Reductive physicalism
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In
philosophy Philosophy ('love of wisdom' in Ancient Greek) is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, Value (ethics and social sciences), value, mind, and language. It is a rational an ...
, physicalism is the view that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. It is opposed to
idealism Idealism in philosophy, also known as philosophical realism or metaphysical idealism, is the set of metaphysics, metaphysical perspectives asserting that, most fundamentally, reality is equivalent to mind, Spirit (vital essence), spirit, or ...
, according to which the world arises from the
mind The mind is that which thinks, feels, perceives, imagines, remembers, and wills. It covers the totality of mental phenomena, including both conscious processes, through which an individual is aware of external and internal circumstances ...
. Physicalism is a form of ontological
monism Monism attributes oneness or singleness () to a concept, such as to existence. Various kinds of monism can be distinguished: * Priority monism states that all existing things go back to a source that is distinct from them; e.g., in Neoplatonis ...
—a "one
substance Substance may refer to: * Matter, anything that has mass and takes up space Chemistry * Chemical substance, a material with a definite chemical composition * Drug, a chemical agent affecting an organism Arts, entertainment, and media Music * ' ...
" view of the nature of
reality Reality is the sum or aggregate of everything in existence; everything that is not imagination, imaginary. Different Culture, cultures and Academic discipline, academic disciplines conceptualize it in various ways. Philosophical questions abo ...
, unlike "two-substance" (
mind–body dualism In the philosophy of mind, mind–body dualism denotes either that mental phenomena are non-physical, Hart, W. D. 1996. "Dualism." pp. 265–267 in ''A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind'', edited by S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Blackwell. or t ...
) or "many-substance" ( pluralism) views. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated. Physicalism is closely related to
materialism Materialism is a form of monism, philosophical monism according to which matter is the fundamental Substance theory, substance in nature, and all things, including mind, mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions. Acco ...
, and has evolved from materialism with advancements in the
physical sciences Physical science is a branch of natural science that studies non-living systems, in contrast to life science. It in turn has many branches, each referred to as a "physical science", together is called the "physical sciences". Definition ...
in explaining observed phenomena. The terms "physicalism" and "materialism" are often used interchangeably, but can be distinguished on the basis that
physics Physics is the scientific study of matter, its Elementary particle, fundamental constituents, its motion and behavior through space and time, and the related entities of energy and force. "Physical science is that department of knowledge whi ...
describes more than just matter. Physicalism encompasses
matter In classical physics and general chemistry, matter is any substance that has mass and takes up space by having volume. All everyday objects that can be touched are ultimately composed of atoms, which are made up of interacting subatomic pa ...
, but also
energy Energy () is the physical quantity, quantitative physical property, property that is transferred to a physical body, body or to a physical system, recognizable in the performance of Work (thermodynamics), work and in the form of heat and l ...
,
physical laws Scientific laws or laws of science are statements, based on reproducibility, repeated experiments or observations, that describe or prediction, predict a range of natural phenomena. The term ''law'' has diverse usage in many cases (approximate, a ...
,
space Space is a three-dimensional continuum containing positions and directions. In classical physics, physical space is often conceived in three linear dimensions. Modern physicists usually consider it, with time, to be part of a boundless ...
,
time Time is the continuous progression of existence that occurs in an apparently irreversible process, irreversible succession from the past, through the present, and into the future. It is a component quantity of various measurements used to sequ ...
,
structure A structure is an arrangement and organization of interrelated elements in a material object or system, or the object or system so organized. Material structures include man-made objects such as buildings and machines and natural objects such as ...
, physical processes,
information Information is an Abstraction, abstract concept that refers to something which has the power Communication, to inform. At the most fundamental level, it pertains to the Interpretation (philosophy), interpretation (perhaps Interpretation (log ...
, state, and
force In physics, a force is an influence that can cause an Physical object, object to change its velocity unless counterbalanced by other forces. In mechanics, force makes ideas like 'pushing' or 'pulling' mathematically precise. Because the Magnitu ...
s, among other things, as described by physics and other sciences, all within a monistic framework. According to a 2020 survey, physicalism holds a slight majority view among philosophers at 51.9%, while there also remains significant opposition to physicalism. Outside of philosophy, physicalism can also refer to the preference or viewpoint that physics should be considered the best and only way to render truth about the world or reality.


Definition of physicalism in philosophy

The word "physicalism" was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by
Otto Neurath Otto Karl Wilhelm Neurath (; ; 10 December 1882 – 22 December 1945) was an Austrian-born philosopher of science, sociologist, and political economist. He was also the inventor of the ISOTYPE method of pictorial statistics and an innovator in ...
and
Rudolf Carnap Rudolf Carnap (; ; 18 May 1891 – 14 September 1970) was a German-language philosopher who was active in Europe before 1935 and in the United States thereafter. He was a major member of the Vienna Circle and an advocate of logical positivism. ...
. The use of "physical" in physicalism is a philosophical concept and can be distinguished from alternative definitions found in the literature (e.g.,
Karl Popper Sir Karl Raimund Popper (28 July 1902 – 17 September 1994) was an Austrian–British philosopher, academic and social commentator. One of the 20th century's most influential philosophers of science, Popper is known for his rejection of the ...
defined a physical proposition as one that can at least in theory be denied by observation). A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are not physical in the ordinary sense. It is common to express the notion of "metaphysical or logical combination of properties" using the notion of supervenience. Supervenience is the idea that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect. The reason to introduce supervenience is that physicalists usually suppose the existence of various abstract concepts that are non-physical in the ordinary sense of the word.


Type physicalism

Type physicalism Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind–brain identity theory, and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, a ...
, also known as mind-body identity theory, holds that
mental events A mental event is any event that happens within the mind of a Consciousness, conscious individual. Examples include thoughts, feelings, decisions, dreams, and realizations. These events often make up the conscious life that are associated with co ...
can be grouped into types that correlate with types of physical events. For instance, one type of mental events, such as pain, correlates with a particular type of physical events, such as C-fiber firings. On this account, all instances of pain correspond to situations where C-fibers are firing. Type physicalism can be understood as the position that there is an identity between types: any mental type is identical with some physical type. A common argument against type physicalism is the problem of
multiple realizability In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue ...
. Multiple realizability posits that the same mental state can be realized by different physical states. Another way to put it is that there is a many-to-one mapping from physical states to mental states.


Token physicalism

Token physicalism is the proposition that every particular mental event is a particular physical event (token physical event) but that there is no type-to-type mapping between mental events and physical events. The most common example of token physicalism is Davidson's anomalous monism. One of token physicalism's strengths is that it is compatible with multiple realizability. Mental states such as pain may be realized in any number of widely different physical events, without any type-like similarity between these physical events.


Reductive and non-reductive physicalism


Reductionism

In the
philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the Body (biology), body and the Reality, external world. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a ...
,
reductionism Reductionism is any of several related philosophical ideas regarding the associations between phenomena which can be described in terms of simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical positi ...
is commonly understood as the reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry. In a simplified form, reductionism implies that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts. There are both reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism (reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism). Reductive physicalism is the view that mental states are nothing over and above physical states and are reducible to physical states.


Emergence

Emergentism Emergentism is the philosophical theory that higher-level properties or phenomena emerge from more basic components, and that these emergent properties are not fully reducible to or predictable from those lower-level parts. A property of a sys ...
is a theory that became popular in the early 20th century. Notions of strong emergence are commonly found in accounts of non-reductive physicalism. A property of a
system A system is a group of interacting or interrelated elements that act according to a set of rules to form a unified whole. A system, surrounded and influenced by its open system (systems theory), environment, is described by its boundaries, str ...
is said to be emergent if it is a new outcome of some of the system's other properties and their interaction while it is itself different from them. Emergentism emphasizes that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. In the context of the philosophy of mind, emergence is often thought to entail
property dualism Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of Substance theory, substance—Materialism, the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of pro ...
.


Arguments against physicalism


Knowledge argument

Though there have been many objections to physicalism throughout its history, many of them are concerned with the apparent contradiction of the existence of
qualia In philosophy of mind, qualia (; singular: quale ) are defined as instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term ''qualia'' derives from the Latin neuter plural form (''qualia'') of the Latin adjective '' quālis'' () meaning "of what ...
in an entirely physical world. The most popular argument of this kind is the so-called knowledge argument as formulated by Frank Jackson, titled " Mary's room". The argument asks us to consider Mary, a girl who has been forced to discover the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor throughout her life. She has access to books containing all physical knowledge. During her time in the room, she learns all the physical facts about the world, including all the physical facts about color. To a physicalist, it would seem that this entails Mary knowing everything about the world. But once she is let out of the room and into the world, it becomes apparent that there were things Mary did not know about the world, such as the ''feeling'' or ''experience'' of seeing color. If Mary did not have such knowledge, how can it be said that everything supervenes upon the physical?


Physicalist response

One response, developed by Lawrence Nemerow and David Lewis, is known as the ability hypothesis. The ability hypothesis distinguishes between propositional knowledge, such as "Mary knows that the sky is typically blue during the day", and knowledge-how, such as "Mary knows how to climb a mountain", and says that all Mary gains from seeing the world in color is knowledge-how. According to this response, Mary does gain knowledge from her experience, but it is not the propositional knowledge required for the knowledge argument to be logically sound.


Argument from philosophical zombies

One commonly issued challenge to a priori physicalism and physicalism in general is the "conceivability argument", or zombie argument. The conceivability argument runs roughly as follows: # According to physicalism, everything in our world (including consciousness) is physical. # Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as in the actual world contains everything that exists in the actual world. In particular, conscious experience exists in such a world. # We can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible. # Therefore, physicalism is false. (This follows from (2) and (3) by ''
modus tollens In propositional logic, ''modus tollens'' () (MT), also known as ''modus tollendo tollens'' (Latin for "mode that by denying denies") and denying the consequent, is a deductive argument form and a rule of inference. ''Modus tollens'' is a m ...
''.) The possibility of
philosophical zombie A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in the philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience. For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked ...
s (p-zombies) entails that mental states do not supervene upon physical states, and thus that physicalism is false. Australian philosopher
David Chalmers David John Chalmers (; born 20 April 1966) is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist, specializing in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is a professor of philosophy and neural science at New York University, as well ...
argues that the conceivability of a zombie entails a metaphysical possibility.


Physicalist response

Galen Strawson Galen John Strawson (; born 1952) is a British analytic philosopher and literary critic who works primarily on philosophy of mind, metaphysics (including free will, panpsychism, the mind–body problem, and the self), John Locke, David Hume, Im ...
argues that it is impossible to establish the conceivability of zombies, so the argument, lacking its first premise, fails.
Daniel Dennett Daniel Clement Dennett III (March 28, 1942 – April 19, 2024) was an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. His research centered on the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of biology, particularly as those ...
argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition". He coined the term "zimboes"—p-zombies that have second-order beliefs—in arguing that p-zombies are incoherent: "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!" In ''The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies'' (1995), Dennett compares consciousness to
health Health has a variety of definitions, which have been used for different purposes over time. In general, it refers to physical and emotional well-being, especially that associated with normal functioning of the human body, absent of disease, p ...
. Michael Lynch argues that the zombie conceivability argument forces us to either question whether we actually have consciousness or accept that zombies are impossible. If zombies falsely believe they are conscious, how can we be sure we are not zombies? We may believe we have conscious mental states when in fact we merely hold a false belief. Lynch thinks denying the possibility of zombies is more reasonable than questioning our own consciousness. Daniel Stoljar has proposed what he calls "the phenomenal concept strategy". Roughly, the phenomenal concept strategy attempts to show that only the ''concept'' of consciousness—not the ''property''—is in some way "special" or
sui generis ( , ) is a Latin phrase that means "of its/their own kind" or "in a class by itself", therefore "unique". It denotes an exclusion to the larger system an object is in relation to. Several disciplines use the term to refer to unique entities. ...
.


Hempel's Dilemma

Physicalists have traditionally opted for a "theory-based" characterization of the physical in terms of either current physics or a future (ideal) physics. Hempel's Dilemma (named after the philosopher of science
Carl Gustav Hempel Carl Gustav "Peter" Hempel (; ; January 8, 1905 – November 9, 1997) was a German writer, philosopher, logician, and epistemologist. He was a major figure in Logical positivism, logical empiricism, a 20th-century movement in the philosophy ...
) attacks physicalism by arguing that both of these approaches are problematic. If, on the one hand, we define the physical by reference to current physics, then physicalism is very likely to be false because it is very likely (by pessimistic meta-induction) that much of current physics is false. If, on the other hand, we define the physical in terms of a future (ideal) or completed physics, then physicalism is hopelessly vague or indeterminate.


Physicalist response

Some physicalists, like Andre Melnyk, accept the dilemma's first horn: they accept that the current definition of physicalism is very likely false as long it is more plausible than any currently formulated rival proposition, such as dualism. Melnyk maintains that this is the attitude most scientists hold toward scientific theories anyway. For example, a defender of evolutionary theory may well accept that its current formulation is likely to be revised in the future but defend it because they believe current evolutionary theory is more likely than any current rival idea, such as creationism. Thus Melnyk holds that one should define physicalism in relation to current physics and have a similar attitude toward its truth as most scientists have toward the truth of currently accepted scientific theories. Some physicalists defend physicalism via alternative characterizations of physicalism. Frank Jackson, for example, has argued for an "object-based" conception of the physical.
David Papineau David Papineau (; born 1947) is a British academic philosopher, born in Como, Italy. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London and the City University of New York Graduate Center, and previously taught for several ye ...
and Barbara Montero have argued for a "via negativa" characterization of the physical. The gist of this approach is characterize the physical in terms of what it is not: the mental. In other words, the via negativa strategy understands the physical as the non-mental.


Argument from overdetermination

Jaegwon Kim Jaegwon Kim (September 12, 1934 – November 27, 2019) was a Korean-American philosopher. At the time of his death, Kim was an emeritus professor of philosophy at Brown University. He also taught at several other leading American universities ...
objects to non-reductive physicalism based on the problem of
overdetermination Overdetermination occurs when a single-observed effect is determined by multiple causes, any one of which alone would be conceivably sufficient to account for ("determine") the effect. The term "overdetermination" () was used by Sigmund Freud a ...
.(2005) ''Physicalism, or Something Near Enough'', Princeton University Press He proposes (using the chart on the right) that ''M1'' causes ''M2'' (these are mental events) and ''P1'' causes ''P2'' (these are physical events). ''M1'' has ''P1'' as its supervenience base (P1 realizes M1), and ''M2'' has ''P2'' as its supervenience base (P2 realizes M2). If ''P1'' causes ''P2'' and M1 causes M2, then we have a case of causal overdetermination. To avoid this causal overdetermination, either M1 or P1 must be eliminated as a cause of P2. Because of the principle of the
causal closure Physical causal closure is a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of metaphysics and the mind. In a strongly stated version, physical causal closure says that "all phy ...
of the physical, M1 is excluded. The non-reductive physicalist is then forced to choose between two unappealing options: accept overdetermination or embrace
epiphenomenalism Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem. It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but d ...
. Kim thus argues that mental causation can be preserved only by embracing a reductionist view, whereby mental properties are considered causally efficacious by being reduced to physical properties.


Argument from first-person perspectives

Christian List Christian List (born 1973) is a German philosopher and political scientist who serves as professor of philosophy and decision theory at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich and co-director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosop ...
argues that the existence of first-person perspectives, i.e., one existing as oneself and not as someone else, refutes physicalism. He argues that since first-personal facts cannot supervene on physical facts, this refutes not only physicalism, but also most forms of dualism that have purely third-personal metaphysics. List also argues that there is a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness: that at most three of the following metaphysical claims can be true: "first-person realism", "non-
solipsism Solipsism ( ; ) is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known ...
", "non-fragmentation", and "one world"—and thus at least one of them must be false. He has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism. These ideas are related to the
vertiginous question Benj Hellie's vertiginous question asks why, of all the subjects of experience out there, ''this'' one—the one corresponding to the human being referred to as Benj Hellie—is the one whose experiences are ''lived''? (The reader is supposed to ...
proposed by Benj Hellie.


Other views


Realistic physicalism

Galen Strawson Galen John Strawson (; born 1952) is a British analytic philosopher and literary critic who works primarily on philosophy of mind, metaphysics (including free will, panpsychism, the mind–body problem, and the self), John Locke, David Hume, Im ...
's realistic physicalism or realistic monism is the view that physicalism entails
panpsychism In philosophy of mind, panpsychism () is the view that the mind or a mind-like aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. It is also described as a theory that "the mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throug ...
– or at least micropsychism. Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists re mistakenlycommitted to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness". Because experiential phenomena allegedly cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to
substance dualism Substance may refer to: * Matter, anything that has mass and takes up space Chemistry * Chemical substance, a material with a definite chemical composition * Drug, a chemical agent affecting an organism Arts, entertainment, and media Music * ' ...
,
property dualism Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of Substance theory, substance—Materialism, the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of pro ...
,
eliminative materialism Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind that expresses the idea that the majority of mental states in folk psychology do not exist. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that ...
and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".


See also

*
Cognitive science Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary, scientific study of the mind and its processes. It examines the nature, the tasks, and the functions of cognition (in a broad sense). Mental faculties of concern to cognitive scientists include percep ...
*
Consciousness Consciousness, at its simplest, is awareness of a state or object, either internal to oneself or in one's external environment. However, its nature has led to millennia of analyses, explanations, and debate among philosophers, scientists, an ...
*
Empiricism In philosophy, empiricism is an epistemological view which holds that true knowledge or justification comes only or primarily from sensory experience and empirical evidence. It is one of several competing views within epistemology, along ...
*
Epiphenomenalism Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem. It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but d ...
*
Hempel's Dilemma Hempel's dilemma is a question first asked (at least on record) by the philosopher Carl Hempel. It has relevance to naturalism and physicalism in philosophy, and to philosophy of mind. The dilemma questions how the language of physics can b ...
* Mary's Room *
Metaphysical naturalism Metaphysical naturalism (also called ontological naturalism, philosophical naturalism and antisupernaturalism) is a philosophical worldview which holds that there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and relations of the kind studied by ...
*
Monism Monism attributes oneness or singleness () to a concept, such as to existence. Various kinds of monism can be distinguished: * Priority monism states that all existing things go back to a source that is distinct from them; e.g., in Neoplatonis ...
*
Multiple realizability In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue ...
* Ontological pluralism *
Philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the Body (biology), body and the Reality, external world. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a ...
*
Reductionism Reductionism is any of several related philosophical ideas regarding the associations between phenomena which can be described in terms of simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical positi ...
*
Supervenience In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to ''supervene'' on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Examples of supervenience, i ...


Notes


References

* Bennett, K., and McLaughlin, B. 2011. "Supervenience". In ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,'' ed. E. Zalta
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
* Chalmers, D. 1996. ''The Conscious Mind''. New York: Oxford University Press. * * Chalmers, D. 2009. "The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism". In ''Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind,'' ed. B. McLaughlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 313–335. * * Hempel, C. 1969. "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets". In ''Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel.'' eds. S. Morgenbesser, et al. New York: St Martin's Press. * * Jackson, F. 1998. ''From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis.'' New York: Oxford University Press. * * Kirk, R. (2013), The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental, Oxford University Press
Review
* Kripke, S. 1972. ''Naming and Necessity.'' In ''Semantics of Natural Language,'' eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel: 253-355, 763-769. * Lewis, D. 1994. "Reduction of Mind". In ''A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind,'' ed. S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 412–431. * Lycan, W. 2003. "Chomsky on the Mind-body Problem". In ''Chomsky and His Critics,'' eds. L. Anthony and N. Hornstein. Oxford: Blackwell * * * * * Papineau, D. 2002. ''Thinking About Consciousness.'' Oxford: Oxford University Press. * Poland, J. 1994. ''Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations.'' Oxford: Clarendon. * Putnam, H. 1967. "Psychological Predicates". In ''Art, Mind, and Religion,'' eds. W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 37–48. * Smart, J.J.C. 1959. "Sensations and Brain Processes". Reprinted in ''Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,'' ed. D. Rosenthal. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. * * * Stoljar, D. 2009. "Physicalism". in ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,'' ed. E. Zalta
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
* Stoljar, D. 2010. ''Physicalism.'' New York: Routledge. * Tye, M. 2009. ''Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.''Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. * *


External links

* {{Authority control Ontology Philosophy of physics Philosophy of science