Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956

The Soviet Union did not sign the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, which had reestablished peaceful relations between most other Allied Powers and Japan. On 19 October 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Joint Declaration providing for the end of the state of war and for the restoration of diplomatic relations between both countries. They also agreed to continue negotiations for a peace treaty. In addition, the Soviet Union pledged to support Japan for UN membership and to waive all World War II reparations claims. The joint declaration was accompanied by a trade protocol, which granted reciprocal most favored nation status and provided for the development of trade. Japan derived few apparent gains from the normalization of diplomatic relations. The second half of the 1950s saw an increase in cultural exchanges.

Territorial provisions

The Joint Declaration provided in Article 9 for the continuation of negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the countries and further stipulated that "in this connexion, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikoton, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan."''Texts of Soviet–Japanese Statements; Peace Declaration Trade Protocol.''
New York Times, page 2, October 20, 1956.
Subtitle: "Moscow, October 19. (UP) – Following are the texts of a Soviet–Japanese peace declaration and of a trade protocol between the two countries, signed here today, in unofficial translation from the Russian". Quote: "The state of war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan ends on the day the present declaration enters into force .. At the time, the United States threatened to keep the Ryukyu Islands if Japan gave away the other islands, which prevented the negotiation of the promised treaty.Kimie Hara, ''50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems''. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 361–382
Available online at J-STOR
Northern Territories dispute highlights flawed diplomacy.
By Gregory Clark. Japan Times, March 24, 2005.

Moreover, the clause was supposedly based upon agreement between the two nations, but each came to interpret it differently. The Soviet Union maintained that the territorial problem had been closed and that territorial demarcation would not be discussed beyond the promised transfer of two islands.
When the Japanese tried to include a passage "including territorial issue" in a sentence regarding continuation of the negotiations, the Soviets refused,Hara, Kimie. '' Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace'' (1998
online
/ref> explicitly stating that it did so precisely to avoid interpretation that would suggest other "territorial questions" beyond Shikotan-Habomai issue.
The Japanese agreed to drop the expression but had a different interpretation arrived anyway. When the final agreement had been reached on the terms of the Joint Declaration, the Japanese delegation decided to interpret it as including a discussion of the territorial problem in the future peace negotiation by interpreting the declaration jointly with "Hatoyama-Bulganin letters" and "Matsumoto-Gromyko letters".

Exchanged before the final negotiations on the declaration, they intended to confirm the conditions for under the so-called " Adenauer Formula" in which diplomatic relations were to be restored without signing a peace treaty and the territorial problem was to be shelved for future negotiation. The formula did not pass, however, since in spite of preliminary agreement with the Soviets to shelve the territorial issue, Japan raised it at the negotiations and managed to get their territorial clause in the declaration but "interpreted in such a manner as to preserve the plenipotentiaries' face at home": "Habomais and Shikotan were promised in the Joint Declaration, and the question of Kunashiri and Etorofu was to be settled during negotiations for a peace treaty." The disagreement between "two-island transfer" stipulated in the 1956 declaration and Japan's persistent demand of "four-island return" became the cornerstone for the continuation of the Kuril Islands dispute in the Soviet and post-Soviet years.

Legacy

On 14 November 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a NTV interview that the Russian Federation, which is the successor state of the Soviet Union, recognized the Declaration of 1956, and was ready to have territorial talks with Japan on that basis and was followed by Russian President Vladimir Putin the next day. However, the dispute persists, no peace treaty has yet been signed, and the islands remain under Russian administration.

See also

* Japan–Soviet Union relations

References

Further reading

* Pavliatenko, Viktor. "The Difficult Road to Peace. On the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration." ''Far Eastern Affairs: A Russian Journal on China, Japan and Asia-Pacific Region'' 34.4 (2006) pp 77–100.

External links

Text of the declaration, from the UN website

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