Committee for the Independence of Georgia
other Georgian guerrilla groups
Commanders and leaders
Casualties and losses
unknown, estimates light
3,000–3,500 killed in fighting;
7,000–10,000 people executed
August Uprising (Georgian: აგვისტოს
აჯანყება, agvistos adjanq’eba) was an unsuccessful
insurrection against Soviet rule in the Georgian Soviet Socialist
Republic from late August to early September 1924.
Aimed at restoring the independence of Georgia from the Soviet Union,
the uprising was led by the Committee for Independence of Georgia, a
bloc of anti-Soviet political organizations chaired by the Georgian
Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party. It represented the culmination of
a three-year struggle against the
Bolshevik regime that Soviet
Red Army had established in Georgia during a military
campaign against the
Democratic Republic of Georgia
Democratic Republic of Georgia in early 1921.
Red Army and
Cheka troops, under orders of the Georgian Bolsheviks
Joseph Stalin and Sergo Ordzhonikidze, suppressed the insurrection
and instigated a wave of mass repressions that killed several thousand
citizens of Georgia. The August uprising proved one of the last major
rebellions against the early Soviet government, and its defeat marked
a definitive establishment of Soviet rule in Georgia.
3 Outbreak and reaction
6 See also
10 External links
Red Army proclaimed Georgia a
Soviet Socialist Republic
Soviet Socialist Republic on 25
February 1921, when they took control of
Tiflis (Tbilisi), the capital
of Georgia, and forced the Menshevik government into exile.
Loyalty of the Georgian population to the new regime did not come
easily. Within the first three years of their rule, the Bolsheviks
managed to recruit fewer than 10,000 people into their party, while
Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party
Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party still enjoyed
significant popularity in Georgia, counting over 60,000 members in
their organizations. The 1918–1921 independence, though short-lived,
had played a crucial role in the national awakening of Georgia,
winning a popular support to the ruling Georgian Social Democratic
(Menshevik) Party. The forcible
Sovietization and grievances over
the ensuing border rearrangements in which Georgia lost sizeable
portion of its pre-Soviet territories to
Turkey (see Treaty of Kars),
Armenian SSR and Russia, fueled a widespread
opposition to the new regime. The new
Bolshevik government, led by the
Revkom (Revolutionary Committee), enjoyed so little support
among the population that it faced the distinct prospect of
insurrection and civil war. The Bolsheviks had limited ties with
the Georgian peasantry, which was overwhelmingly opposed to
collectivization and dissatisfied over land shortages and other
economic troubles. The situation in the country was further aggravated
by a famine prevailing in many areas and the summer 1921 outbreak of
cholera, which carried off thousands of victims. The desperate
shortage of food and the breakdown of medical services resulted in
heavy mortality, Catholicos Patriarch Leonid being among the dead.
The highly politicized working class of Georgia, with its severe
economic problems, was also hostile toward the new regime as were the
national intelligentsia and nobility who had pledged their loyalty to
the Democratic Republic of Georgia. A delayed transition from the
Revkom's rule to the Soviets' system, subordination of workers'
organizations and trades unions to the
Bolshevik party committees and
Moscow's centralizing policy created a discontent even among the
multiethnic workers of
Tiflis who were the most sympathetic towards
Public discontent within the Georgian society indirectly reflected in
a bitter struggle among Bolsheviks about the way to achieve social and
political transformation in Georgia. Hardliners led by Sergo
Ordzhonikidze, head of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee
(Zakkraikom) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Joseph
People's Commissar for Nationalities for the RSFSR and himself
a Georgian, launched a series of measures aimed at elimination of the
last remnants of Georgia's self-rule. They were opposed by a group of
Georgian Bolsheviks, described by their opponents as "national
deviationists" and led by
Filipp Makharadze and Budu Mdivani, who
advocated tolerance toward the Menshevik opposition, greater democracy
within the party, a moderate approach toward land reform, and, above
all, called for greater autonomy from Moscow and stubbornly opposed
Stalin's project of uniting all the three Transcaucasian republics
economically and politically. The crisis known as the "Georgian
Affair" lasted throughout 1922 and ended with the hardliners' victory.
As a result, Georgia merged with the Armenian and Azerbaijan republics
into the Transcaucasian SFSR—a heavy blow to Georgian national
With the defeat of national deviationists, the Bolsheviks became more
assertive, and suppressed all kinds of opposition. Between April 1922
and October 1923, parties that still retained legal status were forced
to announce their dissolution and declare official loyalty to the
Soviet authorities. Those who continued to operate did so as
underground organizations. The Soviets also persecuted the Georgian
Orthodox Church, closing or demolishing over 1,500 churches and
monasteries. They imprisoned a number of clerics, including
Catholicos Patriarch Ambrose who was arrested and tried for having
sent a letter of protest to the 1922 Genoa Conference, in which he
described the conditions under which Georgia was living since the Red
Army invasion and begged for the "help of the civilized world."
Prince Kote Andronikashvili, chairman of the Damkom (1923–4)
In the course of the
Red Army invasion, part of the defeated Georgian
forces withdrew into the mountains and organized themselves into a
number of small partisan groups. From 1921 to 1922, guerrilla warfare
broke out in several regions of Georgia. In May 1921, the highlanders
of Svaneti, northwestern Georgia, led by Mosestro Dadeshkeliani,
Nestor Gardapkhadze and Bidzina Pirveli, rose in rebellion. After a
resistance of six months, the revolt was put down and its leaders were
purged. In early 1922, the rebellion against the Soviet rule broke out
in Khevsureti, another mountainous district, but in northeast Georgia.
Soviet troops using aviation managed to stop this rebellion from
spreading, but could not crush it completely. Colonel Kakutsa
Cholokashvili, who had led the revolt, managed to escape to the
neighboring Chechnya, whence he made several inroads into Georgia,
preventing the Bolsheviks from gaining a foothold in the eastern
Georgian mountains. The local militsiya chief
Levan Razikashvili was
arrested and later shot for having sympathized with the rebellion.
Still, these revolts were local and spontaneous and did not attract
large masses. Within the period of 1922–1923, 33 of 57 active
guerrilla detachments disintegrated or surrendered to the Soviet
authorities. The deplorable situation of the anti-Soviet opposition
forced all major underground parties to seek closer cooperation. The
negotiations proceeded slowly, however, and it was not until mid-1922
Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party
Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party reached an
agreement with their formal rivals—the National Democrats and some
other political groups—to coordinate their efforts against the
Bolsheviks. Soon the opposition parties congregated into an
underground movement known as the Committee for the Independence of
Georgia or the "Damkom" (short for damoukideblobis komiteti, Committee
for Independence). Sponsored by the government of Georgia-in-exile,
the Damkom began preparations for a general uprising in Georgia. The
organization set up a "Military Center" and appointed General Spiridon
Chavchavadze the commander-in-chief of all rebel forces. Several
members of the former
Democratic Republic of Georgia
Democratic Republic of Georgia government
returned clandestinely from exile, including the former Minister of
Agriculture, Noe Khomeriki, as well as the former commander of the
National Guard, Valiko Jugheli. The organizers, encouraged by the
Georgian emigrants in Europe, had still more expectations that the
Western powers intended to help. They also hoped that the Georgian
revolt would further other Caucasian peoples to rise in arms, but the
secret negotiations with Armenian and Azeri nationalists yielded no
results and even more promising talks with the
Muslim Chechen leader,
Ali Mitayev, were finally aborted due to mass arrests and repressions
in Northern Caucasus.
The Georgian branch of the Soviet secret police, Cheka,[note 1] with
recently appointed Deputy Chief
Lavrentiy Beria playing a leading
role, managed to penetrate the organization and carried out mass
arrests. A prominent Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party
activist, David Sagirashvili, was arrested and then deported to
Germany in October 1922 along with sixty-two other members of Georgian
Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party. A heavy loss was sustained in
February 1923 by the Georgian opposition, when fifteen members of the
military center were arrested. Among them were the principal leaders
of the resistance movement, Generals Kote Abkhazi, Alexander
Andronikashvili and Varden Tsulukidze; they were executed on 19 May
1923. In March 1923 the
Cheka discovered an underground Menshevik
printshop and arrested several oppositionists. The Georgian Social
Democratic (Menshevik) Party leaders Noe Khomeriki, Benia
Valiko Jugheli too fell in the hands of the
Cheka on 9 November 1923, 25 July 1924, and 6 August 1924,
Under these circumstances, some Georgians doubted whether the uprising
could be successful. The captured rebel leader, Jugheli, urged Cheka
officials to allow him to inform his comrades that their plans had
been discovered and advise them to abandon their proposed revolt, but
Cheka refused. Jugheli's message still reached the rebels, but
the conspirators decided that this might have been a
and went ahead with plans for the uprising.
There are many indications that the Soviet intelligence had been, at a
certain level, implicated in provoking the uprising. The Cheka,
employing secret agents in local socialist circles, were well informed
of the conspiracy and popular dissatisfaction of the
Instructed by Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, Beria and his superior,
Kvantaliani, actually encouraged the rebellion so they would have a
pretext for eliminating all political opposition and avenging personal
scores with their former rivals in Georgia.
Outbreak and reaction
Colonel Kakutsa Cholokashvili, a guerrilla leader, during the
On 18 August 1924, the Damkom laid plans for a general insurrection
for 2:00 am 29 August. The plan of the simultaneous uprising
miscarried, however, and, through some misunderstanding, the mining
town of Chiatura, western Georgia, rose in rebellion a day earlier, on
28 August. This enabled the Soviet government to timely put all
available forces in the region on alert. Yet, at first the insurgents
achieved considerable success and formed an Interim Government of
Georgia chaired by Prince Giorgi Tsereteli. The uprising quickly
spread to neighboring areas and a large portion of western Georgia and
several districts in eastern Georgia wrested out of the Soviet
The success of the uprising was short-lived, however. Although the
insurrection went further than the
Cheka had anticipated, the reaction
of the Soviet authorities was prompt. Stalin dissipated any doubt in
Moscow of the significance of the disorders in Georgia by the one
word: "Kronstadt", referring to the Kronstadt rebellion, a large scale
though unsuccessful mutiny by Soviet sailors in 1921. Additional Red
Army troops under the overall command of
Semyon Pugachev were promptly
sent in and Georgia's coastline was blockaded to prevent a landing of
Georgian émigré groups. Detachments of the
Red Army and Cheka
attacked the first insurgent towns in western Georgia—Chiatura,
Senaki and Abasha—as early as 29 August and managed to force the
rebels into forests and mountains by 30 August. The
Red Army forces
employed artillery and aviation to fight the guerrillas who still
continued to offer resistance, especially in the province of Guria, a
home region to many Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party
leaders and thus overwhelmingly disloyal to the
Batumi and some larger towns, where the Bolsheviks enjoyed
more authority, remained quiet as did
Abkhazia and most of the
territories compactly settled by ethnic minorities.
Following the setback suffered by the insurgents in the west, the
epicenter of the revolt shifted into eastern Georgia, where, on 29
August, a large rebel force under Colonel Cholokashvili assaulted the
Red Army barracks in Manglisi, on southwestern approaches of Tiflis,
but was driven back by Soviet troops, who had heavily fortified all
strategic positions in and around the capital. Reinforcements failed
and Cholokashvili's forces were left isolated, forcing them to retreat
eastward into the
Kakheti province. On 3 September Cholokashvili made
the last desperate attempt to turn a tide of the rebellion and took
the town of
Dusheti in a surprise attack. However, he could not hold
Red Army counter-offensive and withdrew into mountains. The
suppression of the rebellion was accompanied by a full scale outbreak
of the Red Terror, "unprecedented even in the most tragic moments of
the revolution" as the French author
Boris Souvarine puts it. The
scattered guerrilla resistance continued for several weeks, but by
mid-September most of the main rebel groups had been destroyed.
On 4 September the
Cheka discovered the rebels' chief headquarters at
Shio-Mgvime Monastery near the town of Mtskheta, and arrested
Prince Andronikashvili, the Damkom chairman, and his associates
Javakhishvili, Ishkhneli, Jinoria, and Bochorishvili. On the same day,
Beria met with the arrested oppositionists in Tiflis, and proposed to
issue a declaration urging the partisans to put down their arms. The
committee members, tied up and facing death themselves, accepted the
proposal on the condition that an order to stop mass executions be
given immediately. Beria agreed and the rebels signed the declaration
in order to put an end to the bloodshed.
The Soviet security officer
Lavrentiy Beria rose to prominence for his
role in quashing the rebellion
The persecutions did not end, however. In violation of the promise
made by Beria to the arrested opposition leaders, mass arrests and
executions continued. The political guidance of the anti-revolt
operations was effected by the GPU chief in Georgia, Solomon
Mogilevsky,[note 2] and the repressions were largely supported by the
Transcaucasian Central Committee.[note 3] Stalin himself is quoted to
have vowed that "all of Georgia must be plowed under".
In a series of raids, the
Red Army and
Cheka detachments killed
thousands of civilians, exterminating entire families including women
and children. Mass executions took place in prisons,[note 4]
where people were killed without trial, including even those in prison
at the time of the rebellion. Hundreds of arrested were shot
directly in railway trunks, so that the dead bodies could be removed
faster—a new and effective technical invention by the
The exact number of casualties and the victims of the purges remains
unknown. Approximately 3,000 died in fighting. The number of those
who were executed during the uprising or in its immediate aftermath
amounted to 7,000–10,000 or even more. According to the most
recent accounts included also in
The Black Book of Communism
The Black Book of Communism (Harvard
University Press, 1999), 12,578 people were put to death from 29
August to 5 September 1924. About 20,000 people were deported to
Siberia and Central Asian deserts.
A Soviet-era monument in Sukhumi, dedicated to the
who "fell in the struggle against the enemies of the Soviet power in
1924". A 1969 photo from the RIAN archive.
Reports of the extent of the repressions caused an outcry among
socialists abroad. Leaders of the
Second International sent a
resolution to the
League of Nations
League of Nations condemning the Soviet government,
but did not achieve any substantial results. Clara Zetkin, a notable
German Social Democrat, attempted to counteract the negative
Tiflis and then wrote a leaflet on Georgia, in
which she claimed that only 320 persons had been shot. Nonetheless
the public outcry resulted in unpleasant repercussions for the central
government in Moscow, prompting the
Politburo to set up a special
commission, led by Ordzhonikidze, to investigate the causes of the
uprising and the
Cheka activities during its elimination. In October
1924, following the issuance of the commission's report, some members
of the Georgian
Cheka were purged as "unreliable elements" who were
presumably offered up as scapegoats for the atrocities.
Ordzhonikidze himself admitted before a meeting of the Central
Committee in Moscow in October 1924 that "perhaps we did go a little
far, but we couldn't help ourselves."
On 7 October 1924, the Soviet administration (Sovnarkom, "Council of
People's Commissars") of Georgia declared an amnesty to all
participants of the revolt who surrendered voluntarily. In early March
1925, the Chairman of the All-Union Executive Committee, Mikhail
Kalinin, arrived in Georgia and called for the amnesty of the
participants of the August 1924 insurrection, and for the suspension
of religious persecutions. As a result, the
Cheka grip in Georgia was
relatively eased (for example, Catholicos Patriarch Ambrose and the
members of the Patriarchal Council were released), military
pacification was completed and an appearance of normality returned to
the country, but Georgians had suffered a shock from which they never
completely recovered. The uprising was a last armed effort of
Georgians to oust the
Bolshevik regime and regain their
independence. The most active pro-independence part of the
Georgian society, nobility, military officers and intellectual elites
were virtually exterminated. Only a few survivors such as
Cholokashvili, Lashkarashvili and some of their associates managed to
escape abroad.[note 5] The Georgian émigré Irakly Tsereteli
considered the event disastrous both for the future of social
democracy and of Georgia. The failure of the uprising and the
intensified police repression that followed decimated the Menshevik
organization in Georgia and it no longer was a threat to the
Bolsheviks. However, Beria and his colleagues continued to use a
"menshevik danger" as an excuse for reprisals in Georgia. During the
years 1925–6 at least 500 socialists were shot without trial.
The uprising was also exploited as the pretext for disrupting Tiflis
University, which was seen by the Bolsheviks as a shelter of Georgian
nationalism. Despite the fact that several leading academics, who
sympathized with or even participated in the anti-Soviet movement,
eventually distanced themselves from the idea of an armed revolt and
even denounced it in a special statement, the university was purged of
unreliable elements and placed under the complete control of the
Communist Party. Substantial changes were made in its structure,
curriculum, and personnel, including the dismissal of the Rector, a
noted historian Ivane Javakhishvili.
On the other hand, the events in Georgia demonstrated the necessity
for greater concessions to the peasants; Stalin declared that an
August 1924 uprising in Georgia was sparked by dissatisfaction among
the peasants and called the party to conciliate them. He admitted that
"what has happened in Georgia may happen throughout Russia, unless we
make a complete change in our attitude to the peasantry" and placed
the responsibility for the errors committed on subordinate officials.
Vyacheslav Molotov, an influential member of the Politburo, for his
part declared: "Georgia provides a startling example of the breach
between the Party and the mass of the peasantry in the country."
As a result, the Communist Party of Georgia chose, for the time being,
to use peaceful persuasion rather than armed coercion to extend their
influence over the peasant masses, and to moderate the attempts to
enforce collectivization. The extension of the radical land reform
and the relative freedom granted peasants reduced hostility to the new
regime. Although the last attributes of Georgia's political and
economic sovereignty, which both the Mensheviks and the "national
Communists" had fought to preserve, had been eliminated, the final
victory of the Soviet power in Georgia was accompanied by moderate
economic growth, that ensured relative stability in the country.
Another important factor in lessening opposition to the Bolsheviks,
particularly from the intelligentsia, was the policy of "nativization"
pursued by the Soviet government in the 1920s; Georgian art, language,
and learning were promoted; the spread of literacy was sponsored and
the role of ethnic Georgians in administrative and cultural
Under the Soviet Union, the
August Uprising remained a taboo theme and
was hardly mentioned at all, if not in its ideological content. Using
its control over education and the media, the Soviet propaganda
machine denounced the Georgian rebellion as a "bloody adventure
initiated by the
Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party
Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party and
other reactionary forces who managed to implicate a small and
undereducated part of the population in it." With a new tide of
independence movement sweeping throughout Georgia in the late 1980s,
the anti-Soviet fighters of 1924, particularly, the leading partisan
officer Kakutsa Cholokashvili, emerged as a major symbol of Georgian
patriotism and national resistance to the Soviet rule. The process of
legal "rehabilitation" (exoneration) of the victims of the 1920s
repressions began under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of Glasnost
("openness") and was completed in the 25 May 1992 decree issued by the
State Council of the Republic of Georgia chaired by Eduard
Shevardnadze. In connection with the opening of the Museum of
Soviet Occupation in May 2006, the Ministry of Interior of Georgia
made public more archival reserves, and started to publish names of
victims of the 1924 purges and other materials from the Soviet era
February Uprising, a similar anti-Soviet uprising in Armenia in 1921
^ A large number of
Cheka members came from the 11th Red Army, a
conqueror of Georgia, which had disbanded in June 1921.
^ Mogilevsky was killed in a plane crash on 22 March 1925. There has
always been a strong suspicion that a young Georgian airman who was
piloting the plane crashed deliberately, killing himself, Mogilevsky
and two other high-ranking officials, who had been involved in the
suppression of the August Uprising.
^ "Mikhail Kakhiani, a member of the Georgian Central Committee, made
a speech shortly after the revolt in which he congratulated the Cheka
for "acting splendidly" by quelling the rising so precipitously. He
also stated: "Let everyone remember that the Soviet regime deals
cruelly and mercilessly with those who are considered to be organizers
of the insurrection... If we had not shot them we would have committed
a great crime against the Georgian workers." 
^ Colonel Cholokashvili’s daughter, Tsitsna, who was arrested
despite her minority, later "described one incident at the Telavi
prison during 1924, when a young Chekist was suddenly confronted with
his father, who was sentenced to execution along with a whole group in
one night. When ordered to shoot his own father, the young man shot
his two superiors. This led to an all-night "blood orgy" in which
hundreds of prisoners were massacred. "The streets were red with
blood," recalled Cholokashvili." 
^ The last survivor of the 1924 insurrection, Georges Lomadzé,
died as an émigré in Paris in March 2005.
^ Anton Ciliga, Au pays du mensonge déconcertant, 1938
^ (French) Mirian Méloua : "First Republic".
^ Knight, p. 26.
^ a b Lang, p. 238.
^ Nodia and Scholtbach, p. 93
^ Surguladze, p. 253.
^ a b Lang, p. 241.
^ (French) Kakutsa Cholokashvili.
^ (French) Mirian Méloua : "First Republic into exile".
^ (French) Noe Khomeriki.
^ (French) Valiko Jugheli.
^ Knight, p. 30.
^ a b c Knight, p. 237.
^ (French) Benia Chkhikvishvili.
^ a b Knight, p. 32
^ a b Souvarine, p. 372.
^ Suny, p. 223
^ a b Knight, p. 33.
^ a b c d e Lang, p. 243.
^ a b c Knight, p. 34.
^ Meyer (2001)
^ Rummel, p. 68.
^ Surguladze, p. 255.
^ Cohen, p. 77
^ a b c Pethybridge, p. 256
^ (French) Georges Lomadzé.
^ (in French) Le cimetière communal et son carré géorgien.
Samchoblo – French community in France website. Retrieved 30 April
^ (French) Irakli Tsereteli.
^ a b Surguladze, p. 257.
^ Knight, p. 35.
^ a b Lang, p. 245
^ Souvarine, p. 373
^ a b Suny, p. 236.
^ გ. ჯანგველაძე (G. Jangveladze),
"მენშევიზმი" (Menshevism). ქართული
ტომი 6 (Georgian Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 6), Tbilisi: 1983.
^ The Memorial. "Декрет Государственного
Совета Республики Грузия О
восстановлении справедливости в
отношении лиц, подвергшихся
репрессиям в 1921—1924 гг. за участие в
Грузии: The Decree on restoring justice towards the persons who
were subjected to the repressions of 1921–1924 for their
participation in the national-liberation struggle of Georgia (full
text in Russian)" (in Russian). Retrieved 17 December 2006.
^ საქართველოს შინაგან
საქმეთა სამინისტრო (Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Georgia). "საარქივო
სამმართველო (Archive Administration)" (in
Georgian). Archived from the original on 8 October 2007. Retrieved 17
ვალერი ბენიძე (Valeri Benidze) (1991), 1924
საქართველოში (1924 Uprising in Georgia).
Tbilisi: სამშობლო ("Samshoblo") (in Georgian)
ლევან ზ. ურუშაძე (Levan Z. Urushadze)
(2006), ქაიხოსრო (ქაქუცა)
ბიოგრაფიისათვის (For the biography of
Kaikhosro (Kakutsa) Cholokashvili).- "ამირანი"
("Amirani"), XIV-XV, მონრეალი-თბილისი
(Montreal-Tbilisi), pages 147–166, ISSN 1512-0449 (in Georgian,
Ariel Cohen (1998), Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis.
Praeger/Greenwood, ISBN 978-0-275-96481-8.
Raymond Duguet (1927), Moscou et la Géorgie martyre. Préface de C.
B. Stokes. Paris: Tallandier.
Stephen F. Jones (October 1988). "The Establishment of Soviet Power in
Transcaucasia: The Case of Georgia 1921–1928". Soviet Studies. 40,
No. 4 (4): 616–639. JSTOR 151812.
Amy W. Knight (1993), Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, ISBN 978-0-691-01093-9.
David Marshall Lang (1962). A Modern History of Georgia, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Karl E. Meyer (Summer 2001). "Icebergs in the Caucasus". World Policy
Journal CODA. XVIII (2). Archived from the original on 7 October
Ghia Nodia, Álvaro Pinto Scholtbach, coordinators-editors (2006), The
Political Landscape of Georgia. Eburon Delft,
Roger William Pethybridge (1990), One Step Backwards, Two Steps
Forward: Soviet Society and Politics in the New Economic Policy,
Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-821927-9.
Rudolph J. Rummel
Rudolph J. Rummel (1990), Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass
Murder Since 1917. Transaction Publishers,
Boris Souvarine (2005), Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism,
Kessinger Publishing, ISBN 978-1-4191-1307-9.
Ronald Grigor Suny (1994), The Making of the Georgian Nation: 2nd
edition, Indiana University Press, ISBN 978-0-253-20915-3.
Akaki Surguladze, Paata Surguladze (1991),
საქართველოს ისტორია, 1783–1990
(History of Georgia, 1783–1990), Tbilisi: Meroni. (in Georgian)
Markus Wehner (1995). "Le soulèvement géorgien de 1924 et la
réaction des bolcheviks". Communisme. n° 42/43/44: 155–170.
A documentary film "1924" (includes original footage) on YouTube[dead
link]. Retrieved from
YouTube on 4 September 2007.
(French) Mirian Méloua : "L'insurrection nationale géorgienne
des 28 et 29