Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea)

The Korean People's Army Strategic Force ( Korean: 조선인민군 전략군), previously known as the Korean People's Army Strategic Rocket Force ( Korean: 조선인민군 전략로케트군) and as the Missile Guidance Bureau ( Korean: 미사일지도국), is a military branch of the Korean People's Army that oversees North Korea's nuclear and conventional strategic missiles. It is mainly armed with surface-to-surface missiles of domestic design as well as older Soviet and Chinese models. The KPA Strategic Force was established in 1999 when several missile units under KPA Ground Force Artillery Command were re-organized into a single missile force reporting directly to the office of the Supreme Commander of the KPA via the General Staff.

History

Shortly after Kim Il-Sung's 5 October 1966 instructions to jointly develop the military and the economy, the Second Machine Industry Ministry, under the Workers' Party of Korea secretary in charge of military defence industries was formed to regulate the procurement and production of weapons.

Some sources assert that North Korea had begun the production of multiple rocket launchers in the early 1960s. It might be logically assumed that by 1965, Kim Il-Sung had probably made the political decision to establish an indigenous missile production capability, after the Soviet Union could not produce a suitable ballistic missiles arrangement to favor his request.

Nevertheless, during the 1960s the Soviet Union began to provide free rockets over ground (FROGs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and coastal defense antiship missiles, which provided North Korean engineers groundwork technologies for rocket propulsion, guidance, and related missile systems. In 1965, North Korea founded the Hamhŭng Military Academy to train North Korean defence personnel in rocket and missile research and development. By 1970, North Korea had procured surface-to-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles from China. North Korea also sought assistance to establish its own independent sovereign missile defence development program.

In September 1971, North Korea signed a defence agreement with China to procure, develop, and produce ballistic missiles. Around 1977 final details for bilateral cooperation grew when North Korean engineers participated in a joint development program for the DF-61. The DF-61 was ideally to be a liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 600 km and a 1,000 kg warhead. The program was cancelled in 1978 because of Chinese domestic political opinions.

Around this same time, North Korea was also seeking Soviet missiles and technology. North Korea procured Soviet-made Scud-B ballistic missiles. The timing of the acquisition is unclear. One North Korean defector asserted that the Soviet Union provided about 20 Scud-Bs in 1972. This claim has not been substantiated and is probably not credible.

By 1984, North Korea had produced and flight-tested its Hwasong-5, which reportedly has a range of 320 km compared to the Scud-B's 300 km; the extra 20 km is attributed to improvements in the missile's propulsion system and not a reduction in the mass of the warhead. Just as North Korea was beginning to manufacture the Hwasŏng-5, Iran approached North Korea in 1985 to purchase the missile for use in the “war of the cities” with Iraq. North Korea began to construct missile bases for the Hwasŏng-5 around 1985-86, just before the missile went into serial production around 1987. North Korea's ballistic missile development then accelerated at a fast pace; as soon as mass production of the Hwasŏng-5 began, North Korea began developing the Hwasŏng-6 (火星-6 or Scud-C), the Rodong (commonly known as Nodong-1), the Paektusan-1 (白頭山-1; commonly known as the Taepodong-1), the Paektusan-2 (白頭山-2; commonly known as the Taepodong-2), and the Musudan.

Despite the difficulties of missile development and the fact that other countries had tried and failed to develop medium- and intermediate-range missiles, North Korea began to produce Rodong prototypes around the same time it was beginning mass production of the Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C). The first Rodong deployments were in February 1995, even though the system only had two flight tests—one catastrophic failure and one successful flight at a reduced range. In 1999 different missile units, which were subordinate to the KPA Ground Force Artillery Command, were re-organized into a single missile force - the Missile Guidance Bureau. It would be only in 2012 when Kim Jong-un referred to the service as the Strategic Rocket Forces during his commemorative address honoring the centennial year of Kim Il-sung's birth.

Since Kim Jong-un came to power in December 2011, North Korea has attempted to launch nearly three times as many ballistic missiles as during the entire reign of his father, Kim Jong-il. Between 2011 and the end of 2016, North Korea launched a total of 42 ballistic missiles: 20 short-range Scud- type missiles with a range of 300-1,000 km, 10 medium-range No Dong missiles that can fly 1,300-1,500 km, eight intermediate-range Hwasong 10 (Musudan) missiles traditionally assessed to have a range of 3,500-4,000 km, and four submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These tests can be divided into three categories: tests of operational missiles, tests of missiles North Korea considered operational but were untested (such as the Musudan), and those still under development (such as the Pukkuksong olarisfamily of solid-fuelled missiles).

In 2012 the United Nations and independent experts said that North Korea did not operate missiles beyond the intermediate range, and that the long-range missiles shown at parades are mock-ups. There were doubts about the authenticity of the KN-08 missiles displayed on 16-wheel carrier trucks during a 2012 military parade, and the Musudan missiles shown in 2010.

The testing in 2018 and 2019 of four new road-mobile, solid propellant propulsion, SRBMs marked a qualitative improvement in North Korean missiles. These have a reduced firing preparation signature making destruction before launch more difficult, and some have a flattened trajectory making in-flight interception more difficult. Japanese Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya stated "I believe that orth Korea’sdevelopment of a missile that flies at a lower altitude than a conventional ballistic missile in an irregular trajectory is aimed at breaking through the apanesemissile defence system". These new missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-24 are more sophisticated than the previous Hwasong series. They employ flattened trajectories to remain below 50 km in altitude, putting them in between the 40 km maximum engagement altitude of Patriot missile-defense interceptors and 50 km minimum engagement altitude of THAAD and Aegis missile defense systems. Flying through this coverage gap and using active steering increases survivability against missile defenses. They also have the advantage of being solid-fueled and more accurate than their predecessors, making them more effective weapons.

Between 2018 and 2020, North Korea expanded its missiles brigades from 8 to 13.

Organization

The Strategic Force is a branch of the KPA, and is directly subordinate to the supreme commander.

Facilities

* Musudan-ri is a rocket launching site in North Korea at 40°51′N, 129°40′E. It lies in southern North Hamgyong Province, near the northern tip of East Korea Bay. The area was formerly known as Taep'o-dong (대포동), from which the Taepodong rockets take their name.
* Kittaeryŏng(기태령) site is in Kangwon Province, which borders South Korea. It is used for launches of short to medium-range missiles and has a pad for mobile launchers.
* Kalgol-dong(갈골동) site is in Chagang Province and houses Hwasong-5/6 missiles, targeting South Korea.
* Panghyon Airport

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