Status quo ante bellum _ in South Georgia and the Falklands
* Argentine occupation of
Southern Thule ended
* Relations severed until 1989
* Argentine military government replaced with democratic government
in October 1983
COMMANDERS AND LEADERS
* Sir John Fieldhouse
* Julian Thompson
* Tony Wilson
Basilio Lami Dozo
* Ernesto Crespo
CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
* 255 killed
* 775 wounded
* 115 PoWs
* 2 destroyers
* 2 frigates
* 1 LSL ship
* 1 LCU craft
* 1 container ship
* 24 helicopters
* 10 fighters
* 1 bomber (interned in
* 649 killed
* 1,657 wounded
* 11,313 PoWs
* 1 cruiser
* 1 submarine
* 4 cargo vessels
* 2 patrol boats
* 1 spy trawler
* 25 helicopters
* 35 fighters
* 2 bombers
* 4 cargo aircraft
* 25 COIN aircraft
* 9 armed trainers
3 civilians killed by British shelling
* Argentine invasion
* South Georgia
* Black Buck
* San Carlos
* Seal Cove
* _Atlantic Conveyor _
* Mount Kent
* Top Malo House
* Many Branch Point
* Mount Harriet
* Two Sisters
* Mount Longdon
* Wireless Ridge
* Port Stanley
* Thule Island
The FALKLANDS WAR (Spanish: _Guerra de las Malvinas_), also known as
the FALKLANDS CONFLICT, FALKLANDS CRISIS, SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT, and
the _Guerra del Atlántico Sur_ (Spanish for "SOUTH ATLANTIC WAR"),
was a ten-week war between
Argentina and the
United Kingdom over two
British overseas territories in the South Atlantic: the Falkland
Islands , and
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands . It began
on Friday, 2 April 1982, when
Argentina invaded and occupied the
Falkland Islands (and, the following day, South Georgia and the South
Sandwich Islands ) in an attempt to establish the sovereignty it had
claimed over them . On 5 April, the British government dispatched a
naval task force to engage the
Argentine Navy and Air Force before
making an amphibious assault on the islands. The conflict lasted 74
days and ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982, returning
the islands to British control. In total, 649 Argentine military
personnel, 255 British military personnel, and three Falkland
Islanders died during the hostilities.
The conflict was a major episode in the protracted confrontation over
the territories' sovereignty .
Argentina asserted (and maintains) that
the islands are Argentine territory, and the Argentine government
thus characterised its military action as the reclamation of its own
territory. The British government regarded the action as an invasion
of a territory that had been a
Crown colony since 1841. Falkland
Islanders , who have inhabited the islands since the early 19th
century, are predominantly descendants of British settlers, and favour
British sovereignty . Neither state officially declared war , although
both governments declared the Islands a war zone and officially
recognised that a state of war existed between them and hostilities
were almost exclusively limited to the territories under dispute and
the area of the South Atlantic where they lie.
The conflict has had a strong effect in both countries and has been
the subject of various books, articles, films, and songs . Patriotic
sentiment ran high in Argentina, but the outcome prompted large
protests against the ruling military government , hastening its
downfall. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative government,
bolstered by the successful outcome, was re-elected the following year
. The cultural and political effect of the conflict has been less in
Britain than in Argentina, where it remains a common topic for
Diplomatic relations between the
United Kingdom and
restored in 1989 following a meeting in
Madrid , at which the two
governments issued a joint statement. No change in either country's
position regarding the sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands was made
explicit. In 1994, Argentina's claim to the territories was added to
its constitution .
* 1 Lead-up to the conflict
* 2 Argentine invasion
* 2.1 Initial British response
* 2.2 Position of third party countries
* 3 British Task Force
* 3.1 Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on _Santa Fe_
* 3.2 Black Buck raids
* 3.3 Escalation of the air war
* 3.4 Sinking of ARA _General Belgrano_
* 3.5 Sinking of HMS _Sheffield_
* 3.6 British special forces operations
* 4 Land battles
* 4.1 Landing at San Carlos – Bomb Alley
Battle of Goose Green
Special forces on Mount Kent
Bluff Cove and Fitzroy
* 4.5 Fall of Stanley
* 5 Recapture of
South Sandwich Islands
* 6 Casualties
* 6.1 Red Cross Box
* 6.2 British casualty evacuation
* 7 Aftermath
* 7.1 Military analysis
* 7.2 Memorials
* 7.3 Minefields
* 8 Press and publicity
* 9 Cultural impact
* 10 See also
* 11 Notes
* 12 References
* 13 Bibliography
* 13.1 Historiography
* 14 External links
LEAD-UP TO THE CONFLICT
Main article: Events leading to the Falklands
Leopoldo Galtieri , leader of the Argentine Junta Admiral
Jorge Anaya was the driving force in the Junta's decision to invade.
In the period leading up to the war—and, in particular, following
the transfer of power between the military dictators General Jorge
Rafael Videla and General
Roberto Eduardo Viola late in March
Argentina had been in the midst of a devastating economic
stagnation and large-scale civil unrest against the military _junta_
that had been governing the country since 1976. In December 1981
there was a further change in the Argentine military regime, bringing
to office a new _junta_ headed by General
Leopoldo Galtieri (acting
Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral
Jorge Anaya .
Anaya was the main architect and supporter of a military solution for
the long-standing claim over the islands, calculating that the United
Kingdom would never respond militarily.
By opting for military action, the Galtieri government hoped to
mobilise the long-standing patriotic feelings of Argentines towards
the islands, and thus divert public attention from the country's
chronic economic problems and the regime's ongoing human rights
violations of the Dirty
War . Such action would also bolster its
dwindling legitimacy. The newspaper _La Prensa _ speculated in a
step-by-step plan beginning with cutting off supplies to the islands,
ending in direct actions late in 1982, if the UN talks were fruitless.
The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands
increased on 19 March when a group of Argentine scrap metal merchants
(actually infiltrated by Argentine marines ) raised the Argentine flag
South Georgia Island , an act that would later be seen as the first
offensive action in the war. The
Royal Navy ice patrol vessel HMS
_Endurance_ was dispatched from Stanley to South Georgia in response,
subsequently leading to the invasion of South Georgia by Argentine
forces on 3 April. The Argentine military junta, suspecting that the
UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces, ordered the invasion of
Falkland Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.
Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on
the South Atlantic islands, despite repeated warnings by Royal Navy
captain Nicholas Barker and others. Barker believed that Defence
John Nott 's 1981 review (in which Nott described plans to
withdraw the _Endurance_, Britain's only naval presence in the South
Atlantic) had sent a signal to the Argentines that Britain was
unwilling, and would soon be unable, to defend its territories and
subjects in the Falklands.
Main articles: 1982 invasion of the
Falkland Islands , Invasion of
South Georgia , Argentine air forces in the Falklands
War , Argentine
naval forces in the Falklands
War , and Argentine ground forces in the
War _ The Argentine destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad_
Special Forces south of Stanley
On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces mounted amphibious landings off the
Falkland Islands. The invasion was met with a nominal defence
organised by the Falkland Islands\' Governor Sir Rex Hunt , giving
command to Major Mike Norman of the
Royal Marines . The events of the
invasion included the landing of
Lieutenant Commander Guillermo
Amphibious Commandos Group , the attack on Moody
Brook barracks, the engagement between the troops of Hugo Santillan
and Bill Trollope at Stanley , and the final engagement and surrender
at Government House .
INITIAL BRITISH RESPONSE
Further information: British naval forces in the Falklands
British ground forces in the Falklands
War , and British air services
in the Falklands
War _ The cover of
Newsweek _ magazine, 19 April
1982, depicts HMS _Hermes_ , flagship of the British Task Force. The
title references the 1980 _Star Wars_ sequel .
Word of the invasion first reached Britain from Argentine sources. A
Ministry of Defence operative in London had a short telex conversation
with Governor Hunt's telex operator, who confirmed that Argentines
were on the island and in control. Later that day,
Laurie Margolis spoke with an islander at
Goose Green via amateur
radio , who confirmed the presence of a large Argentine fleet and that
Argentine forces had taken control of the island. _Operation
Corporate_ was the codename given to the British military operations
in the Falklands War. The commander of task force operations was
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse . Operations lasted from 1 April 1982 to
20 June 1982. The British undertook a series of military operations
as a means of recapturing the Falklands from Argentine occupation. The
British government had taken action prior to the 2 April invasion. In
response to events on South Georgia, the submarines HMS _Splendid_ and
HMS _Spartan_ were ordered to sail south on 29 March, whilst the
Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) _Fort Austin _ was dispatched
from the Western Mediterranean to support HMS _Endurance_. Lord
Carrington had wished to send a third submarine, but the decision was
deferred due to concerns about the impact on operational commitments.
Coincidentally, on 26 March, the submarine HMS _Superb_ left Gibraltar
and it was assumed in the press it was heading south. There has since
been speculation that the effect of those reports was to panic the
Argentine junta into invading the Falklands before nuclear-powered
submarines could be deployed.
The following day, during a crisis meeting headed by the Prime
Margaret Thatcher , the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir
Henry Leach , advised them that "Britain could and should send a task
force if the islands are invaded". On 1 April, Leach sent orders to a
Royal Navy force carrying out exercises in the Mediterranean to
prepare to sail south. Following the invasion on 2 April, after an
emergency meeting of the cabinet, approval was given to form a task
force to retake the islands. This was backed in an emergency session
of the House of Commons the next day.
On 6 April, the British Government set up a
War Cabinet to provide
day-to-day political oversight of the campaign. This was the critical
instrument of crisis management for the British with its remit being
to "keep under review political and military developments relating to
the South Atlantic, and to report as necessary to the Defence and
Overseas Policy Committee". Until it was dissolved on 12 August, the
War Cabinet met at least daily. Although
Margaret Thatcher is
described as dominating the
Lawrence Freedman notes in
the _Official History of the Falklands Campaign_ that she did not
ignore opposition or fail to consult others. However, once a decision
was reached she "did not look back".
POSITION OF THIRD PARTY COUNTRIES
On the evening of 3 April, the United Kingdom's United Nations
Anthony Parsons put a draft resolution to the United
Nations Security Council . The resolution, which condemned the
hostilities and demanded the immediate Argentine withdrawal from the
Islands, was adopted by the council the following day as United
Nations Security Council Resolution 502 , which passed with ten votes
in support, one against (Panama) and four abstentions (China, the
Soviet Union, Poland and Spain). The UK received further political
support from the
Commonwealth of Nations
Commonwealth of Nations and the European Economic
Community . The EEC also provided economic support by imposing
economic sanctions on Argentina.
Argentina itself was politically
backed by a majority of countries in Latin America (though not,
crucially, Chile) and some members of the
Non-Aligned Movement . On 20
May 1982, the Prime Minister of New Zealand,
Robert Muldoon ,
announced that he would make HMNZS _Canterbury_ , a Leander-class
frigate , available for use where the British thought fit to release a
Royal Navy vessel for the Falklands.
The war was an unexpected event in a world strained by the Cold War
North–South divide . The response of some countries was the
effort to mediate the crisis and later as the war began, the support
(or criticism) based in terms of anti-colonialism, political
solidarity, historical relationships or realpolitik .
The United States was concerned by the prospect of
Soviet Union for support, and initially tried to mediate an
end to the conflict. However, when
Argentina refused the U.S. peace
overtures, U.S. Secretary of State
Alexander Haig announced that the
United States would prohibit arms sales to
Argentina and provide
material support for British operations. Both Houses of the U.S.
Congress passed resolutions supporting the U.S. action siding with the
The U.S. provided the
United Kingdom with military equipment ranging
from submarine detectors to the latest missiles. President Ronald
Reagan approved the Royal Navy's request to borrow the Sea Harrier
-capable amphibious assault ship USS _Iwo Jima_ (LPH-2) if the British
lost an aircraft carrier. The
United States Navy
United States Navy developed a plan to
help the British man the ship with American military contractors ,
likely retired sailors with knowledge of _Iwo Jima_'s systems. France
provided dissimilar aircraft training so Harrier pilots could train
against the French aircraft used by Argentina. French and British
intelligence also worked to prevent
Argentina from obtaining more
Exocet missiles on the international market, while at the same time
Peru attempted to purchase 12 missiles for Argentina, in a failed
Chile gave support to Britain in the form of
intelligence about the Argentine military and early warning
intelligence on Argentine air movements. Throughout the war,
Argentina was afraid of a Chilean military intervention in Patagonia
and kept some of her best mountain regiments away from the Falklands
near the Chilean border as a precaution.
While France overtly backed the United Kingdom, a French technical
team remained in
Argentina throughout the war. French government
sources have said that the French team was engaged in
intelligence-gathering; however, it simultaneously provided direct
material support to the Argentines, identifying and fixing faults in
Exocet missile launchers. According to the book _Operation Israel_,
Israel Aerospace Industries were already in Argentina
and continued their work during the conflict. The book also claims
that Israel sold weapons and drop tanks in a secret operation in Peru.
Peru also openly sent "Mirages, pilots and missiles" to Argentina
during the war.
Peru had earlier transferred ten Hercules transport
Argentina soon after the British Task Force had set sail in
April 1982. Nick van der Bijl records that, after the Argentine
defeat at Goose Green, Venezuela and Guatemala offered to send
paratroops to the Falklands. Through
Libya , under
Muammar Gaddafi ,
Argentina received 20 launchers and 60
SA-7 missiles, as well as
machine guns, mortars and mines; all in all, the load of four trips of
two Boeing 707s of the AAF, refuelled in
Recife with the knowledge and
consent of the Brazilian government. Some of these clandestine
logistics operations were mounted by the
Soviet Union .
BRITISH TASK FORCE
Main article: British logistics in the Falklands
War _ HMS
Invincible_ , one of two aircraft carriers that the
Royal Navy had
available for the task force.
Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Sea
Harrier FRS1 . The gloss paint scheme was altered to a duller one en
The British government had no contingency plan for an invasion of the
islands, and the task force was rapidly put together from whatever
vessels were available. The nuclear-powered submarine _Conqueror_ set
sail from France on 4 April, whilst the two aircraft carriers
_Invincible_ and _Hermes_ , in the company of escort vessels, left
Portsmouth only a day later. On its return to
Southampton from a
world cruise on 7 April, the ocean liner SS _Canberra_ was
requisitioned and set sail two days later with 3
aboard. The ocean liner _
Queen Elizabeth 2
Queen Elizabeth 2 _ was also requisitioned
Southampton on 12 May with 5th Infantry Brigade on board.
The whole task force eventually comprised 127 ships: 43 Royal Navy
Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and 62 merchant ships .
The retaking of the
Falkland Islands was considered extremely
difficult. The U.S. Navy considered a successful counter-invasion by
the British "...a military impossibility." Firstly, the British were
significantly constrained by the disparity in deployable air cover.
The British had 42 aircraft (28
Sea Harriers and 14 Harrier GR.3s )
available for air combat operations, against approximately 122
serviceable jet fighters, of which about 50 were used as air
superiority fighters and the remainder as strike aircraft , in
Argentina\'s air forces during the war . Crucially, the British
lacked airborne early warning and control (AEW) aircraft. Planning
also considered the Argentine surface fleet and the threat posed by
Exocet -equipped vessels or the two
Type 209 submarines.
By mid-April, the
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force had set up the airbase of RAF
Ascension Island , co-located with Wideawake Airfield on the
mid-Atlantic British overseas territory of
Ascension Island ,
including a sizeable force of
Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page
Victor K Mk 2 refuelling aircraft , and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR
Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile, the main British naval task
force arrived at Ascension to prepare for active service. A small
force had already been sent south to recapture South Georgia.
Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by
Boeing 707 aircraft of the
Argentine Air Force during their travel to
the south. Several of these flights were intercepted by Sea Harriers
outside the British-imposed exclusion zone; the unarmed 707s were not
attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK
had not yet decided to commit itself to armed force. On 23 April, a
Brazilian commercial Douglas DC-10 from
VARIG Airlines en route to
South Africa was intercepted by British Harriers who visually
identified the civilian plane.
RECAPTURE OF SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE ATTACK ON _SANTA FE_
The South Georgia force, _
Operation Paraquet _, under the command of
Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from
42 Commando , a troop
Special Air Service
Special Air Service (SAS) and
Special Boat Service (SBS) troops
who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by
the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA _Tidespring_ . First to
arrive was the _Churchill_-class submarine HMS _Conqueror_ on 19
April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page
Victor on 20 April.
The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but—with
the southern hemisphere autumn setting in—the weather was so bad
that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn
after two helicopters crashed in fog on
Fortuna Glacier . On 23 April,
a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with
_Tidespring_ being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On
24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack. _
The ARA Santa Fe_ (as USS _Catfish_ ) in 1956
On 25 April, after resupplying the Argentine garrison in South
Georgia, the submarine ARA _Santa Fe_ was spotted on the surface by a
Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS _Antrim_ , which attacked
the Argentine submarine with depth charges . HMS _Plymouth_ launched a
Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS _Brilliant_ launched a
Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2 . The Lynx launched a torpedo , and strafed the
submarine with its pintle -mounted general purpose machine gun ; the
Wessex also fired on _Santa Fe_ with its GPMG . The Wasp from HMS
_Plymouth_ as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS _Endurance_
fired AS-12 ASM antiship missiles at the submarine, scoring hits.
_Santa Fe_ was damaged badly enough to prevent her from diving. The
crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at
King Edward Point on
With _Tidespring_ now far out to sea, and the Argentine forces
augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather
the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short
forced march by the British troops and a naval bombardment
demonstration by two
Royal Navy vessels (_Antrim_ and _Plymouth_), the
Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from
the naval force at South Georgia to London was, "Be pleased to inform
Her Majesty that the
White Ensign flies alongside the
Union Jack in
South Georgia. God Save the Queen." The Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice
at that news, and congratulate our forces and the Marines!"
BLACK BUCK RAIDS
Operation Black Buck RAF
Avro Vulcan B.Mk.2
On 1 May, British operations on the Falklands opened with the "Black
Buck 1" attack (of a series of five) on the airfield at Stanley. A
Vulcan bomber from Ascension flew on an 8,000-nautical-mile (15,000
km; 9,200 mi) round trip dropping conventional bombs across the runway
at Stanley and back to Ascension. The mission required repeated
refuelling , and required several Victor K2 tanker aircraft operating
in concert, including tanker to tanker refuelling. The overall effect
of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, and the raids
consumed precious tanker resources from Ascension, but also prevented
Argentina from stationing fast jets on the islands.
The raids did minimal damage to the runway, and damage to radars was
quickly repaired. As of 2014 the
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force Web site stated that
all the three bombing missions had been successful, but historian
Lawrence Freedman , who had access to classified documents, said in a
2005 book that the subsequent bombing missions were failures.
Argentine sources said that the Vulcan raids influenced
withdraw some of its Mirage IIIs from Southern
Argentina to the Buenos
Aires Defence Zone. This was later described as propaganda by
Falklands veteran Commander Nigel Ward. In any case, the effect of
the Vulcan raids on Argentina's deployment of defensive fighters was
watered down when British officials made clear that there would be no
strikes on air bases in Argentina.
Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield,
with the other two anti-radar missions using Shrike anti-radiation
ESCALATION OF THE AIR WAR
French-built Super Étendard of the
Argentine Naval Aviation
The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved
runway was at the capital, Stanley , and even that was too short to
support fast jets (although an arrestor gear was fitted in April to
support Skyhawks). Therefore, the Argentines were forced to launch
their major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering their
efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support
over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine
aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British
forces in any attempt to attack the islands.
The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (A-4
Skyhawks , IAI Daggers , English Electric Canberras , and Mirage III
escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British
invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a
section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which
were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers
managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted
morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an
attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from
the Islands and by using a late pop up profile. Meanwhile, other
Argentine aircraft were intercepted by BAE
Sea Harriers operating from
HMS _Invincible_ . A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.
Combat broke out between
Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801
Naval Air Squadron and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides
refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages
finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder
air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but was damaged and
without enough fuel to return to its mainland air base. The plane made
for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine
As a result of this experience,
Argentine Air Force staff decided to
employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras
only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling
capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea
Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of
Escuadrón Fénix , a squadron of civilian jets flying 24
hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet.
On one of these flights on 7 June, an Air Force Learjet 35A was shot
down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La
Colina, the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the war.
Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict.
Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast
jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by
detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was
defended by a mixture of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems
(Franco-German Roland and British Tigercat ) and Swiss-built Oerlikon
35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons . Lockheed Hercules transport night
flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted
out the wounded up until the end of the conflict.
The only Argentine Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1
June when TC-63 was intercepted by a
Sea Harrier in daylight when it
was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after
Argentine Navy retired its last SP-2H Neptune due to airframe
Various options to attack the home base of the five Argentine
Etendards at Río Grande were examined and discounted (Operation
Mikado ), subsequently five
Royal Navy submarines lined up, submerged,
on the edge of Argentina's 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial
limit to provide early warning of bombing raids on the British task
SINKING OF ARA _GENERAL BELGRANO_
_ ARA Belgrano_ _ Alferez Sobral_
Two British naval task forces (one of surface vessels and one of
submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the
neighbourhood of the Falklands and soon came into conflict. The first
naval loss was the Second World
War -vintage Argentine light cruiser
ARA _General Belgrano_ . The nuclear-powered submarine HMS _Conqueror_
sank _General Belgrano_ on 2 May. Three hundred and twenty-three
members of _General Belgrano_'s crew died in the incident. Over 700
men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy
weather. The losses from _General Belgrano_ totalled nearly half of
the Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict and the loss of the
ship hardened the stance of the Argentine government.
Regardless of controversies over the sinking , due to disagreement on
the exact nature of the Maritime Exclusion Zone and whether _General
Belgrano_ had been returning to port at the time of the sinking, it
had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval
threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception
of the conventional submarine ARA _San Luis_ , returned to port and
did not leave again during the fighting. The two escorting destroyers
and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA _Veinticinco
de Mayo_ both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the
British fleet that their pincer movement had represented.
In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an
Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA _Alferez Sobral_ , that was
searching for the crew of the
Argentine Air Force Canberra light
bomber shot down on 1 May. Two
Royal Navy Lynx helicopters fired four
Sea Skua missiles at her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead,
_Alferez Sobral_ managed to return to
Puerto Deseado two days later.
The Canberra's crew were never found.
SINKING OF HMS _SHEFFIELD_
_ HMS Sheffield_
On 4 May, two days after the sinking of _General Belgrano_, the
British lost the
Type 42 destroyer HMS _Sheffield_ to fire following
Exocet missile strike from the Argentine 2nd Naval Air
Fighter/Attack Squadron . _Sheffield_ had been ordered forward with
two other Type 42s to provide a long-range radar and medium-high
altitude missile picket far from the British carriers. She was struck
amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing 20 crew members
and severely injuring 24 others. The ship was abandoned several hours
later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six
more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10
The incident is described in detail by Admiral
Sandy Woodward in his
book _One Hundred Days_, Chapter One. Woodward was a former commanding
officer of _Sheffield_. The destruction of _Sheffield_ (the first
Royal Navy ship sunk in action since the Second World War) had a
profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the
"Falklands Crisis", as the
BBC News put it, was now an actual
The tempo of operations increased throughout the first half of May as
the United Nations' attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the
Argentinians. The final British negotiating position was presented to
Argentina by UN Secretary General
Pérez de Cuéllar on 18 May 1982.
In it, the British abandoned their previous "red-line" that British
administration of the islands should be restored on the withdrawal of
Argentinian forces, as supported by United Nations Security Council
Resolution 502 . Instead, it proposed a UN administrator should
supervise the mutual withdrawal of both Argentinian and British
forces, then govern the islands in consultation with the
representative institutions of the islands, including Argentines,
although no Argentines lived there. Reference to "self determination"
of the islanders was dropped and the British proposed that future
negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands should be conducted
by the UN.
BRITISH SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard-Exocet
combination, plans were made to use C-130s to fly in some SAS troops
to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra
del Fuego . The operation was codenamed "Mikado ". The operation was
later scrapped, after acknowledging that its chances of success were
limited, and replaced with a plan to use HMS _Onyx_ to drop SAS
operatives several miles offshore at night for them to make their way
to the coast aboard rubber inflatables and proceed to destroy
An SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations
for a seaborne infiltration. A
Westland Sea King helicopter carrying
the assigned team took off from HMS _Invincible_ on the night of 17
May, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its
target and the mission was aborted. The pilot flew to
Chile , landed
Punta Arenas , and dropped off the SAS team. The helicopter's
crew of three then destroyed the aircraft, surrendered to Chilean
police on 25 May, and were repatriated to the UK after interrogation.
The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable
international attention. Meanwhile, the SAS team crossed the border
and penetrated deep into Argentina, but cancelled their mission after
the Argentines suspected an SAS operation and deployed some 2,000
troops to search for them. The SAS men were able to return to Chile,
and took a civilian flight back to the UK.
On 14 May the SAS carried out a raid on
Pebble Island on the
Falklands, where the
Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airstrip
FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground-attack aircraft and Beechcraft
T-34 Mentors , which resulted in the destruction of several aircraft.
LANDING AT SAN CARLOS – BOMB ALLEY
Operation Sutton and Battle of San Carlos _
British sailors in anti-flash gear at action stations on HMS Cardiff_
near San Carlos, June 1982.
During the night of 21 May, the British Amphibious Task Group under
the command of Commodore Michael Clapp (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare
– COMAW) mounted _
Operation Sutton _, the amphibious landing on
San Carlos Water
San Carlos Water , on the northwestern coast of East
Falkland facing onto
Falkland Sound . The bay, known as _Bomb Alley_
by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying
The 4,000 men of
3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd
Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the
RORO ferry _Norland _
Royal Marines from the amphibious ship HMS _Fearless_
were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3rd Battalion, Parachute
Regiment (3 Para) from the amphibious ship HMS _Intrepid_ was landed
Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and
45 Commando from RFA _Stromness_
was landed at
Ajax Bay (Red Beach). Notably, the waves of eight LCUs
and eight LCVPs were led by Major
Ewen Southby-Tailyour , who had
commanded the Falklands detachment NP8901 from March 1978 to 1979. 42
Commando on the ocean liner SS _Canberra_ was a tactical reserve.
Units from the
Royal Artillery ,
Royal Engineers , etc. and armoured
reconnaissance vehicles were also put ashore with the landing craft,
the Round Table class LSL and mexeflote barges. Rapier missile
launchers were carried as underslung loads of Sea Kings for rapid
By dawn the next day, they had established a secure beachhead from
which to conduct offensive operations. From there,
Thompson 's plan was to capture Darwin and
Goose Green before turning
towards Port Stanley. Now, with the British troops on the ground, the
Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them
using Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (14 June).
_ HMS Antelope_ smoking after being hit, 23 May _ HMS
At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was
demonstrated in the sinking of HMS _Ardent_ on 21 May, HMS _Antelope_
on 24 May, and MV _Atlantic Conveyor_ (struck by two AM39 Exocets) on
25 May along with a vital cargo of helicopters , runway-building
equipment and tents. The loss of all but one of the Chinook
helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow
from a logistical perspective.
Also lost on this day was HMS _Coventry_ , a sister to _Sheffield_ ,
whilst in company with HMS _Broadsword_ after being ordered to act as
a decoy to draw away Argentine aircraft from other ships at San Carlos
Bay. HMS _Argonaut_ and HMS _Brilliant_ were badly damaged. However,
many British ships escaped being sunk because of weaknesses of the
Argentine pilots' bombing tactics described below.
To avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine
pilots released ordnance from very low altitude, and hence their bomb
fuzes did not have sufficient time to arm before impact. The low
release of the retarded bombs (some of which the British had sold to
the Argentines years earlier) meant that many never exploded, as there
was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. A simple
free-fall bomb in a low altitude release, impacts almost directly
below the aircraft, which is then within the lethal fragmentation zone
of the explosion.
A retarded bomb has a small parachute or air brake that opens to
reduce the speed of the bomb to produce a safe horizontal separation
between the two. The fuze for a retarded bomb requires that the
retarder be open a minimum time to ensure safe separation. The pilots
would have been aware of this—but due to the high concentration
required to avoid SAMs ,
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), and British
Sea Harriers , many failed to climb to the necessary release point.
The Argentine forces solved the problem by fitting improvised
retarding devices , allowing the pilots to effectively employ
low-level bombing attacks on 8 June.
In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral
Woodward blamed the
BBC World Service for disclosing information that
led the Argentines to change the retarding devices on the bombs. The
World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a
briefing on the matter from a Ministry of Defence official. He
BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers
after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel
\'H\'. Jones levelled similar accusations against the
BBC after they
disclosed the impending British attack on
Goose Green by 2 Para.
Thirteen bombs hit British ships without detonating. Lord Craig ,
the retired Marshal of the
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force , is said to have remarked:
"Six better fuses and we would have lost" although _Ardent_ and
_Antelope_ were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The
fuzes were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released
from too low an altitude. The Argentines lost 22 aircraft in the
BATTLE OF GOOSE GREEN
Infantry deployment in East Falklands after landing in San
Carlos Main article:
Battle of Goose Green
From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500 men)
with artillery support from 8
Commando Battery, Royal Artillery,
approached and attacked Darwin and
Goose Green , which was held by the
Argentine 12th Infantry Regiment. After a tough struggle that lasted
all night and into the next day, the British won the battle; in all,
17 British and 47 Argentine soldiers were killed. In total 961
Argentine troops (including 202
Argentine Air Force personnel of the
_Condor_ airfield) were taken prisoner.
BBC announced the taking of
Goose Green on the
BBC World Service
before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that
H. Jones , the commanding officer of 2 Para, was
killed at the head of his battalion while charging into the
well-prepared Argentine positions. He was posthumously awarded the
Victoria Cross .
With the sizeable Argentine force at
Goose Green out of the way,
British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos beachhead.
On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started a loaded march across East
Falkland towards the coastal settlement of
Teal Inlet .
SPECIAL FORCES ON MOUNT KENT
42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent.
Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were
determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and
on 27 and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe
surface-to-air missiles and commandos (602nd
Commando Company and
601st National Gendarmerie
Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley . This
operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA
For the next week, the SAS and the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre
(M however, the British have denied this, some citing that HMS
_Avenger_ shot it down. When _Invincible_ returned to the UK after
the war, she showed no signs of missile damage.
On 31 May, the M&AWC defeated Argentine
Special Forces at the
skirmish at Top Malo House . A 13-strong
Argentine Army Commando
detachment (Captain José Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd
Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at
Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and
then took refuge in a stream bed 200 metres (700 ft) from the burning
house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under
Captain Rod Boswell for 45 minutes until, with their ammunition almost
exhausted, they elected to surrender.
Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side, there
were two dead, including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant
Mateo Sbert (who were posthumously decorated for their bravery). Only
five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo
House, Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M the 601st Combat Aviation
Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11:00 am on 30 May, an
Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma helicopter was brought down by a
FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by
the SAS in the vicinity of Mount Kent. Six Argentine National
Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the
Brigadier Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored
the views expressed by
Northwood HQ that reconnaissance of Mount Kent
before insertion of
42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not
been there, the Argentine
Special Forces would have caught the
Commando before de-planing and, in the darkness and confusion on a
strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and
BLUFF COVE AND FITZROY
Bluff Cove Air Attacks
By 1 June, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the
5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major
Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an
offensive against Stanley . During this build-up, the Argentine air
assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. Of the
dead, 32 were from the
Welsh Guards on RFA _Sir Galahad_ and RFA _Sir
Tristram_ on 8 June. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the
Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and
injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston
The Guards were sent to support an advance along the southern
approach to Stanley. On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved
to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army
Westland Scout helicopters.
Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered that the area was clear
of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one
remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another
contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy (a settlement on Port Pleasant)
Bluff Cove (a settlement on Port Fitzroy).
This uncoordinated advance caused great difficulties in planning for
the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves
with a 30 miles (48 km) string of indefensible positions on their
southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single
remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers
could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be
ferried by sea.
Plans were drawn up for half the
Welsh Guards to march light on the
night of 2 June, whilst the
Scots Guards and the second half of the
Welsh Guards were to be ferried from
San Carlos Water
San Carlos Water in the Landing
Ship Logistics (LSL) _Sir Tristram_ and the landing platform dock
(LPD) _Intrepid_ on the night of 5 June. _Intrepid_ was planned to
stay one day and unload itself and as much of _Sir Tristram_ as
possible, leaving the next evening for the relative safety of San
Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day, after which _Sir
Tristram_ would be left to unload using a
Mexeflote (a powered raft)
for as long as it took to finish.
Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Commodore
Clapp to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but with
no suitable beaches to land on, _Intrepid_'s landing craft would need
to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several
nights with _Intrepid_ and her sister ship _Fearless_ sailing half-way
to dispatch their craft was devised.
The attempted overland march by half the
Welsh Guards failed,
possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their
equipment. They returned to San Carlos and landed directly at Bluff
Cove when _Fearless_ dispatched her landing craft. _Sir Tristram_
sailed on the night of 6 June and was joined by _Sir Galahad_ at dawn
on 7 June. Anchored 1,200 feet (370 m) apart in Port Pleasant, the
landing ships were near Fitzroy, the designated landing point.
The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to that
point relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered
disembarkation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to
Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior
Welsh Guards infantry officer
aboard insisting that his troops should be ferried the far longer
distance directly to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The alternative was for
the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired
Bluff Cove bridge
(destroyed by retreating Argentine combat engineers ) to their
destination, a journey of around seven miles (11 km).
On _Sir Galahad_'s stern ramp there was an argument about what to do.
The officers on board were told that they could not sail to Bluff Cove
that day. They were told that they had to get their men off ship and
onto the beach as soon as possible as the ships were vulnerable to
enemy aircraft. It would take 20 minutes to transport the men to shore
using the LCU and Mexeflote. They would then have the choice of
walking the seven miles to
Bluff Cove or wait until dark to sail
there. The officers on board said that they would remain on board
until dark and then sail. They refused to take their men off the ship.
They possibly doubted that the bridge had been repaired due to the
presence on board _Sir Galahad_ of the
Royal Engineer Troop whose job
it was to repair the bridge. The
Welsh Guards were keen to rejoin the
rest of their Battalion, who were potentially facing the enemy without
their support. They had also not seen any enemy aircraft since landing
at San Carlos and may have been overconfident in the air defences.
Ewen Southby-Tailyour gave a direct order for the men to leave the
ship and go to the beach. The order was ignored.
The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops
Bluff Cove and the squabbling over how the landing was to
be performed caused an enormous delay in unloading. This had
disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established
their air defence, and still almost fully laden, the two LSLs in Port
Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentine A-4 Skyhawks
The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove)
would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the
war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick
smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships. _ HMS
Cardiff_ anchored outside Port Stanley at the end of hostilities in
British casualties were 48 killed and 115 wounded. Three Argentine
pilots were also killed. The air strike delayed the scheduled British
ground attack on Stanley by two days. Argentine General Mario
Menéndez , commander of Argentine forces in the Falklands, was told
that 900 British soldiers had died. He expected that the losses would
cause enemy morale to drop and the British assault to stall.
FALL OF STANLEY
The road to Stanley Argentine prisoners of war – Port
On the night of 11 June, after several days of painstaking
reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a
brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high
ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3
Commando Brigade, supported by
naval gunfire from several
Royal Navy ships, simultaneously attacked
Battle of Mount Harriet ,
Battle of Two Sisters , and Battle of
Mount Longdon . Mount Harriet was taken at a cost of 2 British and 18
Argentine soldiers. At Two Sisters, the British faced both enemy
resistance and friendly fire , but managed to capture their
objectives. The toughest battle was at Mount Longdon. British forces
were bogged down by assault rifle, mortar, machine gun, artillery
fire, sniper fire, and ambushes. Despite this, the British continued
During this battle, 13 were killed when HMS _Glamorgan_ , straying
too close to shore while returning from the gun line, was struck by an
Exocet MM38 launcher taken from the destroyer
ARA _Seguí_ by
Argentine Navy technicians. On the same day, Sergeant
Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on
an Argentine bunker, which earned him a posthumous
Victoria Cross .
After a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured. Both
sides suffered heavy losses.
The night of 13 June saw the start of the second phase of attacks, in
which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para, with
light armour support from The Blues and Royals, captured Wireless
Ridge , with the loss of 3 British and 25 Argentine lives, and the 2nd
Scots Guards captured
Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of
Mount Tumbledown , which cost 10 British and 30 Argentine lives.
A pile of discarded Argentine weapons in Port Stanley
With the last natural defence line at
Mount Tumbledown breached, the
Argentine town defences of Stanley began to falter. In the morning
gloom, one company commander got lost and his junior officers became
despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described how
a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the houses
and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him", but the entire company did
nothing of the kind.
A ceasefire was declared on 14 June and the commander of the
Argentine garrison in Stanley, Brigade General Mario Menéndez,
surrendered to Major General
Jeremy Moore the same day. See also:
Argentine surrender in the Falklands War
RECAPTURE OF SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS
Operation Keyhole The Argentine Thule Garrison at
Corbeta Uruguay base
On 20 June, the British retook the
South Sandwich Islands (which
involved accepting the surrender of the
Southern Thule Garrison at the
Corbeta Uruguay base), and declared hostilities over.
Corbeta Uruguay in 1976, but prior to 1982 the United
Kingdom had contested the existence of the Argentine base only through
Argentine Military Cemetery , on
East Falkland The
British Military Cemetery at San Carlos on
In total 907 were killed during the 74 days of the conflict:
* ARGENTINA – 649
* Ejército Argentino (_Army_) – 194 (16 officers, 35
non-commissioned officers (NCO) and 143 conscript privates)
* Armada de la República
Argentina (_Navy_) – 341 (including 321
in ARA _General Belgrano_ and 4 naval aviators)
* IMARA (_Marines_) – 34
* Fuerza Aérea
Argentina (_Air Force_) – 55 (including 31 pilots
and 14 ground crew)
* Gendarmería Nacional
Argentina (_Border Guard_) – 7
* Prefectura Naval
Argentina (_Coast Guard_) – 2
* Civilian sailors – 16
* UNITED KINGDOM – A total of 255 British servicemen and 3 female
Falkland Island civilians were killed during the Falklands War.
Royal Navy – 86 + 2 Hong Kong laundrymen (see below)
Royal Marines – 27 (2 officers, 14 NCOs and 11 marines)
Royal Fleet Auxiliary – 4 + 6 Hong Kong sailors
* Merchant Navy – 6
* British Army – 123 (7 officers, 40 NCOs and 76 privates)
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force – 1 (1 officer)
Falkland Islands civilians – 3 women killed by friendly fire
Of the 86
Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost in HMS _Ardent_ , 19 + 1
lost in HMS _Sheffield_ , 19 + 1 lost in HMS _Coventry_ and 13 lost in
HMS _Glamorgan_ . Fourteen naval cooks were among the dead, the
largest number from any one branch in the Royal Navy.
Thirty-three of the British Army's dead came from the Welsh Guards,
21 from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 18 from the 2nd
Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 19 from the
Special Air Service, 3
Royal Signals and 8 from each of the
Scots Guards and Royal
Engineers. The 1st battalion/7th Duke of Edinburgh\'s Own Gurkha
Rifles lost one man killed.
Two more British deaths may be attributed to Operation Corporate,
bringing the total to 260:
* Captain Brian Biddick from SS _Uganda_ underwent an emergency
operation on the voyage to the Falklands. Later he was repatriated by
an RAF medical flight to the hospital at Wroughton where he died on 12
* Paul Mills from HMS _Coventry_ suffered from complications from a
skull fracture sustained in the sinking of his ship and died on 29
March 1983; he is buried in his home town of Swavesey.
There were 1,188 Argentine and 777 British non-fatal casualties.
Further information about the field hospitals and hospital ships is
Ajax Bay and List of hospitals and hospital ships of the Royal Navy
. On the Argentine side beside the Military Hospital at Port Stanley,
Argentine Air Force Mobile Field Hospital was deployed at Comodoro
RED CROSS BOX
This section DOES NOT CITE ANY SOURCES . Please help improve this
section by adding citations to reliable sources . Unsourced material
may be challenged and removed . (February 2014)_ _(Learn how and when
to remove this template message )_
Before British offensive operations began, the British and Argentine
governments agreed to establish an area on the high seas where both
sides could station hospital ships without fear of attack by the other
side. This area, a circle 20 nautical miles in diameter, was referred
to as the Red Cross Box (48°30′S 53°45′W / 48.500°S
53.750°W / -48.500; -53.750 ), about 45 miles (72 km) north of
Falkland Sound . Ultimately, the British stationed four ships (HMS
_Hydra_ , HMS _Hecla_ and HMS _Herald_ and the primary hospital ship
SS _Uganda_ ) within the box, while the Argentines stationed three
(ARA _Almirante Irízar_ , _Bahia Paraiso_ and _Puerto Deseado_ ). _
Hecla_ at HM Naval Base Gibraltar, during conversion to a hospital
ship for service during the Falklands
The hospital ships were non-warships converted to serve as hospital
ships. The three British naval vessels were survey vessels and
_Uganda_ was a passenger liner. _Almirante Irizar_ was an icebreaker,
_Bahia Paraiso_ was an Antarctic supply transport and _Puerto Deseado_
was a survey ship. The British and Argentine vessels operating within
the Box were in radio contact and there was some transfer of patients
between the hospital ships. For example, the _Uganda_ on four
occasions transferred patients to an Argentine hospital ship. The
British naval hospital ships operated as casualty ferries, carrying
casualties from both sides from the Falklands to _Uganda_ and
operating a shuttle service between the Red Cross Box and Montevideo.
Throughout the conflict officials of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted inspections to verify that all
concerned were abiding by the rules of the Geneva Conventions. On 12
June, some personnel transferred from the Argentine hospital ship to
the British ships by helicopter. Argentine naval officers also
inspected the British casualty ferries in the estuary of the River
BRITISH CASUALTY EVACUATION
_Hydra_ worked with _Hecla_ and _Herald_, to take casualties from
Montevideo , Uruguay, where a fleet of Uruguayan
ambulances would meet them. RAF
VC10 aircraft then flew the casualties
to the UK for transfer to the Princess Alexandra Hospital at RAF
Wroughton , near
Main article: Aftermath of the Falklands
This brief war brought many consequences for all the parties
involved, besides the considerable casualty rate and large materiel
loss, especially of shipping and aircraft, relative to the deployed
military strengths of the opposing sides.
In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher's popularity increased. The
success of the Falklands campaign was widely regarded as a factor in
the turnaround in fortunes for the Conservative government, who had
been trailing behind the
SDP-Liberal Alliance in the opinion polls for
months before the conflict began, but after the success in the
Falklands the Conservatives returned to the top of the opinion polls
by a wide margin and went on to win the following year's general
election by a landslide. Subsequently, Defence Secretary Nott's
proposed cuts to the
Royal Navy were abandoned.
The islanders subsequently had full British citizenship restored in
1983, their lifestyle improved by investments Britain made after the
war and by the liberalisation of economic measures that had been
stalled through fear of angering Argentina. In 1985, a new
constitution was enacted promoting self-government, which has
continued to devolve power to the islanders.
In Argentina, the Falklands
War meant that a possible war with Chile
was avoided. Further,
Argentina returned to a democratic government in
the 1983 general election , the first free general election since
1973. It also had a major social impact, destroying the military's
image as the "moral reserve of the nation" that they had maintained
through most of the 20th century.
Various figures have been produced for the number of veterans who
have committed suicide since the war. Some studies have estimated that
264 British veterans and 350–500 Argentine veterans have committed
suicide since 1982. However, a detailed study of 21,432 British
veterans of the war commissioned by the UK Ministry of Defence found
that only 95 had died from "intentional self-harm and events of
undetermined intent (suicides and open verdict deaths)", a proportion
lower than would be expected within the general population over the
Militarily, the Falklands conflict remains the largest air-naval
combat operation between modern forces since the end of the Second
World War. As such, it has been the subject of intense study by
military analysts and historians. The most significant "lessons
learned" include: the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship
missiles and submarines, the challenges of co-ordinating logistical
support for a long-distance projection of power, and reconfirmation of
the role of tactical air power, including the use of helicopters.
In 1986, the
BBC broadcast the _Horizon _ programme, _In the Wake of
HMS Sheffield_, which discussed lessons learned from the
conflict—and measures since taken to implement them, such as stealth
ships and close-in weapon systems .
_ The Monumento a los Caídos en Malvinas_ ("Monument for the
Fallen in the Falklands") in Plaza San Martín , Buenos Aires; a
member of the historic _Patricios_ regiment stands guard.
In addition to memorials on the islands, there is a memorial in the
crypt of St Paul\'s Cathedral , London to the British war dead. The
Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel at
Pangbourne College was opened in
March 2000 as a commemoration of the lives and sacrifice of all those
who served and died in the South Atlantic in 1982. In Argentina,
there is a memorial at Plaza San Martín in Buenos Aires, another one
in Rosario , and a third one in
During the war, British dead were put into plastic body bags and
buried in mass graves. After the war, the bodies were recovered; 14
were reburied at Blue Beach Military Cemetery and 64 were returned to
Many of the Argentine dead are buried in the Argentine Military
Cemetery west of the Darwin Settlement. The government of Argentina
declined an offer by Britain to have the bodies repatriated to the
Although some minefields have been cleared, a substantial number
of them still exist in the islands, such as this one at Port William
East Falkland .
As of 2011, there were 113 uncleared minefields on the Falkland
Islands and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) covering an area of 13 km2 (5.0
sq mi). Of this area, 5.5 km2 (2.1 sq mi) on the Murrell Peninsula
were classified as being "suspected minefields"—the area had been
heavily pastured for the previous 25 years without incident. It was
estimated that these minefields had 20,000 anti-personnel mines and
5,000 anti-tank mines. No human casualties from mines or UXO have been
reported in the
Falkland Islands since 1984, and no civilian mine
casualties have ever occurred on the islands. The UK reported six
military personnel were injured in 1982 and a further two injured in
1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing the minefields
in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of
trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters,
particularly where no detailed records existed.
On 9 May 2008, the
Falkland Islands Government asserted that the
minefields, which represent 0.1% of the available farmland on the
islands "present no long term social or economic difficulties for the
Falklands," and that the impact of clearing the mines would cause more
problems than containing them. However, the British Government, in
accordance with its commitments under the
Mine Ban Treaty has a
commitment to clear the mines by the end of 2019. In May 2012, it
was announced that 3.7 km2 (1.4 sq mi) of Stanley Common (which lies
between the Stanley – Mount Pleasant road and the shoreline) was
made safe and had been opened to the public, opening up a 3 km (1.9
mi) stretch of coastline and a further two kilometres of shoreline
along Mullet's Creek.
PRESS AND PUBLICITY
_ Gente_'s "Estamos ganando" headline ("We're winning")
Selected war correspondents were regularly flown to Port Stanley in
military aircraft to report on the war. Back in Buenos Aires,
newspapers and magazines faithfully reported on "the heroic actions of
the largely conscript army and its successes".
Officers from the intelligence services were attached to the
newspapers and 'leaked' information confirming the official
communiqués from the government. The glossy magazines _
Gente _ and
_Siete Días _ swelled to 60 pages with colour photographs of British
warships in flames—many of them faked—and bogus eyewitness reports
of the Argentine commandos' guerrilla war on South Georgia (6 May) and
an already dead Pucará pilot's attack on HMS _Hermes_ (Lt. Daniel
Antonio Jukic had been killed at
Goose Green during a British air
strike on 1 May). Most of the faked photos actually came from the
tabloid press. One of the best remembered headlines was "Estamos
ganando" ("We're winning") from the magazine _Gente_, that would later
use variations of it.
The Argentine troops on the
Falkland Islands could read _Gaceta
Argentina_—a newspaper intended to boost morale among the
servicemen. Some of its untruths could easily be unveiled by the
soldiers who recovered corpses.
The _Malvinas course_ united the Argentines in a patriotic atmosphere
that protected the junta from critics, and even opponents of the
military government supported Galtieri;
Ernesto Sabato said: "Don't be
mistaken, Europe; it is not a dictatorship who is fighting for the
Malvinas, it is the whole Nation. Opponents of the military
dictatorship, like me, are fighting to extirpate the last trace of
colonialism." The _Madres de Plaza de Mayo _ were even exposed to
death threats from ordinary people.
HMS _Invincible_ was repeatedly sunk in the Argentine press, and on
30 April 1982 the Argentine magazine _Tal Cual_ showed Prime Minister
Thatcher with an eyepatch and the text: _Pirate, witch and assassin.
Guilty!_ Three British reporters sent to
Argentina to cover the war
from the Argentine perspective were jailed until the end of the war.
_ The Sun_'s famous "Gotcha" headline
Seventeen newspaper reporters, two photographers, two radio reporters
and three television reporters with five technicians sailed with the
Task Force to the war. The Newspaper Publishers' Association selected
them from among 160 applicants, excluding foreign media. The hasty
selection resulted in the inclusion of two journalists among the war
reporters who were interested only in Queen Elizabeth II's son Prince
Andrew , who was serving in the conflict. The Prince flew a
helicopter on multiple missions, including anti-surface warfare ,
Exocet missile decoy and casualty evacuation.
Merchant vessels had the civilian
Inmarsat uplink, which enabled
written telex and voice report transmissions via satellite. SS
_Canberra_ had a facsimile machine that was used to upload 202
pictures from the South Atlantic over the course of the war. The Royal
Navy leased bandwidth on the U.S. Defense Satellite Communications
System for worldwide communications. Television demands a thousand
times the data rate of telephone, but the Ministry of Defence was
unsuccessful in convincing the U.S. to allocate more bandwidth.
TV producers suspected that the enquiry was half-hearted; since the
War television pictures of casualties and traumatised soldiers
were recognised as having negative propaganda value. However, the
technology only allowed uploading a single frame per 20 minutes—and
only if the military satellites were allocated 100% to television
transmissions. Videotapes were shipped to Ascension Island, where a
broadband satellite uplink was available, resulting in TV coverage
being delayed by three weeks.
The press was very dependent on the Royal Navy, and was censored on
site. Many reporters in the UK knew more about the war than those with
the Task Force.
Royal Navy expected
Fleet Street to conduct a Second World
War-style positive news campaign but the majority of the British
media, especially the BBC, reported the war in a neutral fashion.
These reporters referred to "the British troops" and "the Argentinian
troops" instead of "our lads" and the "Argies". The two main tabloid
papers presented opposing viewpoints: _The
Daily Mirror _ was
decidedly anti-war, whilst _The Sun _ became well known for headlines
such as "Stick It Up Your Junta!," which, along with the reporting in
other tabloids, led to accusations of xenophobia and jingoism .
_The Sun_ was condemned for its "Gotcha" headline following the
sinking of the ARA _General Belgrano_ .
Main article: Cultural impact of the Falklands
There were wide-ranging influences on popular culture in both the UK
and Argentina, from the immediate postwar period to the present. The
Jorge Luis Borges described the war as "a fight
between two bald men over a comb". The words _yomp _ and _
entered the British vernacular as a result of the war. The Falklands
War also provided material for theatre, film and TV drama and
influenced the output of musicians. In Argentina, the military
government banned the broadcasting of music in the English language,
giving way to the rise of local rock musicians.
Beagle conflict , a border dispute between
Chile and Argentina
that involved island territory.
Operation Algeciras , a failed Argentine plan to send Montoneros
to sabotage British military facilities in
Operation Soberanía , plans for Argentina's invasion of Chile
1978 and later.
* Reassertion of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
* ^ 255 military personnel.
* 2 April: 57
Royal Marines (RM), 11
Royal Navy (RN) and 23 Falkland
Islands Defence Force (FIDF) members
* 3 April: 22 RM
* 21 May: 1
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force (RAF) member
* 10 June: 1
Special Air Services (SAS) member.
* ^ 633 military personnel and 16 civilian sailors.
* ^ 6 Pucaras, 4 T-34 Mentor and 1 Short Skyvan
* ^ Location: "Bomb Alley" San Carlos Water, Falkland
* ^ 21/27 May: 9 Dagger, 5 A-4C, 3 A-4Q, 3 A-4B -58.374782
* ^ "Falklands 25: Background Briefing". Ministry of Defence .
Archived from the original on 3 May 2010. Retrieved 1 November 2009.
* ^ "Nómina de veteranos de Guerra de Malvinas que cumplen con los
requisitos establecidos por la Ley 23.848" (in Spanish). Ministry of
Argentina . Archived from the original on 23 October 2011.
Retrieved 1 November 2009.
* ^ "
Falkland Islands profile".
BBC News Online . 5 November 2013.
Retrieved 19 June 2014.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _Historia Marítima Argentina_, Volume 10, p. 137.
(_Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales_, _Cuántica Editora_,
* ^ "Argentine to reaffirm
Sovereignty Rights over The Falkland
Islands". National Turk. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
* ^ "Cómo evitar que Londres convierta a las Malvinas en un Estado
independiente". Clarin.com. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "Joint statement of 19 October 1989: Re-establishing Consular
Relations Between Britain and Argentina, and Agreeing a Framework on
Sovereignty Which Would Allow Further Talks". _falklands.info_.
Archived from the original on 17 May 2012. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
* ^ "Constitución Nacional". _
Argentine Senate _ (in Spanish).
Archived from the original on 17 June 2004.
La Nación Argentina
ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas
Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios
marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del
* ^ White, Rowland (2006). _Vulcan 607_. London: Bantam Press. pp.
13–14. ISBN 978-0-593-05392-8 . The price for Anaya's blessing was
approval for the navy's plan to seize Las Malvinas, the Falkland
* ^ Bicheno 2006 , p. 25: "A basic assumption underlying the
conflict was that the British were, in the opinion of the war's main
architect, Admiral Jorge Anaya, unworthy heirs to a glorious heritage,
the men mainly _maricones_... to call a man a _maricón_ does not
question his heterosexuality; but it definitely impugns his physical
and moral courage. Anaya was Naval Attaché in London from January
1975 to January 1976 ... He returned to Argentina, making no attempt
to conceal his contempt for all things British."
* ^ Middlebrook 1989 , p. 1: "He was an ardent 'Malvinist' ...
Anaya was enthusiastic, and his orders in the last days of 1981 were
to set in train that tragic series of events."
* ^ "
Argentina – the horrors of a dictatorial past live on –
Radio Netherlands Worldwide – English". Radionetherlands.nl. 30
March 2006. Archived from the original on 16 March 2009. Retrieved 7
* ^ Kirschbaum, Oscar; Van Der Kooy, Roger; Cardoso, Eduardo
(1983). _Malvinas, La Trama Secreta_ (in Spanish). Buenos Aires:
Sudamericana/Planeta. ISBN 978-950-37-0006-8 .
* ^ "Haig: "Malvinas fue mi Waterloo"". _La Nación_ (in Spanish).
10 August 1997. Retrieved 25 October 2010. _¿Qué creía?_ Que tenía
que ver con despertar el orgullo nacional y con otra cosa. … _La
junta – Galtieri me lo dijo – nunca creyó que los británicos
darían pelea._ Él creía que Occidente se había corrompido. Que los
británicos no tenían Dios, que Estados Unidos se había
corrompido… Nunca lo pude convencer de que ellos no sólo iban a
pelear, que además iban a ganar." ("_What do you believe?_ This was
neither about national pride nor anything else. … _The junta –
Galtieri told me – never believed the British would respond._ He
thought the Western World was corrupt. That the British people had no
God, that the U.S. was corrupt… I could never convince him that the
British would not only fight back but also win .
* ^ "Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y Tecnología de la Nación"
(PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 March 2009. Retrieved 7
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_ Jimmy Burns: _The land that lost its heroes_,
1987, Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 0-7475-0002-9 .
* ^ "_En Buenos Aires, la Junta comenzó a estudiar la posibilidad
de ocupar las Islas Malvinas y Georgias antes de que los británicos
pudieran reforzarlas_". Portierramaryaire.com. Retrieved 7 February
* ^ Briley, Harold (9 April 1997). "Obituary: Captain Nicholas
Barker". _The Independent_. UK. p. 16. Retrieved 2 March 2011.
* ^ Barnett, Correlli (1997). "The high cost of cuts". _The
Spectator_. Archived from the original on 1 May 2013. Retrieved 7
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Margolis, Laurie (2 April 2007). "UK How
scooped invasion news".
BBC News. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ Duncan, Andrew, _The Falklands War_, Marshall Cavendish Books
Limited, ISBN 1-84415-429-7
* ^ Margolis, Laurie (2 April 2007). "How
BBC man scooped invasion
BBC World Service.
* ^ "No. 49194". _
The London Gazette _ (Supplement). 13 December
1982. p. 16109.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_
Lawrence Freedman (15 August 2007). _The Official
History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the
Falklands War_. Routledge. pp. 202–203. ISBN 978-0-415-41912-3 .
Retrieved 5 February 2012.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_ _E_ "A Chronology of events during the
Falklands Conflict of 1982".
Falkland Islands Information. Archived
from the original on 27 March 2010. Retrieved 24 December 2011.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Freedman 2005b , pp. 21–22: "day-to-day oversight was
to be provided by ... which came to be known as the
War Cabinet. This
became the critical instrument of crisis management"
* ^ Gold, Peter (2005). _Gibraltar, British or Spanish?_.
Routledge. p. 39. ISBN 0-415-34795-5 .
* ^ Gold, Peter (2005). _Gibraltar, British or Spanish?_.
Routledge. p. 37. ISBN 0-415-34795-5 .
* ^ New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 32 p. 44, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 1982
* ^ Borger, Julian (1 April 2012). "U.S. feared Falklands war would
be \'close-run thing\', documents reveal". _The Guardian_. London.
* ^ Grimmett, Richard F. (1 June 1999). "Foreign Policy Roles of
the President and Congress". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 24
* ^ Caspar Weinberger, _In the Arena: A Memoir of the Twentieth
Century_, with Gretchen Roberts (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2001), 374.
* ^ Paul Reynolds, "Obituary: Caspar Weinberger," _
BBC News_, 28
* ^ Graham Jenkins, "Reagan, Thatcher, and the Tilt," _Automatic
Ballpoint_, 7 May 2010.
* ^ Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher was to later write: "Without
the Harriers ... using the latest version of the Sidewinder air-to-air
missile supplied by Caspar Weinberger, we could not have retaken the
Falklands." Dan Snow, Peter Snow, p. 270, 20th Century Battlefields,
Random House, 2012
* ^ "Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for \'82 Falklands War". _News and
Analysis, U.S. Naval Institute_. 27 June 2012. Retrieved 27 June 2012.
* ^ John, Nott (2002). "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow". Archived from
the original on 22 November 2010. As soon as the conflict began Hernou
(French Defence Minister) got in touch with me to make available a
Super-Etendard and Mirage aircraft so our Harrier pilots could train
against them before setting off to the South Atlantic. (John Nott,
defence minister during the Falklands war)
* ^ John, Nott (2002). "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow". Archived from
the original on 22 November 2010. A remarkable world-wide operation
then ensured to prevent further Exocets being bought by Argentina. I
authorised our agents to pose as bona fide purchasers of equipment on
the international market, ensuring that we outbid the Argentineans.
Other agents identified
Exocet missiles in various markets and
covertly rendered them inoperable, based on information from the
French. (John Nott, defence minister during the Falklands war)
* ^ "The Peruvian
Exocet connection in the Falklands/Malvinas war".
_Mercopress_. 3 April 2012. Retrieved 21 April 2012.
* ^ "El otro rol de
Peru durante la guerra de Malvinas". _Infobae_
(in Spanish). 1 April 2012. Archived from the original on 5 May 2012.
Retrieved 21 April 2012.
* ^ Interview with
Chilean Air Force Chief during the Falklands War
Fernando Matthei Malvinas: "Hice todo lo posible para que Argentina
perdiera la guerra" in Clarin , Buenos Aires on 1. September 2005.
Retrieved 11 Jule 2011
* ^ Freedman 2005b , pp. 397
* ^ _"The best trained units of the Argentine army, the 6th and 8th
Mountain Brigades and the 11th Cold Weather Brigade were left behind
to guard the frontier with Chile."_ Pradeep Barua, p. 152, The
Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States, BRILL, 2013
* ^ Thomson, Mike (5 March 2012). "How France helped both sides in
the Falklands War". _BBC_.
* ^ Robin Yapp (20 April 2011). "Israel \'supplied arms to
Argentina during Falklands War\'". _Daily Telegraph_. London.
Retrieved 18 April 2012.
* ^ "\'Begin aided
Argentina during Falklands
War to avenge the
British\'". _Haaretz_. 21 April 2011. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
* ^ "Tras el pedido de perdón y en medio de elogios, Cristina
regresó de Perú" in Argentine newspaper _Clarín _ on 24 March 2010
* ^ Land that Lost Its Heroes: How
Argentina Lost the Falklands
War, Jimmy Burns, p. 190, Bloomsbury Publishing, 11/04/2012
* ^ van der Bijl, Nick (1999). _Nine battles to Stanley_. Leo
Cooper. p. 141. ISBN 978-0850526196 . The Junta were slow to admit
defeat, but when the news was broadcast, Venezuela and Guatemala
offered to send airborne units to 'smash the British in the
* ^ Hernan Dobry in article Kadafi fue un amigo solidario de la
dictadura durante Malvinas Archived 17 September 2011 at the Wayback
Machine ., in Argentine newspaper _
Perfil _ on 27 February 2011, in
* ^ "
Brazil helped Soviet support operation for
the Falklands conflict". _MercoPress_. 23 April 2012. Retrieved 6 June
* ^ _A_ _B_ "The
Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982". Global Security.
Retrieved 25 December 2011.
* ^ Woodward & Robinson 1997 , p. 72 Cited in _To Rule The Waves:
How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World_ Herman, A (2004) Harper
Collins , New York, p. 560.
Lawrence Freedman (2005). "30". _The Official History of the
War and diplomacy_. 2. Psychology Press. pp.
431–444. ISBN 978-0-7146-5207-8 . Retrieved 7 June 2015. _During
the course of May confidence that the naval threat was under control
grew. Optimism on the air threat was much scarcer, especially among
those who might be on the receiving end._
* ^ "AV-8B Harrier Operations". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 21
* ^ "Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War".
Airpower.maxwell.af.mil. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
* ^ Hastings, Max; Jenkins, Simon (1983). _The Battle for the
Falklands_. Norton. pp. 115–116. ISBN 0-393-30198-2 .
* ^ "FAA map". Archived from the original on 24 October 2007.
* ^ Brown 1987 , p. 110
* ^ _A_ _B_ "
Submarine Operations during the Falklands
War – U.S.
War College". Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "1982: Marines land in South Georgia". BBC. 25 April 1982.
Retrieved 20 June 2005.
* ^ Ward 2000 , p. 186: "... to get twenty-one bombs to Port
Stanley is going to take about one million, one hundred thousand
pounds of fuel – equalled about 137,000 gallons. That was enough
fuel to fly 260
Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which
in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting stuff!"
* ^ "Operation Black Buck". _
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force _. Retrieved 12 March
* ^ Freedman 2005b , pp. 296, 301, 631
* ^ "Offensive Air Operations of the Falklands War".
_Globalsecurity.org_. As a result of these heavy losses ... it was
decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert
for a possible Vulcan attack.
* ^ "The
Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense of the
Fleet". _Globalsecurity.org_. Finally, the bombing raids caused the
Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to
retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense.
* ^ "La familia Mirage". _Aeroespacio_ (in Spanish). Fuerza Aerea
Argentina. ISSN 0001-9127 . Archived from the original on 31 May 2011.
"Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de
posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta
a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de
Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas."
("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible
attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter
bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal
Navy and RAF on the Falklands.") * ^ Ward 2000 , pp. 247–48:
"Propaganda was, of course, used later to try to justify these
missions: 'The Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern
Buenos Aires to add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids
on the islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that
if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the Buenos Aires was well
within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks. I never
went along with that baloney. A lone Vulcan or two running in to
attack Buenos Aires without fighter support would have been shot to
hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs were in evidence near the islands on
several occasions during the conflict, either escorting the Neptune
reconnaissance missions or on 'interference' flights that attempted to
draw CAP attention away from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to
say that you didn't need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept
a Vulcan attack on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a
lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires"
* ^ "The
Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense of the
Fleet". _Globalsecurity.org_. Unfortunately the British Secretary of
State for Defence announced sometime later that Britain would not bomb
targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was undoubtedly
welcomed by the Argentine military command, because it permitted the
very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed around the airfield
* ^ "
Argentine Air Force remembers its "baptism of fire" twenty
years on". En.mercopress.com. 1 May 2002. Retrieved 9 June 2010.
* ^ Rodríguez Mottino, Horacio (1984). _La artillería argentina
en Malvinas_ (in Spanish). Editorial Clio. p. 170. ISBN 978-9509377028
* ^ "Rodolfo Manuel de la Colina". _Fuerza Aérea
Argentina _ (in
Spanish). Archived from the original on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 12
* ^ "Noticias Municipales Puerto Madryn". Madryn.gov.ar. 2 April
2009. Archived from the original on 15 April 2012. Retrieved 4 January
* ^ "Fuerza Aérea Argentina". Fuerzaaerea.mil.ar. Archived from
the original on 30 April 2009. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "ASN Aircraft accident description Lockheed C-130H Hercules
TC-63 – Pebble Island". Aviation-safety.net. Retrieved 7 February
* ^ Evans, Michael (27 November 2007). "Underwater and undercover:
how nuclear subs were first line of Falklands defence". _The Times_.
* ^ Woodward & Robinson 1997 , p. 8
* ^ Charles Moore ,
Margaret Thatcher - The Authorized Biography:
Volume 1, 2013 pp726-728
* ^ "The SAS vs the Exocet". eliteukforces.info. 27 October 2007.
Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ Evans, Michael; Hamilton, Alan (27 June 2005). "
Thatcher in the
dark on sinking of Belgrano". _The Times_.
* ^ "British
Special Air Service
Special Air Service SAS - The Falklands - Operation
Corporate". Retrieved 2 October 2014.
* ^ Yates, David (2006). _Bomb Alley –
Falkland Islands 1982_.
Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-417-3 .
* ^ "Americas Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note". BBC
News. 15 March 1999. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ Rumley, Leesa (1 June 2007). "Captain Hart Dyke, Commanding
Officer of HMS _Coventry_".
BBC News. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ _A_ _B_ Woodward ">
* ^ "British Ships Sunk and Damaged – Falklands
Naval-history.net. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ Gethin Chamberlain (5 April 2002). "Would British forces be
able to retake the Falklands today?". _The Scotsman_. UK. p. 12.
Archived from the original on 5 April 2002. (Subscription required
* ^ "The Falklands Conflict 1982". Royal Navy. 2 April 1982.
Archived from the original on 9 April 2008. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "No. 49134". _
The London Gazette _ (Supplement). 8 October
1982. p. 12854.
* ^ "Argentine Aircraft in the Falklands". Britains-smallwars.com.
Archived from the original on 23 February 2009. Retrieved 7 February
* ^ "
Argentine Air Force – Group 5". Skyhawk.org. Retrieved 7
* ^ "Super Etendard". Operationcorporate.com. 29 May 2007.
Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "HMS Yarmouth, Captains Diary". Archived from the original on
21 March 2009.
* ^ "The Argentine Commandos on Mount Kent".
Britains-smallwars.com. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "Argentine Puma Shot Down By American "Stinger" Missile".
En.mercopress.com. 12 April 2002. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ Julian Thompson, _No Picnic_, p. 93, Cassell & Co, 2001.
* ^ Rick Jolly, _The Red & Green Life Machine_, p. 124.
* ^ "1982:Fifty die in Argentine air attack".
* ^ Bolia, Robert S. "The Falklands War:The
Bluff Cove Disaster"
Military Review _ (November–December 2004): 71. Archived
from the original (PDF) on 16 March 2012.
* ^ "An interview with CL (R) Ing. Julio Pérez, chief designer of
Exocet trailer-based launcher" (in Spanish). Archived from the
original on 2 March 2008.
* ^ Hastings & Jenkins 1984 , p. 307
* ^ "The race to regain Thule". _Navy News p.21_. July 1982.
* ^ "Ley 24.950: Decláranse "Héroes nacionales" a los
combatientes argentinos fallecidos durante la guerra de Malvinas".
_InfoLEG_ (in Spanish). 18 March 1998. Retrieved 11 March 2015.
* ^ "list". Ejercito.mil.ar. Archived from the original on 6 April
2010. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ list Archived 4 February 2010 at the
Wayback Machine .
* ^ "list". Fuerzaaerea.mil.ar. Archived from the original on 6
April 2010. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "Databases – Falklands
War 1982". Roll of Honour. Retrieved 4
* ^ "list". Raf.mod.uk. 1 October 2004. Archived from the original
on 6 June 2011. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "list". Raf.mod.uk. 1 October 2004. Archived from the original
on 6 June 2011. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ _D_ "
Falkland Islands – A history of the 1982
conflict". Raf.mod.uk. 1 October 2004. Archived from the original on
21 March 2009. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ _Force 4: The Newsletter of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary_, April
* ^ "Para". Raf.mod.uk. 1 October 2004. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "SAS". Raf.mod.uk. 1 October 2004. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "rest of army". Raf.mod.uk. 1 October 2004. Retrieved 7
* ^ Peter. "HMHS Uganda History". Merchantnavyofficers.com.
Retrieved 9 June 2010.
* ^ "Swavesey St Andrew Roll of Honour". Roll-of-honour.com.
Retrieved 9 June 2010.
* ^ Davis, Ian (17 October 2014). "NATO\'s Ebola \'capability
gap\': where are the hospital ships?". _NATO Watch_. NATO. Retrieved 2
* ^ "1983:
Thatcher triumphs again".
BBC News. 5 April 2005.
Retrieved 8 June 2010.
* ^ Rees, Alun. "
Suicide of Falklands veterans". _Daily Mail_.
* ^ Kapur, Navneet; While, David; Blatchley, Nick; Bray, Isabelle;
Harrison, Kate (2009). Hotopf, Matthew, ed. "
Suicide after leaving the
UK armed forces—a cohort study" . _PLoS Medicine_. 6 (3): e26. PMC
2650723 _. PMID 19260757 . doi :10.1371/journal.pmed.1000026 .
* ^ "Edición Impresa Una fecha trágica de nuestra historia".
Perfil.com. 4 January 2012. Retrieved 3 January 2013.
* ^ A study of deaths among UK Armed Forces personnel deployed to
the 1982 Falklands Campaign: 1982 to 2012 published: 14 May 2013
* ^ Norton-Taylor, Richard (14 May 2013). "Falklands war: new study
debunks claims of high suicide rates". London: The Guardian. Retrieved
12 July 2013.
* ^ "Lady
Thatcher marks Falklands anniversary at St Paul\'s".
Archived from the original on 3 March 2008.
* ^ "About the Chapel". The
Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel
website_. Retrieved 12 June 2016. The
Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel
Pangbourne College has been built to commemorate the lives and
sacrifice of all those who died in the South Atlantic in 1982 – to
stand as a permanent and ‘living’ memorial to remember them –
and the courage of the thousands of Servicemen and women who served
with them to protect the sovereignty of the
* ^ "Falklands (Las Malvinas)
War Memorial Wall". Archived from the
original on 16 July 2007. Retrieved 2007-07-16.
* ^ Peter Snow, Dan Snow (16 July 2008). "1982 Falklands". _20th
Century Battlefields_. BBC. Retrieved 20 October 2011. After the war
the British government offered to return the bodies of the Argentinian
Argentina for burial, but their government refused. They said
that these islands were part of Argentina, and the bodies would remain
here. For the Falkland islanders, these graves are daily reminder that
Argentina refuses to drop its claim their homeland.
* ^ "
United Kingdom – Mine Action, Contamination and Impact".
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. 21 September 2011. Retrieved 16
* ^ "Falklands' land mine clearance set to enter a new expanded
phase in early 2012". _MercoPress_.
Montevideo . 8 December 2011.
* ^ "Falklands recover 370 hectares of Stanley Common made
minefields in 1982 by Argentine forces". _MercoPress_.
Montevideo . 17
May 2012. Retrieved 17 June 2012.
* ^ El periodismo argentino y su papel en la Guerra de Malvinas (in
* ^ Middlebrook 1989 , p. 94: "First of May. Menéndez ordered the
publication of a newspaper for the troops on the Falkland Islands
called _Gaceta Argentina_. It stated that one of the Mirages lost on 1
May had collided with a
Sea Harrier and the Argentine pilot survived.
In fact Argentine AAA at Stanley shot down the Mirage when it tried an
emergency landing there. It was a blatant lie for all those Argentine
servicemen who had seen the Mirage being shot down by Argentine guns
and had removed the dead pilot from the crashed aeroplane. Similarly,
the junta's press office in Buenos Aires informed that Lieutenant
Antonio Jukic, who actually was killed in his Pucará on the ground at
Goose Green, had perished in a gallant, single-handed Pucará attack
on HMS _Hermes_, setting it on fire. This statement was illustrated
with dramatic sketches. The men at
Goose Green knew that Lieutenant
Jukic had died on the ground there.
_Gaceta Argentina_ summed up the British losses up to 25 May as: 5
warship sunk (correct number 3), 3 transport ships including SS
_Canberra_ (1; _Atlantic Conveyor_), 14
Sea Harriers (2 shot down ">".
La Nación _ (in Spanish). May 1982. No se engañen en Europa. No es
una dictadura la que lucha por Malvinas, es la Nación entera.
Opositores a la dictadura militar, como yo, estamos luchando por
extirpar el último resto de colonialismo.
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Harris 1983
* ^ "
Margaret Thatcher portrayed as a pirate, 30 April 1982.".
_Science and Society Picture Library_. Retrieved 1 July 2011.
* ^ Mather, Ian (1 April 2007). "I went as a reporter but ended up
a prisoner of war". _The Observer_. London.
* ^ Freedman, "two journalists on _Invincible_ were interested in
no issue other than what Prince Andrew, a helicopter pilot as well as
the Queen's son, was up to".
* ^ _A_ _B_ _C_ Freedman 2005b , p. 36
* ^ Harris 1983 : "You must have been told you couldn't report bad
news ... You were expected to do a 1940 propaganda job."
* ^ Hastings ">
* ^ "When Britain Went to War". Channel 4. Retrieved 7 February
* ^ _A_ _B_ Dawn Fowler. "
Margaret Thatcher And Falklands War
Drama" (PDF). Retrieved 9 February 2011.
* ^ _A_ _B_ "A new Britain, a new kind of newspaper". _The
Guardian_. London. 25 February 2002. Retrieved 9 February 2011.
* ^ Stefanie Hauk. "Between censorship and rude sensationalism –
Falkland and "the information war"" (PDF). Retrieved 9 February 2011.
* ^ Kassimeris, George; Buckley, John D. (16 February 2010). _The
Ashgate research companion to modern warfare_. p. 425. ISBN
978-0-7546-7410-8 . Retrieved 9 February 2011. The Falklands conflict
was no different, although the excessively jingoistic headlines of
_The Sun_ newspaper ('UP YOURS GALTIERI!', 'ARGIE BARGEY' and
'GOTCHA') resulted in a downturn in readership.
* ^ "The Sun newspaper on the Falklands". _The Guardian_. London.
25 February 2002. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ Douglas, Torin (14 September 2004). "UK Magazine Forty
years of The Sun".
BBC News. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
* ^ "War". British-library.uk. 4 May 1982. Retrieved 7 February
* ^ "Falkland Islands: Imperial pride". _the Guardian_. Retrieved 2
* ^ Por MATIAS QUEROL. "Malvinas, el curioso renacer del rock
argentino". _About_. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
* Barnett, Anthony (1982). _Iron Britannia: Why Parliament Waged Its
Falklands War_. Allison & Busby. ISBN 0-85031-493-3 .
* Bicheno, Hugh (2006). _Razor's edge: the unofficial history of the
Falklands War_. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-84633-7 .
* Blakeway, Denys (1992). _The Falklands War_. Sidgwick & Jackson.
ISBN 0-283-06101-4 .
* Brown, David (1987). _The
Royal Navy and the Falklands War_. Leo
Cooper. ISBN 0-85052-059-2 .
* Dalyell, Tam (1982). _One man's Falklands_. Cecil Woolf. ISBN
* Dalyell, Tam (1983). _Thatcher's Torpedo_. Cecil Woolf. ISBN
* Eddy, Paul; Gillman, Peter; Linklater, Magnus ; Sunday Times of
London Insight Team (1982). _The Falklands War_. Sphere Books. ISBN
* Femenia, Nora (1996). _National identity in times of crises: The
scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas War_. Nova Science Publishers. ISBN
* Finlan, Alastair. _The
Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and
the Gulf War: Culture and Strategy_ (Psychology Press, 2004).
* Fremont-Barnes, Gregory (2012). _The Falklands 1982: Ground
operations in the South Atlantic_. 244. Osprey Publishing. ISBN
* Franks; et al. (January 1983).
Falkland Islands Review: Report of
a Committee of Privy Counsellors (PDF) (Report). HMSO . Cmnd. 8787.
* Freedman, Lawrence (2005a). _The official history of the Falklands
Campaign_. 1. Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 .
* Freedman, Lawrence (2005b). _The official history of the Falklands
Campaign_. 2. Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5207-5 .
* Gavshon, Arthur; Rice, Desmond (1984). _The sinking of the
Belgrano_. Secker & Warburg. ISBN 0-436-41332-9 .
* Harris, Robert (1983). _GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the
Falklands Crisis_. Faber and Faber. ISBN 0-571-13052-6 .
* Hastings, Max ; Jenkins, Simon (1984). _The battle for the
Falklands_. Norton. ISBN 0-393-30198-2 .
* Hobson, Chris; Noble, Andrew (2002). Munro, Bob, ed. _Falklands
air war_. North American trade distribution, Specialty Press
Publishers & Wholesalers. ISBN 978-1-85780-126-2 .
* Hunt, Rex (1992). _My Falkland Days_. Politico's Publishing. ISBN
* Kon, Daniel (1983). _Los chicos de la guerra = The boys of the
war_. New English Library. ISBN 0-450-05611-2 . (English translation)
* McClure, Jason (November 2004). "The Falklands War: Causes and
Lessons". _Strategic Insights_. 3 (11).
* McManners, Hugh (2007). _
Forgotten Voices of the Falklands _.
Ebury . ISBN 978-0-09-190880-5 .
* Middlebrook, Martin (1985). _Operation Corporate: The story of the
Falklands War, 1982_. Viking. ISBN 0-670-80223-9 .
* Middlebrook, Martin (1989). _The fight for the "Malvinas": The
Argentine Forces in the Falklands War_. Viking. ISBN 0-670-82106-3 .
* Norton-Taylor, Richard (1985). _The Ponting affair_. Cecil Woolf.
ISBN 0-900821-73-6 .
* Ponting, Clive (1985). _The right to know: The inside story of the
Belgrano affair_. Sphere. ISBN 0-7221-6944-2 .
* Prince, Stephen. "British command and control in the Falklands
Campaign." _Defense & Security Analysis_ 18.4 (2002): 333-349.
* Tinker, David (1982). _A message from the Falklands: The life and
gallant death of David Tinker: From his letters and poems_. Penguin.
ISBN 0-14-006778-7 .
* Thornton, Richard C. (1998). _The Falklands sting: Reagan,
Thatcher, and Argentina's bomb_. Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-155-8 .
* Underwood, Geoffrey (1983). _Our Falklands war: The men of the
task force tell their story_. Maritime Books. ISBN 0-907771-08-4 .
* Ward, Nigel (2000). _Sea harrier over the Falklands_. Cassell.
ISBN 978-0-304-35542-6 .
* Woodward, Sandy ; Robinson, Patrick (1997). _One hundred days: The
memoirs of the Falklands battle group commander_. Naval Institute
Press. ISBN 1-55750-652-3 .
* Caviedes, César N (1994). "Conflict over the Falkland Islands: A
never-ending story?". _Latin American Research Review_. 29 (2):
* Little, Walter. "The Falklands Affair: A Review of the
Literature," _Political Studies,_ (June 1984) 32#2 pp 296–310
* Tulchin, Joseph S (1987). "The Malvinas
War Of 1982: An Inevitable
Conflict That Never Should Have Occurred". _Latin American Research
Review_. 22 (3): 123–141.
Wikiquote has quotations related to: FALKLANDS WAR _
Wikimedia Commons has media related to FALKLANDS WAR _.
Falkland Islands History Roll of Honour". _
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force _.
* "The Falklands roundtable: