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''Intentionality'' is the power of minds to be about something: to represent or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs. Intentionality is primarily ascribed to mental states, like perceptions, beliefs or desires, which is why it has been regarded as the characteristic ''mark of the mental'' by many philosophers. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of ''intentional inexistence'': to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states. An early theory of intentionality is associated with
Anselm of Canterbury Anselm of Canterbury, OSB (; 1033/4–1109), also called ( it, Anselmo d'Aosta, link=no) after Aosta, his birthplace and (french: Anselme du Bec, link=no) after his Abbey of Bec, monastery, was an Italian Benedictines, Benedictine monk, abbot, ...
's ontological argument for the
existence of God The existence of God (or more generally, the existence of deities) is a subject of debate in theology, philosophy of religion and popular culture. A wide variety of arguments for and against the existence of God or deities can be categorized ...
, and with his tenets distinguishing between objects that exist in the understanding and objects that exist in reality. The idea fell out of discussion with the end of the medieval scholastic period, but in recent times was resurrected by empirical psychologist
Franz Brentano Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Josef Brentano (; ; 16 January 1838 – 17 March 1917) was an influential Germans, German philosopher, psychologist, and former Catholic priest (withdrawn in 1873 due to the definition of papal infallibility in mat ...
and later adopted by contemporary phenomenological philosopher
Edmund Husserl , thesis1_title = Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung (Contributions to the Calculus of Variations) , thesis1_url = https://fedora.phaidra.univie.ac.at/fedora/get/o:58535/bdef:Book/view , thesis1_year = 1883 , thesis2_title ...
. Today, intentionality is a live concern among philosophers of mind and language. A common dispute is between naturalism about intentionality, the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the
natural sciences Natural science is one of the branches of science concerned with the description, understanding and prediction of natural phenomena, based on empirical evidence from observation and experimentation. Mechanisms such as peer review and repeat ...
, and the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that intentionality is grounded in consciousness.


Overview

The concept of intentionality was reintroduced in 19th-century contemporary
philosophy Philosophy (from , ) is the systematized study of general and fundamental questions, such as those about existence, reason, knowledge, values, mind, and language. Such questions are often posed as problems to be studied or resolved. Some ...
by
Franz Brentano Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Josef Brentano (; ; 16 January 1838 – 17 March 1917) was an influential Germans, German philosopher, psychologist, and former Catholic priest (withdrawn in 1873 due to the definition of papal infallibility in mat ...
(a German philosopher and
psychologist A psychologist is a professional who practices psychology and studies mental states, perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and social processes and behavior. Their work often involves the experimentation, observation, and interpretation of how indi ...
who is generally regarded as the founder of act psychology, also called intentionalism) in his work ''
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint ''Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint'' (german: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte) (1874; second edition 1924) is an 1874 book by the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano, in which the author argues that the goal of psychology should be ...
'' (1874). Brentano described intentionality as a characteristic of all acts of
consciousness Consciousness, at its simplest, is sentience and awareness of internal and external existence. However, the lack of definitions has led to millennia of analyses, explanations and debates by philosophers, theologians, linguisticians, and scient ...
that are thus "psychical" or "mental" phenomena, by which they may be set apart from "physical" or "natural" phenomena. Brentano coined the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicate the peculiar
ontological In metaphysics, ontology is the philosophy, philosophical study of being, as well as related concepts such as existence, Becoming (philosophy), becoming, and reality. Ontology addresses questions like how entities are grouped into Category ...
status of the contents of mental phenomena. According to some interpreters the "in-" of "in-existence" is to be read as locative, i.e. as indicating that "an intended object ... exists in or has ''in-existence'', existing not externally but in the psychological state" (Jacquette 2004, p. 102), while others are more cautious, stating: "It is not clear whether in 1874 this ... was intended to carry any ontological commitment" (Chrudzimski and Smith 2004, p. 205). A major problem within discourse on intentionality is that participants often fail to make explicit whether or not they use the term to imply concepts such as agency or desire, i.e. whether it involves
teleology Teleology (from and )Partridge, Eric. 1977''Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English'' London: Routledge, p. 4187. or finalityDubray, Charles. 2020 912Teleology" In ''The Catholic Encyclopedia'' 14. New York: Robert Applet ...
. Dennett (see below) explicitly invokes teleological concepts in the "
intentional stance The intentional stance is a term coined by philosopher Daniel Dennett for the level of abstraction in which we view the behavior of an entity in terms of mental properties. It is part of a theory of mental content proposed by Dennett, which provide ...
". However, most philosophers use "intentionality" to mean something with no teleological import. Thus, a thought of a chair can be about a chair without any implication of an intention or even a belief relating to the chair. For philosophers of language, what is meant by intentionality is largely an issue of how symbols can have meaning. This lack of clarity may underpin some of the differences of view indicated below. To bear out further the diversity of sentiment evoked from the notion of intentionality, Husserl followed on Brentano, and gave the concept of intentionality more widespread attention, both in continental and
analytic philosophy Analytic philosophy is a Academic discipline, branch and Philosophical tradition, tradition of philosophy using philosophical analysis, analysis, popular in the Western world and particularly the Anglosphere, which began around the turn of the 2 ...
. In contrast to Brentano's view, French philosopher
Jean-Paul Sartre Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre (, ; ; 21 June 1905 – 15 April 1980) was one of the key figures in the philosophy of existentialist, existentialism (and Phenomenology (philosophy), phenomenology), a French playwright, novelist, screenwriter ...
(''
Being and Nothingness ''Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology'' (french: L'Être et le néant : Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique), sometimes published with the subtitle ''A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology'', is a 1943 book by the philosoph ...
'') identified intentionality with
consciousness Consciousness, at its simplest, is sentience and awareness of internal and external existence. However, the lack of definitions has led to millennia of analyses, explanations and debates by philosophers, theologians, linguisticians, and scient ...
, stating that the two were indistinguishable. German philosopher
Martin Heidegger Martin Heidegger (; ; 26 September 188926 May 1976) was a German philosopher who is best known for contributions to Phenomenology (philosophy), phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism. He is among the most important and influential phi ...
('' Being and Time''), defined intentionality as " care" (''Sorge''), a sentient condition where an individual's existence, facticity, and being in the world identifies their ontological significance, in contrast to that which is merely
ontic In ontology, ontic (from the Greek language, Greek , genitive : "of that which is") is physical, real, or factual existence. In more nuance, it means that which concerns particular, individuated beings rather than their modes of being; the present ...
("thinghood"). Other 20th-century philosophers such as
Gilbert Ryle Gilbert Ryle (19 August 1900 – 6 October 1976) was a British philosopher, principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase "ghost in the machine." He was a representative of the generation of British ordi ...
and A.J. Ayer were critical of Husserl's concept of intentionality and his many layers of consciousness. Ryle insisted that perceiving is not a process, and Ayer that describing one's knowledge is not to describe mental processes. The effect of these positions is that consciousness is so fully intentional that the mental act has been emptied of all content, and that the idea of pure consciousness is that it is nothing. (Sartre also referred to "consciousness" as " nothing").
Platonist Platonism is the philosophy of Plato and school of thought, philosophical systems closely derived from it, though contemporary platonists do not necessarily accept all of the doctrines of Plato. Platonism had a profound effect on Western though ...
Roderick Chisholm has revived the Brentano thesis through linguistic analysis, distinguishing two parts to Brentano's concept, the ontological aspect and the psychological aspect. Chisholm's writings have attempted to summarize the suitable and unsuitable criteria of the concept since the Scholastics, arriving at a criterion of intentionality identified by the two aspects of Brentano's thesis and defined by the logical properties that distinguish language describing psychological phenomena from language describing non-psychological phenomena. Chisholm's criteria for the intentional use of sentences are: existence independence, truth-value indifference, and referential opacity. In current
artificial intelligence Artificial intelligence (AI) is intelligence—perceiving, synthesizing, and inferring information—demonstrated by machines, as opposed to intelligence displayed by animal cognition, animals and human intelligence, humans. Example tasks in ...
and
philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy Philosophy (from , ) is the systematized study of general and fundamental questions, such as those about existence, reason, knowledge, values, mind, and language. Such questions are often ...
, intentionality is sometimes linked with questions of semantic inference, with both skeptical and supportive adherents. John Searle argued for this position with the Chinese room thought experiment, according to which no
syntactic In linguistics Linguistics is the scientific study of human language. It is called a scientific study because it entails a comprehensive, systematic, objective, and precise analysis of all aspects of language, particularly its nature an ...
operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with
semantic Semantics (from grc, wikt:σημαντικός, σημαντικός ''sēmantikós'', "significant") is the study of reference, Meaning (philosophy), meaning, or truth. The term can be used to refer to subfields of several distinct discipline ...
content. Others are more skeptical of the human ability to make such an assertion, arguing that the kind of intentionality that emerges from self-organizing networks of automata will always be undecidable because it will never be possible to make our subjective introspective experience of intentionality and decision making coincide with our objective observation of the behavior of a self-organizing machine.


The problem of intentional inexistence

A central issue for theories of intentionality has been ''the problem of intentional inexistence'': to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states. This is particularly relevant for cases involving objects that have no existence outside the mind, as in the case of mere fantasies or hallucinations. For example, assume that Mary is thinking about Superman. On the one hand, it seems that this thought is intentional: Mary is ''thinking about something''. On the other hand, Superman ''doesn't exist''. This suggests that Mary either is ''not thinking about something'' or is ''thinking about something that doesn't exist'' (that Superman fiction exists is beside the point). Various theories have been proposed in order to reconcile these conflicting intuitions. These theories can roughly be divided into ''eliminativism'', ''relationalism'', and ''adverbialism''. Eliminativists deny that this kind of problematic mental state is possible. Relationalist try to solve the problem by interpreting intentional states as relations while adverbialists interpret them as properties.


Eliminativism

''Eliminativists'' deny that the example above is possible. It might seem to us and to Mary that she is thinking about something but she is not really thinking at all. Such a position could be motivated by a form of semantic externalism, the view that the meaning of a term, or in this example the content of a thought, is determined by factors external to the subject. If meaning depends on successful
reference Reference is a relationship between objects in which one object designates, or acts as a means by which to connect to or link to, another object. The first object in this relation is said to ''refer to'' the second object. It is called a ''name'' ...
then failing to refer would result in a lack of meaning. The difficulty for such a position is to explain why it seems to Mary that she is thinking about something and how seeming to think is different from actual thinking.


Relationalism

''Relationalists'' hold that having an intentional state involves standing in a relation to the intentional object. This is the most natural position for non-problematic cases. So if Mary perceives a tree, we might say that a perceptual relation holds between Mary, the subject of this relation, and the tree, the object of this relation. Relations are usually assumed to be existence-entailing: the instance of a relation entails the existence of its relata. This principle rules out that we can bear relations to non-existing entities. One way to solve the problem is to deny this principle and argue for a kind of ''intentionality exceptionalism'': that intentionality is different from all other relations in the sense that this principle doesn't apply to it. A more common relationalist solution is to look for existing objects that can play the role that the non-existing object was supposed to play. Such objects are sometimes called "proxies", "traces", or "ersatz objects". It has been suggested that abstract objects or Platonic forms can play this role. Abstract objects have actual existence but they exist outside space and time. So when Mary thinks about Superman, she is standing in a thinking relation to the abstract object or the Platonic form that corresponds to Superman. A similar solution replaces abstract objects with concrete mental objects. In this case, there exists a mental object corresponding to Superman in Mary's mind. As Mary starts to think about Superman, she enters into a relationship with this mental object. One problem for both of these theories is that they seem to mischaracterize the experience of thinking. As Mary is thinking about Superman, she is neither thinking about a Platonic form outside space-time nor about a mental object. Instead, she ''is'' thinking about a concrete physical being. A related solution sees possible objects as intentional objects. This involves a commitment to modal realism, for example in the form of the Lewisian model or as envisioned by Takashi Yagisawa.


Adverbialism

''Adverbialists'' hold that intentional states are properties of subjects. So no independent objects are needed besides the subject, which is how adverbialists avoid the problem of non-existence. This approach has been termed "adverbialism" since the object of the intentional state is seen as a modification of this state, which can be linguistically expressed through adverbs. Instead of saying that ''Mary is thinking about Superman'', it would be more precise, according to adverbialists, to say that ''Mary is thinking in a superman-ly manner'' or that ''Mary is thinking superman-ly''. Adverbialism has been challenged on the grounds that it puts a strain on natural language and the metaphysical insights encoded in it. Another objection is that, by treating intentional objects as mere modifications of intentional states, adverbialism loses the power to distinguish between different complex intentional contents, the so-called many-property-problem.


Dennett's taxonomy of current theories about intentionality

Daniel Dennett Daniel Clement Dennett III (born March 28, 1942) is an American philosopher, writer, and Cognitive science, cognitive scientist whose research centers on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of biology, particularly as t ...
offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book '' The Intentional Stance''. Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge: * intentional idiom is problematic for
science Science is a systematic endeavor that Scientific method, builds and organizes knowledge in the form of Testability, testable explanations and predictions about the universe. Science may be as old as the human species, and some of the earli ...
; * intentional idiom is not problematic for science, which is divided into: ** Eliminative materialism; ** Epistemological realism; ** Quinean double standard (see below) which is divided into: *** adherence to Normative Principle (epistemology), which is divided into: **** who makes an Assumption of Rationality; **** who follows the Principle of Charity; *** adherence to Projective Principle. Roderick Chisholm (1956), G.E.M. Anscombe (1957),
Peter Geach Peter Thomas Geach (29 March 1916 – 21 December 2013) was a British philosopher who was Professor of Logic at the University of Leeds. His areas of interest were philosophical logic, ethics, history of philosophy, philosophy of religion and t ...
(1957), and Charles Taylor (1964) all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences. Members of this category also maintain realism in regard to intentional objects, which may imply some kind of dualism (though this is debatable). The latter position, which maintains the unity of intentionality with the natural sciences, is further divided into three standpoints: * ''Eliminative materialism'', supported by W.V. Quine (1960) and Churchland (1981) * ''Realism'', advocated by
Jerry Fodor Jerry Alan Fodor (; April 22, 1935 – November 29, 2017) was an American philosopher and the author of many crucial works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His writings in these fields laid the groundwork for the modula ...
(1975), as well as Burge, Dretske, Kripke, and the early
Hilary Putnam Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; July 31, 1926 – March 13, 2016) was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist, and a major figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He made significant contributions ...
* those who adhere to the ''Quinean double standard''. Proponents of the ''eliminative materialism'', understand intentional idiom, such as "belief", "desire", and the like, to be replaceable either with behavioristic language (e.g. Quine) or with the language of neuroscience (e.g. Churchland). Holders of ''realism'' argue that there is a deeper fact of the matter to both translation and belief attribution. In other words, manuals for translating one language into another cannot be set up in different yet behaviorally identical ways and ontologically there are intentional objects. Famously, Fodor has attempted to ground such realist claims about intentionality in a language of thought. Dennett comments on this issue, Fodor "attempt to make these irreducible realities acceptable to the physical sciences by grounding them (somehow) in the 'syntax' of a system of physically realized mental representations" (Dennett 1987, 345). Those who adhere to the so-called ''Quinean double standard'' (namely that ''ontologically there is nothing intentional, but that the language of intentionality is indispensable''), accept Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation and its implications, while the other positions so far mentioned do not. As Quine puts it, indeterminacy of radical translation is the thesis that "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another" (Quine 1960, 27). Quine (1960) and
Wilfrid Sellars Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (May 20, 1912 – July 2, 1989) was an American philosopher and prominent developer of Critical realism (philosophy of perception), critical realism, who "revolutionized both the content and the method of philosophy in the ...
(1958) both comment on this intermediary position. One such implication would be that there is, in principle, no deeper fact of the matter that could settle two interpretative strategies on what belief to attribute to a physical system. In other words, the behavior (including speech dispositions) of any physical system, in theory, could be interpreted by two different predictive strategies and both would be equally warranted in their belief attribution. This category can be seen to be a medial position between the realists and the eliminativists since it attempts to blend attributes of both into a theory of intentionality. Dennett, for example, argues in ''True Believers'' (1981) that intentional idiom (or " folk psychology") is a predictive strategy and if such a strategy successfully and voluminously predicts the actions of a physical system, then that physical system can be said to have those beliefs attributed to it. Dennett calls this predictive strategy the
intentional stance The intentional stance is a term coined by philosopher Daniel Dennett for the level of abstraction in which we view the behavior of an entity in terms of mental properties. It is part of a theory of mental content proposed by Dennett, which provide ...
. They are further divided into two theses: * adherence to the ''Normative Principle'' * adherence to the ''Projective Principle'' Advocates of the former, the Normative Principle, argue that attributions of intentional idioms to physical systems should be the propositional attitudes that the physical system ought to have in those circumstances (Dennett 1987, 342). However, exponents of this view are still further divided into those who make an ''Assumption of Rationality'' and those who adhere to the ''Principle of Charity''. Dennett (1969, 1971, 1975), Cherniak (1981, 1986), and the more recent work of Putnam (1983) recommend the Assumption of Rationality, which unsurprisingly assumes that the physical system in question is rational. Donald Davidson (1967, 1973, 1974, 1985) and Lewis (1974) defend the Principle of Charity. The latter is advocated by Grandy (1973) and Stich (1980, 1981, 1983, 1984), who maintain that attributions of intentional idioms to any physical system (e.g. humans, artifacts, non-human animals, etc.) should be the propositional attitude (e.g. "belief", "desire", etc.) that one would suppose one would have in the same circumstances (Dennett 1987, 343).


Basic intentionality types according to Le Morvan

Working on the intentionality of vision, belief, and knowledge, Pierre Le Morvan (2005) has distinguished between three basic kinds of intentionality that he dubs "transparent", "translucent", and "opaque" respectively. The threefold distinction may be explained as follows. Let's call the "intendum" what an intentional state is about, and the "intender" the subject who is in the intentional state. An intentional state is transparent if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) it is genuinely relational in that it entails the existence of not just the intender but the intendum as well, and (ii) substitutivity of identicals applies to the intendum (i.e. if the intentional state is about a, and a = b, then the intentional state is about b as well). An intentional state is translucent if it satisfies (i) but not (ii). An intentional state is opaque if it satisfies neither (i) nor (ii).


Intentionalism

''Intentionalism'' is the thesis that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that they are about something: about their intentional object. This thesis has also been referred to as "representationalism". Intentionalism is entailed by Brentano's claim that intentionality is "the mark of the mental": if all and only mental states are intentional then it is surely the case that all mental states are intentional. Discussions of intentionalism often focus on the intentionality of conscious states. One can distinguish in such states their phenomenal features, or what it is like for a subject to have such a state, from their intentional features, or what they are about. These two features seem to be closely related to each other, which is why intentionalists have proposed various theories in order to capture the exact form of this relatedness.


Forms of intentionalism

These theories can roughly be divided into three categories: pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism, and qualia theories. Both pure and impure intentionalism hold that there is a
supervenience In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include: * Whether t ...
relation between phenomenal features and intentional features, for example, that two intentional states can't differ regarding their phenomenal features without differing at the same time in their intentional features. Qualia theories, on the other hand, assert that among the phenomenal features of a mental state there are at least some non-intentional phenomenal properties, so-called "Qualia", which are not determined by intentional features. Pure and impure intentionalism disagree with each other concerning which intentional features are responsible for determining the phenomenal features. Pure intentionalists hold that only intentional content is responsible, while impure intentionalists assert that the manner or mode how this content is presented also plays a role. Tim Crane, himself an impure intentionalist, explains this difference by distinguishing three aspects of intentional states: the intentional object, the intentional content, and the intentional mode. For example, seeing that an apple is round and tasting that this apple is sweet both have the same intentional object: the apple. But they involve different contents: the visual perception ascribes the property of roundness to the apple while the gustatory perception ascribes the property of sweetness to the apple. Touching the apple will also result in a perceptual experience ascribing roundness to the apple, but the roundness is presented in a different manner. So the visual perception and the haptic perception agree in both intentional object and intentional content but differ in intentional mode. Pure intentionalists may not agree with this distinction. They may argue, for example, that the difference in the last case also belongs to intentional content, because two different properties are ascribed to the apple: seen-roundness and felt-roundness.


Mental states without intentionality

Critics of intentionalism, so-called anti-intentionalists, have proposed various apparent counterexamples to intentionalism: states that are considered mental but lack intentionality. Some anti-intentionalist theories, such as that of Ned Block, are based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or
qualia In philosophy of mind, qualia ( or ; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of Subjectivity, subjective, consciousness, conscious experience. The term ''qualia'' derives from the Latin neuter plural form (''qualia'') of the Lati ...
is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. (The latter claim is itself disputed by Michael Tye.) Another form of anti-intentionalism associated with John Searle regards phenomenality itself as the "mark of the mental" and sidelines intentionality. A further form argues that some unusual states of consciousness are non-intentional, although an individual might live a lifetime without experiencing them. Robert K.C. Forman argues that some of the unusual states of consciousness typical of
mystical experience Scholarly approaches to mysticism include typology (disambiguation), typologies of mysticism and the explanation of mystical states. Since the 19th century, mystical experience has evolved as a distinctive concept. It is closely related to "mystic ...
are ''pure consciousness events'' in which awareness exists, but has no object, is not awareness "of" anything.


Phenomenal intentionality

''Phenomenal intentionality'' is the type of intentionality grounded in phenomenal or conscious mental states. It contrasts with ''non-phenomenal intentionality'', which is often ascribed to e.g. language and unconscious states. The distinction is important to philosophers who hold that phenomenal intentionality has a privileged status over non-phenomenal intentionality. This position is known as the ''phenomenal intentionality theory''. This privileged status can take two forms. In the moderate version, phenomenal intentionality is privileged because other types of intentionality depend on it or are grounded in it. They are therefore not intrinsically intentional. The stronger version goes further and denies that there are other types of intentionality. ''Phenomenal intentionality theory'' is commonly contrasted with naturalism about intentionality, the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the
natural sciences Natural science is one of the branches of science concerned with the description, understanding and prediction of natural phenomena, based on empirical evidence from observation and experimentation. Mechanisms such as peer review and repeat ...
.


Intentionality and self-consciousness

Several authors have attempted to construct philosophical models describing how intentionality relates to the human capacity to be self-conscious. Cedric Evans contributed greatly to the discussion with his "The Subject of Self-Consciousness" in 1970. He centered his model on the idea that executive attention need not be propositional in form.


See also

* Aboutness * Albert Camus * Collective intentionality * Directedness *
Georges Dreyfus Georges B.J. Dreyfus (born 1950 in Switzerland) is an academic in the fields of Tibetology and Buddhist Studies, Buddhology, with a particular interest in Indian Buddhist philosophy. In 1985 he was the first Westerner to receive the Geshe, Geshe Lh ...
*
Alexius Meinong Alexius Meinong Ritter Ritter (German for "knight") is a designation used as a title of nobility in German-speaking areas. Traditionally it denotes the second-lowest Royal and noble ranks, rank within the nobility, standing above "Edler" an ...
* Ruth Millikan *
Mind–body problem The mind–body problem is a philosophical debate concerning the relationship between thought and consciousness in the human mind, and the brain as part of the physical body. The debate goes beyond addressing the mere question of how mind and bo ...
*
Thomas Nagel Thomas Nagel (; born July 4, 1937) is an American philosopher. He is the University Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus at New York University, where he taught from 1980 to 2016. His main areas of philosophical interest are legal philosophy, ...
* Antonio Millan-Puelles *
Self-awareness In philosophy of self, self-awareness is the experience of one's own personality or individuality. It is not to be confused with consciousness in the sense of qualia. While consciousness is being aware of one's environment and body and lifesty ...
* Superintelligence


References


Further reading

* Brentano, Franz (1874). ''Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte'' Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot (''Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint'', Routledge, 1973. * Chisholm, Roderick M. (1967). "Intentionality" in ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Macmillan. * Chisholm, Roderick M. (1963). "Notes on the Logic of Believing" in ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research''. Vol. 24: p. 195-201. Reprinted in Marras, Ausonio. Ed. (1972) ''Intentionality, mind, and language''. * Chisholm, Roderick M. (1957). ''Perceiving: A Philosophical Study''. Cornell University Press. * Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Barry Smith (2004) "Brentano’s Ontology: from Conceptualism to Reism" in Jacquette (ed.) ''The Cambridge Companion to Brentano'' * Davidson, Donald. "Truth and Meaning". Synthese, XVII, pp. 304–23. 1967. * Dennett, Daniel C. (1989). ''The Intentional Stance''. The MIT Press. * Dreyfus, Georges. "Is Perception Intentional? (A Preliminary Exploration of Intentionality in Indian Philosophy)." 2006. * Fodor, J. "The Language of Thought". Harvard University Press. 1980. * Husserl, Edmund (1962). ''Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology''. Collier Books. * Husserl, Edmund. ''Logical Investigations.'' * Jacquette, Dale (2004) "Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality" in Jacquette (ed.) ''The Cambridge Companion to Brentano'' * Le Morvan, Pierre (2005). "Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque". ''The Journal of Philosophical Research,'' 30, p. 283-302. * Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (Eds.) (2003). ''Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition.'' The MIT Press. . * Mohanty, Jitendra Nath (1972). ''The Concept of Intentionality: A Critical Study''. St. Louis, MO: Warren H. Green, 1972. * Padilla Gálvez, J., M. Gaffal (eds.), ''Intentionality and Action''. De Gruyter, Berlin - Boston, 2017.

* Perler, Dominik (ed.) (2001), ''Ancient and Medieval Theories of Internationality'', Leiden, Brill. * Quine, W.V. (1960). '' Word and Object.'' The MIT Press. . * Sajama, Seppo & Kamppinen, Matti. ''Historical Introduction to Phenomenology''. New York, NY: Croom Helm, 1987. * Stich, Stephen. "Relativism, Rationality, and the Limits of Intentional Description". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, pp. 211–35. 1984. * Williford, Kenneth. "The Intentionality of Consciousness and Consciousness of Intentionality. In G. Forrai and G. Kampis, eds., Intentionality: Past and Future. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 143–156. 2005.


External links

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (''SEP'') combines an online encyclopedia of philosophy with scholarly peer review, peer-reviewed publication of original papers in philosophy, freely accessible to Internet users. It is maintained by S ...
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Intentionality in Ancient Philosophy
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Consciousness and Intentionality
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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy The ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (''IEP'') is a scholarly online encyclopedia, dealing with philosophy, Philosophy, philosophical topics, and philosophers. The IEP combines open access publication with peer reviewed publication of ori ...
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