The BATTLE OF JUTLAND (German : Skagerrakschlacht, the Battle of
High Seas Fleet
The Germans planned to use Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper 's fast scouting
group of five modern battlecruisers to lure Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty\'s battlecruiser squadrons into the path of the main German
fleet. They stationed submarines in advance across the likely routes
of the British ships. However, the British learned from signal
intercepts that a major fleet operation was likely, so on 30 May
Jellicoe sailed with the
On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty encountered Hipper's battlecruiser force long before the Germans had expected. In a running battle, Hipper successfully drew the British vanguard into the path of the High Seas Fleet. By the time Beatty sighted the larger force and turned back towards the British main fleet, he had lost two battlecruisers from a force of six battlecruisers and four powerful battleships – though he had sped ahead of his battleships of 5th Battle Squadron earlier in the day, effectively losing them as an integral component for much of this opening action against the five ships commanded by Hipper. Beatty's withdrawal at the sight of the High Seas Fleet, which the British had not known were in the open sea, would reverse the course of the battle by drawing the German fleet in pursuit towards the British Grand Fleet. Between 18:30, when the sun was lowering on the western horizon, back-lighting the German forces, and nightfall at about 20:30, the two fleets – totalling 250 ships between them – directly engaged twice.
Fourteen British and eleven German ships sank, with great loss of
life. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manoeuvred to
cut the Germans off from their base, hoping to continue the battle the
next morning, but under the cover of darkness Scheer broke through the
British light forces forming the rearguard of the
Both sides claimed victory. The British lost more ships and twice as
many sailors but succeeded in containing the German fleet. However,
the British press criticised the Grand Fleet's failure to force a
decisive outcome, while Scheer's plan of destroying a substantial
portion of the British fleet also failed. Finally, the British
strategy of denying Germany access to both the
Subsequent reviews commissioned by the
* 1 Background and planning
* 1.1 German planning
* 1.2 British response
* 2 Naval tactics in 1916
* 2.1 Ship design
* 3 Order of battle
* 4 Battlecruiser action
* 4.1 Contact * 4.2 Run to the south * 4.3 Run to the north * 4.4 The fleets converge
* 5 Fleet action
* 5.1 Deployment
* 5.2 Windy Corner
Crossing the T
* 6 Night action and German withdrawal
* 7 Outcome
* 7.1 Reporting * 7.2 Assessments
* 7.3 British self-critique
* 7.3.1 Shell performance * 7.3.2 Battlecruiser losses * 7.3.3 Ammunition handling * 7.3.4 Gunnery * 7.3.5 Signalling * 7.3.6 Fleet Standing Orders
* 8 Controversy
* 8.1 Beatty\'s actions
* 9 Death toll
* 9.1 British * 9.2 German
* 10 Selected honours
* 11 Status of the survivors and wrecks * 12 Remembrance * 13 Film * 14 See also * 15 References * 16 Bibliography * 17 External links
BACKGROUND AND PLANNING
With 16 dreadnought -type battleships, compared with the Royal Navy's
28, the German
High Seas Fleet
In January 1916, Admiral von Pohl , commander of the German fleet, fell ill. He was replaced by Scheer, who believed that the fleet had been used too defensively, had better ships and men than the British, and ought to take the war to them. According to Scheer, the German naval strategy should be:
to damage the English fleet by offensive raids against the naval
forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight , as well
as by mine -laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever
possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result
of these operations, and all our forces had been made ready and
concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our fleet to seek battle
under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy.
On 25 April 1916, a decision was made by the German admiralty to halt indiscriminate attacks by submarine on merchant shipping. This followed protests from neutral countries, notably the United States, that their nationals had been the victims of attacks. Germany agreed that future attacks would only take place in accord with internationally agreed prize rules, which required an attacker to give a warning and allow the crews of vessels time to escape, and not to attack neutral vessels at all. Scheer believed that it would not be possible to continue attacks on these terms, which took away the advantage of secret approach by submarines and left them vulnerable to even relatively small guns on the target ships. Instead, he set about deploying the submarine fleet against military vessels.
It was hoped that, following a successful German submarine attack, fast British escorts, such as destroyers , would be tied down by anti-submarine operations. If the Germans could catch the British in the expected locations, good prospects were thought to exist of at least partially redressing the balance of forces between the fleets. "After the British sortied in response to the raiding attack force", the Royal Navy's centuries-old instincts for aggressive action could be exploited to draw its weakened units towards the main German fleet under Scheer. The hope was that Scheer would thus be able to ambush a section of the British fleet and destroy it.
A plan was devised to station submarines offshore from British naval
bases, and then stage some action that would draw out the British
ships to the waiting submarines. The battlecruiser
Additionally, UB-27 was sent out on 20 May with instructions to work
its way into the
Firth of Forth
On 22 May 1916, it was discovered that Seydlitz was still not
watertight after repairs and would not now be ready until the 29th.
The ambush submarines were now on station and experiencing
difficulties of their own: visibility near the coast was frequently
poor due to fog, and sea conditions were either so calm the slightest
ripple, as from the periscope, could give away their position, or so
rough as to make it very hard to keep the vessel at a steady depth.
The British had become aware of unusual submarine activity, and had
begun counter patrols that forced the submarines out of position.
UB-27 passed Bell Rock on the night of 23 May on its way into the
Firth of Forth
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The throat of the
The Germans maintained a fleet of Zeppelins that they used for aerial reconnaissance and occasional bombing raids. The planned raid on Sunderland intended to use Zeppelins to watch out for the British fleet approaching from the north, which might otherwise surprise the raiders.
By 28 May, strong north-easterly winds meant that it would not be possible to send out the Zeppelins, so the raid again had to be postponed. The submarines could only stay on station until 1 June before their supplies would be exhausted and they had to return, so a decision had to be made quickly about the raid.
It was decided to use an alternative plan, abandoning the attack on
Sunderland but instead sending a patrol of battlecruisers to the
Orders for the alternative plan were issued on 28 May, although it
was still hoped that last-minute improvements in the weather would
allow the original plan to go ahead. The German fleet assembled in the
Jade River and at
By 14:00 on 30 May, the wind was still too strong and the final
decision was made to use the alternative plan. The coded signal "31
May G.G.2490" was transmitted to the ships of the fleet to inform them
Unfortunately for the German plan, the British had obtained a copy of
the main German codebook from the light cruiser
The British Admiralty's
Not knowing the Germans' objective, Jellicoe and his staff decided to
position the fleet to head off any attempt by the Germans to enter the
North Atlantic, or the Baltic through the Skagerrak, by taking up a
position off Norway where they could possibly cut off any German raid
into the shipping lanes of the Atlantic, or prevent the Germans from
heading into the Baltic. A position further west was unnecessary, as
that area of the
Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe led the sixteen dreadnought
battleships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons of the
NAVAL TACTICS IN 1916
The principle of concentration of force was fundamental to the fleet tactics of this time (as in earlier periods). Tactical doctrine called for a fleet approaching battle to be in a compact formation of parallel columns, allowing relatively easy manoeuvring, and giving shortened sight lines within the formation, which simplified the passing of the signals necessary for command and control.
A fleet formed in several short columns could change its heading faster than one formed in a single long column. Since most command signals were made with flags or signal lamps between ships, the flagship was usually placed at the head of the centre column so that its signals might be more easily seen by the many ships of the formation. Wireless telegraphy was in use, though security (radio direction finding), encryption, and the limitation of the radio sets made their extensive use more problematic. Command and control of such huge fleets remained difficult.
Thus, it might take a very long time for a signal from the flagship to be relayed to the entire formation. It was usually necessary for a signal to be confirmed by each ship before it could be relayed to other ships, and an order for a fleet movement would have to be received and acknowledged by every ship before it could be executed. In a large single-column formation, a signal could take 10 minutes or more to be passed from one end of the line to the other, whereas in a formation of parallel columns, visibility across the diagonals was often better (and always shorter) than in a single long column, and the diagonals gave signal "redundancy", increasing the probability that a message would be quickly seen and correctly interpreted.
However, before battle was joined the heavy units of the fleet would, if possible, deploy into a single column. To form the battle line in the correct orientation relative to the enemy, the commanding admiral had to know the enemy fleet's distance, bearing, heading, and speed. It was the task of the scouting forces, consisting primarily of battlecruisers and cruisers , to find the enemy and report this information in sufficient time, and, if possible, to deny the enemy's scouting forces the opportunity of obtaining the equivalent information.
Ideally, the battle line would cross the intended path of the enemy
column so that the maximum number of guns could be brought to bear,
while the enemy could fire only with the forward guns of the leading
ships, a manoeuvre known as "crossing the T ". Admiral Tōgō ,
commander of the Japanese battleship fleet, had achieved this against
Within the existing technological limits, a trade-off had to be made between the weight and size of guns, the weight of armour protecting the ship, and the maximum speed. Battleships sacrificed speed for armour and heavy naval guns (11 in (280 mm) or larger). British battlecruisers sacrificed weight of armour for greater speed, while their German counterparts were armed with lighter guns and heavier armour. These weight savings allowed them to escape danger or catch other ships. Generally, the larger guns mounted on British ships allowed an engagement at greater range. In theory, a lightly armoured ship could stay out of range of a slower opponent while still scoring hits. The fast pace of development in the pre-war years meant that every few years, a new generation of ships rendered its predecessors obsolete. Thus, fairly young ships could still be obsolete compared to the newest ships, and fare badly in an engagement against them.
Admiral John Fisher , responsible for reconstruction of the British
fleet in the pre-war period, favoured large guns, oil fuel, and speed.
Admiral Tirpitz , responsible for the German fleet, favoured ship
survivability and chose to sacrifice some gun size for improved
armour. The German battlecruiser
SMS Derfflinger had belt armour
equivalent in thickness—though not as comprehensive—to the British
battleship HMS Iron Duke , significantly better than on the British
battlecruisers such as Tiger. German ships had better internal
subdivision and had fewer doors and other weak points in their
bulkheads , but with the disadvantage that space for crew was greatly
reduced. As they were designed only for sorties in the
ORDER OF BATTLE
Main article: Order of battle at
Dreadnought battleships 28 16
Pre-dreadnoughts 0 6
Battlecruisers 9 5
Armoured cruisers 8 0
Light cruisers 26 11
Destroyers 79 61
Warships of the period were armed with guns firing projectiles of varying weights, bearing high explosive warheads. The sum total of weight of all the projectiles fired by all the ship's guns is referred to as "weight of broadside". At Jutland, the total of the British ships' weight of broadside was 332,360 lb (150,760 kg), while the German fleet's total was 134,216 lb (60,879 kg). This does not take into consideration the ability of some ships and their crews to fire more or less rapidly than others, which would increase or decrease amount of fire that one combatant was able to bring to bear on their opponent for any length of time.
British reconnaissance was provided by the Battlecruiser Fleet under David Beatty: six battlecruisers, four fast Queen Elizabeth-class battleships , 14 light cruisers and 27 destroyers. Air scouting was provided by the attachment of the seaplane tender HMS Engadine , one of the first aircraft carriers in history to participate in a naval engagement.
High Seas Fleet
The German scouting force, commanded by Franz Hipper, consisted of five battlecruisers, five light cruisers and 30 torpedo-boats. The Germans had no equivalent to Engadine and no heavier-than-air aircraft to operate with the fleet but had the Imperial German Naval Airship Service's force of rigid airships available to patrol the North Sea.
All of the battleships and battlecruisers on both sides carried torpedoes of various sizes, as did the lighter craft. The British battleships carried three or four underwater torpedo tubes. The battlecruisers carried from two to five. All were either 18-inch or 21-inch diameter. The German battleships carried five or six underwater torpedo tubes in three sizes from 18 to 21 inch and the battlecruisers carried four or five tubes.
The German battle fleet was hampered by the slow speed and relatively poor armament of the six pre-dreadnoughts of II Squadron, which limited maximum fleet speed to 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph), compared to maximum British fleet speed of 21 knots (39 km/h; 24 mph). On the British side, the eight armoured cruisers were deficient in both speed and armour protection. Both of these obsolete squadrons were notably vulnerable to attacks by more modern enemy ships.
The route of the British battlecruiser fleet took it through the patrol sector allocated to U-32. After receiving the order to commence the operation, the U-boat moved to a position 80 mi (70 nmi; 130 km) east of May Island at dawn on 31 May. At 03:40, it sighted the cruisers HMS Galatea and Phaeton leaving the Forth at 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph). It launched one torpedo at the leading cruiser at a range of 1,000 yd (910 m), but its periscope jammed 'up', giving away the position of the submarine as it manoeuvred to fire a second. The lead cruiser turned away to dodge the torpedo, while the second turned towards the submarine, attempting to ram. U-32 crash dived , and on raising its periscope at 04:10 saw two battlecruisers (the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron) heading south-east. They were too far away to attack, but Kapitänleutnant von Spiegel reported the sighting of two battleships and two cruisers to Germany.
U-66 was also supposed to be patrolling off the
Firth of Forth
The courses reported by both submarines were incorrect, because they
reflected one leg of a zigzag being used by British ships to avoid
submarines. Taken with a wireless intercept of more ships leaving
Jellicoe's ships proceeded to their rendezvous undamaged and
undiscovered. However, he was now misled by an
The German battlecruisers cleared the minefields surrounding the
HMS Warspite and Malaya, seen from HMS Valiant at around 14:00 hrs
By around 14:00, Beatty's ships were proceeding eastward at roughly
the same latitude as Hipper's squadron, which was heading north. Had
the courses remained unchanged, Beatty would have passed between the
two German fleets, 40 mi (35 nmi; 64 km) south of the battlecruisers
and 20 mi (17 nmi; 32 km) north of the
High Seas Fleet
At 14:20 on 31 May, despite heavy haze and scuds of fog giving poor
visibility, scouts from Beatty's force reported enemy ships to the
south-east; the British light units, investigating a neutral Danish
steamer (N J Fjord), which was stopped between the two fleets, had
found two German destroyers engaged on the same mission (B109 and B110
). The first shots of the battle were fired at 14:28 when HMS Galatea
and Phaeton of the British 1st Light
Beatty began to move his battlecruisers and supporting forces south-eastwards and then east to cut the German ships off from their base and ordered Engadine to launch a seaplane to try to get more information about the size and location of the German forces. This was the first time in history that a carrier-based aeroplane was used for reconnaissance in naval combat. Engadine's aircraft did locate and report some German light cruisers just before 15:30 and came under anti-aircraft gunfire but attempts to relay reports from the aeroplane failed.
Unfortunately for Beatty, his initial course changes at 14:32 were not received by Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas\'s 5th Battle Squadron (the distance being too great to read his flags), because the battlecruiser HMS Tiger —the last ship in his column—was no longer in a position where she could relay signals by searchlight to Evan-Thomas, as she had previously been ordered to do. Whereas before the north turn, Tiger had been the closest ship to Evan-Thomas, she was now further away than Beatty in Lion. Matters were aggravated because Evan-Thomas had not been briefed regarding standing orders within Beatty's squadron, as his squadron normally operated with the Grand Fleet. Fleet ships were expected to obey movement orders precisely and not deviate from them. Beatty's standing instructions expected his officers to use their initiative and keep station with the flagship. As a result, the four Queen Elizabeth-class battleships —which were the fastest and most heavily armed in the world at that time—remained on the previous course for several minutes, ending up 10 mi (8.7 nmi; 16 km) behind rather than five. Beatty also had the opportunity during the previous hours to concentrate his forces, and no reason not to do so, whereas he steamed ahead at full speed, faster than the battleships could manage. Dividing the force had serious consequences for the British, costing them what would have been an overwhelming advantage in ships and firepower during the first half-hour of the coming battle.
With visibility favouring the Germans, Hipper's battlecruisers at 15:22, steaming approximately north-west, sighted Beatty's squadron at a range of about 15 mi (13 nmi; 24 km), while Beatty's forces did not identify Hipper's battlecruisers until 15:30. (position 1 on map). At 15:45, Hipper turned south-east to lead Beatty toward Scheer, who was 46 mi (40 nmi; 74 km) south-east with the main force of the High Seas Fleet.
RUN TO THE SOUTH
Beatty's conduct during the next 15 minutes has received a great deal of criticism, as his ships out-ranged and outnumbered the German squadron, yet he held his fire for over 10 minutes with the German ships in range. He also failed to use the time available to rearrange his battlecruisers into a fighting formation, with the result that they were still manoeuvring when the battle started.
At 15:48, with the opposing forces roughly parallel at 15,000 yd (14,000 m), with the British to the south-west of the Germans (i.e., on the right side), Hipper opened fire, followed by the British ships as their guns came to bear upon targets (position 2). Thus began the opening phase of the battlecruiser action, known as the Run to the South, in which the British chased the Germans, and Hipper intentionally led Beatty toward Scheer. During the first minutes of the ensuing battle, all the British ships except Princess Royal fired far over their German opponents, due to adverse visibility conditions, before finally getting the range. Only Lion and Princess Royal had settled into formation, so the other four ships were hampered in aiming by their own turning. Beatty was to windward of Hipper, and therefore funnel and gun smoke from his own ships tended to obscure his targets, while Hipper's smoke blew clear. Also, the eastern sky was overcast and the grey German ships were indistinct and difficult to range. Beatty\'s flagship Lion burning after being hit by a salvo from Lützow HMS Indefatigable sinking after being struck by shells from the German battlecruiser Von der Tann
Beatty had ordered his ships to engage in a line, one British ship engaging with one German and his flagship HMS Lion doubling on the German flagship SMS Lützow . However, due to another mistake with signalling by flag, and possibly because Queen Mary and Tiger were unable to see the German lead ship because of smoke, the second German ship, Derfflinger, was left un-engaged and free to fire without disruption. SMS Moltke drew fire from two of Beatty's battlecruisers, but still fired with great accuracy during this time, hitting Tiger 9 times in the first 12 minutes. The Germans drew first blood. Aided by superior visibility, Hipper's five battlecruisers quickly registered hits on three of the six British battlecruisers. Seven minutes passed before the British managed to score their first hit.
The first near-kill of the Run to the South occurred at 16:00, when a
30.5 cm (12.0 in) shell from Lützow wrecked the "Q" turret amidships
on Beatty's flagship Lion. Dozens of crewmen were instantly killed,
but far larger destruction was averted when the mortally wounded
turret commander – Major
Francis Harvey of the
Hipper's position deteriorated somewhat by 16:15 as the 5th Battle Squadron finally came into range, so that he had to contend with gunfire from the four battleships astern as well as Beatty's five remaining battlecruisers to starboard. But he knew his baiting mission was close to completion, as his force was rapidly closing with Scheer's main body. At 16:08, the lead battleship of the 5th Battle Squadron, HMS Barham , caught up with Hipper and opened fire at extreme range, scoring a 15 in (380 mm) hit on Von der Tann within 60 seconds. Still, it was 16:15 before all the battleships of the 5th were able to fully engage at long range.
At 16:25, the battlecruiser action intensified again when HMS Queen Mary was hit by what may have been a combined salvo from Derfflinger and Seydlitz ; she disintegrated when both forward magazines exploded, sinking with all but nine of her 1,275 man crew lost. (position 4). Commander von Hase, the first gunnery officer aboard Derfflingler, noted:
The enemy was shooting superbly. Twice the Derfflinger came under
their infernal hail and each time she was hit. But the Queen Mary was
having a bad time; engaged by the Seydlitz as well as the Derfflinger,
she met her doom at 1626. A vivid red flame shot up from her forepart;
then came an explosion forward, followed by a much heavier explosion
amidships. Immediately afterwards, she blew up with a terrific
explosion, the masts collapsing inwards and the smoke hiding
HMS Queen Mary
During the Run to the South, from 15:48 to 16:54, the German battlecruisers made an estimated total of forty-two 28 and 30.5 cm (11.0 and 12.0 in) hits on the British battlecruisers (nine on Lion, six on Princess Royal, seven on Queen Mary, 14 on Tiger, one on New Zealand, five on Indefatigable), and two more on the battleship Barham, compared with only eleven 13.5 in (340 mm) hits by the British battlecruisers (four on Lützow, four on Seydlitz, two on Moltke, one on von der Tann), and six 15 in (380 mm) hits by the battleships (one on Seydlitz, four on Moltke, one on von der Tann).
Shortly after 16:26, a salvo struck on or around HMS Princess Royal , which was obscured by spray and smoke from shell bursts. A signalman promptly leapt on to the bridge of Lion and announced "Princess Royal's blown up, Sir." Beatty famously turned to his flag captain , saying "Chatfield , there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today." (In popular legend, Beatty also immediately ordered his ships to "turn two points to port", i.e., two points nearer the enemy, but there is no official record of any such command or course change.) Princess Royal, as it turned out, was still afloat after the spray cleared.
At 16:30, Scheer's leading battleships sighted the distant
battlecruiser action; soon after,
HMS Southampton of Beatty's 2nd
RUN TO THE NORTH
As soon as he himself sighted the vanguard of Scheer's distant battleship line 12 mi (10 nmi; 19 km) away, at 16:40, Beatty turned his battlecruiser force 180°, heading north to draw the Germans toward Jellicoe. (position 5). Beatty's withdrawal toward Jellicoe is called the "Run to the North", in which the tables turned and the Germans chased the British. Because Beatty once again failed to signal his intentions adequately, the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron – which were too far behind to read his flags – found themselves passing the battlecruisers on an opposing course and heading directly toward the approaching main body of the High Seas Fleet. At 16:48, at extreme range, Scheer's leading battleships opened fire.
Meanwhile, at 16:47, having received Goodenough's signal and knowing
that Beatty was now leading the German battle fleet north to him,
Jellicoe signalled to his own forces that the fleet action they had
waited so long for was finally imminent; at 16:51, by radio, he
The difficulties of the 5th Battle Squadron were compounded when
Beatty gave the order to Evan-Thomas to "turn in succession" (rather
than "turn together") at 16:48 as the battleships passed him.
Evan-Thomas acknowledged the signal, but
For the next hour, the 5th Battle Squadron acted as Beatty's rearguard, drawing fire from all the German ships within range, while by 17:10 Beatty had deliberately eased his own squadron out of range of Hipper's now-superior battlecruiser force. Since visibility and firepower now favoured the Germans, there was no incentive for Beatty to risk further battlecruiser losses when his own gunnery could not be effective. Illustrating the imbalance, Beatty's battlecruisers did not score any hits on the Germans in this phase until 17:45, but they had rapidly received five more before he opened the range (four on Lion, of which three were by Lützow, and one on Tiger by Seydlitz). Now the only targets the Germans could reach, the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, received simultaneous fire from Hipper's battlecruisers to the east (which HMS Barham and Valiant engaged) and Scheer's leading battleships to the south-east (which HMS Warspite and Malaya engaged). Three took hits: Barham (four by Derfflinger), Warspite (two by Seydlitz), and Malaya (seven by the German battleships). Only Valiant was unscathed.
The four battleships were far better suited to take this sort of pounding than the battlecruisers, and none were lost, though Malaya suffered heavy damage, an ammunition fire, and heavy crew casualties. At the same time, the 15 in (380 mm) fire of the four British ships was accurate and effective. As the two British squadrons headed north at top speed, eagerly chased by the entire German fleet, the 5th Battle Squadron scored 13 hits on the enemy battlecruisers (four on Lützow, three on Derfflinger, six on Seydlitz) and five on battleships (although only one, on SMS Markgraf , did any serious damage). (position 6).
THE FLEETS CONVERGE
Jellicoe was now aware that full fleet engagement was nearing, but
had insufficient information on the position and course of the
Germans. To assist Beatty, early in the battle at about 16:05,
Jellicoe had ordered
At 17:33, the armoured cruiser HMS Black Prince of Arbuthnot's
squadron, on the far southwest flank of Jellicoe's force, came within
view of HMS Falmouth , which was about 5 mi (4.3 nmi; 8.0 km) ahead of
Beatty with the 3rd Light
Heavily outnumbered by Boedicker's four light cruisers, Chester was pounded before being relieved by Hood's heavy units, which swung westward for that purpose. Hood's flagship HMS Invincible disabled the light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden shortly after 17:56. Wiesbaden became a sitting target for most of the British fleet during the next hour, but remained afloat and fired some torpedoes at the passing enemy battleships from long range. Meanwhile, Boedicker's other ships turned toward Hipper and Scheer in the mistaken belief that Hood was leading a larger force of British capital ships from the north and east. A chaotic destroyer action in mist and smoke ensued as German torpedo boats attempted to blunt the arrival of this new formation, but Hood's battlecruisers dodged all the torpedoes fired at them. In this action, after leading a torpedo counter-attack, the British destroyer HMS Shark was disabled, but continued to return fire at numerous passing enemy ships for the next hour.
(1) 18:00 Scouting forces rejoin their respective fleets. (2) 18:15 British fleet deploys into battle line (3) 18:30 German fleet under fire turns away (4) 19:00 German fleet turns back (5) 19:15 German fleet turns away for second time (6) 20:00 (7) 21:00 Nightfall: Jellicoe assumes night cruising formation
In the meantime, Beatty and Evan-Thomas had resumed their engagement with Hipper's battlecruisers, this time with the visual conditions to their advantage. With several of his ships damaged, Hipper turned back toward Scheer at around 18:00, just as Beatty's flagship Lion was finally sighted from Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke. Jellicoe twice demanded the latest position of the German battlefleet from Beatty, who could not see the German battleships and failed to respond to the question until 18:14. Meanwhile, Jellicoe received confused sighting reports of varying accuracy and limited usefulness from light cruisers and battleships on the starboard (southern) flank of his force.
Jellicoe was in a worrying position. He needed to know the location
of the German fleet to judge when and how to deploy his battleships
from their cruising formation (six columns of four ships each) into a
single battle line. The deployment could be on either the westernmost
or the easternmost column, and had to be carried out before the
Germans arrived; but early deployment could mean losing any chance of
a decisive encounter. Deploying to the west would bring his fleet
closer to Scheer, gaining valuable time as dusk approached, but the
Germans might arrive before the manoeuvre was complete. Deploying to
the east would take the force away from Scheer, but Jellicoe's ships
might be able to cross the "T" , and visibility would strongly favour
British gunnery – Scheer's forces would be silhouetted against the
setting sun to the west, while the
Meanwhile, Hipper had rejoined Scheer, and the combined High Seas Fleet was heading north, directly toward Jellicoe. Scheer had no indication that Jellicoe was at sea, let alone that he was bearing down from the north-west, and was distracted by the intervention of Hood's ships to his north and east. Beatty's four surviving battlecruisers were now crossing the van of the British dreadnoughts to join Hood's three battlecruisers; at this time, Arbuthnot's flagship, the armoured cruiser HMS Defence , and her squadron-mate HMS Warrior both charged across Beatty's bows, and Lion narrowly avoided a collision with Warrior. Nearby, numerous British light cruisers and destroyers on the south-western flank of the deploying battleships were also crossing each other's courses in attempts to reach their proper stations, often barely escaping collisions, and under fire from some of the approaching German ships. This period of peril and heavy traffic attending the merger and deployment of the British forces later became known as "Windy Corner".
Arbuthnot was attracted by the drifting hull of the crippled Wiesbaden. With Warrior, Defence closed in for the kill, only to blunder right into the gun sights of Hipper's and Scheer's oncoming capital ships. Defence was deluged by heavy-calibre gunfire from many German battleships, which detonated her magazines in a spectacular explosion viewed by most of the deploying Grand Fleet. She sank with all hands (903 officers and men). Warrior was also hit badly, but was spared destruction by a mishap to the nearby battleship Warspite. Warspite had her steering gear overheat and jam under heavy load at high speed as the 5th Battle Squadron made a turn to the north at 18:19. Steaming at top speed in wide circles, Warspite appeared as a juicy target to the German dreadnoughts and took 13 hits, inadvertently drawing fire from the hapless Warrior. Warspite was brought back under control and survived the onslaught, but was badly damaged, had to reduce speed, and withdrew northward; later (at 21:07), she was ordered back to port by Evan-Thomas. Warspite went on to a long and illustrious career, serving also in World War II. Warrior, on the other hand, was abandoned and sank the next day after her crew was taken off at 08:25 on 1 June by Engadine, which towed the sinking armoured cruiser 100 mi (87 nmi; 160 km) during the night. Invincible blowing up after being struck by shells from Lützow and Derfflinger
As Defence sank and Warspite circled, at about 18:19, Hipper moved
within range of Hood's 3rd
Battlecruiser Squadron, but was still also
within range of Beatty's ships. At first, visibility favoured the
British: HMS Indomitable hit Derfflinger three times and Seydlitz
once, while Lützow quickly took 10 hits from Lion, Inflexible and
Invincible, including two below-waterline hits forward by Invincible
that would ultimately doom Hipper's flagship. But at 18:30,
Invincible abruptly appeared as a clear target before Lützow and
Derfflinger. The two German ships then fired three salvoes each at
Invincible, and sank her in 90 seconds. A 30.5 cm (12.0 in) shell from
the third salvo struck Invincible's Q-turret amidships, detonating the
magazines below and causing her to blow up and sink. All but six of
her crew of 1,032 officers and men, including
CROSSING THE T
By 18:30, the main battle fleet action was joined for the first time,
with Jellicoe effectively "crossing Scheer's T". The officers on the
lead German battleships, and Scheer himself, were taken completely by
surprise when they emerged from drifting clouds of smoky mist to
suddenly find themselves facing the massed firepower of the entire
It was now obvious that we were confronted by a large portion of the English fleet. The entire arc stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The flash from the muzzles of the guns was seen distinctly through the mist and smoke on the horizon, although the ships themselves were not distinguishable.
Conscious of the risks to his capital ships posed by torpedoes,
Jellicoe did not chase directly but headed south, determined to keep
High Seas Fleet
Simultaneously, the disabled British destroyer
HMS Shark fought
desperately against a group of four German torpedo boats and disabled
V48 with gunfire, but was eventually torpedoed and sunk at 19:02 by
the German destroyer S54 . Shark's Captain Loftus Jones won the
HMS Birmingham under fire
Commodore Goodenough's 2nd Light
At 19:17, for the second time in less than an hour, Scheer turned his outnumbered and out-gunned fleet to the west using the "battle about turn" (German: Gefechtskehrtwendung), but this time it was executed only with difficulty, as the High Seas Fleet's lead squadrons began to lose formation under concentrated gunfire. To deter a British chase, Scheer ordered a major torpedo attack by his destroyers and a potentially sacrificial charge by Scouting Group I's four remaining battlecruisers. Hipper was still aboard the torpedo boat G39 and was unable to command his squadron for this attack. Therefore, SMS Derfflinger , under Captain Hartog, led the already badly damaged German battlecruisers directly into "the greatest concentration of naval gunfire any fleet commander had ever faced", at ranges down to 4 mi (3.5 nmi; 6.4 km).
In what became known as the "death ride", all the battlecruisers except SMS Moltke were hit and further damaged, as 18 of the British battleships fired at them simultaneously. Derfflinger had two main gun turrets destroyed. The crews of Scouting Group I suffered heavy casualties, but survived the pounding and veered away with the other battlecruisers once Scheer was out of trouble and the German destroyers were moving in to attack. In this brief but intense portion of the engagement, from about 19:05 to about 19:30, the Germans sustained a total of 37 heavy hits while inflicting only two; Derfflinger alone received 14.
While his battlecruisers drew the fire of the British fleet, Scheer slipped away, laying smoke screens. Meanwhile, from about 19:16 to about 19:40, the British battleships were also engaging Scheer's torpedo boats, which executed several waves of torpedo attacks to cover his withdrawal. Jellicoe's ships turned away from the attacks and successfully evaded all 31 of the torpedoes launched at them – though, in several cases, only just barely – and sank the German destroyer S35 . British light forces also sank V48, which had previously been disabled by HMS Shark. This action, and the turn away, cost the British critical time and range in the last hour of daylight – as Scheer intended, allowing him to get his heavy ships out of immediate danger.
The last major exchanges between capital ships in this battle took
place just after sunset, from about 20:19 to about 20:35, as the
surviving British battlecruisers caught up with their German
counterparts, which were briefly relieved by
NIGHT ACTION AND GERMAN WITHDRAWAL
Main article: Night action at the Battle of
At 21:00, Jellicoe, conscious of the Grand Fleet's deficiencies in night fighting, decided to try to avoid a major engagement until early dawn. He placed a screen of cruisers and destroyers 5 mi (4.3 nmi; 8.0 km) behind his battle fleet to patrol the rear as he headed south to guard Scheer's expected escape route. In reality, Scheer opted to cross Jellicoe's wake and escape via Horns Reef . Luckily for Scheer, most of the light forces in Jellicoe's rearguard failed to report the seven separate encounters with the German fleet during the night; the very few radio reports that were sent to the British flagship were never received, possibly because the Germans were jamming British frequencies. Many of the destroyers failed to make the most of their opportunities to attack discovered ships, despite Jellicoe's expectations that the destroyer forces would, if necessary, be able to block the path of the German fleet.
Jellicoe and his commanders did not understand that the furious
gunfire and explosions to the north (seen and heard for hours by all
the British battleships) indicated that the German heavy ships were
breaking through the screen astern of the British fleet. Instead, it
was believed that the fighting was the result of night attacks by
German destroyers. The most powerful British ships of all (the
15-inch-guns of the 5th Battle Squadron ) directly observed German
battleships crossing astern of them in action with British light
forces, at ranges of 3 mi (2.6 nmi; 4.8 km) or less, and gunners on
While the nature of Scheer's escape, and Jellicoe's inaction, indicate the overall German superiority in night fighting, the results of the night action were no more clear-cut than were those of the battle as a whole. In the first of many surprise encounters by darkened ships at point-blank range, Southampton, Commodore Goodenough's flagship, which had scouted so proficiently, was heavily damaged in action with a German Scouting Group composed of light cruisers, but managed to torpedo SMS Frauenlob , which went down at 22:23 with all hands (320 officers and men).
From 23:20 to approximately 02:15, several British destroyer
flotillas launched torpedo attacks on the German battle fleet in a
series of violent and chaotic engagements at extremely short range
(often under 0.5 mi (0.80 km)). At the cost of five destroyers sunk
and some others damaged, they managed to torpedo the light cruiser SMS
Rostock , which sank several hours later, and the pre-dreadnought SMS
Pommern , which blew up and sank with all hands (839 officers and men)
at 03:10 during the last wave of attacks before dawn. Three of the
British destroyers collided in the chaos, and the German battleship
Just after midnight on 1 June, SMS Thüringen and other German battleships sank HMS Black Prince of the ill-fated 1st Cruiser Squadron, which had blundered into the German battle line. Deployed as part of a screening force several miles ahead of the main force of the Grand Fleet, Black Prince had lost contact in the darkness and took a position near what she thought was the British line. The Germans soon identified the new addition to its line and opened fire. Overwhelmed by point-blank gunfire, Black Prince blew up, (857 officers and men – all hands – were lost), as her squadron leader Defence had done hours earlier. Lost in the darkness, the battlecruisers SMS Moltke and Seydlitz had similar point-blank encounters with the British battle line and were recognised, but were spared the fate of Black Prince when the captains of the British ships, again, declined to open fire, reluctant to reveal their fleet's position.
At 01:45, the sinking battlecruiser Lützow – fatally damaged by Invincible during the main action – was torpedoed by the destroyer G38 on orders of Lützow's Captain Viktor von Harder after the surviving crew of 1,150 transferred to destroyers that came alongside. At 02:15, the German torpedo boat V4 suddenly had its bow blown off; V2 and V6 came alongside and took off the remaining crew, and the V2 then sank the hulk. Since there was no enemy nearby, it was assumed that she had hit a mine or had been torpedoed by a submarine.
At 02:15, five British ships of the 13th
Finally, at 05:20, as Scheer's fleet was safely on its way home, the battleship SMS Ostfriesland struck a British mine on her starboard side, killing one man and wounding ten, but was able to make port. Seydlitz, critically damaged and very nearly sinking, barely survived the return voyage: after grounding and taking on even more water on the evening of 1 June, she had to be assisted stern first into port, where she dropped anchor at 07:30 on the morning of 2 June.
The Germans were helped in their escape by the failure of the British
At midday on 2 June, German authorities released a press statement
claiming a victory, including the destruction of a battleship, two
battlecruisers, two armoured cruisers, a light cruiser, a submarine
and several destroyers, for the loss of Pommern and Wiesbaden. News
that Lützow, Elbing and Rostock had been scuttled was withheld, on
the grounds this information would not be known to the enemy. The
victory of the
In Britain, the first official news came from German wireless
broadcasts. Ships began to arrive in port, their crews sending
messages to friends and relatives both of their survival and the loss
of some 6,000 others. Authorities considered suppressing the news, but
it had already spread widely. Some crews coming ashore found rumours
had already reported them dead to relatives, while others were jeered
for the defeat they had suffered. At 19:00 on 2 June, the Admiralty
released a statement based on information from Jellicoe containing the
bare news of losses on each side. The following day British newspapers
reported a German victory. The
At Jutland, the Germans, with a 99-strong fleet, sank 115,000 long tons (117,000 t) of British ships, while a 151-strong British fleet sank 62,000 long tons (63,000 t) of German ships. The British lost 6,094 seamen; the Germans 2,551. Several other ships were badly damaged, such as Lion and Seydlitz .
As of the summer of 1916, the High Seas Fleet's strategy was to
whittle away the numerical advantage of the
However, Scheer seems to have quickly realised that further battles
with a similar rate of attrition would exhaust the High Seas Fleet
long before it reduced the Grand Fleet. Further, after the 19 August
advance was nearly intercepted by the Grand Fleet, he no longer
believed that it would be possible to trap a single squadron of Royal
Navy warships without having the
At a strategic level, the outcome has been the subject of a huge amount of literature with no clear consensus. The battle was widely viewed as indecisive in the immediate aftermath and this view remains influential.
Despite numerical superiority, the British had been disappointed in
their hopes for a decisive victory comparable to Trafalgar and the
objective of the influential strategic doctrines of
Subsequently, there has been considerable support for the view of
The German fleet would only sortie into the
Apart from these three abortive operations the
High Seas Fleet
There is also significant support for viewing the battle as a German
tactical victory, due to the much higher losses sustained by the
British. The Germans declared a great victory immediately afterwards,
while the British by contrast had only reported short and simple
results. In response to public outrage, the First Lord of the
At the end of the battle, the British had maintained their numerical
superiority and had 23 dreadnoughts ready and four battlecruisers
still able to fight, while the Germans had only 10 dreadnoughts. One
month after the battle, the
A third view, presented in a number of recent evaluations, is that
Jutland, the last major fleet action between battleships, illustrated
the irrelevance of battleship fleets following the development of the
submarine, mine and torpedo. In this view, the most important
The official British
* British armour-piercing shells exploded outside the German armour rather than penetrating and exploding within. As a result, some German ships with only 8 in (20 cm)-thick armour survived hits from 15-inch (38 cm) projectiles. Had these shells penetrated the armour and then exploded, German losses would probably have been far greater. * Communication between ships and the British commander-in-chief were comparatively poor. For most of the battle, Jellicoe had no idea where the German ships were, even though British ships were in contact. They failed to report enemy positions, contrary to the Grand Fleet's Battle Plan. Some of the most important signalling was carried out solely by flag instead of wireless or using redundant methods to ensure communications—a questionable procedure, given the mixture of haze and smoke that obscured the battlefield, and a foreshadowing of similar failures by habit-bound and conservatively minded professional officers of rank to take advantage of new technology in World War II.
German armour-piercing shells were far more effective than the
British ones, which often failed to penetrate heavy armour. The issue
particularly concerned shells striking at oblique angles, which became
increasingly the case at long range. Germany had adopted
trinitrotoluene (TNT) as the explosive filler for artillery shells in
1902, while the
The issue of poorly performing shells had been known to Jellicoe, who as Third Sea Lord from 1908 to 1910 had ordered new shells to be designed. However, the matter had not been followed through after his posting to sea and new shells had never been thoroughly tested. Beatty discovered the problem at a party aboard Lion a short time after the battle, when a Swedish Naval officer was present. He had recently visited Berlin, where the German navy had scoffed at how British shells had broken up on their ships' armour. The question of shell effectiveness had also been raised after the Battle of Dogger Bank , but no action had been taken. Hipper later commented, "It was nothing but the poor quality of their bursting charges which saved us from disaster."
Admiral Dreyer, writing later about the battle, during which he had been captain of the British flagship Iron Duke, estimated that effective shells as later introduced would have led to the sinking of six more German capital ships, based upon the actual number of hits achieved in the battle. The system of testing shells, which remained in use up to 1944, meant that, statistically, a batch of shells of which 70% were faulty stood an even chance of being accepted. Indeed, even shells that failed this relatively mild test had still been issued to ships. Analysis of the test results afterwards by the Ordnance Board suggested the likelihood that 30–70% of shells would not have passed the standard penetration test specified by the Admiralty.
Efforts to replace the shells were initially resisted by the Admiralty, and action was not taken until Jellicoe became First Sea Lord in December 1916. As an initial response, the worst of the existing shells were withdrawn from ships in early 1917 and replaced from reserve supplies. New shells were designed, but did not arrive until April 1918, and were never used in action.
British battlecruisers were designed to chase and destroy enemy cruisers from out of the range of those ships. They were not designed to be ships of the line and exchange broadsides with the enemy. One German and three British battlecruisers were sunk—but none were destroyed by enemy shells penetrating the belt armour and detonating the magazines. Each of the British battlecruisers was penetrated through a turret roof and her magazines ignited by flash fires passing through the turret and shell-handling rooms. Lützow sustained 24 hits and her flooding could not be contained. She was eventually sunk by her escorts' torpedoes after most of her crew had been safely removed (though six trapped stokers died when the ship was scuttled ). Derfflinger and Seydlitz sustained 22 hits each but reached port (although in Seydlitz's case only just).
The disturbing feature of the battlecruiser action is the fact that five German battle-cruisers engaging six British vessels of this class, supported after the first twenty minutes, although at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, were yet able to sink 'Queen Mary' and 'Indefatigable'....The facts which contributed to the British losses, first, were the indifferent armour protection of our battle-cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour, and, second, deck plating and the disadvantage under which our vessels laboured in regard to the light. Of this there can be no question. But it is also undoubted that the gunnery of the German battle-cruisers in the early stages was of a very high standard. — Sir John Jellicoe, Jellicoe's official despatch
Jellicoe and Beatty, as well as other senior officers, gave an
impression that the loss of the battlecruisers was caused by weak
armour, despite reports by two committees and earlier statements by
Jellicoe and other senior officers that
British and German propellant charges differed in packaging,
handling, and chemistry. The British propellant was of two types, MK1
and MD. The Mark 1 cordite had a formula of 37% nitrocellulose, 58%
nitroglycerine, and 5% petroleum jelly. It was a good propellant but
burned hot and caused an erosion problem in gun barrels. The petroleum
jelly served as both a lubricant and a stabiliser.
British cordite propellant (when uncased and exposed in the silk bag) tended to burn violently, causing uncontrollable "flash fires" when ignited by nearby shell hits. In 1945, a test was conducted by the U.S.N. Bureau of Ordnance (Bulletin of Ordnance Information, No.245, pp. 54–60) testing the sensitivity of cordite to then-current U.S. Naval propellant powders against a measurable and repeatable flash source. It found that cordite would ignite at 530 mm/22" from the flash, the current U.S. powder at 120 mm, /5", and the U.S. flashless powder at 25 mm./1"/
This meant that about 75 times the propellant would immediately ignite when exposed to flash, as compared to the U.S. powder. British ships had inadequate protection against these flash fires. German propellant (RP C/12, handled in brass cartridge cases) was less vulnerable and less volatile in composition. German propellants were not that different in composition from cordite—with one major exception: centralite . This was symmetrical Diethyl Diphenyl Urea, which served as a stabiliser that was superior to the petroleum jelly used in British practice. It stored better and burned but did not explode. Stored and used in brass cases, it proved much less sensitive to flash. RP C/12 was composed of 64.13% nitrocellulose, 29.77% nitroglycerine, 5.75% centralite, 0.25% magnesium oxide and 0.10% graphite.
The British cordite charges were stored two silk bags to a metal cylindrical container, with a 16-oz gunpowder igniter charge, which was covered with a thick paper wad, four charges being used on each projectile. The gun crews were removing the charges from their containers and removing the paper covering over the gunpowder igniter charges. The effect of having eight loads at the ready was to have 4 short tons (3,600 kg) of exposed explosive, with each charge leaking small amounts of gunpowder from the igniter bags. In effect, the gun crews had laid an explosive train from the turret to the magazines, and one shell hit to a battlecruiser turret was enough to end a ship.
A diving expedition during the summer of 2003 provided corroboration of this practice. It examined the wrecks of Invincible, Queen Mary, Defence, and Lützow to investigate the cause of the British ships' tendency to suffer from internal explosions. From this evidence, a major part of the blame may be laid on lax handling of the cordite propellant for the shells of the main guns. The wreck of the Queen Mary revealed cordite containers stacked in the working chamber of the X turret instead of the magazine.
There was a further difference in the propellant itself. While the
German RP C/12 burned when exposed to fire, it did not explode, as
opposed to cordite. RP C/12 was extensively studied by the British
and, after World War I, would form the basis of the later
The memoirs of Alexander Grant, Gunner on Lion, suggest that some British officers were aware of the dangers of careless handling of cordite:
With the introduction of cordite to replace powder for firing guns, regulations regarding the necessary precautions for handling explosives became unconsciously considerably relaxed, even I regret to say, to a dangerous degree throughout the Service. The gradual lapse in the regulations on board ship seemed to be due to two factors. First, cordite is a much safer explosive to handle than gun-powder. Second, but more important, the altered construction of the magazines on board led to a feeling of false security....The iron or steel deck, the disappearance of the wood lining, the electric lights fitted inside, the steel doors, open because there was now no chute for passing cartridges out; all this gave officers and men a comparative easiness of mind regarding the precautions necessary with explosive material.
Grant had already introduced measures onboard Lion to limit the number of cartridges kept outside the magazine and to ensure doors were kept closed, probably contributing to her survival.
On 5 June 1916, the First Lord of the
On 22 November 1916, following detailed interviews of the survivors of the destroyed battlecruisers, the Third Sea Lord, Rear Admiral Tudor, issued a report detailing the stacking of charges by the gun crews in the handling rooms to speed up loading of the guns.
After the battle, the B.C.F. Gunnery Committee issued a report (at the command of Admiral David Beatty) advocating immediate changes in flash protection and charge handling. It reported, among other things, that:
* Some vent plates in magazines allowed flash into the magazines and should be retro-fitted to a new standard. * Bulkheads in HMS Lion's magazine showed buckling from fire under pressure (overpressure) – despite being flooded and therefore supported by water pressure – and must be made stronger. * Doors opening inward to magazines were an extreme danger. * Current designs of turrets could not eliminate flash from shell bursts in the turret from reaching the handling rooms. * Ignition pads must not be attached to charges but instead be placed just before ramming. * Better methods must be found for safe storage of ready charges than the current method. * Some method for rapidly drowning charges already in the handling path must be devised. * Handling scuttles (special flash-proof fittings for moving propellant charges through ship's bulkheads), designed to handle overpressure, must be fitted.
The United States Navy in 1939 had quantities of
British gunnery control systems, based on Dreyer tables , were well
in advance of the German ones, as demonstrated by the proportion of
main calibre hits made on the German fleet. Because of its
demonstrated advantages, it was installed on ships progressively as
the war went on, had been fitted to a majority of British capital
ships by May, 1916, and had been installed on the main guns of all but
two of the Grand Fleet's capital ships. The
In the years following the battle the wrecks were slowly discovered.
Invincible was found by the
During 2000–2016 a series of diving and marine survey expeditions
involving veteran shipwreck historian and archaeologist Innes
McCartney has located all of the wrecks sunk in the battle. It was
discovered that over 60% of them had suffered from metal theft. In
2003 McCartney led a detailed survey of the wrecks for the Channel 4
documentary "Clash of the Dreadnoughts". The film examined the last
minutes of the lost ships and revealed for the first time how both 'P'
and 'Q' turrets of Invincible had been blasted out of the ship and
tossed into the sea before she broke in half. This was followed by the
On the 90th anniversary of the battle, in 2006, the UK Ministry of
Defence belatedly announced that the 14 British vessels lost in the
battle were being designated as protected places under the Protection
of Military Remains Act 1986 . This legislation only affects British
ships and citizens and in practical terms offers no real protection
from non-British salvors of the wreck sites. In May 2016 a number of
British newspapers named the Dutch salvage company "Friendship
Offshore" as one of the main salvors of the
The last surviving veteran of the battle,
In 2013, one ship from the battle survives and is still afloat, the
light cruiser HMS Caroline . Decommissioned in 2011, she is docked at
Royal Naval Reserve depot in
The Battle of
In May 2016, the 100th Anniversary commemoration of the Battle of
* Wrath of the Seas (Die versunkene Flotte, D 1926, director Manfred Noa , assistant director Graham Hewett )
World War I
* ^ In this article the terms "torpedo boat" (sometimes "torpedo-boat") and "destroyer" are used interchangeably to refer to the same class of vessels in the German Navy.
* ^ A B C D Nasmith, p. 261
* ^ "The Battle of Jutland". History Learning Site. Retrieved
* ^ Jeremy Black, "Jutland's Place in History," Naval History (June
2016) 30#3 pp 16-21.
* ^ "Distant Victory: The Battle of
* Bennett, Geoffrey (2005). Naval Battles of the First World War.
London: Pen & Sword Military Classics. ISBN 1-84415-300-2 .
* Black, Jeremy. "Jutland's Place in History," Naval History (June
2016) 30#3 pp 16–21.
* Brooks, John (2005).
* Bacon, Reginald (1925). The
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* WW1 Centenary News - Battle of Jutland