Workers' Party of Korea

The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is the founding and sole ruling party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea. Founded in 1949 from the merger of the Workers' Party of North Korea and the Workers' Party of South Korea, the WPK is the oldest active party in Korea. It also controls the Korean People's Army, North Korea's armed forces. The WPK is the largest party represented in the Supreme People's Assembly and coexists with two other legal parties making up the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea. However, these minor parties are completely subservient to the WPK and must accept the WPK's "leading role" as a condition of their existence. The WPK is banned in South Korea (Republic of Korea) under the National Security Act and is sanctioned by the United Nations, the European Union, Australia, and the United States.

Officially, the WPK is a communist party guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, a synthesis of the ideas of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The party is committed to ''Juche'', an ideology attributed to Kim Il-sung which promotes national independence and development through the efforts of the popular masses. Although ''Juche'' was originally presented as the Korean interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, the party now presents it as a freestanding philosophy. The WPK recognizes the ruling Kim family as the ultimate source of its political thought. The fourth party conference, held in 2012, amended the party rules to state that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism was "the only guiding idea of the party". Under Kim Jong-il, who governed as chairman of the National Defence Commission, communism was steadily removed from party and state documents in favor of ''Songun'', or military-first politics. The military, rather than the working class, was established as the base of political power. However, his successor Kim Jong-un reversed this position in 2021, replacing ''Songun'' with "people-first politics" as the party's political method and reasserting the party's commitment to communism.

The WPK is organized according to the Monolithic Ideological System, conceived by Kim Yong-ju and Kim Jong-il. The highest body of the WPK is formally the party congress, but in practice, a congress rarely occurs. Between 1980 and 2016, there were no congresses held. Although the WPK is organizationally similar to other communist parties, in practice it is far less institutionalized and informal politics plays a larger role than usual. Institutions such as the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Politburo and the Politburo's Presidium have much less power than what is formally bestowed on them by the party rules, which is little more than a nominal document. Kim Jong-un is the current party leader, serving as General Secretary of the WPK and Chairman of the CMC.

History

Founding and early years (1945–1953)

On 13 October 1945, the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea (NKB–CPK) was established, with Kim Yong-bom as its first chairman. However, the NKB–CPK remained subordinate to the CPK Central Committee, which was headquartered in Seoul and headed by Pak Hon-yong. Two months later, at the 3rd Plenum of the NKB, Kim Yong-bom was replaced by Kim Il-sung, an event which was probably orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The North Korean Bureau became the Communist Party of North Korea in spring 1946, with Kim Il-sung being elected its chairman. On 22 July 1946, Soviet authorities in North Korea established the United Democratic National Front, a popular front led by the Communist Party of North Korea. The Communist Party of North Korea soon merged with the New People's Party of Korea, a party primarily composed of communists from China. A special commission of the two parties ratified the merger on 28 July 1946, and it became official the following day. One month later (28–30 August 1946), the party held its founding congress, establishing the Workers' Party of North Korea (WPNK). The congress elected the former leader of the New People's Party of Korea Kim Tu-bong as the first WPNK chairman, with Kim Il-sung its appointed deputy chairman. However, despite his formal downgrade in the party's hierarchy, Kim Il-sung remained its leader.

Party control increased throughout the country after the congress. From 27 to 30 March 1948, the WPNK convened its 2nd Congress. While Kim Tu-bong was still the party's formal head, Kim Il-sung presented the main report to the congress. In it he claimed that North Korea was "a base of democracy", in contrast to South Korea, which he believed to be dictatorial. On 28 April 1948 a special session of the Supreme People's Assembly approved the constitution proposed and written by WPNK cadres, which led to the official establishment of an independent North Korea. It did not call for the establishment of an independent North Korea, but for a unified Korea under a communist government; the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would be Seoul, not Pyongyang. Kim Il-sung was the appointed head of government of the new state, with Kim Tu-bong heading the legislative branch. A year later on 24 June 1949, the Workers' Party of Korea was created with the merger of the WPNK and the Workers' Party of South Korea.

Kim Il-sung was not the most ardent supporter of a military reunification of Korea; that role was played by the South Korean communists, headed by Pak Hon-yong. After several meetings between Kim Il-sung and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, thus beginning the Korean War. With American intervention in the war the DPRK nearly collapsed, but it was saved by Chinese intervention in the conflict. The war had the effect of weakening Soviet influence over Kim Il-sung and the WPK. Around this time, the main fault lines in early WPK politics were created. Four factions formed: the domestic faction (WPK cadres who had remained in Korea during Japanese rule), the Soviet faction (Koreans from the Soviet Union), the Yan'an faction (Koreans from China) and the guerrilla faction (Kim Il-sung's personal faction). However, Kim Il-sung would be unable to further strengthen his position until the end of the war.

Kim Il-sung's consolidation of power (1953–1980)

Relations worsened between the WPK and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) when Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, began pursuing a policy of de-Stalinization. During the Sino–Soviet conflict, an ideological conflict between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Kim Il-sung manoeuvred between the two socialist superpowers; by doing so, he weakened their influence on the WPK. By 1962 Kim Il-sung and the WPK favored the CCP over the CPSU in the ideological struggle, and "for a few years North Korea almost unconditionally supported the Chinese position on all important issues." The primary conflict between the WPK and the CPSU during this period was that Kim Il-sung did not support the denunciation of Stalinism, the creation of a collective leadership, and the theory of peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist worlds. Kim Il-sung believed peaceful coexistence to be synonymous with capitulation and knew that de-Stalinization in North Korea would effectively end his unlimited power over the WPK. The result of the souring of relations between the CPSU and the WPK was that the Soviet Union discontinued aid to North Korea. China was meanwhile unwilling to increase its aid, and, as a result, several industries in North Korea were on the brink of disaster. Mao Zedong began the Cultural Revolution shortly thereafter, an event criticized by the WPK as "left-wing opportunism" and a manifestation of the "Trotskyist theory of a permanent revolution." Relations between the CPSU and the CCP stabilized during the 1960s, with the WPK making it clear it would remain neutral in the Sino–Soviet conflict, thus resulting in the 1966 launch of the ''Juche'' program aimed at national self-determination at all levels. This, in turn, strengthened Kim Il-sung's position in the WPK.

Beginning in the 1960s, Kim Il-sung's cult of personality reached new heights. It had been no greater than Stalin's or Mao's until 1972, when his birthday on 15 April became the country's main public holiday and statues of him began to be built nationwide. Kim became known as "Great Leader", the "Sun of the Nation", "The Iron All-Victorious General" and "Marshal of the All-Mighty Republic" in WPK and state publications; official propaganda stated that "burning loyalty to the leader" was one of the main characteristics of any Korean.

Kim Il-sung and his guerilla faction had purged the WPK of its opposing factions during the 1950s and the 1960s, to the dismay of both the CCP and the CPSU. The domestic faction was the first to go (in 1953–55), followed by the Yan'an faction in 1957–58 and the Soviet Koreans (along with anyone else deemed unfaithful to the WPK leadership) in the 1957–62 purge. According to historian Andrei Lankov, "Kim Il-sung had become not only supreme but also the omnipotent ruler of North Korea—no longer merely 'first amongst equals, as had been the case in the late 1940s". After purging his WPK opposition, Kim Il-sung consolidated his power base with nepotism and hereditary succession in the Kim family and the guerilla faction. Beginning in the late 1980s, "a high (and increasing) proportion of North Korean high officials have been sons of high officials." Since the 1960s, Kim Il-sung had appointed family members to positions of power. By the early 1990s, a number of leading national offices were held by people in his family: Kang Song-san (Premier of the Administrative Council and member of the WPK Secretariat), Pak Song-chol (Vice President), Hwang Jang-yop and Kim Chung-rin (members of the WPK Secretariat), Kim Yong-sun (Head of the WPK International Department and member of the WPK Secretariat), Kang Hui-won (Secretary of the WPK Pyongyang Municipal Committee and Deputy Premier of the Administrative Council), Kim Tal-hyon (Minister of Foreign Trade), Kim Chan-ju (Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Chairman of the Administrative Council) and Yang Hyong-sop (President of the Academy of Social Sciences and chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly). These individuals were appointed solely because of their ties to the Kim family, and presumably retain their positions as long as the Kim family controls the WPK and the country. The reason for Kim's support of nepotism (his own and that of the guerrilla faction) can be explained by the fact that he did not want the party bureaucracy to threaten his—and his son's—rule as it did in other socialist states.

It was first generally believed by foreign observers that Kim Il-sung was planning for his brother, Kim Yong-ju, to succeed him. Kim Yong-ju's authority gradually increased, until he became co-chairman of the North-South Coordination Committee. From late 1972 to the 6th WPK Congress, Kim Yong-ju became an increasingly remote figure in the regime. At the 6th Congress, he lost his Politburo and Central Committee seats, and rumours that Kim Il-sung had begun grooming Kim Jong-il in 1966 were confirmed. From 1974 to the 6th Congress, Kim Jong-il (called the "Party centre" by North Korean media) was the second most powerful man in North Korea. His selection was criticized, with his father accused of creating a dynasty or turning North Korea into a feudal state.

Kim Jong-il's rule (1980–2011)

With Kim Jong-il's official appointment as heir apparent at the 6th Congress, power became more centralized in the Kim family. WPK officials began to speak openly about his succession, and beginning in 1981 he began to participate in (and lead) tours. In 1982, he was made a Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and wrote ''On the Juche Idea''. While foreign observers believed that Kim Jong-il's appointment would increase participation by the younger generation, in ''On the Juche Idea'' he made it clear that his leadership would not mark the beginning of a new generation of leaders. The WPK could not address the crisis facing Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's leadership at home and abroad, in part because of the gerontocracy at the highest level of the WPK and the state.

With the death of O Jin-u on 25 February 1995, Kim Jong-il became the sole remaining living member of the Presidium (the highest body of the WPK when the Politburo and the Central Committee are not in session). While no member list of the WPK Central Military Commission (CMC, the highest party organ on military affairs) was published from 1993 to 2010, there were clear signs of movement in the military hierarchy during 1995. For the WPK's 50th anniversary, Kim Jong-il initiated a reshuffling of the CMC (and the military leadership in general) to appease the old guard and younger officials. He did not reshuffle the WPK Central Committee or the government, however, during the 1990s the changes to its membership were caused mostly by its members dying of natural causes.

Beginning in 1995, Kim Jong-il favoured the military over the WPK and the state. Problems began to mount as an economic crisis, coupled with a famine in which at least half a million people died, weakened his control of the country. Instead of recommending structural reforms, Kim began to criticize the WPK's lack of control over the economy, lambasting its local and provincial branches for their inability to implement central-level instructions. At a speech celebrating the 50th anniversary of Kim Il-sung University, he said: "The reason why people are loyal to the instructions of the Central Committee is not because of party organizations and workers, but because of my authority." Kim Jong-il said that his father had told him to avoid economics, claiming that it was better left to experts. After this speech, the WPK's responsibility to control the economy was given to the Administrative Council (the central government). By late 1996 Kim Jong-il concluded that neither the WPK nor the central government could run the country, and began shifting control to the military. A constitutional amendment in 1998 later redirected supreme state power in North Korea to the leadership of the military, rather than the WPK.

On 8 July 1997, the three-year mourning period for Kim Il-sung ended. Later that year, on 8 October, Kim Jong-il was appointed to the newly established office of General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea. There was considerable discussion by foreign experts about why Kim Jong-il was appointed General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, instead of succeeding his father as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. In a clear breach of the WPK rules, Kim Jong-il was appointed WPK General Secretary in a joint announcement by the 6th Central Committee and the CMC rather than elected by a plenum of the Central Committee. Although it was believed that Kim Jong-il would call a congress shortly after his appointment (to elect a new WPK leadership), he did not. The WPK would not be revitalized organizationally until the 3rd Conference in 2010. Until then, Kim Jong-il ruled as an autocrat; only in WPK institutions considered important were new members and leaders appointed to take the place of dying officials. The 10th Supreme People's Assembly convened on 5 September 1998, amended the North Korean constitution. The amended constitution made the National Defense Commission (NDC), previously responsible for supervising the military, the highest state organ. Although the new constitution gave the cabinet and the NDC more independence from WPK officials, it did not weaken the party. Kim Jong-il remained WPK General Secretary, controlling the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) and other institutions. While the central WPK leadership composition was not renewed in a single stroke until 2010, the WPK retained its important role as a mass organization.

On 26 June 2010, the Politburo announced that it was summoning delegates for the 3rd Conference, with its official explanation of the need to "reflect the demands of the revolutionary development of the Party, which is facing critical changes in bringing about the strong and prosperous state and Juche development." The conference met on 28 September, revising the party rules and electing (and dismissing) members of the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Politburo, the Presidium and other bodies. The WPK removed a sentence from the preamble which expressed the party's commitment "to building a communist society", replacing it with a new adherence to ''Songun'', the "military-first" policies developed by Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-un was confirmed as heir apparent; Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho and General Kim Kyong-hui (Kim Jong-il's sister) were appointed to leading positions in the Korean People's Army and the WPK to help him consolidate power. The following year, on 17 December 2011, Kim Jong-il died.

Kim Jong-un's rule (2011–present)

After Kim Jong-il's death, the North Korean elite consolidated Kim Jong-un's position; he was declared in charge of the country when the official report of his father's death was published on 19 December. On 26 December 2011, the official newspaper ''Rodong Sinmun'' hailed him as supreme leader of the party and the state. On 30 December a meeting of the Politburo officially appointed him Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, after he was nominated for the position by Kim Jong-il in October 2011 (the anniversary of Kim Jong-il's becoming general secretary). Despite the fact that he was not a Politburo member, Kim Jong-un was named to the unofficial position of the supreme leader of the Workers' Party of Korea.

After celebrations for Kim Jong-il's 70th birth anniversary, the Politburo announced on 18 February the 4th Party Conference (which was scheduled for mid-April 2012, near the 100th birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung) "to glorify the sacred revolutionary life and feats of Kim Jong-il for all ages and accomplish the ''Juche'' cause, the ''Songun'' revolutionary cause, rallied close around Kim Jong-un". Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of " Marshal of the Republic" in July 2012. At the 4th Party Conference on 11 April, Kim Jong-il was declared Eternal General Secretary and Kim Jong-un was elected to the newly created post of First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Presidium. The conference amended the party rules to say Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism "the only guiding idea of the party". In December 2013, the party experienced its first open inner struggle in decades with the purge of Jang Song-taek.

The party has seen somewhat of a revival under Kim Jong-un, with more frequent meetings. There have been two conferences, after a gap of 44 years, and a congress between 2010 and 2016. After staging a huge military parade in celebration of the party's 70th anniversary on 10 October 2015, the Politburo announced that its 7th Congress will be held on 6 May 2016 after a 36-year hiatus. The congress announced the first Five-Year Plan since the 1980s and gave Kim Jong-un the new title of chairman, which replaced the previous office of First Secretary. In January 2021, Kim Jong-un was given the title of general secretary, replacing the title of chairman. It was reported in June 2021 that the party set up the post of 'First Secretary', with speculation that Jo Yong-won or Kim Tok-hun, the Premier of North Korea would fill the position. Starting from 2021, Kim Jong-un has started reviving communism and communist terminology within the WPK, with the ideology being again written to the party rules. He also increasingly replaced ''Songun'' with "people-first politics" in the party rules.

Ideology

The WPK maintains a leftist image, and normally sends a delegation to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, where it has some support; its 2011 resolution, "Let us jointly commemorate the Birth Centenary of the Great Leader comrade President Kim Il Sung as a Grand Political Festival of the World's Humankind", was signed by 30 of the 79 attending parties. The WPK also sees itself as part of the worldwide leftist and socialist movements; during the Cold War, the WPK and North Korea had a policy of "exporting revolution", aiding leftist guerrillas worldwide. Additionally, its party rules say it upholds "the revolutionary principles of Marxism–Leninism". However, a number of scholars argue that the WPK's ideology is xenophobic, nationalist, or far-right.

''Juche''

Relationship to Marxism–Leninism

Although the term "''Juche''" was first used in Kim Il-sung's speech (given in 1955), " On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing ''Juche'' in Ideological Work", ''Juche'' as a coherent ideology did not develop until the 1960s. Similar to Stalinism, it led to the development of an unofficial (later formalized) ideological system defending the central party leadership. Until about 1972, ''Juche'' was called a "creative application" of Marxism–Leninism and "the Marxism–Leninism of today", and Kim Il-sung was hailed as "the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our time". However, by 1976 ''Juche'' had become a separate ideology; Kim Jong-il called it "a unique ideology, the contents and structures which cannot simply be described as Marxist–Leninist."

At the 5th Congress, ''Juche'' was elevated to the same level as Marxism–Leninism. It gained in prominence during the 1970s, and at the 6th Congress in 1980 it was recognized as the WPK's only ideology. During the following decade, ''Juche'' transformed from practical to pure ideology. ''On the Juche Idea'', the primary text on ''Juche'', was published in Kim Jong-il's name in 1982. ''Juche'' is, according to this study, inexorably linked with Kim Il-sung and "represents the guiding idea of the Korean Revolution... we are confronted with the honourable task of modelling the whole society on the ''Juche'' idea". Kim Jong-il says in the work that ''Juche'' is not simply a creative application of Marxism–Leninism, but "a new era in the development of human history". The WPK's break with basic Marxist–Leninist premises is spelt out clearly in the article, " Let Us March Under the Banner of Marxism–Leninism and the ''Juche'' Idea".

Despite ''Juche'' conception as a creative application of Marxism and Leninism, some scholars argue it has little direct connection to them. Policies may be explained without a Marxist or Leninist rationale, making the identification of specific influences from these ideologies difficult. Some analysts say it is easier to connect ''Juche'' with nationalism, but not a unique form of nationalism. Although the WPK claims to be socialist-patriotic, some analysts state its socialist patriotism would be more similar to bourgeois nationalism; the chief difference is that socialist patriotism is nationalism in a socialist state. ''Juche'' developed as a reaction to foreign occupation, involvement and influence (primarily by the Chinese and Soviets) in North Korean affairs, and may be described "as a normal and healthy reaction of the Korean people to the deprivation they suffered under foreign domination." However, there is nothing uniquely Marxist or Leninist in this reaction; the primary reason for its description as "communist" is that it occurred in a self-proclaimed socialist state. The WPK (and the North Korean leadership in general) have not explained in detail how their policies are Marxist, Leninist or communist; ''Juche'' is defined as "Korean", and the others as "foreign".

Basic tenets

''Juche'' primary objective for North Korea is political, economic and military independence. Kim Il-sung, in his "Let Us Defend the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-reliance, and Self-defense More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activities" speech to the Supreme People's Assembly in 1967, summarized ''Juche'':

The principle of political independence known as ''chaju'' is one of ''Juche'' central tenets. ''Juche'' stresses equality and mutual respect among nations, asserting that every state has the right to self-determination. In practice, the beliefs in self-determination and equal sovereignty have turned North Korea into a perceived " hermit kingdom". As interpreted by the WPK, yielding to foreign pressure or intervention would violate ''chaju'' and threaten the country's ability to defend its sovereignty. This may explain why Kim Jong-il believed that the Korean revolution would fail if North Korea became dependent on a foreign entity. In relations with fellow socialist countries China and the Soviet Union Kim Il-sung urged cooperation, mutual support and dependence, acknowledging that it was important for North Korea to learn from other countries. Despite this, he abhorred the idea that North Korea could (or should) depend on the two nations and did not want to dogmatically follow their example. Kim Il-sung said that the WPK needed to "resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically", attributing the success of North Korea on the WPK's independence in implementing policies. To ensure North Korean independence, official pronouncements stressed the need for the people to unite under the WPK and the Great Leader.

Economic independence (''charip'') is seen as the material basis of ''chaju''. One of Kim Il-sung's greatest fears involved North Korean dependence on foreign aid; he believed it would threaten the country's ability to develop socialism, which only a state with a strong, independent economy could do. ''Charip'' emphasizes an independent national economy based on heavy industry; this sector, in theory, would then drive the rest of the economy. Kim Jong-il said:

Kim Il-sung considered military independence (''chawi'') crucial. Acknowledging that North Korea might need military support in a war against imperialist enemies, he emphasized a domestic response and summed up the party's (and state's) attitude towards military confrontation: "We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists."

According to ''Juche'', because of his consciousness man has ultimate control over himself and the ability to change the world. This differs from classical Marxism, which believes that humans depend on their relationship to the means of production more than on themselves. The ''Juche'' view of a revolution led by a Great Leader, rather than a group of knowledgeable revolutionaries, is a break from Lenin's concept of a vanguard party.

Nationalism

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

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