Coordinates : 21°22′N 157°57′W / 21.367°N 157.950°W
/ 21.367; -157.950
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
Part of the Asia and the Pacific Theater of
World War II
World War II
Battleship Row taken from a Japanese plane at the
beginning of the attack. The explosion in the center is a torpedo
strike on USS West Virginia . Two attacking Japanese planes can be
seen: one over USS Neosho and one over the Naval Yard.
December 7, 1941; 76 years ago (1941-12-07)
Pearl Harbor ,
Hawaii Territory , U.S.
Major Japanese tactical victory; precipitated the entrance of the
United States into
World War II
World War II
* See consequences of the attack on
COMMANDERS AND LEADERS
Husband E. Kimmel
Walter Short VADM
3 USCG Cutters
47 other ships
≈390 aircraft MOBILE UNIT :
6 aircraft carriers
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
23 fleet submarines
5 midget submarines
CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
4 battleships sunk
4 battleships damaged
2 other ships sunk
3 cruisers damaged
3 destroyers damaged
3 other ships damaged
188 aircraft destroyed
159 aircraft damaged
1,143 wounded 4 midget submarines sunk
1 midget submarine grounded
29 aircraft destroyed
1 sailor captured
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 68 killed
3 aircraft shot down
Hawaiian Islands Campaign
* Pearl Harbor
* 1st Midway
* Johnston and Palmyra
* 2nd Midway
* 3rd Midway
* French Indochina
* Pearl Harbor
* Hong Kong
* Dutch East Indies
* New Guinea
* Indian Ocean
* Coral Sea
* North America
* Coral Sea
* Gilberts & Marshalls
* Marianas & Palau
* Volcano & Ryukyu
* Indochina (1940)
* Indian Ocean (1940–45)
* Dutch East Indies
* Hong Kong
* Burma (1941–42)
* Burma (1942–43)
* Burma (1944)
* Burma (1944–45)
* Indochina (1945)
* Malacca Strait
* Strategic bombing (1944–45)
* Dutch East Indies 1941–42
* Portuguese Timor
* New Guinea
* Borneo 1945
* Attack on Pearl Harbor
* Aleutian Islands
* Estevan Point Lighthouse
* Fort Stevens
Lookout Air Raids
* Air raids
* Mariana Islands
* Volcano & Ryukyu Is
* Naval bombardments
* Sagami Bay
* Hiroshima 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were
wounded. Important base installations such as the power station, dry
dock , shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities,
as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of
the intelligence section ), were not attacked. Japanese losses were
light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 64 servicemen
killed. One Japanese sailor,
Kazuo Sakamaki , was captured.
The surprise attack came as a profound shock to the American people
and led directly to the American entry into
World War II
World War II in both the
Pacific and European theaters . The following day, December 8, the
United States declared war on Japan, and several days later, on
December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S. The U.S.
responded with a declaration of war against Germany and Italy .
Domestic support for non-interventionism , which had been fading since
Fall of France
Fall of France in 1940, disappeared.
There were numerous historical precedents for unannounced military
action by Japan, but the lack of any formal warning, particularly
while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt to proclaim December 7, 1941, "a date which will
live in infamy ". Because the attack happened without a declaration of
war and without explicit warning, the attack on
Pearl Harbor was later
judged in the Tokyo Trials to be a war crime .
* 1 Background to conflict
* 1.1 Diplomatic background
* 1.2 Military planning
* 1.3 Objectives
* 2 Approach and attack
* 2.1 Submarines
* 2.2 Japanese declaration of war
* 2.3 First wave composition
* 2.4 Second wave composition
* 2.5 American casualties and damage
* 2.6 Japanese losses
* 2.7 Possible third wave
* 3 Ships lost or damaged
* 3.1 Battleships
* 3.2 Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)
* 3.3 Cruisers
* 3.4 Destroyers
* 3.5 Auxiliaries
* 4 Salvage
* 5 Aftermath
* 5.2 Strategic implications
* 5.3 Retrospective debate on American intelligence
* 6 In popular culture
* 7 See also
* 8 References
* 9 External links
BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT
Main article: Events leading to the attack on
War between Japan and the
United States had been a possibility that
each nation had been aware of (and developed contingency plans for)
since the 1920s, though tensions did not begin to grow seriously until
Japan\'s 1931 invasion of Manchuria . Over the next decade, Japan
continued to expand into China, leading to all-out war between those
countries in 1937 . Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate
China and achieve sufficient resource independence to attain victory
on the mainland; the "Southern Operation" was designed to assist these
Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941, looking southwest
From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Panay ,
the Allison incident , and the
Nanking Massacre (the International
Military Tribunal of the Far East concluded that more than 200,000
Chinese non-combatants were killed in indiscriminate massacres, though
other estimates have ranged from 40,000 to more than 300,000) swung
public opinion in the West sharply against Japan. Fearing Japanese
expansion, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France provided
loan assistance for war supply contracts to China .
In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to control
supplies reaching China. The
United States halted shipments of
airplanes, parts, machine tools , and aviation gasoline to Japan,
which was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act. The U.S. did not
stop oil exports to Japan at that time in part because prevailing
sentiment in Washington was that such an action would be an extreme
step that Japan would likely consider a provocation, given Japanese
dependence on U.S. oil.
Early in 1941, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt moved the Pacific
Fleet to Hawaii from its previous base in
San Diego and ordered a
military buildup in the
Philippines in the hope of discouraging
Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command
was (mistakenly) certain that any attack on the UK\'s Southeast Asian
colonies , including
Singapore , would bring the U.S. into war, a
devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to avoid
U.S. naval interference. An invasion of the
Philippines was also
considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan
Orange had envisioned defending the
Philippines with a 40,000-man
elite force. This was opposed by
Douglas MacArthur , who felt that he
would need a force ten times that size, and was never implemented. By
1941, U.S. planners anticipated abandonment of the
Philippines at the
outbreak of war and orders to that effect were given in late 1941 to
Admiral Thomas Hart , commander of the Asiatic Fleet .
The U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following Japanese
expansion into French Indochina after the
Fall of France
Fall of France , in part
because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.
This in turn caused the Japanese to proceed with plans to take the
Dutch East Indies, an oil-rich territory. On August 17, Roosevelt
warned Japan that the U.S. was prepared to take steps against Japan if
it attacked "neighboring countries". The Japanese were faced with the
option of either withdrawing from China and losing face or seizing and
securing new sources of raw materials in the resource-rich,
European-controlled colonies of Southeast Asia.
Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941
in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan
offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina when peace was
made with the Nationalist government, adopt an independent
interpretation of the
Tripartite Pact , and not to discriminate in
trade provided all other countries reciprocated. Washington rejected
these proposals. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye then offered to meet
with Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on coming to an agreement
before any meeting. The U.S. ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged
Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to
preserve the conciliatory Konoye government and peace in the Pacific.
His recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoye government collapsed
the following month when the Japanese military refused to agree to the
withdrawal of all troops from China.
Japan's final proposal, on November 20, offered to withdraw their
forces from southern Indochina and not to launch any attacks in
Southeast Asia provided that the U.S., the UK, and the Netherlands
ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan. The
American counter-proposal of November 26 (November 27 in Japan) (the
Hull note ) required Japan to evacuate all of China without conditions
and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. However the day
Hull Note was delivered, on November 26 in Japan, the main
Japanese attack fleet left port for Pearl Harbor.
Preliminary planning for an attack on
Pearl Harbor to protect the
move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the
Dutch East Indies and
Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early
in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto , then
Combined Fleet . He won assent to formal planning
and training for an attack from the
Imperial Japanese Navy
Imperial Japanese Navy General
Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a
threat to resign his command. Full-scale planning was underway by
early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral
Ryūnosuke Kusaka , with
assistance from Captain
Minoru Genda and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of
Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima. The planners studied the 1940
British air attack on the Italian fleet at
Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was
adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations,
Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5,
after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the
matter. Final authorization was not given by the emperor until
December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "Hull
Note " would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger
Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea."
By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the
U.S. and Japan were imminent. A
Gallup poll just before the attack on
Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27%
did not, and 21% had no opinion. While U.S. Pacific bases and
facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, U.S. officials
Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected
Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to
the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval
base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of
supplies to Japan from territory to the south. They also incorrectly
believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major
naval operation at a time.
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to
destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific
Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies
and Malaya and to enable Japan to conquer
Southeast Asia without
interference. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to
consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before
shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance
of victory. Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to
mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the
main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the
time. Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American
morale such that the U.S. government would drop its demands contrary
to Japanese interests, and would seek a compromise peace with Japan.
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in
Pearl Harbor carried two
distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow
water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair
them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would
be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further
important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the
Japanese—was the absence from
Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (Enterprise , Lexington , and
Saratoga ). IJN top command was so imbued with Admiral Mahan 's
"decisive battle " doctrine—especially that of destroying the
maximum number of battleships—that, despite these concerns, Yamamoto
decided to press ahead.
Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious
war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard,
oil tank farms, and submarine base, were ignored, since—by their
thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these
facilities would be felt.
APPROACH AND ATTACK
See also: Order of battle of the Attack on
Pearl Harbor Route
followed by the Japanese fleet to
Pearl Harbor and back An
Imperial Japanese Navy
Imperial Japanese Navy
Mitsubishi A6M Zero
Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter on the aircraft
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force ) of
six aircraft carriers—Akagi , Kaga , Sōryū , Hiryū , Shōkaku ,
and Zuikaku —departed Hittokapu Bay on Kasatka (now Iterup) Island
in the Kurile Islands, en route to a position northwest of Hawaii,
intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for
the two attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP),
including nine fighters from the first wave.
The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave
was to attack carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its
second, with battleships as the third target. The first wave carried
most of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted
Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll
mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow
water. The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets
(battleships and aircraft carriers ) or, if these were not present,
any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). First wave dive
bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe
and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not
get into the air to intercept the bombers, especially in the first
wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the
aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP
duties where needed, especially over U.S. airfields.
Before the attack commenced, two reconnaissance aircraft launched
from cruisers Chikuma and Tone were sent to scout over Oahu and Maui
and report on U.S. fleet composition and location. Reconnaissance
aircraft flights risked alerting the U.S., and were not necessary.
U.S. fleet composition and preparedness information in Pearl Harbor
was already known due to the reports of the Japanese spy Takeo
Yoshikawa . A report of the absence of the U.S. fleet in Lahaina
anchorage off Maui was received from the fleet submarine I-72 .
Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese
carrier force (the
Kidō Butai ) and
Niihau , to detect any
Fleet submarines I-16 , I-18 , I-20 , I-22 , and I-24 each embarked a
Type A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu. The
five I-boats left
Kure Naval District on November 25, 1941. On
December 6, they came to within 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) of the mouth of
Pearl Harbor and launched their midget subs at about 01:00 on
December 7. At 03:42
Hawaiian Time , the minesweeper Condor spotted
a midget submarine periscope southwest of the
Pearl Harbor entrance
buoy and alerted the destroyer Ward . The midget may have entered
Pearl Harbor. However, Ward sank another midget submarine at 06:37
in the first American shots in the Pacific Theater . A midget
submarine on the north side of
Ford Island missed the seaplane tender
Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer
Monaghan with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.
A third midget submarine, Ha-19 , grounded twice, once outside the
harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was
captured on December 8. Ensign
Kazuo Sakamaki swam ashore and was
Hawaii National Guard Corporal
David Akui , becoming the
first Japanese prisoner of war . A fourth had been damaged by a depth
charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its
torpedoes. Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget
submarine at 00:41 on December 8 claiming damage to one or more large
warships inside Pearl Harbor.
In 1992, 2000, and 2001,
Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory 's
submersibles found the wreck of the fifth midget submarine lying in
three parts outside Pearl Harbor. The wreck was in the debris field
where much surplus U.S. equipment was dumped after the war, including
vehicles and landing craft. Both of its torpedoes were missing. This
correlates with reports of two torpedoes fired at the light cruiser
St. Louis at 10:04 at the entrance of Pearl Harbor, and a possible
torpedo fired at destroyer Helm at 08:21.
JAPANESE DECLARATION OF WAR
Japanese war crimes
Japanese war crimes
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made
by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally
stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes
after Japan had informed the
United States that peace negotiations
were at an end. However, the attack began before the notice could be
delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5000-word notification (commonly
called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in
Washington. Transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese
ambassador to deliver it on schedule; in the event, it was not
presented until more than an hour after the attack began. (In fact,
U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the
message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it.) The final part
is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While it was viewed by
a number of senior U.S government and military officials as a very
strong indicator negotiations were likely to be terminated and that
war might break out at any moment, it neither declared war nor
severed diplomatic relations. A declaration of war was printed on the
front page of Japan\'s newspapers in the evening edition of December 8
, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the
For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without
first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents
and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to
Washington. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and
international relations at
International Christian University
International Christian University in
Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside
the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of
Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including
a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "ur deceptive diplomacy is
steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary
shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper
declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of
negotiations ... and they clearly prevailed."
In any event, even if the Japanese had decoded and delivered the
14-Part Message before the beginning of the attack, it would not have
constituted either a formal break of diplomatic relations or a
declaration of war. The final two paragraphs of the message read:
Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has
finally been lost. The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify
hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the
American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to
reach an agreement through further negotiations.
FIRST WAVE COMPOSITION
The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected
U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical miles (252 km), but was
USAAF bombers arriving from the American mainland
Ford Island NAS B.
Hickam Field C.
Bellows Field D. Wheeler Field
E. Kaneohe NAS F. Ewa MCAS R-1. Opana
Radar Station R-2. Kawailoa RS
R-3. Kaaawa RS
G. Haleiwa H. Kahuku I. Wahiawa J. Kaneohe K. Honolulu
0. B-17s from mainland 1. First strike group 1-1. Level bombers
1–2. Torpedo bombers 1–3. Dive bombers 2. Second strike group 2-1.
Level bombers 2-1F. Fighters 2-2. Dive bombers
A. Wake Island B. Midway Islands C. Johnston Island D. Hawaii
D-1. Oahu 1. USS Lexington 2. USS Enterprise 3. First Air Fleet
< 21 feet (6.4 m) 22–23 feet (6.7–7.0 m) 29 feet (8.8 m)
30–32 feet (9.1–9.8 m) 33–34 feet (10.1–10.4 m) 34–35
feet (10.4–10.7 m) 36–37 feet (11.0–11.3 m) 38–39 feet
(11.6–11.9 m) 40–41 feet (12.2–12.5 m) 42–48 feet
(12.8–14.6 m) > 49 feet (14.9 m) City Army base Navy base
1: USS California
2: USS Maryland
3: USS Oklahoma
4: USS Tennessee
5: USS West Virginia
6: USS Arizona
7: USS Nevada
8: USS Pennsylvania
Ford Island NAS
10: Hickam field
Ignored infrastructure targets:
A: Oil storage tanks
B: CINCPAC headquarters building
C: Submarine base
D: Navy Yard
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, led
Mitsuo Fuchida . Six planes failed to launch due to
technical difficulties. It included:
* 1ST GROUP (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)
Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb)
armor-piercing bombs , organized in four sections (1 failed to launch)
* 40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes , also in four
* 2ND GROUP – (targets:
Ford Island and
Wheeler Field )
Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg)
general-purpose bombs (3 failed to launch)
* 3RD GROUP – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field,
Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
* 43 Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters for air control and strafing
(2 failed to launch)
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army
SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's northern tip. This post
had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.
The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard, reported
a target. But Lieutenant
Kermit A. Tyler , a newly assigned officer
at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled
arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. The Japanese planes were
approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees
difference) to the bombers, and while the operators had never seen a
formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size.
Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of the six
B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known).
As the first wave planes approached Oahu, they encountered and shot
down several U.S. aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat
incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance
were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking
planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any
warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted
correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in
Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though
MacArthur had almost nine hours warning that the Japanese had already
attacked Pearl Harbor.
The air portion of the attack began at 7:48 a.m.
Hawaiian Time (3:18
a.m. December 8
Japanese Standard Time , as kept by ships of the Kido
Butai), with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353 Japanese planes
in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the
first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the
most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers
attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with
Hickam Field , the
Wheeler Field , the main
U.S. Army Air Forces fighter
base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces'
Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and
Ford Island . The only aerial opposition came from a handful of P-36
Hawks , P-40 Warhawks , and some
SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the
carrier Enterprise . A destroyed Vindicator at Ewa field , the
victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to
In the first wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800 kg (1760
lb) armor-piercing bombs dropped hit their intended battleship
targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another
detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a dud.
Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, and four torpedoes
hit other ships. Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms,
bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men to dress as
they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid
Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.", was sent from the headquarters of
Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The
defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked,
aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to prevent sabotage,
guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s , only a quarter of its
machine guns , and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).
Despite this low alert status , many American military personnel
responded effectively during the attack. Ensign Joe Taussig Jr.,
aboard Nevada , commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and was
severely wounded, but continued to be on post. Lt. Commander F. J.
Thomas commanded Nevada in the captain's absence and got her under way
until the ship was grounded at 9:10 a.m. One of the destroyers,
Aylwin , got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns,
none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for 36
hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard.
Mervyn Bennion , commanding West Virginia , led his men until
he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit Tennessee , moored
SECOND WAVE COMPOSITION
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As,
and 36 A6Ms, commanded by
Shigekazu Shimazaki .
Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties. This
wave and its targets comprised:
* 1ST GROUP – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg)
* 27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and
* 27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
* 2ND GROUP (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
* 78 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general-purpose bombs, in four
sections (3 aborted)
* 3RD GROUP – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field,
Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
* 35 A6Ms for defense and strafing (1 aborted)
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to
attack Kāneʻohe, the rest
Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections
arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several
AMERICAN CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE
Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. Two thousand and
eight sailors were killed, and 710 others wounded; 218 soldiers and
airmen (who were part of the Army until the independent U.S. Air Force
was formed in 1947) were killed and 364 wounded; 109 marines were
killed and 69 wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 wounded. In
total, 2,403 Americans died and 1,178 were wounded. Eighteen ships
were sunk or run aground, including five battleships. All of the
Americans killed or wounded during the attack were non-combatants,
given the fact there was no state of war when the attack occurred.
USS Arizona during the attack USS Nevada, on fire and down
at the bow, attempting to leave the harbor before being deliberately
Of the American fatalities, nearly half were due to the explosion of
Arizona 's forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 16-inch
(410 mm) shell.
Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, Nevada attempted
to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she
got under way and sustained more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs,
which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to avoid
blocking the harbor entrance. USS West Virginia was sunk by six
torpedoes and two bombs during the attack
California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might
have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they
were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West
Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look
worse than it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by
torpedoes. West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh
tearing away her rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last
two above her belt armor , which caused her to capsize. Maryland was
hit by two of the converted 16" shells, but neither caused serious
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest
vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser
Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the
neighboring minelayer Oglala . Two destroyers in dry dock , Cassin and
Downes were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers . The
leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight
fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. Cassin
slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes. The light
cruiser Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was
damaged, but remained in service. The repair vessel Vestal , moored
alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane
tender Curtiss was also damaged. The destroyer Shaw was badly damaged
when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine. This message
denotes the first U.S. ship, St. Louis to clear Pearl Harbor.
(National Archives and Records Administration) (Note that this is in
answer to question "Is channel clear?" and faint writing at bottom
concerning the answer being held until St. Louis had successfully
Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159
damaged, 155 of them on the ground. Almost none were actually ready
to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Forces pilots managed
to get airborne during the attack and six were credited with downing
at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack: 1st Lt. Lewis M.
Sanders, 2nd Lt. Philip M. Rasmussen , 2nd Lt.
Kenneth M. Taylor , 2nd
Lt. George S. Welch , 2nd Lt. Harry W. Brown , and 2nd Lt. Gordon H.
Sterling Jr. Sterling was shot down by Lt. Fujita over Kaneohe Bay and
is listed as Body Not Recovered (not Missing In Action). Lt. John L.
Dains was killed by friendly fire returning from a victory over Kaawa.
Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged
beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Friendly fire
brought down some U.S. planes on top of that, including five from an
inbound flight from Enterprise . Japanese attacks on barracks killed
At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Of these, three were shot down.
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the
attack, and one was captured. Of Japan's 414 available planes, 29
were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the
second), with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the
POSSIBLE THIRD WAVE
Several Japanese junior officers including Fuchida and Genda urged
Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of
Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo storage, maintenance, and dry dock
facilities as possible. Genda, who had unsuccessfully advocated for
invading Hawaii after the air attack , believed that without an
invasion three strikes were necessary to disable the base as much as
possible. The captains of the other five carriers in the task force
reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike.
Military historians have suggested the destruction of these shore
facilities would have hampered the
U.S. Pacific Fleet
U.S. Pacific Fleet far more
seriously than the loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped
out, "serious operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for
more than a year"; according to Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz
Chester W. Nimitz , later
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the
war another two years." Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for
* American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably
during the second strike, and two thirds of Japan's losses were
incurred during the second wave.
* Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking
three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the
remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering
higher aircraft losses.
* The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In
addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of
American land-based bombers. Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S.
had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack
against his carriers.
* A third wave would have required substantial preparation and
turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had
to land at night. At the time, only the
Royal Navy had developed night
carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
* The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in
waters north of
Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very
limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low
on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
* He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main
objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific
Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses. Moreover, it was
Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the
total destruction of the enemy.
At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto
supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave. In
retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the
oil tank farm meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to
Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's
decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great
mistake not to order a third strike.
SHIPS LOST OR DAMAGED
Seventeen ships were damaged or lost in the attack, of which fourteen
were repaired and returned to service.
* Arizona (RADM Kidd 's flagship of Battleship Division One ): hit
by four armor-piercing bombs, exploded; total loss. 1,177 dead.
* Oklahoma : hit by five torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 429 dead.
* West Virginia : hit by two bombs, seven torpedoes, sunk; returned
to service July 1944. 106 dead.
* California : hit by two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to
service January 1944. 100 dead.
* Nevada : hit by six bombs, one torpedo, beached; returned to
service October 1942. 60 dead.
* Pennsylvania (ADM Kimmel 's flagship of the
United States Pacific
Fleet ): in drydock with Cassin and Downes, hit by one bomb and
debris from USS Cassin; remained in service. 9 dead.
* Tennessee : hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5
* Maryland : hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4
dead (including floatplane pilot shot down).
EX-BATTLESHIP (TARGET/AA TRAINING SHIP)
* Utah : hit by two torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 64 dead.
* Helena : hit by one torpedo; returned to service January 1942. 20
* Raleigh : hit by one torpedo; returned to service February 1942.
* Honolulu : Near miss, light damage; remained in service.
* Cassin : in drydock with Downes and Pennsylvania, hit by one bomb,
burned; returned to service February 1944.
* Downes : in drydock with Cassin and Pennsylvania, caught fire from
Cassin, burned; returned to service November 1943.
* Shaw : hit by three bombs; returned to service June 1942.
* Oglala (minelayer): Damaged by torpedo hit on Helena, capsized;
returned to service (as engine-repair ship) February 1944.
* Vestal (repair ship): hit by two bombs, blast and fire from
Arizona, beached; returned to service by August 1942.
* Curtiss (seaplane tender): hit by one bomb, one crashed Japanese
aircraft; returned to service January 1942. 19 dead.
* Sotoyomo (harbor tug): damaged by explosion and fires in Shaw;
sunk; returned to service August 1942.
Homer N. Wallin (center) supervises salvage operations
aboard USS California , early 1942
After a systematic search for survivors, formal salvage operations
Homer N. Wallin , Material Officer for Commander,
Battle Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was immediately ordered to lead
salvage operations. "Within a short time I was relieved of all other
duties and ordered to full time work as Fleet Salvage Officer."
Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy (shore and tenders), the
Shipyard , and civilian contractors (Pacific Bridge and others)
began work on the ships that could be refloated. They patched holes,
cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. Navy divers worked
inside the damaged ships. Within six months, five battleships and two
cruisers were patched or refloated so they could be sent to shipyards
Pearl Harbor and on the mainland for extensive repair.
Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of
some 20,000 man-hours under water. Oklahoma, while successfully
raised, was never repaired, and capsized while under tow to the
mainland in 1947. Arizona and the target ship Utah were too heavily
damaged for salvage, though much of their armament and equipment was
removed and put to use aboard other vessels. Today, the two hulks
remain where they were sunk, with Arizona becoming a war memorial .
Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor U.S.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt signing declaration of war against
Imperial Japan on December 8, 1941
In the wake of the attack, 15 Medals of Honor , 51 Navy Crosses , 53
Silver Stars , four Navy and Marine Corps Medals , one Distinguished
Flying Cross , four Distinguished Service Crosses , one Distinguished
Service Medal , and three Bronze Star Medals were awarded to the
American servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl
Harbor. Additionally, a special military award , the Pearl Harbor
Commemorative Medal , was later authorized for all military veterans
of the attack.
The day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his famous Infamy
Speech to a
Joint Session of Congress , calling for a formal
declaration of war on the
Empire of Japan
Empire of Japan . Congress obliged his
request less than an hour later. On December 11, Germany and Italy
declared war on the United States, even though the
Tripartite Pact did
not require it. Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany
and Italy later that same day. The UK actually declared war on Japan
nine hours before the U.S. did, partially due to Japanese attacks on
Singapore and Hong Kong, and partially due to Winston
Churchill's promise to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese
attack on the United States. Pennsylvania , behind the wreckage
of Downes and Cassin
The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific
Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan
Philippines hours later (because of the time difference,
it was December 8 in the Philippines). Only three days after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse
were sunk off the coast of Malaya , causing British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received
a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of
the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital
ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors
Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast
expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and
naked". Remember December 7th! propaganda issued in 1942
Throughout the war,
Pearl Harbor was frequently used in American
One further consequence of the attack on
Pearl Harbor and its
aftermath (notably the
Niihau incident ) was that Japanese American
residents and citizens were relocated to nearby Japanese-American
internment camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese
American leaders were rounded up and brought to high-security camps
such as Sand Island at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and Kilauea
Military Camp on the island of Hawaii . Eventually, more than
110,000 Japanese Americans, nearly all who lived on the West Coast,
were forced into interior camps, but in Hawaii , where the
150,000-plus Japanese Americans composed over one-third of the
population, only 1,200 to 1,800 were interned.
The attack also had international consequences. The Canadian province
British Columbia , bordering the
Pacific Ocean , had long had a
large population of Japanese immigrants and their Japanese Canadian
descendants. Pre-war tensions were exacerbated by the Pearl Harbor
attack, leading to a reaction from the
Government of Canada
Government of Canada . On
February 24, 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. no. 1486 was passed under the
War Measures Act allowing for the forced removal of any and all
Canadians of Japanese descent from British Columbia, as well as the
prohibiting from them returning to the province. On 4 March,
regulations under the Act were adopted to evacuate Japanese-Canadians.
As a result, 12,000 were interned in interior camps, 2,000 were sent
to road camps and another 2,000 were forced to work in the prairies at
sugar beet farms. Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi's aircraft
shown ten days after it crashed
The Japanese planners had determined that some means was required for
rescuing fliers whose aircraft were too badly damaged to return to the
carriers. The island of Niihau, only 30 minutes flying time from Pearl
Harbor, was designated as the rescue point.
The Zero flown by Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi of Hiryu was
damaged in the attack on Wheeler, so he flew to the rescue point on
Niihau. The aircraft was further damaged on landing. Nishikaichi was
helped from the wreckage by one of the native Hawaiians, who, aware of
the tension between the
United States and Japan, took the pilot's maps
and other documents. The island's residents had no telephones or radio
and were completely unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nishikaichi
enlisted the support of three Japanese-American residents in an
attempt to recover the documents. During the ensuing struggles,
Nishikaichi was killed and a Hawaiian civilian was wounded; one
collaborator committed suicide, and his wife and the third
collaborator were sent to prison.
The ease with which the local ethnic Japanese residents had
apparently gone to the assistance of Nishikaichi was a source of
concern for many, and tended to support those who believed that local
Japanese could not be trusted.
Admiral Hara Tadaichi summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We
won a great tactical victory at
Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the
war." To a similar effect, see Isoroku Yamamoto\'s alleged "sleeping
giant" quote .
While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out
to be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the
original plan, the U.S. Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to
abandon 'charging' across the Pacific towards the
response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of Plan
Orange ). The U.S. instead adopted "
Plan Dog " in 1940, which
emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from
the shipping lanes to Australia, while the U.S. concentrated on
defeating Nazi Germany.
Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers
were untouched by the Japanese attack; otherwise the Pacific Fleet's
ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a
year or more (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was,
the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice
but to rely on its aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons
with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese
advance. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned
to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption
limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment
roles (their only major action being the
Battle of Surigao Strait in
October 1944). A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a
belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by
battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan . As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships
for a "decisive battle" that never happened.
The Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short,
victorious war meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair
yards, oil tank farms, submarine base, and old headquarters building.
All of these targets were omitted from Genda's list, yet they proved
more important than any battleship to the American war efforts in the
Pacific. The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed
Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support to the U.S. Navy's
operations, such as the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway . It was
submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships
and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the
transportation of oil and raw materials: by the end of 1942, import of
raw materials was cut to half of what it had been, "to a disastrous
ten million tons", while oil import "was almost completely stopped".
Lastly, the basement of the Old Administration Building was the home
of the cryptanalytic unit which contributed significantly to the
Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.
RETROSPECTIVE DEBATE ON AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to how and
United States had been caught unaware, and how much and when
American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. Military
officers including Gen.
Billy Mitchell had pointed out the
vulnerability of Pearl to air attack. At least two naval war games,
one in 1932 and another in 1936, proved that Pearl was vulnerable to
such an attack. Admiral James Richardson was removed from command
shortly after protesting President Roosevelt's decision to move the
bulk of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor. The decisions of military
and political leadership to ignore these warnings has contributed to
conspiracy theories. Several writers, including journalist Robert
Stinnett and former
United States Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald,
have argued that various parties high in the U.S. and British
governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it
happen or encouraged it in order to force the U.S. into war via the
so-called "back door". However, this conspiracy theory is rejected by
IN POPULAR CULTURE
Main article: Attack on
Pearl Harbor in popular culture
Battle of Taranto
* Air warfare of
World War II
World War II
* Attack on Howland Island
* List of
United States Navy ships present at Pearl Harbor, December
* List of
Medal of Honor
Medal of Honor recipients for the Attack on
Edwin T. Layton
Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day
Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
USCGC Taney (WHEC-37) , USCGC Reliance (WSC-150), USCGC Tiger
* ^ Utah and Oglala
* ^ Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed were salvageable.
* ^ A B In 1941, Hawaii was a half-hour different from the majority
of other time zones. See UTC−10:30 .
* ^ USS Utah (AG-16, formerly BB-31); Utah was moored in the space
intended to have been occupied by the aircraft carrier Enterprise
which, returning with a task force, had been expected to enter the
channel at 0730 on December 7; delayed by weather, the task force did
Pearl Harbor until dusk the following day.
* ^ After it was announced in September iron and steel scrap export
would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to
Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 warning this might be considered an
* ^ This was mainly a Japanese Navy preference; the Japanese Army
would have chosen to attack the Soviet Union.
* ^ "The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and
Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did
know, as did the Japanese. Lt. Cdr. Takeshi Naito, the assistant naval
attaché to Berlin, flew to
Taranto to investigate the attack first
hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Cdr.
Mitsuo Fuchida about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack
on December 7, 1941."
* ^ "A torpedo bomber needed a long, level flight, and when
released, its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet
deep before swerving upward to strike a hull.
Pearl Harbor deep
averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British
carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They
fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal,
so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway
"nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the
* ^ She was located by a
University of Hawaii
University of Hawaii research submersible
on August 28, 2002 in 400 m (1,300 ft) of water, 6 nmi (11 km) outside
* ^ While the nine sailors who died in the attack were quickly
lionized by the Japanese government as Kyūgunshin ("The Nine War
Heroes"), the news of Sakamaki's capture, which had been publicized in
U.S. news broadcasts, was kept secret. Even after the war, however, he
received recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for
not sacrificing his own life.
* ^ The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution.
First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54
Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36
Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane
shifts every two hours, with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight
decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.
* ^ In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85
credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders
(P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr.
(P-36, killed in action ), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor
(P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were
not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval
* ^ Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with
standard Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and
Beloite after years of research and debate.
* ^ The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories
against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the
attack by Tautog , and
Dorie Miller 's
Navy Cross -worthy effort.
Miller was an
African-American cook aboard West Virginia who took over
an unattended anti-aircraft gun on which he had no training. He was
African-American sailor to be awarded the Navy Cross.
* ^ The wreck has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of
whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of
fuel oil , over 70 years after the attack.
USAAF pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th
Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10.
* ^ In the event, loss of these might have been a net benefit to
the U.S. Blair, passim.
* ^ Wallin had been assigned to go to
Massawa in East Africa. The
harbor there was blocked by scuttled Italian and German ships, which
prevented British use of the port. Commander
Edward Ellsberg was sent
* ^ The pact had one of its objectives limiting U.S. intervention in
conflicts involving the three nations.
Liddell Hart, B. H. (1970) History of the Second World War London:
Weidenfeld Nicolson. p.206
Shirer, William L. (1960) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich:A
History of Nazi Germsny New York: Simon and Shuster. p.873
Keegan, John (1990) The Second World War New York: Viking. p.130.
ISBN 0670823597 * ^ In less than eleven months, most of Japan's
elite naval aviators who had been at
Pearl Harbor were lost in
subsequent battles. Lack of fuel and an inflexible training policy
meant that they could not be replaced.
Gordon Prange specifically addresses some revisionist works,
Charles A. Beard
Charles A. Beard . President Roosevelt and the Coming War
William Henry Chamberlin
William Henry Chamberlin , America's Second Crusade; John T.
Flynn , The Roosevelt Myth; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor; Frederic
R. Sanborn, Design for War;
Robert Alfred Theobald
Robert Alfred Theobald , The Final Secret
of Pearl Harbor; Harry E. Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace and The Court Historians versus Revisionism;
Husband E. Kimmel ,
Admiral Kimmel's Story."
* ^ "The Long Blue Line: The attack on Pearl Harbor—"a date that
will live in infamy"". coastguard.dodlive.mil. Retrieved 8 December
2017. These units included high-endurance cutter Taney and patrol
cutters Tiger and Reliance
* ^ "U.S. COAST GUARD UNITS IN HAWAII" (PDF). media.defense.gov.
Retrieved 8 December 2017. USCGC Tiger (WSC-152); Commanding Officer:
CWO William J. Mazzoni, USCG; 125-foot cutter
* ^ "Active Class, U.S. Coast Guard Cutters". pwencycl.kgbudge.com.
Retrieved 8 December 2017.
* ^ "Ships and District Craft Present at Pearl Harbor, 0800 7
December 1941 U.S. Navy Historical Center". History.navy.mil. Archived
from the original on July 10, 2011. Retrieved July 5, 2015.
* ^ CinCP report of damage to ships in
Pearl Harbor from
* ^ "Overview of The
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* ^ Gilbert 2009 , p. 272.
* ^ Gailey 1995
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December 7, 2012.
* ^ A B Conn 2000 , p. 194
* ^ Morison 2001 , pp. 101, 120, 250
* ^ Prange, Gordon W., Goldstein, Donald, Google Books entry on
Prange et al.
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"Decoding Pearl Harbor", in The Northern Mariner, XII, #1 (January
2002), p. 32fn81.
* ^ Fukudome, Shigeru, "Hawaii Operation".
United States Naval
Institute, Proceedings, 81 (December 1955), pp. 1315–1331
* ^ Gill, G. Hermon (1957). Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942.
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* ^ A B C D E Parillo 2006 , p. 288
* ^ Thomas 2007 , pp. 57–59.
* ^ "
Pearl Harbor Facts". About. Retrieved October 5, 2014.
* ^ "
United States declares war".
Abilene Reporter-News . December
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* ^ A B Yuma Totani (April 1, 2009). The Tokyo War Crimes Trial:
The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II. Harvard University
Asia Center . p. 57.
* ^ A B Stephen C. McCaffrey (September 22, 2004). Understanding
AuthorHouse . pp. 210–229.
* ^ Barnhart 1987 .
* ^ Werner Gruhl (2007). Imperial Japan\'s World War Two,
1931–1945. Transaction Publishers. p. 39. ISBN 978-0-7658-0352-8
* ^ GPO 1943 , p. 96
* ^ GPO 1943 , p. 94
* ^ Toland, Japan's War.
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Defeat Japan, 1897–1945, Naval Institute Press, pp. 63, ISBN
* ^ GPO 1943 , p. 125
* ^ A B Peattie 1997 ; Coox, Kobun.
* ^ Chapter IV The Showdown With Japan August–December 1941
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942
* ^ Chapter IV: The Fatal Turn Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command:
The First Two Years
* ^ Review of the Diplomatic Conversations REPORT OF THE JOINT
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* ^ A B Chapter V: The Decision for War Morton, Louis. Strategy and
Command: The First Two Years
* ^ Gailey 1995 , p. 68
* ^ Gailey 1995 , p. 70
* ^ Lord, Walter (2012). Day of Infamy. Open Road Media. p. 14.
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* ^ Borch & Martinez 2005 , pp. 53–54.
* ^ Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in
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* ^ Wetzler 1998 , p. 39.
* ^ Bix 2000 , p. 417, citing the Sugiyama memo
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* ^ Noted by Arthur MacArthur in the 1890s. Manchester, William.
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* ^ Zimm 2011 , pp. 173, 174
* ^ Zimm 2011 , p. 153
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Pearl Harbor –
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* ^ Goldstein 2000 , p. 146
* ^ Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p. 57
* ^ Smith 1999 , p. 36
* ^ A B C Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p. 58
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* ^ Toland, Infamy
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* ^ Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 493–494
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Pearl Harbor Truly a
Sneak Attack, Papers Show". The New York Times.
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Harbor \'sneak attack\' infamy",
Japan Times , December 10, 2014, p. 3
* ^ "Japanese \'Fourteen Part\' Message of December 7, 1941"
* ^ Shinsato, Douglas and Tadanori Urabe, For That One Day: The
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