Coordinates: 21°22′N 157°57′W / 21.367°N 157.950°W /
Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Asia and the Pacific Theater of World War II
Battleship Row taken from a Japanese plane at the
beginning of the attack. The explosion in the center is a torpedo
strike on USS West Virginia. Two attacking Japanese planes can be
seen: one over USS Neosho and one over the Naval Yard.
December 7, 1941; 76 years ago (1941-12-07)
Primarily Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory, U.S.
Major Japanese tactical victory; precipitated the entrance of the
United States into World War II
See consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor
Commanders and leaders
ADM Husband E. Kimmel
LTG Walter Short
VADM Chūichi Nagumo
ADM Isoroku Yamamoto
CDR Mitsuo Fuchida
3 USCG Cutters[nb 1]
47 other ships
6 aircraft carriers
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
23 fleet submarines
5 midget submarines
Casualties and losses
4 battleships sunk
4 battleships damaged
1 ex-battleship sunk
1 harbor tug sunk
3 cruisers damaged[nb 2]
3 destroyers damaged
3 other ships damaged
188 aircraft destroyed
159 aircraft damaged
4 midget submarines sunk
1 midget submarine grounded
29 aircraft destroyed
1 sailor captured
3 aircraft shot down
Hawaiian Islands Campaign
Johnston and Palmyra
Dutch East Indies
Gilberts & Marshalls
Marianas & Palau
Volcano & Ryukyu
Indian Ocean (1940–45)
Dutch East Indies
Strategic bombing (1944–45)
Dutch East Indies 1941–42
Attack on Pearl Harbor
Estevan Point Lighthouse
Lookout Air Raids
Volcano & Ryukyu Is
Hiroshima & Nagasaki
Second Sino-Japanese War
The attack on
Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike by the
Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service
Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service against the
United States naval
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory, on the morning of December 7,
1941. The attack, also known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor, led to
the United States' entry into World War II. The Japanese military
leadership referred to the attack as the Hawaii Operation and
Operation AI, and as Operation Z during its planning.
Japan intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the U.S.
Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions that were planned
Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the next seven hours
there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines,
Guam and Wake Island and on the
British Empire in Malaya, Singapore,
and Hong Kong.
The attack commenced at 7:48 a.m.
Hawaiian Time (18:18 GMT).[nb
3] The base was attacked by 353 Imperial Japanese aircraft
(including fighters, level and dive bombers, and torpedo bombers) in
two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers. All eight U.S.
Navy battleships were damaged, with four sunk. All but the
USS Arizona were later raised, and six were returned to service
and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged
three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship,[nb
4] and one minelayer. One hundred eighty-eight U.S. aircraft were
destroyed; 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were
wounded. Important base installations such as the power station,
dry dock, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage
facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building
(also home of the intelligence section), were not attacked. Japanese
losses were light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 64
servicemen killed. One Japanese sailor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured.
The surprise attack came as a profound shock to the American people
and led directly to the American entry into
World War II
World War II in both the
Pacific and European theaters. The following day, December 8, the
United States declared war on Japan, and several days later,
on December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S. The U.S.
responded with a declaration of war against Germany and Italy.
Domestic support for non-interventionism, which had been fading since
Fall of France
Fall of France in 1940, disappeared.
There were numerous historical precedents for unannounced military
action by Japan, but the lack of any formal warning, particularly
while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt to proclaim December 7, 1941, "a date which will
live in infamy". Because the attack happened without a declaration of
war and without explicit warning, the attack on
Pearl Harbor was later
judged in the Tokyo Trials to be a war crime.
1 Background to conflict
1.1 Diplomatic background
1.2 Military planning
2 Approach and attack
2.2 Japanese declaration of war
2.3 First wave composition
2.4 Second wave composition
2.5 American casualties and damage
2.6 Japanese losses
2.7 Possible third wave
3 Ships lost or damaged
3.2 Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)
5.2 Strategic implications
5.3 Retrospective debate on American intelligence
6 In popular culture
7 See also
9 External links
Background to conflict
Main article: Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor
War between Japan and the
United States had been a possibility that
each nation had been aware of (and developed contingency plans for)
since the 1920s, though tensions did not begin to grow seriously until
Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan
continued to expand into China, leading to all-out war between those
countries in 1937. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate
China and achieve sufficient resource independence to attain victory
on the mainland; the "Southern Operation" was designed to assist these
Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941, looking southwest
From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Panay,
the Allison incident, and the
Nanking Massacre (the International
Military Tribunal of the Far East concluded that more than 200,000
Chinese non-combatants were killed in indiscriminate massacres, though
other estimates have ranged from 40,000 to more than 300,000) swung
public opinion in the West sharply against Japan. Fearing Japanese
expansion, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
provided loan assistance for war supply contracts to China.
In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to control
supplies reaching China. The
United States halted shipments of
airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline to Japan, which
was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act.[nb 5] The U.S. did not
stop oil exports to Japan at that time in part because prevailing
sentiment in Washington was that such an action would be an extreme
step that Japan would likely consider a provocation, given Japanese
dependence on U.S. oil.
In mid-1940 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt moved the Pacific Fleet to
Hawaii from its previous base in San Diego. He also ordered a
military buildup in the Philippines, both in the hope of discouraging
Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command
was (mistakenly) certain that any attack on the UK's Southeast Asian
colonies, including Singapore, would bring the U.S. into war, a
devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to avoid
U.S. naval interference. An invasion of the
Philippines was also
considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan
Orange had envisioned defending the
Philippines with a 40,000-man
elite force. This was opposed by Douglas MacArthur, who felt that he
would need a force ten times that size, and was never
implemented.[self-published source] By 1941, U.S. planners
anticipated abandonment of the
Philippines at the outbreak of war and
orders to that effect were given in late 1941 to Admiral Thomas Hart,
commander of the Asiatic Fleet.
The U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following Japanese
expansion into French Indochina after the Fall of France, in part
because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.
This in turn caused the Japanese to proceed with plans to take the
Dutch East Indies, an oil-rich territory.[nb 6] On August 17,
Roosevelt warned Japan that the U.S. was prepared to take steps
against Japan if it attacked "neighboring countries". The Japanese
were faced with the option of either withdrawing from China and losing
face or seizing and securing new sources of raw materials in the
resource-rich, European-controlled colonies of Southeast Asia.
Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941
in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan
offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina when peace was
made with the Nationalist government, adopt an independent
interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, and not to discriminate in
trade provided all other countries reciprocated. Washington rejected
these proposals. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye then offered to meet
with Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on coming to an agreement
before any meeting. The U.S. ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged
Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to
preserve the conciliatory Konoye government and peace in the
Pacific. His recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoye
government collapsed the following month when the Japanese military
refused to agree to the withdrawal of all troops from China.
Japan's final proposal, on November 20, offered to withdraw their
forces from southern Indochina and not to launch any attacks in
Southeast Asia provided that the U.S., the UK, and the Netherlands
ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan. The
American counter-proposal of November 26 (November 27 in Japan) (the
Hull note) required Japan to evacuate all of China without conditions
and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. However the day
Hull Note was delivered, on November 26 in Japan, the main
Japanese attack fleet left port for Pearl Harbor.
Preliminary planning for an attack on
Pearl Harbor to protect the move
into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch
East Indies and
Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941
under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding
Japan's Combined Fleet. He won assent to formal planning and
training for an attack from the
Imperial Japanese Navy
Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff
only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat
to resign his command. Full-scale planning was underway by early
spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka, with
assistance from Captain
Minoru Genda and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of
Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima. The planners studied the 1940
British air attack on the Italian fleet at
Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was
adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations,
Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5,
after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the
matter. Final authorization was not given by the emperor until
December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "Hull
Note" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger
Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea."
By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the
U.S. and Japan were imminent. A
Gallup poll just before the attack on
Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27%
did not, and 21% had no opinion. While U.S. Pacific bases and
facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, U.S. officials
Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected
Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to
the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval
base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of
supplies to Japan from territory to the south. They also
incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than
one major naval operation at a time.
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to
destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific
Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies
and Malaya and to enable Japan to conquer
Southeast Asia without
interference. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to
consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before
shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance
of victory. Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to
mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the
main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the
time. Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine
American morale such that the U.S. government would drop its demands
contrary to Japanese interests, and would seek a compromise peace with
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in
Pearl Harbor carried two
distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow
water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair
them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would
be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further
important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the
Japanese—was the absence from
Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, and
Saratoga). IJN top command was attached to Admiral Mahan's "decisive
battle" doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of
battleships. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press
Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious
war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard,
oil tank farms, and submarine base, were ignored, since—by their
thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these
facilities would be felt.
Approach and attack
See also: Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
Route followed by the Japanese fleet to
Pearl Harbor and back
Imperial Japanese Navy
Imperial Japanese Navy
Mitsubishi A6M Zero
Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter on the aircraft
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of
six aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and
Zuikaku—departed Hittokapu Bay on Kasatka (now Iterup) Island in the
Kurile Islands, en route to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending
to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two
attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including
nine fighters from the first wave.
The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was
to attack carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its second,
with battleships as the third target. The first wave carried most
of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted Type
91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism
and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water. The
aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships
and aircraft carriers) or, if these were not present, any other high
value ships (cruisers and destroyers). First wave dive bombers were to
attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as
many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the
air to intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the
fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers
and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed,
especially over U.S. airfields.
Before the attack commenced, two reconnaissance aircraft launched from
cruisers Chikuma and Tone were sent to scout over Oahu and Maui and
report on U.S. fleet composition and location. Reconnaissance aircraft
flights risked alerting the U.S., and were not necessary. U.S.
fleet composition and preparedness information in
Pearl Harbor was
already known due to the reports of the Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa.
A report of the absence of the U.S. fleet in Lahaina anchorage off
Maui was received from the fleet submarine I-72. Another four
scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force
(the Kidō Butai) and Niihau, to detect any counterattack.
Fleet submarines I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 each embarked a Type
A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu. The five
Kure Naval District on November 25, 1941. On December
6, they came to within 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) of the
mouth of Pearl Harbor and launched their midget subs at about
01:00[clarification needed] on December 7. At 03:42 Hawaiian
Time, the minesweeper Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope
southwest of the
Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer
Ward. The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, Ward sank
another midget submarine at 06:37[nb 9] in the first American
shots in the Pacific Theater. A midget submarine on the north side of
Ford Island missed the seaplane tender Curtiss with her first torpedo
and missed the attacking destroyer Monaghan with her other one before
being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.
A third midget submarine, Ha-19, grounded twice, once outside the
harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was
captured on December 8. Ensign
Kazuo Sakamaki swam ashore and was
Hawaii National Guard Corporal David Akui, becoming the
first Japanese prisoner of war.[nb 10] A fourth had been damaged by a
depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire
its torpedoes. Japanese forces received a radio message from a
midget submarine at 00:41 on December 8 claiming damage to one or more
large warships inside Pearl Harbor.
In 1992, 2000, and 2001, Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory's
submersibles found the wreck of the fifth midget submarine lying in
three parts outside Pearl Harbor. The wreck was in the debris field
where much surplus U.S. equipment was dumped after the war, including
vehicles and landing craft. Both of its torpedoes were missing. This
correlates with reports of two torpedoes fired at the light cruiser
St. Louis at 10:04 at the entrance of Pearl Harbor, and a possible
torpedo fired at destroyer Helm at 08:21.
Japanese declaration of war
See also: Japanese war crimes
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by
Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally
stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes
after Japan had informed the
United States that peace negotiations
were at an end. However, the attack began before the
notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5000-word
notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to
the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Transcribing the message took too
long for the Japanese ambassador to deliver it on schedule; in the
event, it was not presented until more than an hour after the attack
began. (In fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and
translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to
deliver it.) The final part is sometimes described as a
declaration of war. While it was viewed by a number of senior U.S
government and military officials as a very strong indicator
negotiations were likely to be terminated and that war might break
out at any moment, it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic
relations. A declaration of war was printed on the front page of
Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but not
delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.
For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without
first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents
and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to
Washington. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and
international relations at
International Christian University
International Christian University in
Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside
the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of
Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including
a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "[O]ur deceptive diplomacy
is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The
diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper
declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of
negotiations ... and they clearly prevailed."
In any event, even if the Japanese had decoded and delivered the
14-Part Message before the beginning of the attack, it would not have
constituted either a formal break of diplomatic relations or a
declaration of war. The final two paragraphs of the message read:
Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has
finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement
through further negotiations.
First wave composition
The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by
U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical miles (252 km), but was
USAAF bombers arriving from the American mainland
Ford Island NAS B.
Hickam Field C.
Bellows Field D. Wheeler Field
E. Kaneohe NAS F. Ewa MCAS R-1. Opana
Radar Station R-2. Kawailoa RS
R-3. Kaaawa RS
G. Haleiwa H. Kahuku I. Wahiawa J. Kaneohe K. Honolulu
0. B-17s from mainland 1. First strike group 1-1. Level bombers 1–2.
Torpedo bombers 1–3. Dive bombers 2. Second strike group 2-1. Level
bombers 2-1F. Fighters 2-2. Dive bombers
A. Wake Island B. Midway Islands C. Johnston Island D. Hawaii
D-1. Oahu 1. USS Lexington 2. USS Enterprise 3. First Air Fleet
< 21 feet (6.4 m)
22–23 feet (6.7–7.0 m)
29 feet (8.8 m)
30–32 feet (9.1–9.8 m)
33–34 feet (10.1–10.4 m)
34–35 feet (10.4–10.7 m)
36–37 feet (11.0–11.3 m)
38–39 feet (11.6–11.9 m)
40–41 feet (12.2–12.5 m)
42–48 feet (12.8–14.6 m)
> 49 feet (14.9 m)
1: USS California
2: USS Maryland
3: USS Oklahoma
4: USS Tennessee
5: USS West Virginia
6: USS Arizona
7: USS Nevada
8: USS Pennsylvania
Ford Island NAS
10: Hickam field
Ignored infrastructure targets:
A: Oil storage tanks
B: CINCPAC headquarters building
C: Submarine base
D: Navy Yard
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, led by
Commander Mitsuo Fuchida. Six planes failed to launch due to
technical difficulties. It included:[nb 11]
1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)
Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb)
armor-piercing bombs, organized in four sections (1 failed to launch)
40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections
2nd Group – (targets:
Ford Island and Wheeler Field)
Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg)
general-purpose bombs (3 failed to launch)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler
Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
43 Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters for air control and strafing (2
failed to launch)
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army
SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's northern tip. This post
had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.
The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard, reported
a target. But Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a newly assigned officer
at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled
arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. The Japanese planes were
approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees
difference) to the bombers, and while the operators had never seen
a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its
size. Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of
the six B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known).
As the first wave planes approached Oahu, they encountered and shot
down several U.S. aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat
incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance
were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking
planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any
warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted
correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in
Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though
MacArthur had almost nine hours warning that the Japanese had already
attacked Pearl Harbor.
The air portion of the attack began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian
Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by
ships of the Kido Butai),[nb 3] with the attack on Kaneohe. A
total of 353 Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow,
vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first
moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the
battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu,
starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main
U.S. Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave
attacked the Army Air Forces'
Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the
windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial
opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks, and some
SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the carrier Enterprise.[nb 12]
A destroyed Vindicator at Ewa field, the victim of one of the smaller
attacks on the approach to Pearl Harbor
In the first wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800 kg
(1760 lb) armor-piercing bombs dropped hit their intended
battleship targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact,
another detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a
dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, and four
torpedoes hit other ships. Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the
sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed
men to dress as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous
message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.",[nb 13] was sent
from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian
command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition
lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to
prevent sabotage, guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s, only a
quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in
action). Despite this low alert status, many American military
personnel responded effectively during the attack.[nb 14] Ensign Joe
Taussig Jr., aboard Nevada, commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and
was severely wounded, but continued to be on post. Lt. Commander F. J.
Thomas commanded Nevada in the captain's absence and got her under way
until the ship was grounded at 9:10 a.m. One of the
destroyers, Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all
ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea
for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back
aboard. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding West Virginia, led his
men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit
Tennessee, moored alongside.
Second wave composition
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and
36 A6Ms, commanded by
Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki.
Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.
This wave and its targets comprised:
1st Group – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and
132 lb (60 kg) general-purpose bombs
27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers
27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
78 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general-purpose bombs, in
four sections (3 aborted)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler
Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
35 A6Ms for defense and strafing (1 aborted)
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to
attack Kāneʻohe, the rest
Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections
arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several
American casualties and damage
Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. Two thousand and
eight sailors were killed, and 710 others wounded; 218 soldiers and
airmen (who were part of the Army until the independent U.S. Air Force
was formed in 1947) were killed and 364 wounded; 109 marines were
killed and 69 wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 wounded. In
total, 2,403 Americans died and 1,178 were wounded.[self-published
source] Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five
battleships. All of the Americans killed or wounded during the
attack were non-combatants, given the fact there was no state of war
when the attack occurred.
USS Arizona during the attack
USS Nevada, on fire and down at the bow, attempting to leave the
harbor before being deliberately beached
Of the American fatalities, nearly half were due to the explosion of
Arizona's forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 16-inch
(410 mm) shell.[nb 15]
Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, Nevada attempted
to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she
got under way and sustained more hits from 250 lb (113 kg)
bombs, which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to
avoid blocking the harbor entrance.
USS West Virginia was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs during the
California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have
kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were
raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West
Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look
worse than it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by
torpedoes. West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh
tearing away her rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last
two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. Maryland was
hit by two of the converted 16" shells, but neither caused serious
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels
present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena
was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the
neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock, Cassin and
Downes were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The
leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight
fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. Cassin
slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes. The light
cruiser Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was
damaged, but remained in service. The repair vessel Vestal, moored
alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane
tender Curtiss was also damaged. The destroyer Shaw was badly damaged
when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.
This message denotes the first U.S. ship, St. Louis to clear Pearl
Harbor. (National Archives and Records Administration) (Note that this
is in answer to question "Is channel clear?" and faint writing at
bottom concerning the answer being held until St. Louis had
Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159
damaged, 155 of them on the ground. Almost none were actually
ready to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Forces pilots
managed to get airborne during the attack and six were credited
with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack: 1st Lt.
Lewis M. Sanders, 2nd Lt. Philip M. Rasmussen, 2nd Lt. Kenneth M.
Taylor, 2nd Lt. George S. Welch, 2nd Lt. Harry W. Brown, and 2nd Lt.
Gordon H. Sterling Jr. Sterling was shot down by Lt. Fujita over
Kaneohe Bay and is listed as Body Not Recovered (not Missing In
Action). Lt. John L. Dains was killed by friendly fire returning from
a victory over Kaawa. Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed,
and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned
Friendly fire brought down some U.S. planes on top of
that, including five from an inbound flight from Enterprise. Japanese
attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.
At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Of these, three were shot down.
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the
attack, and one was captured. Of Japan's 414 available planes, 29
were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the
second),[nb 16] with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from
Possible third wave
Several Japanese junior officers including Fuchida and Genda urged
Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of
Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo[nb 17] storage, maintenance, and dry
dock facilities as possible. Genda, who had unsuccessfully
advocated for invading Hawaii after the air attack, believed that
without an invasion, three strikes were necessary to disable the base
as much as possible. The captains of the other five carriers in
the task force reported they were willing and ready to carry out a
third strike. Military historians have suggested the destruction
of these shore facilities would have hampered the U.S. Pacific Fleet
far more seriously than the loss of its battleships. If they had
been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would
have been postponed for more than a year"; according to Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it
would have prolonged the war another two years." Nagumo, however,
decided to withdraw for several reasons:
American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during
the second strike, and two thirds of Japan's losses were incurred
during the second wave.
Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three
quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining
targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher
The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition,
the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American
land-based bombers. Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had
enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack
against his carriers.
A third wave would have required substantial preparation and
turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had
to land at night. At the time, only the
Royal Navy had developed night
carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters
Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of
logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel,
perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main
objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific
Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses. Moreover, it was
Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the
total destruction of the enemy.
At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto
supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave. In
retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the
oil tank farm meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to
Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's
decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great
mistake not to order a third strike.
Ships lost or damaged
Seventeen ships were damaged or lost in the attack, of which fourteen
were repaired and returned to service.
Arizona (RADM Kidd's flagship of Battleship Division One): hit by four
armor-piercing bombs, exploded; total loss. 1,177 dead.
Oklahoma: hit by five torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 429 dead.
West Virginia: hit by two bombs, seven torpedoes, sunk; returned to
service July 1944. 106 dead.
California: hit by two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to service
January 1944. 100 dead.
Nevada: hit by six bombs, one torpedo, beached; returned to service
October 1942. 60 dead.
Pennsylvania (ADM Kimmel's flagship of the
United States Pacific
Fleet): in drydock with Cassin and Downes, hit by one bomb and
debris from USS Cassin; remained in service. 9 dead.
Tennessee: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5
Maryland: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4 dead
(including floatplane pilot shot down).
Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)
Utah: hit by two torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 64 dead.
Helena: hit by one torpedo; returned to service January 1942. 20 dead.
Raleigh: hit by one torpedo; returned to service February 1942.
Honolulu: Near miss, light damage; remained in service.
Cassin: in drydock with Downes and Pennsylvania, hit by one bomb,
burned; returned to service February 1944.
Downes: in drydock with Cassin and Pennsylvania, caught fire from
Cassin, burned; returned to service November 1943.
Shaw: hit by three bombs; returned to service June 1942.
Oglala (minelayer): Damaged by torpedo hit on Helena, capsized;
returned to service (as engine-repair ship) February 1944.
Vestal (repair ship): hit by two bombs, blast and fire from Arizona,
beached; returned to service by August 1942.
Curtiss (seaplane tender): hit by one bomb, one crashed Japanese
aircraft; returned to service January 1942. 19 dead.
Sotoyomo (harbor tug): damaged by explosion and fires in Shaw; sunk;
returned to service August 1942.
Homer N. Wallin
Homer N. Wallin (center) supervises salvage operations aboard
USS California, early 1942
After a systematic search for survivors, formal salvage operations
began. Captain Homer N. Wallin, Material Officer for Commander, Battle
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was immediately ordered to lead salvage
operations. "Within a short time I was relieved of all other duties
and ordered to full time work as Fleet Salvage Officer."[nb 18]
Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy (shore and tenders), the
Naval Shipyard, and civilian contractors (Pacific Bridge and others)
began work on the ships that could be refloated. They patched holes,
cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. Navy divers worked
inside the damaged ships. Within six months, five battleships and two
cruisers were patched or refloated so they could be sent to shipyards
Pearl Harbor and on the mainland for extensive repair.
Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of
some 20,000 man-hours under water. Oklahoma, while successfully
raised, was never repaired, and capsized while under tow to the
mainland in 1947. Arizona and the target ship Utah were too heavily
damaged for salvage, though much of their armament and equipment was
removed and put to use aboard other vessels. Today, the two hulks
remain where they were sunk, with Arizona becoming a war
Main article: Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Franklin D. Roosevelt signing declaration of war
against Imperial Japan on December 8, 1941
In the wake of the attack, 15 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, 53
Silver Stars, four Navy and Marine Corps Medals, one Distinguished
Flying Cross, four Distinguished Service Crosses, one Distinguished
Service Medal, and three Bronze Star Medals were awarded to the
American servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl
Harbor. Additionally, a special military award, the Pearl Harbor
Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military veterans of
The day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his famous Infamy Speech
to a Joint Session of Congress, calling for a formal declaration of
war on the Empire of Japan. Congress obliged his request less than an
hour later. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the
United States, even though the
Tripartite Pact did not require it.[nb
19] Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany and Italy
later that same day. The UK actually declared war on Japan nine hours
before the U.S. did, partially due to Japanese attacks on Malaya,
Singapore and Hong Kong, and partially due to Winston Churchill's
promise to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the
Pennsylvania, behind the wreckage of Downes and Cassin
The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific
Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan
Philippines hours later (because of the time difference,
it was December 8 in the Philippines). Only three days after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse
were sunk off the coast of Malaya, causing British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received
a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of
the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital
ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors
Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast
expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and
Remember December 7th!, by Allen Saalburg, propaganda issued in 1942
Throughout the war,
Pearl Harbor was frequently used in American
One further consequence of the attack on
Pearl Harbor and its
aftermath (notably the
Niihau incident) was that Japanese American
residents and citizens were relocated to nearby Japanese-American
internment camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese
American leaders were rounded up and brought to high-security camps
such as Sand Island at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and Kilauea
Military Camp on the island of Hawaii. Eventually, more than
110,000 Japanese Americans, nearly all who lived on the West Coast,
were forced into interior camps, but in Hawaii, where the 150,000-plus
Japanese Americans composed over one-third of the population, only
1,200 to 1,800 were interned.
The attack also had international consequences. The Canadian province
of British Columbia, bordering the Pacific Ocean, had long had a large
population of Japanese immigrants and their Japanese Canadian
descendants. Pre-war tensions were exacerbated by the Pearl Harbor
attack, leading to a reaction from the Government of Canada. On
February 24, 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. no. 1486 was passed under the
War Measures Act
War Measures Act allowing for the forced removal of any and all
Canadians of Japanese descent from British Columbia, as well as the
prohibiting them from returning to the province. On 4 March,
regulations under the Act were adopted to evacuate
Japanese-Canadians. As a result, 12,000 were interned in interior
camps, 2,000 were sent to road camps and another 2,000 were forced to
work in the prairies at sugar beet farms.
Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi's aircraft shown ten days after it
The Japanese planners had determined that some means was required for
rescuing fliers whose aircraft were too badly damaged to return to the
carriers. The island of Niihau, only 30 minutes flying time from Pearl
Harbor, was designated as the rescue point.
The Zero flown by Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi of Hiryu was
damaged in the attack on Wheeler, so he flew to the rescue point on
Niihau. The aircraft was further damaged on landing. Nishikaichi was
helped from the wreckage by one of the native Hawaiians, who, aware of
the tension between the
United States and Japan, took the pilot's maps
and other documents. The island's residents had no telephones or radio
and were completely unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nishikaichi
enlisted the support of three Japanese-American residents in an
attempt to recover the documents. During the ensuing struggles,
Nishikaichi was killed and a Hawaiian civilian was wounded; one
collaborator committed suicide, and his wife and the third
collaborator were sent to prison.
The ease with which the local ethnic Japanese residents had apparently
gone to the assistance of Nishikaichi was a source of concern for
many, and tended to support those who believed that local Japanese
could not be trusted.
Admiral Hara Tadaichi summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won
a great tactical victory at
Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the
war." To a similar effect, see Isoroku Yamamoto's alleged
"sleeping giant" quote.
While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to
be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the
original plan, the U.S. Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to
abandon 'charging' across the Pacific towards the
response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of Plan
Orange). The U.S. instead adopted "Plan Dog" in 1940, which
emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from
the shipping lanes to Australia, while the U.S. concentrated on
defeating Nazi Germany.
Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were
untouched by the Japanese attack; otherwise the Pacific Fleet's
ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a
year or more (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was,
the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice
but to rely on its aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons
with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese
advance. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned
to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption
limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment
roles (their only major action being the
Battle of Surigao Strait
Battle of Surigao Strait in
October 1944). A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a
belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by
battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships
for a "decisive battle" that never happened.
The Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short,
victorious war meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair
yards, oil tank farms, submarine base, and old headquarters
building. All of these targets were omitted from Genda's list, yet
they proved more important than any battleship to the American war
efforts in the Pacific. The survival of the repair shops and fuel
Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support to the U.S.
Navy's operations, such as the Battles of Coral Sea and
Midway. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese
Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill
by crippling the transportation of oil and raw materials: by the end
of 1942, import of raw materials was cut to half of what it had been,
"to a disastrous ten million tons", while oil import "was almost
completely stopped".[nb 20] Lastly, the basement of the Old
Administration Building was the home of the cryptanalytic unit which
contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine
Retrospective debate on American intelligence
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to how and
United States had been caught unaware, and how much and when
American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. Military
officers including Gen.
Billy Mitchell had pointed out the
vulnerability of Pearl to air attack. At least two naval war games,
one in 1932 and another in 1936, proved that Pearl was vulnerable to
such an attack. Admiral James Richardson was removed from command
shortly after protesting President Roosevelt's decision to move the
bulk of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor. The decisions of
military and political leadership to ignore these warnings has
contributed to conspiracy theories. Several writers, including
Robert Stinnett and former
United States Rear Admiral
Robert Alfred Theobald, have argued that various parties high in the
U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may
even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force the U.S.
into war via the so-called "back door". However, this conspiracy
theory is rejected by mainstream historians.[nb
In popular culture
Main article: Attack on
Pearl Harbor in popular culture
Battle of Taranto
Air warfare of World War II
Attack on Howland Island
United States Navy ships present at Pearl Harbor, December 7,
Medal of Honor
Medal of Honor recipients for the Attack on Pearl Harbor
Edwin T. Layton
Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day
Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
^ USCGC Taney (WHEC-37), USCGC Reliance (WSC-150), USCGC
^ Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed were salvageable.
^ a b In 1941, Hawaii was a half-hour different from the majority of
other time zones. See UTC−10:30.
^ USS Utah (AG-16, formerly BB-31); Utah was moored in the space
intended to have been occupied by the aircraft carrier Enterprise
which, returning with a task force, had been expected to enter the
channel at 0730 on December 7; delayed by weather, the task force did
Pearl Harbor until dusk the following day.
^ After it was announced in September iron and steel scrap export
would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to
Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 warning this might be considered an
^ This was mainly a Japanese Navy preference; the Japanese Army would
have chosen to attack the Soviet Union.
^ "The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short
knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as
did the Japanese. Lt. Cdr. Takeshi Naito, the assistant naval attaché
to Berlin, flew to
Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and
Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Cdr. Mitsuo Fuchida
about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on December 7,
^ "A torpedo bomber needed a long, level flight, and when released,
its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet deep
before swerving upward to strike a hull.
Pearl Harbor deep averages 42
feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based
torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned
auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they
would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway "nosecone" of
soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water."
^ She was located by a
University of Hawaii
University of Hawaii research submersible on
August 28, 2002 in 400 m (1,300 ft) of water, 6 nmi
(11 km) outside the harbor.
^ While the nine sailors who died in the attack were quickly lionized
by the Japanese government as Kyūgunshin ("The Nine War Heroes"), the
news of Sakamaki's capture, which had been publicized in U.S. news
broadcasts, was kept secret. Even after the war, however, he received
recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for not
sacrificing his own life.
^ The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First
wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals,
45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes.
The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts
every two hours, with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks
and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.
^ In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85
credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders
(P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr.
(P-36, killed in action), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor
(P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were
not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval
^ Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard
Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite
after years of research and debate.
^ The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories
against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the
attack by Tautog, and Dorie Miller's Navy Cross-worthy effort. Miller
African-American cook aboard West Virginia who took over an
unattended anti-aircraft gun on which he had no training. He was the
African-American sailor to be awarded the Navy Cross.
^ The wreck has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of whom
remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel
oil, over 70 years after the attack.
USAAF pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit
Group, claim to have destroyed 10.
^ In the event, loss of these might have been a net benefit to the
U.S. Blair, passim.
^ Wallin had been assigned to go to
Massawa in East Africa. The harbor
there was blocked by scuttled Italian and German ships, which
prevented British use of the port. Commander
Edward Ellsberg was sent
^ The pact had one of its objectives limiting U.S. intervention in
conflicts involving the three nations.
Liddell Hart, B. H. (1970) History of the Second World War London:
Weidenfeld Nicolson. p.206
Shirer, William L. (1960) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich:A
History of Nazi Germsny New York: Simon and Shuster. p.873
Keegan, John (1990) The Second World War New York: Viking. p.130.
^ In less than eleven months, most of Japan's elite naval aviators who
had been at
Pearl Harbor were lost in subsequent battles. Lack of fuel
and an inflexible training policy meant that they could not be
Gordon Prange specifically addresses some revisionist works,
including Charles A. Beard. President Roosevelt and the Coming War
1941; William Henry Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade; John T.
Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor; Frederic
R. Sanborn, Design for War; Robert Alfred Theobald, The Final Secret
of Pearl Harbor; Harry E. Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace and The Court Historians versus Revisionism; Husband E. Kimmel,
Admiral Kimmel's Story."
^ "The Long Blue Line: The attack on Pearl Harbor—"a date that will
live in infamy"". coastguard.dodlive.mil. Retrieved 8 December 2017.
These units included high-endurance cutter Taney and patrol cutters
Tiger and Reliance
^ "U.S. COAST GUARD UNITS IN HAWAII" (PDF). media.defense.gov.
Retrieved 8 December 2017. USCGC Tiger (WSC-152); Commanding Officer:
CWO William J. Mazzoni, USCG; 125-foot cutter
^ "Active Class, U.S. Coast Guard Cutters". pwencycl.kgbudge.com.
Retrieved 8 December 2017.
^ "Ships and District Craft Present at Pearl Harbor, 0800 7 December
1941 U.S. Navy Historical Center". History.navy.mil. Archived from the
original on July 10, 2011. Retrieved July 5, 2015.
^ CinCP report of damage to ships in
Pearl Harbor from
^ "Overview of The
Pearl Harbor Attack, 7 December 1941". Archived
from the original on August 6, 2010. Retrieved October 5, 2014.
^ Gilbert 2009, p. 272.
^ Gailey 1995
Pearl Harbor Casualty List". USSWestVirginia.org. Retrieved
December 7, 2012.
^ a b Conn 2000, p. 194
^ Morison 2001, pp. 101, 120, 250
^ Prange, Gordon W., Goldstein, Donald, & Dillon, Katherine. The
Pearl Harbor Papers (Brassey's, 2000), p. 17ff; Google Books entry on
Prange et al.
^ For the Japanese designator of Oahu. Wilford, Timothy. "Decoding
Pearl Harbor", in The Northern Mariner, XII, #1 (January 2002), p.
^ Fukudome, Shigeru, "Hawaii Operation".
United States Naval
Institute, Proceedings, 81 (December 1955), pp. 1315–1331
^ Gill, G. Hermon (1957). Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942. Australia
in the War of 1939–1945. Series 2 – Navy. 1. Canberra: Australian
War Memorial. p. 485. LCCN 58037940. Archived from the
original on May 25, 2009. Retrieved June 16, 2015.
^ a b Prange et al. December 7, 1941, p. 174.
^ a b c d e Parillo 2006, p. 288
^ Thomas 2007, pp. 57–59.
Pearl Harbor Facts". About. Retrieved October 5, 2014.
United States declares war". Abilene Reporter-News. December 8,
1941. p. 1. Retrieved August 12, 2014 – via
^ a b Bromwich, Jonah Engel (2016-12-07). "How
Pearl Harbor Shaped the
Modern World". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved
^ Braumoeller, Bear F. (2010) "The Myth of American Isolationism."
Foreign Policy Analysis 6: 349–371.
^ a b Yuma Totani (April 1, 2009). The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The
Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II. Harvard University
Asia Center. p. 57.
^ a b Stephen C. McCaffrey (September 22, 2004). Understanding
International Law. AuthorHouse. pp. 210–229.
^ Barnhart 1987.
^ Werner Gruhl (2007). Imperial Japan's World War Two, 1931–1945.
Transaction Publishers. p. 39. ISBN 978-0-7658-0352-8
^ GPO 1943, p. 96
^ GPO 1943, p. 94
^ Toland, Japan's War.[clarification needed]
^ Shift Of Our Fleet To Atlantic Studied, New York Times, June 23,
1940, "Except for the Atlantic Battle Squadron, the entire fleet is
now in the Pacific, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii."
^ Harper, Tim (2009-09-07). "Japan's gigantic second world war
gamble". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved
^ a b Peattie 1997
^ William Chalek (2002), "8. War Plan Orange", Guest of the Emperor,
iUniverse, pp. 45–52, ISBN 978-0-595-23996-2
^ Edward S. Miller (2007), War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to
Defeat Japan, 1897–1945, Naval Institute Press, pp. 63,
^ GPO 1943, p. 125
^ a b Peattie 1997; Coox, Kobun.
^ Chapter IV The Showdown With Japan August–December 1941 Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942
^ Chapter IV: The Fatal Turn Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The
First Two Years
^ Review of the Diplomatic Conversations REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (1946)
^ a b Chapter V: The Decision for War Morton, Louis. Strategy and
Command: The First Two Years
^ Gailey 1995, p. 68
^ Gailey 1995, p. 70
^ Lord, Walter (2012). Day of Infamy. Open Road Media. p. 14.
^ Borch & Martinez 2005, pp. 53–54.
^ Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in World
War II. By Robert Gannon, Published by Penn State Press, 1996, p. 49.
^ Wetzler 1998, p. 39.
^ Bix 2000, p. 417, citing the Sugiyama memo
^ The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (December 8, 1941). "Gallup
Poll Found 52 p.c. of Americans Expected War". Ottawa Citizen.
p. 1. Retrieved November 28, 2011.
^ Noted by Arthur MacArthur in the 1890s. Manchester, William.
^ Peattie & Evans, Kaigun
^ a b Willmott 1983, p. 14.
^ Fukudome, Shigeru. Shikan: Shinjuwan Kogeki (Tokyo, 1955), p. 150.
^ Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, At
Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of
Pearl Harbor (1982)
^ Alan Zimm, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths,
^ Kaigun; Wilmott, Barrier and the Javelin; Blair, Silent Victory
^ a b Willmott 1983
^ Zimm 2011, p. 132
^ Peattie 2001 p. 145.
^ Zimm 2011, pp. 173, 174
^ Zimm 2011, p. 153
^ a b c Tony DiGiulian. "Order of Battle –
Pearl Harbor – December
7, 1941". Navweaps.com. Archived from the original on June 30, 2011.
Retrieved July 17, 2011.
^ Stewart, A.J., Lieutenant Commander, USN. "Those Mysterious
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1974, p.
^ Stewart, p. 56
^ Goldstein 2000, p. 146
^ Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p. 57
^ Smith 1999, p. 36
^ a b c Stewart, "Those Mysterious Midgets", p. 58
^ "Japanese Midget Submarine". Retrieved January 20, 2014.
^ Stewart, pp. 59–61
^ Stewart, Those Mysterious Midgets, pp. 61–62
^ Ofstie, R. A., Rear Admiral, USN. The Campaigns of the Pacific War
United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 19
^ Zimm 2011, pp. 330–341
^ Toland, Infamy
^ Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 424 and 475
^ Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 493–494
^ Declaration of War handout Retrieved August 9, 2012.
^ Howard W. French (December 9, 1999). "
Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak
Attack, Papers Show". The New York Times.
^ Kawabata, Tai, "Historian seeks to clear embassy of Pearl Harbor
'sneak attack' infamy", Japan Times, December 10, 2014, p. 3
^ "Japanese 'Fourteen Part' Message of December 7, 1941" HyperWar
^ Shinsato, Douglas and Tadanori Urabe, For That One Day: The Memoirs
of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, Chapters
19 and 20, eXperience, inc., Kamuela, Hawaii, 2011.
^ a b c d e "Aircraft Attack Organization". Ibiblio.org. Archived from
the original on June 23, 2011. Retrieved July 17, 2011.
^ a b NavSource 2003
^ Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. At Dawn We Slept. pages 730–31
'Short mishandled radar ...' In his (Short's) words
'... more for training than any idea it would be real'
^ Evans, Harold. The American Century London: Jonathan Cape, 1998. p.
^ Prange 1988, p. 98
^ a b Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept, p. 500-501.
^ Symonds, Craig L. The Battle Of Midway, (Oxford University Press,
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^ Hone, Thomas C. (1977). "The Destruction of the Battle Line at Pearl
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(1991). At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York:
Penguin Books. p. 867. ISBN 9780140157345.
Barnhart, Michael A. (1987), Japan prepares for total war: the search
for economic security, 1919–1941, Cornell University Press,
Bix, Herbert P. (2000),
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Diane
Pub Co, ISBN 978-0-7567-5780-9
Borch, Frederic L.; Martinez, Daniel (2005), Kimmel, Short, and Pearl
Harbor: the final report revealed, Naval Institute Press,
Conn, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron; Engelman, Rose C. (2000), "7 – The
Attack on Pearl Harbor", Guarding the
United States and Its Outposts,
Washington D.C.: Center of Military History
United States Army
Gailey, Harry A. (1997), War in the Pacific: From
Pearl Harbor to
Tokyo Bay, Presidio, ISBN 0-89141-616-1
Gilbert, Martin (2009), The Second World War, Phoenix,
Goldstein, Donald M. (2000), Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine
V., eds., The
Pearl Harbor papers: inside the Japanese plans,
Brassey's, ISBN 978-1-57488-222-3
Hakim, Joy (1995), A History of US: Book 9: War, Peace, and All that
Jazz, Oxford University Press, U.S., ISBN 978-0-19-509514-2
Hixson, Walter L. (2003), The American Experience in World War II: The
United States and the road to war in Europe, Taylor & Francis,
Hoyt, Edwin P. (2000), Pearl Harbor, G. K. Hall,
Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001), History of
United States Naval
Operations in World War II: The rising sun in the Pacific, 1931 –
April 1942, University of Illinois Press,
Ofstie, Ralph, A., RADM USN, Naval Analysis Division, United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) (1946), The Campaigns of the
United States Government Printing Office
Peattie, Mark R.; Evans, David C. (1997), Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics,
and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, Naval Institute Press,
Peattie, Mark R. (2001), Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air
Power, 1909–1941, Naval Institute Press,
Parillo, Mark (2006), "The
United States in the Pacific", in Higham,
Robin; Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat,
The University Press of Kentucky, ISBN 978-0-8131-2374-5
Prange, Gordon William; Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V.
(1988). December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor.
McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-050682-4.
Smith, Carl (1999),
Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy; Osprey
Campaign Series #62, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-798-8
Stille, Mark E. (2011), Tora! Tora! Tora!:
Pearl Harbor 1941; Osprey
Raid Series #26, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84908-509-0
Thomas, Evan (2007), Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last
Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945, Simon and Schuster,
Willmott, H. P. (1983), The barrier and the javelin: Japanese and
Allied Pacific strategies, February to June 1942, Naval Institute
Zimm, Alan D. (2011), Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths,
Deceptions, Havertown, Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers,
U.S. government documents
"Document text", U.S. Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor,
United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch, 1942,
archived from the original on January 13, 2008, retrieved December 25,
"Document text", Peace and War,
United States Foreign Policy
1931–1941, Washington D.C.:
United States Government Printing
Office, 1943, retrieved December 8, 2007
United States Naval Forces and Installations as a Result of
the Attack", Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington D.C.:
United States Government
Printing Office, 1946, retrieved December 8, 2007
Rodgaard, John; Peter Hsu; Carroll Lucas & Captain Andrew Biach
(December 1999), "
Pearl Harbor – Attack from Below", Naval History,
United States Naval Institute, 13 (6), archived from the original on
September 30, 2006 (requires subscription)
Wetzler, Peter (1998),
Hirohito and war: imperial tradition and
military decision making in prewar Japan,
University of Hawaii
University of Hawaii Press,
Organization of the Japanese Air Attack Units December 7, 1941,
NavSource Naval History, 2003, archived from the original on December
13, 2007, retrieved December 8, 2007
USS Shaw, destroyerhistory.org, archived from the original on June 17,
2011, retrieved January 5, 2017
Homer N. Wallin, "Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal", Hyperwar, ibiblio.org, retrieved October 10, 2011
Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello (1985), And I Was
Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets, New York:
Morrow. Layton, Kimmel's Combat Intelligence Officer, says that
Douglas MacArthur was the only field commander who had received any
substantial amount of Purple intelligence.
George Edward Morgenstern. Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War.
(The Devin-Adair Company, 1947) ISBN 978-1-299-05736-4.
James Dorsey. "Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping, and the Nine Gods
of War: 'Fascist Proclivities' Made Real," in The Culture of Japanese
Fascism, ed. by Alan Tansman (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2009),
pp. 409–431. A study of Japanese wartime media representations
of the submarine component of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to
his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might
lead to war (declassified in 1994).
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor:
The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The
Day the Japanese Attacked
Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This
monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and
Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the
Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An
Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique
illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed
overview of the surprise attack that brought the
United States into
World War II.
Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and
entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations
in the Pacific During
World War II
World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains
some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S.
Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely
resulted in an even greater disaster.
Michael V. Gannon,
Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a
recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the
Frederick D. Parker,
Pearl Harbor Revisited:
United States Navy
Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic
History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew
from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment,
(HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry"
undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson.
Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of
Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub,
1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by
Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958)
ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
Hamilton Fish III, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in
World War II
World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
John Toland, Infamy:
Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue
edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X).
Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, "The
U.S. Army Medical Department and the
Attack on Pearl Harbor". (The Journal of Medical History, January
1989). PMID 11617401. This article discusses the state of medical
readiness prior to the attack, and the post-attack response by medical
Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor
(Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents
that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short.
Edward L. Beach, Jr., Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at
Pearl Harbor ISBN 1-55750-059-2
Andrew Krepinevich. "Lighting the Path Ahead: Field Exercises and
Transformation (186 KB)" (PDF). Archived from the original
(PDF) on July 13, 2007. Retrieved January 5, 2017. (Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the
Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford
University Press: 1962). The most cited scholarly work on the
intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of
the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence
Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight."
Foreign Affairs 43.4 (1965): 691-707. online
John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups.
Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter
on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what
Douglas T. Shinsato and Tadanori Urabe, "For That One Day: The Memoirs
of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor".
(eXperience: 2011) ISBN 978-0-9846745-0-3
Horn, Steve (2005). The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor:
Operation K And
Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II. Naval
Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-388-8.
Seki, Eiji. (2006). Mrs. Ferguson's Tea-Set, Japan and the Second
World War: The Global Consequences Following Germany's Sinking of the
SS Automedon in 1940. London: Global Oriental.
ISBN 1-905246-28-5; ISBN 978-1-905246-28-1 (cloth) Published
by BRILL/Global Oriental, 2006. Previously announced as Sinking of the
SS Automedon and the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation.
Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl
Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and
thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the
salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.
Takeo, Iguchi, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective From
Japan, I-House Press, 2010, ASIN: B003RJ1AZA.
Haynok, Robert J. (2009). How the Japanese Did It. Naval History
United States Naval Institute.
Melber, Takuma, Pearl Harbor. Japans Angriff und der Kriegseintritt
der USA. C.H. Beck, München 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69818-7. A
concise introduction with a good focus oo what came before the attack
and on the Japanese perspective.
Moorhead, John J. 1942 "Surgical Experience at Pearl Harbor", The
Journal of the American Medical Association. An overview of different
surgical procedures at the hospital at the scene of the event.
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