Congress of Industrial Organizations
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was a federation of
unions that organized workers in industrial unions in the United
Canada from 1935 to 1955. Created in 1935 by John L. Lewis,
who was a part of the
United Mine Workers
United Mine Workers (UMW), it was originally
called the Committee for Industrial Organization but changed its name
in 1938 when it broke away from the American Federation of Labor.
It also changed names because it was not successful with organizing
unskilled workers with the AFL.
The CIO supported
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal Coalition,
and was open to African Americans. Both the CIO and its rival the AFL
grew rapidly during the Great Depression. The rivalry for dominance
was bitter and sometimes violent. The CIO (Congress for Industrial
Organization) was founded on November 9, 1936, by eight international
unions belonging to the American Federation of Labor.
In its statement of purpose, the CIO said it had formed to encourage
the AFL to organize workers in mass production industries along
industrial union lines. The CIO failed to change AFL policy from
within. On September 10, 1936, the AFL suspended all 10 CIO unions
(two more had joined in the previous year). In 1938, these unions
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Congress of Industrial Organizations as a rival labor
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 required union leaders to
swear that they were not Communists. Many CIO leaders refused to obey
that requirement, later found unconstitutional. In 1955, the CIO
rejoined the AFL, forming the new entity known as the American
Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
3 Initial triumphs
4 Early setbacks and successes
5 Growth during the Second World War
6 The post-War era
7 Purging the communists
8 Merger with the AFL
9 Presidents of the CIO, 1935-1956
10 See also
12 Further reading
12.3 Web sites
13 External links
The CIO's second headquarters was an office on the third floor of this
building, the United Mine Workers' headquarters, at 900 15th Street
NW, Washington, DC. 
The CIO was born out of a fundamental dispute within the United States
labor movement over whether and how to organize industrial workers.
The eight union chiefs who founded the CIO were not happy with how the
AFL was unwilling to work with America's manufacturing combines.
Those who favored craft unionism believed that the most effective way
to represent workers was to defend the advantages that they had
secured through their skills. They focused on the hiring of skilled
workers, such as carpenters, lithographers, and railroad engineers in
an attempt to maintain as much control as possible over the work their
members did by enforcement of work rules, zealous defense of their
jurisdiction to certain types of work, control over apprenticeship
programs, and exclusion of less-skilled workers from membership.
Craft unionists were opposed to organizing workers on an industrial
basis, into unions that represented all of the production workers in a
particular enterprise, rather than in separate units divided along
The proponents of industrial unionism, on the other hand, generally
believed that craft distinctions may have been appropriate in those
industries in which craft unions had flourished, such as construction
or printing, but they were unworkable in industries such as steel or
auto production. In their view, dividing workers in a single plant
into a number of different crafts represented by separate
organizations, each with its own agenda, would weaken the workers'
bargaining power and leave the majority, who had few traditional craft
skills, completely unrepresented.
While the AFL had always included a number of industrial unions, such
United Mine Workers
United Mine Workers and the Brewery Workers, the most dogmatic
craft unionists had a strong hold on power within the federation by
the 1930s. They used that power to quash any drive toward industrial
Industrial unionism became even more fierce in the 1930s, when the
Great Depression in the
United States caused large membership drops in
some unions, such as the
United Mine Workers
United Mine Workers and the International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. A number of labor leaders,
John L. Lewis
John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, came to the
conclusion that their own unions would not survive while the great
majority of workers in basic industry remained nonunion. They started
to press the AFL to change its policies in this area.
The AFL, in fact, responded and added even more new members than the
CIO. The AFL had long permitted the formation of "federal" unions,
which were affiliated directly with the AFL; in 1933, it proposed to
use them to organize workers on an industrial basis. The AFL did not,
however, promise to allow the unions to maintain a separate identity
indefinitely. That meant the unions might be broken up later to
distribute their members among the craft unions that claimed
jurisdiction over their work. The AFL, in fact, dissolved hundreds of
federal unions in late 1934 and early 1935.
While the bureaucratic leadership of the AFL was unable to win
strikes, three victorious strikes suddenly exploded onto the scene in
1934. These were the Minneapolis Teamsters Strike of 1934, the
leadership of which included some members of the
League of America; the 1934 West Coast Longshore Strike, the
leadership of which included some members of the Communist Party USA;
and the 1934 Toledo Auto-Lite strike, which was led by the American
Workers Party. Victorious industrial unions with militant leaderships
were the catalyst that brought about the rise of the CIO.
The AFL authorized organizing drives in the automobile, rubber, and
steel industries at its convention in 1934 but gave little financial
support or effective leadership to those unions. The AFL's timidity
succeeded only in making it less credible among the workers that it
was supposedly trying to organize. That was especially significant in
those industries, such as auto and rubber, in which workers had
already achieved some organizing success, at great personal risk.
The dispute came to a head at the AFL's convention in Atlantic City in
1935, when William Hutcheson, the President of the United Carpenters,
made a slighting comment about a rubber worker who was delivering an
organizing report. Lewis responded that Hutcheson's comment was "small
potatoes," and Hutcheson replied, "I was raised on small potatoes,
that is why I am so small." After some more words, Lewis punched
Hutcheson, knocking him to the ground. Lewis then relit his cigar and
returned to the rostrum. The incident, which was also "small potatoes"
but very memorable, helped cement Lewis's image in the public eye as
someone willing to fight for workers' right to organize.
Shortly afterward, Lewis called together Charles Howard, President of
the International Typographical Union; Sidney Hillman, head of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; David Dubinsky, President of
the ILGWU, Thomas McMahon, head of the United Textile Workers; John
Sheridan of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union; Harvey Fremming,
of the Oil Workers Union; and Max Zaritsky, of the Hatters, Cap and
Millinery Workers. They discussed the formation of a new group within
the AFL to carry on the fight for industrial organizing. The creation
of the CIO was announced on November 9, 1935.
Whether Lewis then intended to split the AFL over this issue is
debatable; at the outset, the CIO presented itself as only a group of
unions within the AFL gathered to support industrial unionism, rather
than a group opposed to the AFL itself.
The AFL leadership, however, treated the CIO as an enemy from the
outset by refusing to deal with it and demanding that it dissolve. The
AFL's opposition to the CIO, however, only increased the stature of
the CIO and Lewis in the eyes of the industrial workers who were keen
on organizing and were disillusioned with the AFL's ineffective
performance. Lewis continued to denounce the AFL's policies, and the
CIO offered organizing support to workers in the rubber industry who
went on strike and formed the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(SWOC) in defiance of all of the craft divisions that the AFL had
required in past organizing efforts. In 1936, Lee Pressman, affiliated
with the far left, became the union's general counsel until 1948.
The first major industrial union to be chartered by the CIO, on
November 16, 1938, was the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America (UE).
The subsequent explosive growth of the UE was instrumental for the
survival in the early days of the CIO. By the end of 1936, the UE had
organized the General Electric plant at Schenectady, New York, and the
UE went on to organize 358 more local unions with contracts covering
over 600,000 workers, at 1375 plants.
The CIO met with dramatic initial successes in 1937, with the UAW
winning union recognition at
General Motors Corporation
General Motors Corporation after a
tumultuous forty-four-day sit-down strike, while the Steel Workers
Organizing Committee (SWOC) signed a collective bargaining agreement
with U.S. Steel. Those two victories, however, came about very
The CIO's initial strategy was to focus its efforts in the steel
industry and then build from there. The UAW, however, did not wait for
the CIO to lead it. Instead, having built up a membership of roughly
25,000 workers by gathering in federal unions and some locals from
rival unions in the industry, the union decided to go after GM, the
largest car maker of them all, by shutting down its nerve center, the
production complex in Flint, Michigan.
Flint Sit-Down Strike
Flint Sit-Down Strike was a risky and illegal enterprise from the
outset: the union was able to share its plans with only a few workers
because of the danger that spies employed by GM would alert management
in time to stop it, yet needed to be able to mobilize enough to seize
physical control of GM's factories. The union, in fact, not only took
over several GM factories in Flint, including one that made the dies
necessary to stamp automotive body parts and a companion facility in
Cleveland, Ohio, but held on to those sites despite repeated attempts
by the police and National Guard to retake them and court orders
threatening the union with ruinous fines if it did not call off the
While Lewis played a key role in negotiating the one-page agreement
that ended the strike with GM's promise to recognize the UAW as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees for a six months
period, UAW activists, rather than CIO staff, led the strike.
The organizing campaign in the steel industry, by contrast, was a
top-down affair. Lewis, who had a particular interest in organizing
the steel industry because of its important role in the coal industry
where UMW members worked, dispatched hundreds of organizers, many his
past political opponents or radicals drawn from the Communist-led
unions that had attempted to organize the industry earlier in the
1930s, to sign up members. Lewis was not particularly concerned with
the political beliefs of his organizers, so long as he controlled the
organization; as he once famously remarked, when asked about the
"reds" on the SWOC staff, "Who gets the bird? The hunter or the dog?".
The SWOC signed up thousands of members and absorbed a number of
company unions at U.S. Steel and elsewhere, but did not attempt the
sort of daring strike that the UAW had pulled off against GM. Instead
Lewis was able to extract a collective bargaining agreement from U.S.
Steel, which had previously been an implacable enemy of unions, by
pointing to the chaos and loss of business that GM had suffered by
fighting the UAW. The agreement provided for union recognition, a
modest wage increase and a grievance procedure. CIO unions signed
multiyear contracts, often complicated and long, with GM, U.S. Steel,
and other corporations in order to minimize strikes and also make sure
employers took care of the work process.
The CIO also won several significant legal battles. Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization 307 U.S. 496 (1939), arose out of events
late in 1937.
Jersey City, New Jersey
Jersey City, New Jersey
Mayor Frank "Boss" Hague had
used a city ordinance to prevent labor meetings in public places and
stop the distribution of literature pertaining to the CIO's cause.
District and circuit courts ruled in favor of the CIO. Hague appealed
United States Supreme Court, which held in 1939 that Hague's
ban on political meetings violated the First Amendment right to
freedom of assembly.
Early setbacks and successes
The UAW was able to capitalize on its stunning victory over GM by
winning recognition at
Chrysler and smaller manufacturers. It then
focused its organizing efforts on Ford, sometimes battling company
security forces as at the
Battle of the Overpass
Battle of the Overpass on May 26, 1937. At
the same time, the UAW was in danger of being torn apart by internal
political rivalries. Homer Martin, the first president of the UAW,
expelled a number of the union organizers who had led the Flint
sit-down strike and other early drives on charges that they were
communists. In some cases, such as Wyndham Mortimer, Bob Travis and
Henry Kraus, those charges may have been true; in other cases, such as
Victor Reuther and Roy Reuther, they were probably not. Those
expulsions were reversed at the next convention of the UAW in 1939,
which expelled Martin instead. He took approximately 20,000 UAW
members with him to form a rival union, known for a time as the
UAW-AFL. The SWOC encountered equally serious problems: after winning
union recognition after a strike against Jones & Laughlin Steel,
SWOC's strikes against the rest of "Little Steel," i.e., Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, National Steel, Inland
American Rolling Mills
American Rolling Mills and
Republic Steel failed, in spite of
support from organizations like the Catholic Radical Alliance. The
steelmakers offered workers the same wage increases that U.S. Steel
had offered. In the Memorial Day Massacre on May 30, 1937, Chicago
police opened fire on a group of strikers who had attempted to picket
at Republic Steel, killing ten and seriously wounding dozens. A month
and a half later police in
Massillon, Ohio fired on a crowd of
unionists, resulting in three deaths, when one union supporter failed
to dim his headlights.
After some time passed between the disputes of the AFL and the CIO;
the CIO began to grow larger as a union as it printed its own
newspaper. The newspaper featured articles that were written by big
journalists, cartoons, and other political stories. The newspaper had
spread to 40% of the CIO's members and had different stories for
The CIO found organizing textile workers in the South even harder. As
in steel, these workers had abundant recent first-hand experience of
failed organizing drives and defeated strikes, which resulted in
unionists being blacklisted or worse. In addition, the intense
antagonism of white workers toward black workers and the conservative
political and religious milieu made organizing even harder. On the
other hand, some independent left-wing unions, such as Mine, Mill and
the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers Union of America.
Adding to the uncertainties for the CIO was its own internal disarray.
When the CIO formally established itself as a rival to the AFL in
1938, renaming itself as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the
ILGWU and the Millinery Workers left the CIO to return to the AFL.
Lewis feuded with Hillman and Philip Murray, his long-time assistant
and head of the SWOC, over both the CIO's own activities and its
relations with the FDR administration. Lewis finally resigned as
President of the CIO in 1941, after endorsing
Wendell Willkie for
President in 1940. The doldrums did not last forever, however. The UAW
finally organized Ford in 1941. The SWOC, now known as the United
Steel Workers of America, won recognition in Little Steel in 1941
through a combination of strikes and National Labor Relations Board
elections in the same year. In addition, after the west coast
longshoremen organized in the strike led by
Harry Bridges in 1934
split from the
International Longshoremen's Association
International Longshoremen's Association in 1937 to
form the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the
ILWU joined the CIO. Bridges became the most powerful force within the
CIO in California and the west. The Transport Workers Union of
America, originally representing the subway workers in New York, also
joined, as did the National Maritime Union, made up of sailors based
on the east coast, and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
The AFL continued to fight the CIO, forcing the NLRB to allow skilled
trades employees in large industrial facilities the option to choose,
in what came to be called "Globe elections," between representation by
the CIO or separate representation by AFL craft unions. The CIO now
also faced competition, moreover, from a number of AFL affiliates who
now sought to organize industrial workers. The competition was
particularly sharp in the aircraft industry, where the UAW went
head-to-head against the International Association of Machinists,
originally a craft union of railroad workers and skilled trade
employees. The AFL organizing drives proved even more successful, and
they gained new members as fast or faster than the CIO.
Growth during the Second World War
718 Jackson Place NW, Washington, D.C., (red building with white
steps) the fourth and final headquarters for the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. As of 2008, the building is owned by the
federal government and houses small units attached to the Executive
Office of the President.
The unemployment problem ended in the
United States with the beginning
of World War II, as stepped up wartime production created millions of
new jobs, and the draft pulled young men out. The war mobilization
also changed the CIO's relationship with both employers and the
Having failed to ally with capitalist countries against fascism in the
eves of the World War II, in August 1939 the
Soviet Union signed a
non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
which would later be broken by the Nazis. Many Communists in Western
parties repudiated this action and resigned their party membership in
protest. American Communists took the public position of being opposed
to the war against Germany. The Mine Workers led by Lewis, with a
strong pro-Soviet presence, opposed Roosevelt's reelection in 1940 and
left the CIO in 1942. After June 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet
Union, the Communists became fervent supporters of the war and sought
to end wildcat strikes that might hurt war production. The CIO, and in
particular the UAW, supported a wartime no-strike pledge that aimed to
eliminate not only major strikes for new contracts, but also the
innumerable small strikes called by shop stewards and local union
leadership to protest particular grievances.
That pledge did not, however, actually eliminate all wartime strikes;
in fact there were nearly as many strikes in 1944 as there had been in
1937. But those strikes tended to be far shorter and far less
tumultuous than the earlier ones, usually involving small groups of
workers over working conditions and other local concerns.
The CIO did not, on the other hand, strike over wages during the war.
In return for labor's no-strike pledge, the government offered
arbitration to determine the wages and other terms of new contracts.
Those procedures produced modest wage increases during the first few
years of the war, but, over time, not enough to keep up with
inflation, particularly when combined with the slowness of the
Yet even though the complaints from union members about the no-strike
pledge became louder and more bitter, the CIO did not abandon it.
The Mine Workers, by contrast, who did not belong to either the AFL or
the CIO for much of the war, engaged in a successful twelve-day strike
But the CIO unions on the whole grew stronger during the war. The
government put pressure on employers to recognize unions to avoid the
sort of turbulent struggles over union recognition of the 1930s, while
unions were generally able to obtain maintenance of membership
clauses, a form of union security, through arbitration and
negotiation. Workers also won benefits, such as vacation pay, that had
been available only to a few in the past while wage gaps between
higher skilled and less skilled workers narrowed.
The experience of bargaining on a national basis, while restraining
local unions from striking, also tended to accelerate the trend toward
bureaucracy within the larger CIO unions. Some, such as the
Steelworkers, had always been centralized organizations in which
authority for major decisions resided at the top. The UAW, by
contrast, had always been a more grassroots organization, but it also
started to try to rein in its maverick local leadership during these
The CIO also had to confront deep racial divides in its own
membership, particularly in the UAW plants in
Detroit where white
workers sometimes struck to protest the promotion of black workers to
production jobs. It also worked on this issue in shipyards in Alabama,
mass transit in Philadelphia, and steel plants in Baltimore. The CIO
leadership, particularly those in more left unions such as the
Packinghouse Workers, the UAW, the NMU and the Transport Workers,
undertook serious efforts to suppress hate strikes, to educate their
membership and to support the Roosevelt Administration's tentative
efforts to remedy racial discrimination in war industries through the
Fair Employment Practices Commission. Those unions contrasted their
relatively bold attack on the problem with the timidity and racism of
The CIO unions were less progressive in dealing with sex
discrimination in wartime industry, which now employed many more women
workers in nontraditional jobs. Some unions who had represented large
numbers of women workers before the war, such as the UE and the Food
and Tobacco Workers, had fairly good records of fighting
discrimination against women; others often saw them as merely wartime
replacements for the men in the armed forces.
The post-War era
The end of the war meant the end of the no-strike pledge and a wave of
strikes as workers sought to make up the ground they had lost,
particularly in wages, during the war. The UAW went on strike against
GM in November 1945; the Steelworkers, UE and Packinghouse Workers
struck in January 1946.
Murray, as head of both the CIO and the Steelworkers, wanted to avoid
a wave of mass strikes in favor of high-level negotiations with
employers, with government intervention to balance wage demands with
price controls. That project failed when employers showed that they
were not willing to accept the wartime status quo, but instead
demanded broad management rights clauses to reassert their workplace
authority, while the new Truman administration proved unwilling to
intervene on labor's side.
The UAW took a different tack: rather than involve the federal
government, it wanted to bargain directly with GM over management
issues, such as the prices it charged for its cars, and went on strike
for 113 days over these and other issues. The union eventually settled
for the same wage increase that the Steelworkers and the UE had gotten
in their negotiations; GM not only did not concede any of its
managerial authority, but never even bargained over the UAW's
proposals over its pricing policies.
These strikes were qualitatively different from those waged over union
recognition in the 1930s: employers did not try to hire strikebreakers
to replace their employees, while the unions kept a tight lid on
picketers to maintain order and decorum even as they completely shut
down some of the largest enterprises in the United States.
The CIO's major organizing drive of this era, Operation Dixie, aimed
at the textile workers of the American South, was a complete failure.
The CIO was reluctant to confront Jim Crow segregation laws. Although
the Steelworkers' Southern outpost in the steel industry remained
intact, the CIO and the union movement as a whole remained
marginalized in the Deep South and surrounding states.
In July 1943, the CIO formed the first-ever political action committee
in the United States, the CIO-PAC, to help elected Roosevelt.
In 1946, the Republican Party took control of both the House and
Senate. That Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which made
organizing more difficult, gave the states authority to pass right to
work laws, and outlawed certain types of strikes and secondary
boycotts. It also required all union officers to sign an affidavit
that they were not Communists in order for the union to bring a case
before the NLRB. This affidavit requirement, later declared
unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court, was the first
sign of serious trouble ahead for a number of Communists in the CIO.
Purging the communists
Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the
Chicago Tribune, who with some
reluctance supported Thomas E. Dewey, the governor of New York and the
1944 Republican presidential nominee, claimed that the CIO had become
the dominant faction in the national Democratic Party:
They call it the Democratic national convention but obviously it is
the CIO convention.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt is the candidate of the CIO
and the Communists because they know if elected, he will continue to
put the government of the
United States at their service, at home and
abroad. ... The CIO is in the saddle and the Democrat donkey, under
whip and spur, is meekly taking the road to communism and atheism. ...
Everybody knows that Roosevelt is the Communist candidate, but even
the Communists cannot be sure where their place will be if he wins.
His purpose is to overthrow the Republic for his own selfish ambitions
[but] it is the duty of every American to oppose The Great Deceiver
The Taft Hartley Act of 1947 penalized unions whose officers failed to
sign statements that they were not members of the Communist Party.
Many Communists held power in the CIO unions (few did so in the AFL).
The most affected unions were the ILWU, UE, TWU, United Public
Workers, and Fur and Leather Workers. Other Communists held senior
staff positions in a number of other unions.
The leftists had an uneasy relationship with Murray while he headed
the CIO. He mistrusted the radicalism of some of their positions and
was innately far more sympathetic to anti-Communist organizations such
as the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists. He also believed,
however, that making anti-Communism a crusade would only strengthen
labor's enemies and the rival AFL at a time when labor unity was most
Murray might have let the status quo continue, even while Walter
Reuther and others within the CIO attacked Communists in their unions,
if the CPUSA had not chosen to back Henry A. Wallace's Progressive
Party campaign for President in 1948. That, and an increasingly bitter
division over whether the CIO should support the Marshall Plan,
brought Murray to the conclusion that peaceful co-existence with
Communists within the CIO was impossible.
Murray began by removing Bridges from his position as the California
Regional Director for the CIO and firing
Lee Pressman as General
Counsel of both the Steelworkers and the CIO. Anti-communist unionists
then took the battle to the City and State Councils where they ousted
Communist leaders who did not support the CIO's position favoring the
Marshall Plan and opposing Wallace.
After the 1948 election, the CIO took the fight one step further,
expelling the International Longshore and Warehouse Union;
International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers; Farm Equipment
Union (FE); Food and Tobacco Workers; and the International Fur and
Leather Workers Union after a series of internal trials in the first
few months of 1950, while creating a new union, the International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (which later merged
with the Communications Workers of America), to replace the United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE), which left the CIO.
Merger with the AFL
Reuther succeeded Murray, who died in 1952, as head of the CIO.
William Green, who had headed the AFL since the 1920s, died the same
month. Reuther began discussing merger of the two organizations with
George Meany, Green's successor as head of the AFL, the next year.
Most of the critical differences that once separated the two
organizations had faded since the 1930s. The AFL had not only embraced
industrial organizing, but included industrial unions, such as the
International Association of Machinists, that had become as large as
the UAW or the Steelworkers.
The AFL had a number of advantages in those negotiations. It was, for
one thing, twice as large as the CIO. The CIO was, for its part, once
again facing internal rivalries that threatened to seriously weaken
Reuther was spurred toward merger by the threats from David J.
McDonald, Murray's successor as President of the Steelworkers, who
disliked Reuther intensely, insulted him publicly and flirted with
disaffiliation from the CIO. While Reuther set out a number of
conditions for merger with the AFL, such as constitutional provisions
supporting industrial unionism, guarantees against racial
discrimination, and internal procedures to clean up corrupt unions,
his weak bargaining position forced him to compromise most of these
demands. Although the unions that made up the CIO survived, and in
some cases thrived, as members of the newly created AFL-CIO, the CIO
as an organization was folded into the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union
AFL-CIO is made up of 56 national and international labor
unions with 12.5 million members.
Presidents of the CIO, 1935-1956
John L. Lewis
John L. Lewis 1935-1940
Philip Murray 1940-1952
Walter Reuther 1952-1955
Organized labour portal
Communists in the U.S. Labor Movement (1919-1937)
Communists in the U.S. Labor Movement (1937-1950)
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^ Kazin, Michael (1995). The Populist Persuasion. New York:
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^ Phelan 1989, p. 129.
^ Kazin, Michael (1995). The Populist Persuasion. New York:
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^ Pesotta, Rose. Bread Upon the Waters. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1984. ISBN 0-87546-127-1; "183 - Letter to the
President, CIO, on the Flood Control Problem in the Missouri River
Basin." August 6, 1951. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. The
American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, Calif.:
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^ "No-Strike Pledge". CQ Researcher by CQ Press.
^ David M. Jordan, FDR, Dewey, and the Election of 1944 (Blomington,
Indiana University Press, 2011), pp. 201-201,
^ "American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) labour organization". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved
^ "About Us". AFL-CIO. 2017. Retrieved November 14, 2017.
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Special Collections, The
University Library, Georgia State University. (Official repository for
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Congress of Industrial Organizations
Congress of Industrial Organizations from 1945-1947.
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AFL-CIO Web site
George Meany (1955–1979)
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