. When the revenues of the public awqaf properties
declined after the Great Depression of 1929, and with it the revenues
of the Supreme
Muslim Council, the latter were supplemented by British
subventions starting in 1931, which were naturally kept secret.".
^ a b Sells 2015, p. 725
^ Brynen 1990, p. 20:'The leadership of al-
Hajj Amin al-Husayni
and the Arab Higher Committee, which had dominated Palestinian Arab
political scene since the 1920s, was devastated by the disaster of
1948 and discredited by its failure to prevent it. The socio-economic
base underlying the political power of traditional Palestinian Arab
notables was severely disrupted.'
^ Gelvin, James L. (13 January 2014). The Israel-Palestine Conflict:
One Hundred Years of War. Cambridge University Press.
pp. 119–120. ISBN 978-1-107-47077-4. The
opportunistic wartime residence and propaganda activities in Nazi
Germany certainly was not the proudest moment in the history of
Palestinian nationalism. And, certainly, opponents of Palestinian
nationalism have made good use of those activities to associate the
Palestinian national movement with European-style anti-Semitism and
the genocidal program of the Nazis. But it should be remembered that
Hajj Amin was not the only non-European nationalist leader to find
refuge and succor in
Berlin at this time. While in Berlin, the Hajj
might have rubbed shoulders with Subhas Chandra Bose, a leader of the
nationalist Congress Party of India, who believed that Germany might
prove to be an effective ally in the struggle against British
imperialism… Or the
Hajj Amin might have bumped into Pierre Gemayel,
the leader of a Lebanese
Christian group called the Phalange, who
believed that Nazi Germany represented the wave of the future…
Members of the Stern Gang also sought a tactical partnership with Nazi
Germany and even opened negotiations with Hitler’s government.
^ "Nazi Germany and the Arab and
Muslim World: Old and New
^ Mattar 1998, p. 156;Laurens 2002, p. 624, n.5 Laurens, in
the first volume of his trilogy (Laurens 1999, p. 425) had used
Mattar's dating for 1895, but revised this to 1897 as more probable in
his second volume.
^ Mattar 1992, p. 6;Pappé 1994, p. 2.
^ Laurens 1999, p. 425.
^ a b Krämer 2008, p. 219.
^ Laurens 1999, pp. 425–6:Laurens 2002, p. 467. Antébi
considered al-Husseini his pupil, and refers to him in a letter, for
which see Elizabeth Antébi,L’homme du Sérail, NiL, Paris, 1996 p.
563, cited by Laurens. translation needed
^ Sicker 2000, p. 33; Krämer 2008, p. 219
^ a b c Matthews 2006, p. 31.
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 3.
^ Laurens 1999, p. 409:'Selon Jaussen (Antonin Jaussen?), le
nombre d'Arabes palestiniens reclutés dépasse les 500.'
^ Krämer 2008, pp. 152–153:Both local Palestinian Arabs and
Jews played almost no role in the conquest of Palestine: the former
enlisted after the Arab revolt and were active east of the Jordan, the
latter were recruited after the conquest of
Jerusalem and saw little
^ Huneidi 2001, p. 35.
^ Friedman 2000, pp. 239–240.
^ Tauber 1994, pp. 79ff., esp.96ff..
^ Huneidi 2001, p. 40. The report was never published, the newly
Sir Herbert Samuel informing the War
Office that it was best forgotten.
^ Schechtman 1986, pp. 334–337.
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 6.
^ Laurens 1999, pp. 506–512
^ Segev 2001, p. 140
^ Sicker 2000, pp. 23ff. for a reading which follows closely
Meinertzhagen's reading of the events as a British army plot.
^ Regarding the whole period preceding the riot, marked by conflicting
rumours, Laurens writes:'For several months, the intelligence service
Zionists organised in 1918 multiplied warnings about plots by Arab
activists. These pieces of information never received any confirmation
from the British (or French) intelligence service. Later Arab sources
show this quite clearly: no one claimed responsibility for any
planning (prémeditation) for the events, even several decades
afterwards'. Laurens 1999, p. 506.
^ Tauber 1994, p. 102.
^ Huneidi 2001, p. 37 citing the Palin Report, pp. 29-33.
^ Laurens 1999, p. 545. 1920 was considered the 'year of
disaster' (am al-nakba) after the failure, with the French overthrow
of Faisal, of the pan-Arab project for a Greater Syria, embracing also
Lebanon and Palestine. The
Haifa conference, 13–20 December 1920,
'marks the basic date in the history of the Palestinian question: it
is the historical moment where the Palestinian version of nationalism
prevails over the pan-Arab version.'
^ Kimmerling & Migdal 2003, pp. 81–86.'Faysal's fall marked
an important turning point. From then until 1948, Palestinian politics
and loyalties were determined by the idea of an independent
Palestine.' (p.86) 'The platform drawn up in
Haifa would change little
over the next few decades. It contained the following six elements:
the first public recognition of Palestine, as it would be constituted
by the mandate, as a distinct political entity for the people living
there. .; a total rejection of any political or moral right of the
Jews over Palestine; a declaration of unity among the Palestinian
Arabs to supersede any other loyalties, such as those to religion,
region, and clan; a call to the new administration to halt any
transfers of Arab or state lands to Jewish control; the demand to
close Palestine to further immigration; a call to recognize the Arab
executive Committee . . as a legitimate representative of the
population before the British authorities (with a status similar to
that defined for the Jewish Agency) . .' (p.86)
^ Milton-Edwards 1999, p. 25:'Through his position Haj Amin, with
the blessing of the British, was able to play a pivotal role in the
course of Palestinian nationalist politics. He sought eventually to
combine his religious role with his political position in the
burgeoning area of Palestinian nationalist agitation.'
^ Nicosia 2008.
^ Tauber 1994, pp. 105–109.
^ Ghandour 2009, p. 142.
^ Morris 2011, pp. 111ff.
^ Elpeleg 2007, pp. 7–10.
^ Kupferschmidt 1987, pp. 19,78:'Soon after the British began to
style Kāmil al-Husaynī as the Grand Muftī (al-muftī al-akbar), a
title which had hitherto been unknown in Palestine but which was
probably copied from Egypt. This gesture was, in part, meant as a
reward for Kāmil’s cooperation with the British, but it may have
been intended to substitute some kind of a new hierarchy for the
former Ottoman one'.
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 11:'He demanded that the title Grand Mufti,
which had been granted to his brother by the British for cooperating
with them, also be given to him, and that his salary be higher than
that of the other muftis. Richmond and Storrs supported this claim,
arguing that since, from the spiritual and religious points of view,
the status of
Jerusalem was superior to that of other regions in
Jerusalem should be considered head of the
Muslim community. '.
^ Khalidi 2001, p. 22:'After their occupation of the country, the
British created the entirely new post of "grand mufti of Palestine"
(al-mufti al-akbar), who was also designated the "mufti of Jerusalem
and the Palestine region" (mufti al-Quds wal-diyar al-filistiniyya).
^ Cohen 1989, p. 69.
^ Sicker 2000, pp. 32f.:Elpeleg 2007, p. 48.
^ Matthews 2006, pp. 31–32:'It was not scholarly religious
credentials that made
Hajj Amin an attractive candidate for president
of the SMC in the eyes of colonial officials. Rather, it was the
combination of his being an effective nationalist activist and a
member of one of Jerusalem’s most respected notable families that
made it advantageous to align his interests with those of the British
administration and thereby keep him on a short tether.'
^ Matthews 2006, p. 32
^ Reiter 1996, pp. 22–24 for details.
^ Huneidi 2001, p. 38 This excludes funds for land purchases. The
'Jewish Agency', mentioned in article 4 of the Mandate only became the
official term in 1928. At the time the organisation was called the
Palestine Zionist Executive.
^ Milton-Edwards 1999, p. 38
^ Robinson 1997, p. 6.
^ Morris 2011, p. 111
^ Kupferschmidt 1987, pp. 131–132 for a detailed list of the
several sites on the Haram that underwent extensive renovation.
^ Monk 2002, p. 61 The name is occasionally given as Kamal Bey,
or Kamal al-Din in primary and secondary sources.
^ Monk 2002, pp. 42–72 for a detailed account of Richmond's
role. Richmond authored an important volume on the Haram (Ernest
Tatham Richmond, The
Dome of the Rock
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem: A description of
its structure and decoration, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1924).
^ Laurens 2002, p. 156.translation needed
^ Kupferschmidt 1987, pp. 127ff.,130. The mosaic tesserae,
however, were manufactured in, and imported from, Turkey.
^ Sicker 2000, p. 77.
^ Benvenisti 1996, pp. 77f. writes that Rabbi Kook had preached
as early as 1920:'The
Temple Mount is Israel’s holy place, and even
should it be under the hand of others for long days and periods of
time, it will finally come into our hands. . ,' which could merely
mean however that, in rabbinical thought, with the coming of the
Messiah, the Temple would automatically revert to the Jews.
^ Yaeger 1996, pp. 196ff..
^ Laurens 2002, p. 154.translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, p. 163. translation needed
^ The longest accounts for the riots are in Kolinsky 1993,
pp. 42–70 and Segev 2001, pp. 309–327.
^ Among them Shukri al-Quwatli, Ihsan al-Jabiri and Adil Arslan
^ Kupferschmidt 1987, p. 131 gives the 26th: Laurens 2002,
p. 155 (translation needed) gives the 17th.
^ a b Laurens 2002, p. 158. translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, p. 157: Kupferschmidt 1987, p. 131 gives 24
^ See also the British account of this incident in: A Survey of
Palestine (Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the
information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry), vol. 1,
chapter 2, British Mandate Government of Palestine:
Jerusalem 1946, p.
^ Ovendale 2004, p. 71
^ Lajnat al-Difa and al-Buraq al-Sharif. See Monk 2002, p. 70.
Muslim name for the contested section of the wall, where Mohammed
was said to have tethered his steed Buraq while on his famous
visionary flight to heaven. See Krämer 2008, p. 225.
^ Gonen 2003, p. 141
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 153,158–161,162 translation needed
^ Muslims in the Mughrabi Quarter were to make similar complaints
against the racket of
Hasidic ritual dancing in the area on the night
of the anniversary of Muhammad's birth, 16 August 1929.Laurens 2002,
p. 170. translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 163–165. translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, p. 632. n.3: 'Fixed hours of Jewish worship' was
given, instead of 'customary hours of Jewish worship'.
^ Sicker 2000, p. 79:'This was done to ensure a new major influx
of non-Zionist American wealth into the country to support the
development of a Jewish national home'.
^ Sicker 2000, pp. 179ff..
^ Laqueur 2002, pp. 168–169.
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 168–169. translation needed
^ Krämer 2008, p. 230.
^ Krämer 2008, p. 230 writes that it was in revenge for the
^ Particularly with Riad al-Suhl
^ Laurens 2002, p. 171 asserts that 'The matter was sufficiently
important. . for this not to be (read as) an attempt to secure an
alibi for subsequent events'.
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 168–172. translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, p. 173. translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, p. 179 translation needed; Sicker 2000,
p. 46 gives 133 Jewish killed, and 339 wounded, 116 Arabs known
to be killed, and 232 known to be wounded, the latter almost entirely
due to police actions. The Arab wounded are those registered by the
Mandatory authorities. Many preferred to hide their injuries.
^ Great Britain 1930, pp. 158–159
^ Laurens 2002, p. 199. translation needed
^ Laurens 2002, p. 200 citing Samuel 1970, p. 96, which
records several long talks of members of Brit Shalom with Snell.
^ a b Great Britain 1930, p. 172.
Permanent Mandates Commission 1930.
^ Huneidi 2001, p. 36 citing Palin Report p. 184.
^ Sells 2015, p. 725.
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 175–176.
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 180–181. translation needed
^ Hen-Tov 1974, p. 16.
^ Lachman 1982, pp. 75–76.
^ Achcar & 2010 (a), p. 144.
^ Daniel P. Kotzin (2010). Judah L. Magnes: An American Jewish
Nonconformist. Syracuse University Press. pp. 251–.
ISBN 978-0-8156-5109-3. The grand mufti, Alami has claimed,
expressed interest in the Idea of Jewish Palestine as part of a larger
^ Laurens 2002, p. 297. translation needed
^ Rosen 2005, p. 104. Rosen notes that, by 1934, it had 63 cells
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 292, 297f. One such discovery, in the port of
Haifa, in October 1935, of a shipment of arms from Germany, with the
apparent authorization of the Nazi Ministry for Internal Affairs, and
destined for the Haganah, led to great agitation and played into the
hands of those Arabs who pressed for more radical activities.
^ Laurens 2002, p. 376.
^ De Felice 1990, pp. 210–211 mentions £138,000 from 10
September 1936 to 15 June 1938. Earlier, in January 1936 Italy had
given al-Husseini £12,000 of a promised £25,000.
^ De Felice 1990, pp. 210.
^ Sachar 2006, pp. 199–200.
^ Sachar 1972, p. 73.
^ a b Sachar 2006, pp. 200–201.
^ Laurens 2002, p. 373:Levenberg 1993, p. 8 provides the
text of the decree.
^ Rose 1986, p. 332.
^ Mattar 1988, p. 83.
^ Fieldhouse 2006, p. 169.
^ Karmi 2004, p. 9
Ghada Karmi recalls that her eldest uncle, who
refused to join Husseini's camp, suffered two attempts on his life by
an assassin sent by al-Husseini, in
Nablus and Beirut. The second
^ Swedenburg 2003, p. 87.
^ Laurens 2002, p. 374.
^ Cohen 2009, p. 171.
^ Aboul-Enein & Aboul-Enein 2013, p. 15:'Both Italy and
Britain came to the realization in the late 1930s as the clouds of war
began to descend on Europe that support for the Arabs would prove
^ Hilberg 1973, p. 716.
^ Morris 2011, p. 159
^ Khalaf 1991, pp. 72–75.
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 52
^ a b Mikics 2014
^ Gordon 2008.
^ Cohen 2009, pp. 172–174
^ Aboul-Enein & Aboul-Enein 2013, pp. 184–186.
^ Morris 2008, pp. 20–22
^ De Felice 1990, pp. 212–213:'It should be quite clear that
this relation (arose) not, as a number of authors have nonetheless
argued, because of a presumed affinity of their ideology with that of
the Nazis or Fascists, no such thing existed, but by virtue of the
wholly political logic (of events) that saw in the enemies (in deed or
potentially) of their own enemies their own friends, particularly if
the latter have already provided evidence—and this was, precisely,
the case with Germany, and all the more so, with Italy -of being
interested, in terms of the same political logic, in giving support to
their cause'.('E questo, sia ben chiaro, non -come pure è stato
sostenuto da vari autori - per una presunta affinità della loro
ideologia con quelle nazista e fascista, che non esisteva, ma in forza
della logica tutta politica che vede nei nemici (in atto o potenziali)
dei propri nemici i propri amici, specie se essi hanno già dato prova
- e questo era appunto il caso della Germania ed ancor più
dell'Italia - di essere interessati, nella stessa logica politica, a
sostenere la loro causa').
واعتبرت المانيا بلدآ صديقآ لأنها لم
تكن دولة مستعمرة ولم يسبق لها أن تعرضت
بسوء لأية دولة عربية أو اسلامية,
ولأنها كانت تقاتل أعداءنا من مستعمرين
و صهيونيين, ولان عدو عدوك صديقك, و كنت
موقنآ, أن انتصار المانيا سينقذ بلادنا
حتمآ من خطر الصهيونية و الاستعمار
Translation: 'I have considered Germany to be a friendly country,
because it was not a colonizing country, and it never harmed any Arab
or Islamic country, and because it was fighting our colonialist and
Zionist enemies, and because the enemy of your enemy is your friend.
And I was certain that Germany's victory would definitely save our
countries from the danger of
Zionism and colonization'.Mudhakkirat
Hajj Amin al-Husayni,
Damascus 1999 p.96.
^ Laqueur 1970, p. 106.
^ Yahil, Friedman & Galai 1991, p. 676, n.53
^ Nicosia 2000, pp. 87 Wolff's wife was Jewish, and he was forced
to resign in 1936. Hans Döhle replaced him.
^ Nicosia 2000, pp. 85–86.
^ Nicosia 2000, pp. 86–87.
^ Nicosia 2008, pp. 71,95,196.Check
^ De Felice 1990, pp. 211–212.
^ Nicosia 2000, pp. 105,185ff.
^ Davidson 2001, p. 239
^ Laurens 2002, p. 467
^ Tripp 2002, p. 99
^ Simon 2004, p. 130: 'Soon after his arrival, the Jerusalem
Mufti was received in state by the Iraqi politicians who welcomed and
feted him and voted him an immediate subvention of ID 18,000 to be
followed by other grants throughout his stay in Iraq: ID 1,000 monthly
from hidden funds of the Iraqi secret service, 2 percent of the salary
of every Iraqi government official including the military and the
police, grants of ID 12,000 between 1939 and mid-1940 for the relief
of distress in Palestine, and special sums donated by the Palestine
Defense Society, the Red Crescent, and other public donations. He
received gifts from Egypt, from King 'Abd al-'Azis Al Sa'ud, payments
of some ID 60,000 from the Germans and some ID 40,000 from the
Italians, who also promised £20,000 in gold monthly if the Mufti
initiated another Palestine revolt. He was the guest of honor at state
functions and, with his 5,000 to 6,000 followers, the
a mini-government in Baghdad where he settled and began to renew
contract with old friends and make new ones in the Iraqi army and
police force, with doctrors, lawyers, and teachers. By 1941 his
influence was such that he could place
Palestinians in the Iraqi
bureaucracy, adding more teachers and other professionals to those
Palestinians already working in Iraq. It was said that he controlled
hirings, firings, and promotions in Iraqi government departments, that
he could have passports issued on demand to his followers, and that he
could authorize the importation of personal effects into Iraq
duty-free. He controlled newspapers and propaganda mechanisms, some
mutually with German influence and money, which were not interfered
^ Tripp 2002, pp. 100–102
^ Hirszowicz 1966, pp. 82–83.
^ Simon 2004, p. 131
^ Mattar 1984, p. ?; Nevo 1984, pp. 3–16;Simon 2004,
p. 207, n.16.
^ a b Gavish 2010, p. 239.
^ Davis 2005, p. 70.
^ Lukitz 1995, p. 96.
^ Tripp 2002, p. 105
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 463–4
^ Fisk 2006, p. 442
^ De Felice 1990, p. 247.
^ Lewis 1999, pp. 150–151.
^ Lewis 2002, p. 190
^ Lewis 1999, pp. 151–152.
^ Segev 2001, p. 463.
^ Lewis 1999, p. 152.
^ Lewis 2002, p. 190.
^ Lewis 1999, p. 151.check
^ Browning 2004, p. 406 drawing on Yisraeli 1974, p. 310.
^ Yisraeli 1974, p. 310:denn die Stunde der Befreieung der Araber
habe dann geschlagen, Deutschland habe dort keine anderen Interessen
als die Vernichtung der das Judentum protegierenden Macht.
^ Schechtman 1965, pp. 307–308
"Germany has no ambitions in this area but cares only to annihilate
the power which produces the Jews". And earlier: "It is clear that the
Jews have accomplished nothing in Palestine and their claims are lies.
Everything that has been achieved in Palestine is due to the Arabs and
not the Jews. I (Hitler) have decided to find a solution to the Jewish
problem, approaching it step by step without holding back. In this
regard, I am about to make a just and indispensable appeal, firstly to
all the European countries and, later, to countries outside of
Europe". Also in Laurens 2002, pp. 664–666 n.47
^ Laurens 2002, p. 468.
^ Günther & Zankel 2006, p. 7.
^ Gensicke 2011, p. 119 wrote on 17 July 1942 that the Mufti
himself had visited Oranienburg concentration camp and that "the Jews
aroused particular interest among the Arabs. ... It all made a very
favorable impression on the Arabs."
^ Lebor & Boyes 2000, p. 230.
^ Schwanitz 2004, pp. 217–220.
^ a b Sells 2015, p. 726.
^ Sells 2015, pp. 734–735.
^ Kaufman, Ambiguous Partnership, 287, 306–7. Steven L Spiegel, The
Other Arab–Israeli Conflict (Chicago: 1985), 17, 32, quoted in
Norman G. Finkelstein
Norman G. Finkelstein (17 October 2003).
The Holocaust Industry:
Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering. Verso Books.
p. 25. ISBN 978-1-78168-440-5.
^ Schwanitz & Rubin 2014, p. 160
^ Schwanitz 2008 citing Abd al-Karim al-Umar (ed.), Memoirs of the
Grand Mufti, Damascus, 1999, p. 126.
^ Achcar & 2010 (a), pp. 151–2.
^ Laurens 2002, p. 469.
^ Schwanitz 2008, p. ? citing Abd al-Karim
al-Umar (ed.), Memoirs of the Grand Mufti, Damascus, 1999, p. 126.
^ a b Achcar & 2010 (a).
^ Ahren 2015' Yehuda Bauer, Israel’s preeminent Holocaust scholar,
is a prominent case in point. "After the war, they caught him
(Wisliceny) and tried him at Nuremberg, where he tried to eschew all
responsibility, saying: ‘It wasn’t Hitler, it wasn’t me, it was
the mufti,' . . It’s clear that his account is untrue: the Germans
had started annihilating the Jews half a year before Hitler and the
^ Hopwood 1980, p. 69.'During his trial in
Jerusalem in 1961,
Eichmann denied having known the
Mufti well, affirming he had met him
only once during an official reception. The evidence for the
friendship came from Dieter Wisliceny, one of Eichmann's aides, who
months before the
Nuremberg trials had begun to prepare an alibi for
himself at the expense of Eichmann. Wisliceny went much further and
Mufti of being an "initiator" of the extermination policy.
Other evidence of the Mufti's alleged role came from
Rudolf Kastner (a
Jewish leader in Hungary), who reported that Wisliceny had told him
that "According to my opinion, the Grand
Mufti . .played a role in the
decision . . . to exterminate the European Jews . . .I heard say that,
accompanied by Eichmann, he has visited incognito the gas chamber at
Auschwitz". These reports coming only from Wisliceny must be
questioned until substantiated from other sources.'
^ Cesarani 2007, p. 263.
^ a b Cesarani 2007, pp. 54–57
^ 'It is doubtful whether Eichmann made contact with al-Husseini even
in 1942, when the latter resided in Berlin. If this fallen idol makes
an occasional appearance in Eichmann's office correspondence it is
because Eichmann's superiors at the Foreign Office found the
very useful sacred cow, always to be invoked when the reception of
Jewish refugees in Palestine was under discussion. Dieter Wisliceny
even believed that Eichmann regarded al-Husseini as a colleague in a
much expanded post-war Final Solution.'Reitlinger 1971,
^ Sells 2015, p. 738.
^ Pearlman 1963, p. 596.
^ Landsman 2005, pp. 95–96
^ Arendt 1965, p. 13.
^ Landsman 2005, p. 96 writes:'The mufti materials were highly
prejudicial, and the argument constructed from them was deeply
troubling. . .Eichmann's and the mufti crimes had nothing to do with
each other. The prosecution's attempt to link Eichmann symbolically
with the Arabs, Israel's bitterest enemy, showed its preoccupation
with the contemporary situation of the Jewish state. The success of
this effort to prejudice the court is clear in the judges' willingness
to entertain the mufti evidence and to incorporate it into their
judgment in a coy passage that identifies shared goals but not a shred
of actual joint criminal activity.'
^ a b c Medoff 1996, p. ?
^ Lewis 1999, p. 156.
^ Stangneth 2014, pp. 43–44
^ Sells 2015, p. 730
^ Laurens 2002, p. 670, n.190
^ Hilberg 1973, p. 504.
^ Zertal 2005, p. 102.
^ Schechtman 1965, pp. 154–155.
^ Achcar & 2010 (a), p. 148.
^ Achcar & 2010 (a), pp. 145–146.
^ Carpi 1977, p. 39.
^ Lewis 1997, p. 311
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 68.
^ a b New Documents 2001, p. 19.
^ Fountain 2001.
^ Adams 2009, p. 15
^ a b Mallmann & Cüppers 2010, p. 201.
^ Bar-Zohar & Haber 2002, pp. 45–66.
^ Finkelstein 2005, p. 322.
^ Breitman & Goda 2011
^ Medoff 1996, p. 317
^ Shaul Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, The Interdisciplinary
Center Herzilya Project (2007), Transaction Publishers, p. 33
^ Sells 2015, p. 747 n.33.
^ Sachar 1961, p. 231
^ Pearlman 1947, p. 51
^ Stillman 2000, p. 143.
^ Fisk 2006, p. 439.
^ Hoare, Marko Attila (2013). The Bosnian Muslims in the Second World
War: A History. London: C. Hust and Co. p. 53.
^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 496
^ Lepre 1997, pp. 12, 310
^ Stein 1984, pp. 184–5.
^ Lepre 1997, p. 228, n.28.
^ Lepre 1997, p. 47 named from the word for a Turkish policeman's
sword (or fighting knife:handžar from Turkish hancerTomasevich 2001,
p. 497), which had figured as an emblem on the Bosnian
^ Mojzes 2011, p. 78
^ Lepre & 1997 313:'Overall, it is fairest to say that the
Yugoslavian insurgency was a racial - national - ideological -
religious struggle that was unique in its barbarity and excesses were
perpetrated by all of the warring sides against both combatants and
the civilian population.'
^ Mojzes 1984, pp. 97–98: ‘a scorched-earth practice
commenced . ."During the operation, we carried out the complete
annihilation of the Moslem inhabitants, without regard to their sex
and age . .The whole population has been annihilated.'
^ Lepre 1997, p. 31:'The hearts of all Muslims must today go out
to our Islamic brothers in Bosnia, who are forced to endure a tragic
fate. They are being persecuted by the Serbian and communist bandits,
who receive support from England and the Soviet Union.... They are
being murdered, their possessions are robbed, and their villages are
burned. England and its allies bear a great accountability before
history for mishandling and murdering Europe's Muslims, just as they
have done in the Arabic lands and in India.'
^ Lepre 1997, pp. 26–28
^ Lepre 1997, p. 34.
^ Lepre 1997, p. 313.
^ Lepre 1997, p. 33.
^ Lepre 1997, p. 75
^ Lepre 1997, p. 125.
^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 497:'the objective was not to synthesize
National Socialism and Islam, nor to convert the Bosnian Muslims (who,
it said, though racially Germanic, were ideologically part of the Arab
world) to National Socialism. . .though distinct the two ideologies
would act together against their common enemies-Jews, Anglo-Americans,
Communists, Freemasons, and the Catholic Church.'
^ Lepre 1997, p. 67:'Husseini and the Germans opted against
forming any synopsis between
Islam and national socialism. . .The Idea
of Family (Familiengedanke) - the strong family sense possessed by the
Muslim peoples.The Idea of Order (Ordnungsgedanke) - the
idea of the New Order in Europe. The Idea of the Fũhrer
(Fũhrergedanke) - The idea that a people should be led by one leader.
The Idea of Faith (Glaubensgedanke) - That
Islam (for Muslims) and
national socialism (for Germans) would serve as educational tools to
create order, discipline, and loyalty.’
^ Lepre 1997, p. 135.
^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 499
^ Hoare 2014, pp. 194–195.
^ Lepre 1997, pp. 247ff..
^ Lepre 1997, p. 257
^ Lepre 1997, p. 303.
^ a b Fisk 2006, p. 446.
^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Hershco 2006.
^ Breitman & Goda 2011, p. 21.
^ Hilberg 1961, pp. 691:'In all the sessions of the American
Jewish Conference and its interim committees, no proposal was put
forward for the trial of any specific individual or category of
individuals, save one: the ed-
Mufti of Jerusalem.'
^ Shlaim 2000, pp. 156–7 regarding Ben-Gurion's relationship
with al-Husseini writes of '(his) old tactic of projecting an image of
reasonableness and placing the onus for the deadlock on the shoulders
of his Arab opponents. This was the tactic that had served him so well
in relation to the grand Mufti,
Hajj Amin al-Husseini, and other Arab
leaders in the pre-Independence period'.
^ a b Laurens 2002, p. 549.
^ Morris 2008, pp. 107
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 594–5.
Hillel Cohen (3 January 2008). Army of Shadows: Palestinian
Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948. University of California Press.
p. 236. ISBN 978-0-520-93398-9. ...Musa al-alami surmised
that the mufti would agree to partition if he were promised that he
would rule the Arab state
^ Radosh & Radosh 2008, pp. 65–75.
^ Shlaim 2001, p. 30.
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 106.
^ Uri Milstein; Alan Sacks (1997). History of the War of Independence:
The first month. University Press of America. p. 190.
ISBN 978-0-7618-0721-6. On December 31 (1947), Macatee, the
American consul general in Jerusalem, filed a report summing up the
events of the month following the UN decision to partition Palestine.
... Terror ruled Palestine, Macatee wrote. That situation certainly
would continue until Britain withdrew. The direct cause of terror was
partition; other causes were the Arabs patriotic feelings and their
hatred of Jews. As an example, Macatee described who the Arabs were
shooting at: a Jewish woman, the mother of five children, hanging her
laundry on the line; the ambulance that took her to the hospital; and
mourners attending her funeral. The roads between the Jewish
settlements were blocked, supplies of food were spotty and the Arabs
even attacked police vehicles. The Jews were quieter: the Stern Gang
(LEHI) struck only at the British and the Hagana at Arabs only in
retaliation. ETZEL, which had started such actions, apparently had the
Hagana in tow, and if attacks on Jews continued, the Hagana might
switch from a policy of protecting lives to aggressive defense. The
Jewish Agency, wrote Macatee, was correct to a certain extent in its
claim that the British were supporting the Arabs...The Arab'ss leader
..al-Husseini, enjoyed popular support in the Arab states….The arabs
Israel did not dare to oppose Haj Amin, yet neither did they
rally en masse around his flag in the war against the Zionists
^ a b Levenberg 1993, p. 198.
^ Sayigh 2000, p. 14.
^ Musa Budeiri. "The Battle for
Jerusalem in the Memoirs of Anwar
Jerusalem Quarterly File, 11-12, 2001.
^ Shlaim 2001, p. 97.
^ a b Kamel 2013.
^ Kassim 1988, p. 294.
^ Tucker et.al.
^ Shlaim 2001, p. 99.
^ Laurens 2007, pp. 167–169.
^ Brynen 1990, p. 20.
^ Cohen 2008, p. 257
^ Cohen 2008, p. 237.
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 48.
Oliver Stanley (Secretary of State for the Colonies), answer to a
question on notice, House of Commons debates, 1 December 1943;
Hansard, vol 395 paragraphs 347–8 
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 98.
^ Laurens 2007, p. 308.
^ Laurens 2007, p. 694.
^ Morris 2011, p. 57
^ Morris 1997, pp. 57ff.,232:'Both before and after 1948, the
Yishuv was convinced that the ex-Mufti’s hand was behind every
anti-Jewish pogrom, murder, and act of sabotage. The Jordanian
authorities, always apprehensive of the Palestinians, suspected that
the ex-Mufti—and various Arab regimes—were sponsoring terrorism
Israel in order to foment trouble between the two
and to destabilize the
Hashemite rule. . .There were persistent
suspicions in Amman and
Jerusalem that the
Mufti and AHC had organized
and were running a permanent anti-Israel, anti-
in the West Bank. But not such organization was discovered between
1949 and 1956. The truth was somewhat more prosaic. The ex-
managed, through contact men and supporters in Jordan, to
'subcontract' occasional raids against Israel.'
^ a b Achcar & 2010 (b), p. 162.
^ Fisk 2006, p. 447.
^ Achcar & 2010 (b), pp. 162–163.
^ Pearlman 1947
^ Schechtman 1965, p. ?.
^ Sells 2015, pp. 725–726
^ Rouleau 1994.
^ Mattar 1992, p. 13.
^ Rouleau 1994:'C’est surtout dans l’appréciation globale de
l’ancien mufti de Jérusalem et de son action que nos deux
historiens s’opposent. Médiocre et velléitaire pour le
Palestinien, Haj Amin est, pour l’Israélien, un homme " hors du
commun ", " comparable à Haïm Weizmann, David Ben Gourion, ou même
Theodor Herzl ". Ancien gouverneur militaire à Gaza et en
Cisjordanie, qui passait autrefois pour un " faucon ", Zvi Elpeleg
témoigne de l’évolution des esprits en Israël, où son livre a
reçu le meilleur des accueils dans les médias.'
^ Hōpp & Wien 2010, pp. 214–215:'Zionist and Israeli
leaders, however, have exploited the Mufti's activities to denigrate
the Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation as in fact Nazi
inspired from the beginning and thus as fundamentally anti-Semitic.
The latest example for these efforts is Israeli Foreign Minister
Avigdor Lieberman's circulating a photograph of a meeting between the
Adolf Hitler in
Berlin in 1941 in order to provide a
convincing argument why
Israel had the right to expand building
activities in East Jerusalem.'
^ Sachar 1961, p. 231,
^ Laurens 2002, pp. 467,469–470;'In terms of his initial
formation, Haj Amin was far from being an antisemite. He had learnt
French at the
Alliance Israélite Universelle
Alliance Israélite Universelle institute in Jerusalem
Albert Antébi had been one of his mentors. In the interwar
period, he had fought
Zionism as a political and religious leader. He
was then of the opinion that the aim of
Zionism was to expel the Arabs
of Palestine and take over the
Haram al-Sharif in order to build the
Third Temple. Gradually (progressivement) he was persuaded that world
Judaism supported Zionists in an secretive manner and exercised a
major influence over decision-making in Great Britain and the United
States. For some time (during WW2) he was certain (based on real
facts) that the Zionists were seeking to assassinate him. … It is
evident that he gradually came to identify his battle in Palestine
with that of Germany against world Judaism. The reading of all those
passages in his memoirs devoted to his European sojourn reveal an
assimilation of the content of european antisemitism, with their two
great themes of the identification of Judaism with financial
capitalism (Anglo-Saxons), and of the legend of the stab in the back
(the Jews as responsible for the two world wars). On the other hand, a
racist vision of world history is totally absent from his general
worldview. … Taken together, his writings after 1945 do not show him
as having an attitude of holocaust denial, whilst Arab politicians of
the first rank, in the period of Eichmann's trial, had begun to adopt
(precisely) this kind of discourse.'
^ Kiely 2008, p. 113.
^ Rouleau 1994
^ Elpeleg 2007, p. 73.
^ Laqueur & Rubin 2001, p. 51.
^ Sells 2015, p. 743
^ Morris 2008, pp. 21–22, "He was deeply anti-Semitic. He later
explained the Holocaust as owing to the Jew's sabotage of the German
war effort in
World War I
World War I and the millennia of Gentile anti-Semitism
as due to the Jews' 'chararacter': (quoting al-Husseini) 'One of the
most prominent facets of the Jewish character is their exaggerated
conceit and selfishness, rooted in their belief that they are the
chosen people of God. There is no limit to their covetousness and they
prevent others from enjoying the Good. … They have no pity and are
known for their hatred, rivalry and hardness, as Allah described them
in the Qur'an.' "
Benny Morris starts to talk about the topic on 43:24. Morris 2011
^ Zertal 2005, pp. 102, 175:'the demonization of the
to magnify the Arafatian threat', … the '[portrayal of the
one of the initiators of the systematic extermination of European
Jewry (…) has no (…) historical substantiation'. (p.175).
^ Fisk 2006, p. 441.
Philip Mattar (1988). "The
Jerusalem and the Politics of
Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), pp.
227-240. p. 240. instead of prudently recognizing this reality
and accepting the relatively favorable 1939 White Paper, or
compromising with the Zionists, the
Mufti shifted to a policy of
active and futile opposition and rejection. In short, moderation
during the Palestine phase and rejection during the exile phase
contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Palestinians
^ Novick 2000, pp. 157–158
^ Zertal 2005, pp. 102–3.
^ Netanyahu 2015
^ a b Writers 2015
^ Beaumont 2015
^ Ravid 2015
^ Rudoren 2015
^ Browning 2015: "His extraordinary exaggeration of Husseini’s
complicity, and by implication that of the entire Palestinian people,
is a blatant attempt to stigmatize and delegitimize any sympathy or
concern for Palestinian rights and statehood. Netanyahu's shameful and
indecent speech is a disservice to anyone — Jew and non-Jew — for
whom research, teaching, and preservation of the historical truth of
the Holocaust has value, meaning, and purpose."
^ Sells 2015, p. 728
^ Sells 2015, p. 736.
^ Höpp 2004, pp. 217–221.
^ Sells, 2015 & pp.749-759, p.749, note 35.
^ Achcar & 2010 (b), p. 158
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Media related to Haj
Amin al-Husseini at Wikimedia Commons
Husseini, Haj Amin (1895-1974) at passia.org (with photos)
10 December 1941. Deutsche Wochenschau No. 588. The Fuhrer receives
Mufti (Haj Amin al-Husseini) of
Jerusalem on YouTube[dead
Islamic Leadership in Jerusalem
M. T. al-Husayni (1860s–1908)
K. al-Husayni (1908–1921)1
A. al-Husseini (1921–1937)
1 From 1914–1918, the
Ottoman Empire claimed
As'ad Shukeiri as Qadi.
ISNI: 0000 0001 1694 9120
BNF: cb155026852 (data)