Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
   HOME

TheInfoList



OR:

Various conspiracy theories allege that
U.S. government The federal government of the United States (U.S. federal government or U.S. government) is the national government of the United States, a federal republic located primarily in North America, composed of 50 states, a city within a fede ...
officials had advance knowledge of
Japan Japan ( ja, 日本, or , and formally , ''Nihonkoku'') is an island country in East Asia. It is situated in the northwest Pacific Ocean, and is bordered on the west by the Sea of Japan, while extending from the Sea of Okhotsk in the north ...
's December 7, 1941,
attack on Pearl Harbor The attack on Pearl HarborAlso known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service upon the United States against the naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, j ...
. Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to why and how the
United States The United States of America (U.S.A. or USA), commonly known as the United States (U.S. or US) or America, is a country primarily located in North America. It consists of 50 states, a federal district, five major unincorporated territorie ...
had been caught off guard, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans for an attack. In September 1944,
John T. Flynn John Thomas Flynn (October 25, 1882 – April 13, 1964) was an American journalist best known for his opposition to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to American entry into World War II. In September 1940, Flynn helped establish the America Fi ...
, a co-founder of the non-interventionist America First Committee, launched a Pearl Harbor counter-narrative when he published a 46-page booklet entitled ''The Truth about Pearl Harbor'', arguing that Roosevelt and his inner circle had been plotting to provoke the Japanese into an attack on the U.S. and thus provide a reason to enter the war since January 1941. Several writers, including journalist Robert Stinnett, retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral
Robert Alfred Theobald Robert Alfred Theobald (January 25, 1884 – May 13, 1956), nicknamed "Fuzzy", was a United States Navy officer who served in World War I and World War II, and achieved the rank of rear admiral. In retirement, he was the author of the 1954 book ...
, and
Harry Elmer Barnes Harry Elmer Barnes (June 15, 1889 – August 25, 1968) was an American historian who, in his later years, was known for his historical revisionism and Holocaust denial. After receiving a PhD at Columbia University in 1918 Barnes became a pr ...
have argued that various parties high in the government of the United States and the United Kingdom knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to ensure America’s entry into the
European theatre of World War II The European theatre of World War II was one of the two main Theater (warfare), theatres of combat during World War II. It saw heavy fighting across Europe for almost six years, starting with Nazi Germany, Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 Sept ...
via a Japanese–American war started at "the back door". However, the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy is rejected by many historians as a
fringe theory A fringe theory is an idea or a viewpoint which differs from the accepted scholarship of the time within its field. Fringe theories include the models and proposals of fringe science, as well as similar ideas in other areas of scholarship, such a ...
.


Ten official U.S. inquiries

The U.S. government made nine official inquiries into the attack between 1941 and 1946, and a tenth in 1995. They included an inquiry by
Secretary of the Navy The secretary of the Navy (or SECNAV) is a statutory officer () and the head (chief executive officer) of the Department of the Navy, a military department (component organization) within the United States Department of Defense. By law, the se ...
Frank Knox William Franklin Knox (January 1, 1874 – April 28, 1944) was an American politician, newspaper editor and publisher. He was also the Republican vice presidential candidate in 1936, and Secretary of the Navy under Franklin D. Roosevelt during ...
(1941); the
Roberts Commission The Roberts Commission is one of two presidentially-appointed commissions. One related to the circumstances of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and another related to the protection of cultural resources during and after World War II. Both were ...
(1941–42); the Hart Inquiry (1944); the Army Pearl Harbor Board (1944); the
Naval Court of Inquiry Naval Board of Inquiry and Naval Court of Inquiry are two types of investigative court proceedings, conducted by the United States Navy in response to an event that adversely affects the performance, or reputation, of the fleet or one of its ship ...
(1944); the Hewitt investigation; the Clarke investigation; the Congressional InquiryIn general, "Congressional inquiry" refers to any United States congressional hearing. (Pearl Harbor Committee; 1945–46); a top-secret inquiry by Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson Henry Lewis Stimson (September 21, 1867 – October 20, 1950) was an American statesman, lawyer, and Republican Party politician. Over his long career, he emerged as a leading figure in U.S. foreign policy by serving in both Republican and D ...
, authorized by Congress and carried out by
Henry Clausen Henry Christian Clausen (30 June 1905 – 4 December 1992) was an American lawyer, and investigator. He authored the ''Clausen Report'', an 800-page report on the Army Board's Pearl Harbor Investigation. He traveled over 55,000 miles over seven ...
(the Clausen Inquiry; 1946); and the Thurmond-Spence hearing, in April 1995, which produced the Dorn Report. The inquiries reported incompetence, underestimation, and misapprehension of Japanese capabilities and intentions; problems resulting from excessive secrecy about
cryptography Cryptography, or cryptology (from grc, , translit=kryptós "hidden, secret"; and ''graphein'', "to write", or ''-logia'', "study", respectively), is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of adver ...
; division of responsibility between Army and Navy (and lack of consultation between them); and lack of adequate manpower for intelligence (analysis, collection, processing). Investigators prior to Clausen did not have the security clearance necessary to receive the most sensitive information, as Brigadier General Henry D. Russell had been appointed guardian of the pre-war decrypts, and he alone held the combination to the storage safe. Clausen claimed, in spite of Secretary Stimson having given him a letter informing witnesses he had the necessary clearances to require their cooperation, he was repeatedly lied to until he produced copies of top secret decrypts, thus proving he indeed had the proper clearance. Stimson's report to Congress, based on Clausen's work, was limited due to secrecy concerns, largely about cryptography. A more complete account was not made publicly available until the mid-1980s, and not published until 1992 as ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement''. Reaction to the 1992 publication has varied. Some regard it as a valuable addition to understanding the events, while one historian noted Clausen did not speak to General
Walter Short Walter Campbell Short (March 30, 1880 – September 3, 1949) was a lieutenant general (temporary rank) and major general of the United States Army and the U.S. military commander responsible for the defense of U.S. military installations in ...
, Army commander at Pearl Harbor during the attack, and called Clausen's investigation "notoriously unreliable" in several aspects.


Diplomatic situation

Some authors argue that President Roosevelt was actively provoking Japan in the weeks prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. These authors assert that Roosevelt was imminently expecting and seeking war, but wanted Japan to take the first overtly aggressive action., reprinted by
Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group is an international company originating in England that publishes books and academic journals. Its parts include Taylor & Francis, Routledge, F1000 (publisher), F1000 Research or Dovepress. It is a division of Informa ...
in 2017 with


Statements by high-ranking officials

One perspective is given by
Rear Admiral Rear admiral is a senior naval flag officer rank, equivalent to a major general and air vice marshal and above that of a commodore and captain, but below that of a vice admiral. It is regarded as a two star "admiral" rank. It is often regarde ...
Frank Edmund Beatty Jr., who at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack was an aide to the
Secretary of the Navy The secretary of the Navy (or SECNAV) is a statutory officer () and the head (chief executive officer) of the Department of the Navy, a military department (component organization) within the United States Department of Defense. By law, the se ...
Frank Knox William Franklin Knox (January 1, 1874 – April 28, 1944) was an American politician, newspaper editor and publisher. He was also the Republican vice presidential candidate in 1936, and Secretary of the Navy under Franklin D. Roosevelt during ...
and was very close to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt Franklin Delano Roosevelt (; ; January 30, 1882April 12, 1945), often referred to by his initials FDR, was an American politician and attorney who served as the 32nd president of the United States from 1933 until his death in 1945. As the ...
's inner circle, remarked that: Another "eyewitness viewpoint" akin to Beatty's is provided by Roosevelt's administrative assistant at the time of Pearl Harbor, Jonathan Daniels; it is a telling comment about FDR's reaction to the attack – "The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be. ... But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price. ..." "Ten days before the
attack on Pearl Harbor The attack on Pearl HarborAlso known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service upon the United States against the naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, j ...
",
Henry L. Stimson Henry Lewis Stimson (September 21, 1867 – October 20, 1950) was an American statesman, lawyer, and Republican Party politician. Over his long career, he emerged as a leading figure in U.S. foreign policy by serving in both Republican and D ...
,
United States Secretary of War The secretary of war was a member of the President of the United States, U.S. president's United States Cabinet, Cabinet, beginning with George Washington's Presidency of George Washington, administration. A similar position, called either "Se ...
at the time "entered in his diary the famous and much-argued statement – that he had met with President Roosevelt to discuss the evidence of impending hostilities with Japan, and the question was 'how we should maneuver them he Japaneseinto the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.'" However Stimson, in reviewing his diary after the war, recalled that the commanders at Pearl Harbor had been warned of the possibility of attack, and that the poor state of readiness that the attack had revealed was a surprise to him:
etGeneral Short had been told the two essential facts: 1) a war with Japan is threatening, 2) hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given these two facts, both of which were stated without equivocation in the message of Nov. 27, the outpost commander should be on the alert to make his fight ... To cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief. ...quoted in
Robert Stinnett's ''
Day of Deceit ''Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor'' is a book by Robert Stinnett. It alleges that Franklin Roosevelt and his administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to bring the United States into ...
'' suggests a memorandum prepared by Commander McCollum was central to U.S. policy in the immediate pre-war period. Stinnett claims the memo suggests only a direct attack on U.S. interests would sway the American public (or Congress) to favor direct involvement in the European war, specifically in support of the British. An attack ''by Japan'' would not, could not, aid Britain. Although the memo was passed to Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, two of Roosevelt's military advisors, on October 7, 1940, there is no evidence to suggest Roosevelt ever saw it, while Stinnett's claims of evidence he did is nonexistent. Moreover, although Anderson and Knox offered eight specific plans to aggrieve the Japanese Empire and added, "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better," of the eight "plans" (actions to be taken) offered in the memo, many if not all were implemented, but there is considerable doubt the McCollum memo was the inspiration. Nonetheless, in ''Day of Deceit'' Stinnett claims all action items were implemented. Yet there were numerous instances of members of the Roosevelt Administration insisting on not provoking Japan. Mark Parillo, in his essay ''The United States in the Pacific'', wrote, " ese theories tend to founder on the logic of the situation. Had Roosevelt and other members of his administration known of the attack in advance, they would have been foolish to sacrifice one of the major instruments needed to win the war just to get the United States into it." Furthermore, on 5 November 1941, in a joint memo, Stark, CNO, and Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, warned, "if Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still not have been reached.... War between the United States and Japan should be avoided...." Additionally, in a 21 November 1941 memo, Brigadier
Leonard T. Gerow Leonard Townsend Gerow (July 13, 1888 – October 12, 1972) was a general in the United States Army who served with distinction in both World War I and World War II. A 1911 graduate the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), Gerow served with the Uni ...
, head of Army War Plans, stated, "one of our present major objectives sthe avoidance of war with Japan... nd toinsure continuance of material assistance to the British."Prange, ''et al.'', ''At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor'' (New York: Penguin, 1991), p. 369. He concluded, " is of grave importance to our war effort in Europe..." Furthermore, Churchill himself, in a 15 May 1940 telegram, said he hoped a U.S. commitment to aid Britain would "quiet" Japan, following with a 4 October message requesting a USN courtesy visit to Singapore aimed at "preventing the spreading of the war" And Stark's own Plan Dog expressly stated, "Any strength that we might send to the Far East would...reduce the force of our blows against Germany..." Roosevelt could scarcely have been ignorant of Stark's views, and war with Japan was clearly contrary to Roosevelt's express wish to aid Britain.
Oliver Lyttelton Oliver Lyttelton, 1st Viscount Chandos, (15 March 1893 – 21 January 1972) was a British businessman from the Lyttelton family who was brought into government during the Second World War, holding a number of ministerial posts. Background, ed ...
, the British Minister of War Production, said, "... Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history ever to say that America was forced into the war. Everyone knows where American sympathies were. It is incorrect to say that America was truly neutral even before America came into the war on an all-out basis." How this demonstrates anything with regard to Japan is unclear. Rather, it refers to other aid to Britain.
Lend-Lease Lend-Lease, formally the Lend-Lease Act and introduced as An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States (), was a policy under which the United States supplied the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and other Allied nations with food, oil, ...
, enacted in March 1941, informally declared the end of American neutrality in favor of the Allies by agreeing to supply Allied nations with war materials. In addition, Roosevelt authorized a so-called Neutrality Patrol, which would protect the merchantmen of one nation, namely Britain, from attack by another, Germany. This made shipping legitimate target of attack by submarine. Furthermore, Roosevelt ordered U.S.
destroyer In naval terminology, a destroyer is a fast, manoeuvrable, long-endurance warship intended to escort larger vessels in a fleet, convoy or battle group and defend them against powerful short range attackers. They were originally developed in ...
s to report
U-boat U-boats were naval submarines operated by Germany, particularly in the First and Second World Wars. Although at times they were efficient fleet weapons against enemy naval warships, they were most effectively used in an economic warfare role ...
s, then later authorized them to "shoot on sight". This made the U.S. a ''de facto'' belligerent. None was the act of a disinterested neutral, while all are unquestionably of assistance to Britain. When considering information like this as a point for or against, the reader must keep in mind questions such as: was this official privy to information about the U.S. government? Did he have communications with high-level administration figures such as President Roosevelt or Ambassador Joseph Grew? Is this just a strongly held personal opinion? Or were there measures justifying this view? If Britain, did, indeed know and chose to conceal, "withholding this vital intelligence only ran the risk of losing American trust",Parillo, in Higham and Harris, p. 289. and with it any further American aid, which would be reduced after the attack in any event. There is also a claim, first asserted in Toland's ''Infamy'', that
ONI An is a kind of ''yōkai'', demon, orc, ogre, or troll in Japanese folklore. Oni are mostly known for their fierce and evil nature manifested in their propensity for murder and cannibalism. Notwithstanding their evil reputation, oni possess i ...
knew about Japanese carrier movements. Toland cited entries from the diary of Rear Admiral J. E. Meijer Ranneft of the Dutch Navy for 2 December and 6 December. Ranneft attended briefings at ONI on these dates. According to Toland, Ranneft wrote that he was told by ONI that two Japanese carriers were northwest of Honolulu. However, the diary uses the Dutch abbreviation ''beW'', meaning "westerly", contradicting Toland's claim. Nor did any other persons present at the briefings report hearing Toland's version. In their reviews of ''Infamy'', David Kahn and John C. Zimmerman suggested Ranneft's reference was to carriers near the Marshall Islands. Toland has made other conflicting and incorrect claims about the diary during lectures at the Holocaust denial organization the
Institute for Historical Review The Institute for Historical Review (IHR) is a United States-based nonprofit organization which promotes Holocaust denial. It is considered by many scholars to be central to the international Holocaust denial movement. Self-described as a "hist ...
. The diary states at 02:00 (6-12-41) Turner fears a sudden Japanese attack on
Manila Manila ( , ; fil, Maynila, ), officially the City of Manila ( fil, Lungsod ng Maynila, ), is the capital of the Philippines, and its second-most populous city. It is highly urbanized and, as of 2019, was the world's most densely populate ...
. At 14:00 the diary states "Everyone present on O.N.I. I speak to Director Admiral Wilkinson, Captain MacCollum, Lt. Cdr. Kramer ... They show me – on my request – the place of the 2 carriers (see 2–12–41) West of Honolulu. I ask what the idea is of these carriers on that place. The answer was: 'perhaps in connection with Japanese rapports icon eventual American actions'. There is not one of ours who speaks about a possible air attack on Honolulu. I myself did not think of it because I believed everyone on Honolulu to be 100% on the alert, as everyone here on O.N.I. There prevails a tense state of mind at O.N.I." These diary entries are provided (in Dutch) in the photo section in George Victor's ''The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable''. CBS correspondent Edward R. Murrow had a dinner appointment at the White House on 7 December. Because of the attack he and his wife only ate with Mrs. Roosevelt, but the president asked Murrow to stay afterwards. As he waited outside the Oval Office, Murrow observed government and military officials entering and leaving. He wrote after the war: One historian has written, however, that when Murrow met Roosevelt with
William J. Donovan William Joseph "Wild Bill" Donovan (January 1, 1883 – February 8, 1959) was an American soldier, lawyer, intelligence officer and diplomat, best known for serving as the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the Bur ...
of the
OSS OSS or Oss may refer to: Places * Oss, a city and municipality in the Netherlands * Osh Airport, IATA code OSS People with the name * Oss (surname), a surname Arts and entertainment * ''O.S.S.'' (film), a 1946 World War II spy film about ...
that night, while the magnitude of the destruction at Pearl Harbor horrified the president, Roosevelt seemed slightly less surprised by the attack than the other men. According to Murrow, the president told him, "Maybe you think
he attack He or HE may refer to: Language * He (pronoun), an English pronoun * He (kana), the romanization of the Japanese kana へ * He (letter), the fifth letter of many Semitic alphabets * He (Cyrillic), a letter of the Cyrillic script called ''He'' in ...
didn't surprise us!" He said later, "I believed him", and thought that he might have been asked to stay as a witness. When allegations of Roosevelt's foreknowledge appeared after the war, John Gunther asked Murrow about the meeting. Murrow reportedly responded the full story would pay for his son's college education and "if you think I'm going to give it to you, you're out of your mind". Murrow did not write the story, however, before his death.


McCollum memo

On October 7, 1940,
Lieutenant Commander Lieutenant commander (also hyphenated lieutenant-commander and abbreviated Lt Cdr, LtCdr. or LCDR) is a commissioned officer rank in many navies. The rank is superior to a lieutenant and subordinate to a commander. The corresponding rank i ...
Arthur H. McCollum of the
Office of Naval Intelligence The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is the military intelligence agency of the United States Navy. Established in 1882 primarily to advance the Navy's modernization efforts, it is the oldest member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and serves ...
submitted a memo to Navy Captains
Walter S. Anderson Walter Stratton Anderson (October 4, 1881 – October 24, 1981) was a Vice Admiral of the United States Navy, who served as the Executive officer of in World War I and as Commander Battleships, Battle Force in the Pacific Fleet, and of the Gulf ...
and Dudley Knox, which details eight actions which might have the effect of provoking Japan into attacking the United States. The memo remained classified until 1994 and contains the notable line, "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." Sections 9 and 10 of the memo are said by Gore Vidal to be the "smoking gun" revealed in Stinnett's book, suggesting it was central to the high level plan to lure the Japanese into an attack. Evidence the memo or derivative works actually reached President Roosevelt, senior administration officials, or the highest levels of U.S. Navy command, is circumstantial, at best.


Roosevelt's desire for war with Germany

Theorists challenging the traditional view that Pearl Harbor was a surprise repeatedly note that Roosevelt wanted the U.S. to intervene in the war against Germany, though he did not say so officially. A basic understanding of the political situation of 1941 precludes any possibility the public wanted war. Thomas Fleming argued President Roosevelt wished for Germany or Japan to strike the first blow, but did not expect the United States to be hit as severely as it was in the attack on Pearl Harbor. An attack by Japan on the U.S. could not guarantee the U.S. would declare war on Germany. After such an attack, American public anger would be directed at Japan, not Germany, just as happened. The
Tripartite Pact The Tripartite Pact, also known as the Berlin Pact, was an agreement between Germany, Italy, and Japan signed in Berlin on 27 September 1940 by, respectively, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Galeazzo Ciano and Saburō Kurusu. It was a defensive military ...
(Germany, Italy, Japan) called for each to aid another in defense; Japan could not reasonably claim America had attacked Japan if she struck first. For instance, Germany had been at war with the UK since 1939, and with the USSR since June 1941, without Japanese assistance. There had been a serious, if low-level, naval war going on in the Atlantic between Germany and the U.S. since summer of 1941, as well. On October 17 a
U-boat U-boats were naval submarines operated by Germany, particularly in the First and Second World Wars. Although at times they were efficient fleet weapons against enemy naval warships, they were most effectively used in an economic warfare role ...
torpedoed a U.S. destroyer, '' USS Kearny'', inflicting severe damage and killing eleven crewmen. Two weeks after the attack on the Kearny, a submarine sank an American destroyer, ''
USS Reuben James Three ships of the United States Navy have borne the name USS ''Reuben James''. Reuben James was a boatswain's mate who distinguished himself fighting the Barbary pirates. * The first , a four-stack , was the first US Navy ship sunk by hostile a ...
'', killing 115 sailors. Nevertheless, it was only Hitler's declaration of war on 11 December, unforced by treaty, that brought the U.S. into the European war. Clausen and Lee's ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement'' reproduces a Purple message, dated 29 November 1941, from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo. A closing paragraph reads, "... He (Ribbentrop) also said that if Japan were to go to war with America, Germany would, of course, join in immediately, and Hitler's intention was that there should be absolutely no question of Germany making a separate peace with England. ..." While theorists who challenge the conventional view that the attack was a surprise treat this as a guarantee to join after Japan's attack, it can as easily be taken as a guarantee to come to Japan's aid, as Germany had done for Italy in
Libya Libya (; ar, ليبيا, Lībiyā), officially the State of Libya ( ar, دولة ليبيا, Dawlat Lībiyā), is a country in the Maghreb region in North Africa. It is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Egypt to Egypt–Libya bo ...
.


Assertions that Japanese codes had already been broken

U.S.
signals intelligence Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-gathering by interception of ''signals'', whether communications between people (communications intelligence—abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals not directly used in communication ( ...
in 1941 was both impressively advanced and uneven. In 1929, the U.S.
MI-8 The Mil Mi-8 (russian: Ми-8, NATO reporting name: Hip) is a medium twin-turbine helicopter, originally designed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s and introduced into the Soviet Air Force in 1968. It is now produced by Russia. In addition to ...
cryptographic operation in New York City was shut down by Henry Stimson (Hoover's newly appointed Secretary of State), citing "ethical considerations", which inspired its now broke former director,
Herbert Yardley Herbert Osborn Yardley (April 13, 1889 – August 7, 1958) was an American cryptologist. He founded and led the cryptographic organization the Black Chamber. Under Yardley, the cryptanalysts of The American Black Chamber broke Japanese diplomatic ...
, to write a 1931 book, ''
The American Black Chamber ''The American Black Chamber'' is a 1931 book by Herbert O. Yardley. The book describes the inner workings of the interwar American governmental cryptography organization called the Black Chamber. The cryptography historian David Kahn called the b ...
'', about its successes in breaking other nations' crypto traffic. Most countries responded promptly by changing (and generally improving) their ciphers and codes, forcing other nations to start over in reading their signals. The Japanese were no exception. Nevertheless, U.S. cryptanalytic work continued after Stimson's action in two separate efforts: the Army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) crypto group, OP-20-G. Cryptanalytic work was kept secret to such an extent, however, that major commands such as the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor were prohibited from working on codebreaking by Admiral
Kelly Turner Admiral (United States), Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (May 27, 1885 – February 12, 1961), commonly known as Admiral Kelly Turner, served in the United States Navy during World War II, and is best known for commanding the Amphibious Force, Pa ...
. By late 1941, those organizations had broken several Japanese ciphers, such as J19 and PA-K2, called ''Tsu'' and ''Oite'' respectively by the Japanese. The highest security diplomatic code, dubbed
Purple Purple is any of a variety of colors with hue between red and blue. In the RGB color model used in computer and television screens, purples are produced by mixing red and blue light. In the RYB color model historically used by painters, pu ...
by the U.S., had been broken, but American cryptanalysts had made little progress against the IJN's current ''Kaigun Ango Sho D'' (Naval Code D, called AN-1 by the U.S.; JN-25 after March 1942). In addition, there was a perennial shortage of manpower, thanks to penury on one hand and the perception of intelligence as a low-value career path on the other. Translators were over-worked, cryptanalysts were in short supply, and staffs were generally stressed. In 1942, "Not every cryptogram was decoded. Japanese traffic was too heavy for the undermanned Combat Intelligence Unit." Furthermore, there were difficulties retaining good intelligence officers and trained linguists; most did not remain on the job for the extended periods necessary to become truly professional. For career reasons, nearly all wanted to return to more standard assignments. However, concerning the manning levels, "... just prior to
World War II World War II or the Second World War, often abbreviated as WWII or WW2, was a world war that lasted from 1939 to 1945. It involved the vast majority of the world's countries—including all of the great powers—forming two opposin ...
,
he US He or HE may refer to: Language * He (pronoun), an English pronoun * He (kana), the romanization of the Japanese kana へ * He (letter), the fifth letter of many Semitic alphabets * He (Cyrillic), a letter of the Cyrillic script called ''He'' in ...
had some 700 people engaged in the effort and as in fact, obviously having some successes." Of these, 85% were tasked to decryption and 50% to translation efforts against IJN codes. The nature and degree of these successes has led to great confusion among non-specialists. Furthermore, OP-20-GY "analysts relied as much on summary reports as on the actual intercepted messages." The U.S. was also given decrypted messages by Dutch (NEI) intelligence, who like the others in the British–Dutch–U.S. agreement to share the cryptographic load, shared information with allies. However, the U.S. refused to do likewise. This was, at least in part, due to fears of compromise; sharing even between the US Navy and Army was restricted (e.g see
Central Bureau The Central Bureau was one of two Allied signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisations in the South West Pacific area (SWPA) during World War II. Central Bureau was attached to the headquarters of the Allied Commander of the South West Pacific area ...
). The eventual flow of intercepted and decrypted information was tightly and capriciously controlled. At times, even President Roosevelt did not receive all information from code-breaking activities. There were fears of compromise as a result of poor security after a memo dealing with
Magic Magic or Magick most commonly refers to: * Magic (supernatural), beliefs and actions employed to influence supernatural beings and forces * Ceremonial magic, encompasses a wide variety of rituals of magic * Magical thinking, the belief that unrela ...
was found in the desk of Brigadier General Edwin M. (Pa) Watson, the President's military aide.


Purple

The Japanese code dubbed "
Purple Purple is any of a variety of colors with hue between red and blue. In the RGB color model used in computer and television screens, purples are produced by mixing red and blue light. In the RYB color model historically used by painters, pu ...
", which was used by the Japanese Foreign Office and only for diplomatic (but not for military) messages, was broken by Army cryptographers in 1940. A 14-part message using this code, sent from Japan to its embassy in Washington, was decoded in Washington on 6 and 7 December. The message, which made plain the Japanese intention to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, was to be delivered by the Japanese ambassador at 1 p.m. Washington time (dawn in the Pacific). The SIS decoded the first 13 parts of the message, but did not decode the 14th part of the message until it was too late. Colonel
Rufus S. Bratton Colonel Rufus Sumter Bratton (September 5, 1892 – March 19, 1958) was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) in the War Department in December 1941, when the United States ent ...
, then serving as Chief of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 (intelligence), was responsible for receiving and distributing Magic intercepts to senior military and government officials. In Bratton's view, the 14-part message by itself merely signaled a break in diplomatic relations, which appeared to be inevitable anyway. Others saw it differently: Roosevelt, upon reviewing just the first 13-parts (and without part 14 or the 1 p.m. delivery requirement) declared "this means war", and when Marshall was given the intercept on the morning of December 7, ordered a warning message sent to American bases in the area, including Hawaii. Due to atmospheric transmission conditions the message was sent out via
Western Union The Western Union Company is an American multinational financial services company, headquartered in Denver, Colorado. Founded in 1851 as the New York and Mississippi Valley Printing Telegraph Company in Rochester, New York, the company chang ...
over its undersea cable rather than over the military radio channels; the message was not received until the attack was already underway. The claim no pre-attack IJN message expressly mentioned Pearl Harbor is perhaps true. The claims that no Purple traffic pointed to Pearl Harbor may also be true, as the Japanese Foreign Office was not well thought of by the military and during this period was routinely excluded from sensitive or secret material, including war planning. It is also possible any such intercepts were not translated until after the attack, or indeed, after the war ended; some messages were not. In both instances, all traffic from these pre-attack intercepts has not yet been declassified and released to the public domain. Hence, any such claims are now indeterminate, pending a fuller accounting. Additionally, no decrypts have come to light of JN-25B traffic with any intelligence value prior to Pearl Harbor, and certainly no such has been identified. Such breaks as recorded by authors W. J. Holmes and Clay Blair Jr., were into the additive tables, which was a required second step of three (see above). The first 100 JN-25 decrypts from all sources in date/time order of translation have been released, and are available in the National Archives. The first JN-25B decrypt was in fact by HYPO (Hawaii) on 8 January 1942 (numbered #1 up JN-25B RG38 CNSG Library, Box 22, 3222/82 NA CP). The first 25 decrypts were very short messages or partial decrypts of marginal intelligence value. As Whitlock stated, "The reason that not one single JN-25 decrypt made prior to Pearl Harbor has ever been found or declassified is not due to any insidious cover-up... it is due quite simply to the fact that no such decrypt ever existed. It simply was not within the realm of our combined cryptologic capability to produce a usable decrypt at that particular juncture."


JN-25

The JN-25 superencrypted code, and its cryptanalysis by the US, is one of the most debated portions of Pearl Harbor lore. JN-25 is the U.S. Navy's last of several names for the
cryptosystem In cryptography, a cryptosystem is a suite of cryptographic algorithms needed to implement a particular security service, such as confidentiality (encryption). Typically, a cryptosystem consists of three algorithms: one for key generation, one for ...
of the
Imperial Japanese Navy The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN; Kyūjitai: Shinjitai: ' 'Navy of the Greater Japanese Empire', or ''Nippon Kaigun'', 'Japanese Navy') was the navy of the Empire of Japan from 1868 to 1945, when it was dissolved following Japan's surrender ...
, sometimes referred to as Naval Code D. Other names used for it include five-numeral, 5Num, five-digit, five-figure, AN (JN-25 Able), and AN-1 (JN-25 Baker), and so on. Superenciphered codes of this sort were widely used and were the state of the art in practical cryptography at the time. JN-25 was very similar in principle to the British "Naval Cypher No. 3", known to have been broken by Germany during World War II. Once it was realized what sort of cryptosystem JN-25 was, how to attempt breaking into it was known. Stinnett notes the existence of a USN handbook for attacks on such a system, produced by OP-20-G. Even so, breaking any such code was not easy in actual practice. It took much effort and time, not least in accumulating sufficient 'cryptanalytic depth' in intercepted messages prior to the outbreak of hostilities when IJN radio traffic increased abruptly and substantially; prior to 7 December 1941, IJN radio traffic was limited, since the IJN played only a minor role in the war against China and therefore was only rarely required to send radio messages whatever the highest level crypto system might have been. (As well, interception of IJN traffic off China would have been at best spotty.) Rather oddly however, the official history of GYP-1 shows nearly 45,000 IJN messages intercepted during the period from 1 June 1941 until 4 December 1941. Thus, most Japanese encrypted broadcast military radio traffic was Army traffic associated with the land operations in China, none of which used IJN cryptography. Breaking a superencrypted cipher like JN-25 was a three-step process: (a) determining the "indicator" method to establish the starting point within the additive cipher, (b) stripping away the superencryption to expose the bare code, and then (c) breaking the code itself. When JN-25 was first detected and recognized, such intercepted messages as were interceptable were collected (at assorted intercept stations around the Pacific by the Navy) in an attempt to accumulate sufficient depth to attempt to strip away the superencryption. Success at doing so was termed by the cryptographers a 'break' into the system. Such a break did not always produce a cleartext version of the intercepted message; only a break in the third phase could do so. Only after breaking the underlying code (another difficult process) would the message be available, and even then its meaning—in an intelligence sense—might be less than fully clear. When a new edition was released, the cryptographers were forced to start again. The original JN-25A system replaced the 'Blue' code (as Americans called it), and used five-digit numbers, each divisible by three (and so usable as a quick, and somewhat reliable, error check, as well as something of a 'crib' to cryptanalysts), giving a total of 33,334 legal code values. To make it harder to crack a code value, meaningless additives (from a large table or book of five-digit numbers) were added arithmetically to each five-digit cipher element. JN-25B superseded the first release of JN-25 at the start of December 1940. JN-25B had 55,000 valid words, and while it initially used the same additive list, this was soon changed and the cryptanalysts found themselves entirely locked out again. Over the years, various claims have been made as to the progress made decrypting this system, and arguments made over when it was readable (in whole or part). Lt. "Honest John" Leitwiler, Commander of
Station CAST Station CAST was the United States Navy signals monitoring and cryptographic intelligence fleet radio unit at Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippines, until Cavite was captured by the Japanese forces in 1942, during World War II. It was an important p ...
, the Philippines, stated in November 1941 that his staff could "walk right across" the number columns of the coded messages. He is frequently quoted in support of claims JN-25 was then mostly readable. This comment, however, refers not to the message itself but to the superenciphering additives and referred to the ease of attacking the code using a new method for discovery of additive values. The 16 November 1941 letter to L.W. Parks (OP-20-GY) sent by Leitwiler states, "We have stopped work on the period 1 February to 31 July as we have all we can do to keep up with the current period. We are reading enough current traffic to keep two translators very busy." Another document, Exhibit No. 151 (Memoranda from Captain L. F. Safford) from the Hewitt Inquiry has a copy of the U.S. Navy message OPNAV-242239 'Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941' which has in part: '1. Reference (a) advised that Com 16 intercepts were considered most reliable and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on Japanese naval movements and send dispatch to OPNAV, info CINCPAC. Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's, not only because of better radio interception, but because Com 16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was exchanging technical information and Japanese-to-English translations with the British unit (the Far East Combined Bureau) then at Singapore. Lt. Cdr. Arthur H. McCollum was aware of this, and it may have been part of his thinking when he drafted the
McCollum memo The McCollum memo, also known as the ''Eight Action Memo'', was a memorandum, dated October 7, 1940 (more than a year before the Pearl Harbor attack), sent by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, who "provided the president with intelligence ...
. Duane L. Whitlock, traffic analyst at CAST, was not aware before the attack IJN movement traffic code was being read. "Reading" in this context means being able to see the underlying code groups, not breaking out the messages into usable
plaintext In cryptography, plaintext usually means unencrypted information pending input into cryptographic algorithms, usually encryption algorithms. This usually refers to data that is transmitted or stored unencrypted. Overview With the advent of comp ...
. The Hewitt Inquiry document also states, "The "5 numeral system" (JN-25B) yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward." Detailed month by month progress reports have shown no reason to believe any JN-25B messages were fully decrypted before the start of the war. Tallied results for September, October, and November reveal roughly 3,800 code groups (out of 55,000, about 7%) had been recovered by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. In all, the U.S. intercepted 26,581 messages in naval or related systems, not counting PURPLE, between September and December 1941 alone. So convinced were U.S. Navy planners Japan could only stage a single operation at a time, after intercepts indicated a Japanese buildup for operations in the Dutch East Indies, for more than two weeks (between 1 November and 17 November), no JN-25 message not relating to that expected operation was even examined for intelligence value.


Japanese intelligence

Japanese espionage against Pearl Harbor involved at least two ''
Abwehr The ''Abwehr'' (German for ''resistance'' or ''defence'', but the word usually means ''counterintelligence'' in a military context; ) was the German military-intelligence service for the ''Reichswehr'' and the ''Wehrmacht'' from 1920 to 1944. A ...
'' agents. One of them, Otto Kuhn, was a
sleeper agent A sleeper agent, also called sleeper cell, is a spy who is placed in a target country or organization not to undertake an immediate mission but to act as a potential asset if activated. Even if unactivated, the "sleeper agent" is still an asset ...
living in Hawaii with his family. Kuhn was incompetent and there is no evidence he provided information of value. The other,
Yugoslavia Yugoslavia (; sh-Latn-Cyrl, separator=" / ", Jugoslavija, Југославија ; sl, Jugoslavija ; mk, Југославија ;; rup, Iugoslavia; hu, Jugoszlávia; rue, label=Pannonian Rusyn, Югославия, translit=Juhoslavija ...
n businessman Duško Popov, was a double agent, working for the
XX Committee The Double-Cross System or XX System was a World War II counter-espionage and deception operation of the British Security Service (a civilian organisation usually referred to by its cover title MI5). Nazi agents in Britain – real and false – w ...
of MI5. In August 1941, he was sent by the ''Abwehr'' to the U.S., with an assignment list that included specific questions about military facilities in Oahu, including Pearl Harbor. Although
British Security Coordination British Security Co-ordination (BSC) was a covert organisation set up in New York City by the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in May 1940 upon the authorisation of the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. Its purpose was to investigate ...
introduced Popov to the FBI, the Americans seem to have paid little attention. It is possible that previous propaganda and forged or unreliable intelligence contributed to
J. Edgar Hoover John Edgar Hoover (January 1, 1895 – May 2, 1972) was an American law enforcement administrator who served as the first Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He was appointed director of the Bureau of Investigation  ...
's dismissing Popov's interest in Pearl Harbor as unimportant. There is nothing to show his assignment list was passed on to military intelligence, nor was he allowed to visit Hawaii. Popov later asserted his list was a clear warning of the attack, ignored by the bungling FBI. The questions in his list were rambling and general, and in no way pointed to air attack on Pearl Harbor. Prange considered Popov's claim overblown, and argued the notorious questionnaire was a product of ''Abwehr'' thoroughness. Furthermore, the Japanese did not need ''Abwehr'' assistance, having a consulate in Hawaii which had on its staff an undercover IJN intelligence officer,
Takeo Yoshikawa was a Japanese spy in Hawaii before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Early career A 1933 graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima (graduating at the top of his class), Yoshikawa served briefly at sea aboard the ...
. The consulate had reported to IJN Intelligence for years, and Yoshikawa increased the rate of reports after his arrival. (Sometimes called a "master spy", he was in fact quite young, and his reports not infrequently contained errors.) Pearl Harbor base security was so lax Yoshikawa had no difficulty obtaining access, even taking the Navy's own harbor tourboat. (Even had he not, hills overlooking the Harbor were perfect for observation or photography, and were freely accessible.) Some of his information, and presumably other material from the Consulate, was hand-delivered to IJN intelligence officers aboard Japanese commercial vessels calling at Hawaii prior to the War; at least one is known to have been deliberately routed to Hawaii for this purpose during the summer. Most, however, seem to have been transmitted to Tokyo, almost certainly ''via'' cable (the usual communication method with Tokyo). Many of those messages were intercepted and decrypted by the U.S.; most were evaluated as routine intelligence gathering all nations do about potential opponents, rather than evidence of an active attack plan. None of those currently known, including those decrypted after the attack when there was finally time to return to those remaining undecrypted, explicitly stated anything about an attack on Pearl Harbor. In November 1941, advertisements for a new
board game Board games are tabletop games that typically use . These pieces are moved or placed on a pre-marked board (playing surface) and often include elements of table, card, role-playing, and miniatures games as well. Many board games feature a comp ...
called ''The Deadly Double'' appeared in American magazines. These ads later drew suspicion for possibly containing coded messages, for unknown agents, giving advance notice of the Pearl Harbor attack. The ads were headlined "Achtung, Warning, Alerte!" and showed an
air raid shelter Air raid shelters are structures for the protection of non-combatants as well as combatants against enemy attacks from the air. They are similar to bunkers in many regards, although they are not designed to defend against ground attack (but many ...
and a pair of white and black
dice Dice (singular die or dice) are small, throwable objects with marked sides that can rest in multiple positions. They are used for generating random values, commonly as part of tabletop games, including dice games, board games, role-playing g ...
which, despite being six-sided, carried the figures 12, 24, and XX, and 5, 7, and 0, respectively. It was suggested that these could possibly be interpreted as giving warning of an air raid on day "7" of month "12" at approximate latitude coordinate "20" (
Roman numeral Roman numerals are a numeral system that originated in ancient Rome and remained the usual way of writing numbers throughout Europe well into the Late Middle Ages. Numbers are written with combinations of letters from the Latin alphabet, eac ...
"XX"). The board game was an actual product with sets sold during this time.


Detection of Japanese radio transmissions en route


Alleged detection by ''SS Lurline''

There are claims that, as the ''Kido Butai'' (the Striking Force) steamed toward Hawaii, radio signals were detected that alerted U.S. intelligence to the imminent attack. For instance, the Matson liner , heading from
San Francisco San Francisco (; Spanish language, Spanish for "Francis of Assisi, Saint Francis"), officially the City and County of San Francisco, is the commercial, financial, and cultural center of Northern California. The city proper is the List of Ca ...
to Hawaii on its regular route, is said to have heard and plotted, via "
relative bearing In navigation, bearing or azimuth is the horizontal angle between the direction of an object and north or another object. The angle value can be specified in various angular units, such as degrees, mils, or grad. More specifically: * Absolut ...
s", unusual radio traffic in a telegraphic code very different from International Morse which persisted for several days, and came from signal source(s) moving in an easterly direction, not from shore stations—possibly the approaching Japanese fleet. There are numerous
Morse Code Morse code is a method used in telecommunication to encode text characters as standardized sequences of two different signal durations, called ''dots'' and ''dashes'', or ''dits'' and ''dahs''. Morse code is named after Samuel Morse, one of ...
standards including those for Japanese, Korean, Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, and Greek. To the experienced radio operator, each has a unique and identifiable pattern. For example, ''kana'', International Morse, and "Continental" Morse all have a specific rhythmic sound to the "dit" and "dah" combinations. This is how ''Lurline''s radiomen, Leslie Grogan, a U.S. Navy reserve officer in naval communications, and with decades of maritime service in the Pacific identified the mooted signal source as Japanese and not, say, Russian. There are several problems with this analysis. Surviving officers from the Japanese ships state there was no radio traffic to have been overheard by anyone: their radio operators had been left in Japan to send fake traffic, and all radio transmitters aboard the ships (even those in the airplanes) were physically disabled to prevent any inadvertent or unauthorized broadcast. The ''Kido Butai'' was constantly receiving intelligence and diplomatic updates. Regardless of whether the ''Kido Butai'' broke radio silence and transmitted, there was a great deal of radio traffic picked up by its antennas. In that time period, it was known for a radio signal to reflect from the
ionosphere The ionosphere () is the ionized part of the upper atmosphere of Earth, from about to above sea level, a region that includes the thermosphere and parts of the mesosphere and exosphere. The ionosphere is ionized by solar radiation. It plays an ...
(an atmospheric layer); ionospheric skip could result in its reception hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Receiving antennas were sometimes detected passively 'rebroadcasting' signals that reached them (at much lower amplitudes, sufficiently low that the phenomenon was not of practical importance, nor even of much significance. Some have argued that, since the ''Kido Butai'' contained a large number of possible receiving antennas, it is conceivable the task force did not break radio silence but was detected anyway. Such detection would not have helped the Americans track the Japanese fleet. A radio
direction finder Direction finding (DF), or radio direction finding (RDF), isin accordance with International Telecommunication Union (ITU)defined as radio location that uses the reception of radio waves to determine the direction in which a radio station ...
(DF or RDF) from that time period reported compass direction without reference to distance. (Moreover, it was common for the receiving stations to report erroneous reciprocal bearings.) To locate the source, a plotter needed two such detections taken from two separate stations to triangulate and find the target. If the target was moving, the detections must be close to one another in time. To plot the task force's course with certainty, at least four such detections must have been made in proper time-pairs, and the information analyzed in light of further information received by other means. This complex set of requirements did not occur; if the ''Kido Butai'' was detected, it was not tracked. The original records of ''Lurline'' surrendered to Lt. Cmdr. George W. Pease, 14th Naval District in Honolulu, have disappeared. Neither ''Lurline''s log, nor the reports to the Navy or Coast Guard by Grogan in Hawaii have been found. Thus no contemporaneously written evidence of what was recorded aboard ''Lurline'' is now available. Grogan commented on a signal source "moving" eastward in the North Pacific over several days as shown via "relative bearings" which then "bunched up" and stopped moving. However, the directions given by Grogan in a recreation of the logbook for the Matson Line were 18 and 44° off from known strike force positions and instead pointed towards Japan. According to author Jacobsen, Japanese commercial shipping vessels are the likely source. A re-discovered personal report written by Grogan after the radio log had been passed to the 13th Naval District, dated 10 December 1941 and titled "Record for Posterity", also does not support claims of ''Kido Butai'' broadcasting.


Other alleged detections

The contention that "low-powered" radio (such as
VHF Very high frequency (VHF) is the ITU designation for the range of radio frequency electromagnetic waves (radio waves) from 30 to 300 megahertz (MHz), with corresponding wavelengths of ten meters to one meter. Frequencies immediately below VHF ...
or what the U.S. Navy called TBS, or talk between ships), might have been used, and detected, is contradicted as impossible due to the tremendous distances involved and when contact was lost, it was routinely presumed it was because low-powered radio and land line were being used.
Freedom of Information Act Freedom of Information Act may refer to the following legislations in different jurisdictions which mandate the national government to disclose certain data to the general public upon request: * Freedom of Information Act 1982, the Australian act * ...
(FOIA) requests for specific RDF reports remain wanting. "A more critical analysis of the source documentation shows that not one single radio direction finder bearing, much less any locating "fix," was obtained on any Kido Butai unit or command during its transit from Saeki Bay, Kyushu to Hitokappu Bay and thence on to Hawaii. By removing this fallacious lynchpin propping up such claims of Kido Butai radio transmissions, the attendant suspected conspiracy tumbles down like a house of cards." One suggested example of a ''Kido Butai'' transmission is the November 30, 1941, COMSUM14 report in which Rochefort mentioned a "tactical" circuit heard calling "''maru''s". (a term often used for commercial vessels or non-combat units). Further, the perspective of U.S. naval intelligence at the time was, "... The significance of the term, 'tactical circuit' is that the vessel itself, that is ''Akagi'', was using its own radio to call up the other vessels directly rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the ''Akagi'' with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a maru."


Japanese radio silence

According to a 1942 Japanese after action report, "In order to keep strict radio silence, steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, and holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strict radio silence was perfectly carried out... The ''Kido Butai'' used the radio instruments for the first time on the day of the attack since they had been fixed at the base approximately twenty days before and proved they worked well. Paper flaps had been inserted between key points of some transmitters on board to keep the strictest radio silence..." Commander Genda, who helped plan the attack, stated, "We kept absolute radio silence." For two weeks before the attack, the ships of ''Kido Butai'' used flag and light signals (
semaphore Semaphore (; ) is the use of an apparatus to create a visual signal transmitted over distance. A semaphore can be performed with devices including: fire, lights, flags, sunlight, and moving arms. Semaphores can be used for telegraphy when arra ...
and blinker), which were sufficient since task force members remained in line of sight for the entire transit time. Kazuyoshi Kochi, the communications officer for , dismantled vital transmitter parts and kept them in a box that he used as a pillow to prevent ''Hiei'' from making any radio transmissions until the attack commenced. Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshioka, communications officer of the flagship, ''Akagi'', said he did not recall any ship sending a radio message before the attack. Furthermore, Captain Kijiro, in charge of the ''Kido Butai''s three screening submarines, stated nothing of interest happened on the way to Hawaii, presumably including signals received from the supposedly radio silent Kido Butai. Vice Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka stated, "It is needless to say that the strictest radio silence was ordered to be maintained in every ship of the Task Force. To keep radio silence was easy to say, but not so easy to maintain." There is nothing in the Japanese logs or after action report indicating that radio silence was broken until after the attack. Kusaka worried about this when it was briefly broken on the way home. The appendix to the war-initiating operational order is also often debated. The message of 25 November 1941 from CinC Combined Fleet (Yamamoto) to All Flagships stated, "Ships of the Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedure as follows: 1. Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating. 2. Other forces are at the discretion of their respective commanders. 3. Supply ships, repair ships, hospital ships, etc., will report directly to parties concerned." Furthermore, "In accordance with this Imperial Operational Order, the CinC of the Combined Fleet issued his operational order ... The Task Force ''then drew up its own operational order'', which was given for the first time to the whole force at Hitokappu Bay... In paragraph four of the appendix to that document, the especially secret Strike Force was specifically directed to 'maintain strict radio silence from the time of their departure from the Inland Sea. Their communications will be handled entirely on the general broadcast communications net.'" In addition, Genda recalled, in a 1947 interview, ''Kido Butai''s communications officer issuing this order, with the task force to rely (as might be expected) on flag and blinker.


Radio deception measures

The Japanese practiced radio
deception Deception or falsehood is an act or statement that misleads, hides the truth, or promotes a belief, concept, or idea that is not true. It is often done for personal gain or advantage. Deception can involve dissimulation, propaganda and sleight o ...
. Susumu Ishiguru, intelligence and communications officer for Carrier Division Two, stated, "Every day false communications emanated from Kyushu at the same time and same wavelength as during the training period." Because of this, Commander
Joseph Rochefort Joseph John Rochefort (May 12, 1900 – July 20, 1976) was an American naval officer and cryptanalyst. He was a major figure in the United States Navy's cryptographic and intelligence operations from 1925 to 1946, particularly in the Battle of M ...
of Hawaii Signals Intelligence concluded that the First Air Fleet remained in home waters for routine training. The ships left their own regular wireless operators behind to carry on "routine" radio traffic. Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka stated, "The main force in the Inland Sea and the land-based air units carried out deceptive communications to indicate the carriers were training in the Kyushu area." The main Japanese naval bases (Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo) all engaged in considerable radio deception. Analysis of the bearings from Navy DF stations account for claimed breaks of radio silence, and when plotted, the bearings point to Japanese naval bases, not where the ''Kido Butai'' actually was. On 26 November, CAST reported all Japan's aircraft carriers were at their home bases. Rochefort, with Huckins and Williams, states there were no dummy messages used at any time throughout 1941 and no effort by the Japanese to use serious deception. When asked after the attack just how he knew where ''Akagi'' was, Rochefort (who commanded HYPO at the time) said he recognized her "same ham-fisted" radio operators. (The Japanese contend that radio operators were left behind as part of the deception operation.) The critical DF-tracked radio transmissions show bearings that could have not come from the strike force. Emissions monitored from CAST, or CAST's report ''Akagi'' was off Okinawa on 8 December 1941, are examples, though some transmissions continue to be debated. To deceive radio eavesdroppers, ''IJN Settsu'' commanded by Captain
Chiaki Matsuda ''Translated from the corresponding article in the Japanese Wikipedia'' Rear Admiral Matsuda Chiaki (Japanese: 松田千秋) (29 September 1896 – 6 November 1995) was an admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy and the third captain of the ''Yama ...
sailed from
Taiwan Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), is a country in East Asia, at the junction of the East and South China Seas in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the northwest, Japan to the nort ...
to the
Philippines The Philippines (; fil, Pilipinas, links=no), officially the Republic of the Philippines ( fil, Republika ng Pilipinas, links=no), * bik, Republika kan Filipinas * ceb, Republika sa Pilipinas * cbk, República de Filipinas * hil, Republ ...
simulating radio traffic for all six fleet carriers of the
1st Air Fleet The , also known as the ''Kidō Butai'' ("Mobile Force"), was a name used for a combined carrier battle group comprising most of the aircraft carriers and carrier air groups of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during the first eight months of the P ...
and two other
light carrier A light aircraft carrier, or light fleet carrier, is an aircraft carrier that is smaller than the standard carriers of a navy. The precise definition of the type varies by country; light carriers typically have a complement of aircraft only one-h ...
s.


U.S. contact with Japanese submarines

Additionally, Japanese submarines were sighted and attacked (by the destroyer ) outside the harbor entrance a few hours before the attack commenced, and at least one was sunk—all before the planes began launching. This might have provided enough notice to disperse aircraft and fly off reconnaissance, except, yet again, reactions of the duty officers were tardy. It has been argued that failure to follow up on DF bearings saved . If she had been correctly directed, she might have run into the six-carrier Japanese strike force. After the attack, the search for the attack force was concentrated south of Pearl Harbor, continuing the confusion and ineffectiveness of the American response.


Allied intelligence

Locally, Naval Intelligence in Hawaii had been tapping telephones at the Japanese Consulate before the 7th. Among much routine traffic was overheard a most peculiar discussion of flowers in a call to Tokyo (the significance of which is still publicly opaque and which was discounted in Hawaii at the time), but the Navy's tap was discovered and removed in the first week of December. The local FBI field office was informed of neither the tap nor its removal; the local FBI Agent in charge later claimed he would have had installed one of his own had he known the Navy's had been disconnected. Throughout 1941, the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands collected considerable evidence suggesting Japan was planning some new military adventure. The Japanese attack on the U.S. in December was essentially a side operation to the main Japanese thrust to the South against
Malaya Malaya refers to a number of historical and current political entities related to what is currently Peninsular Malaysia in Southeast Asia: Political entities * British Malaya (1826–1957), a loose collection of the British colony of the Straits ...
and the
Philippines The Philippines (; fil, Pilipinas, links=no), officially the Republic of the Philippines ( fil, Republika ng Pilipinas, links=no), * bik, Republika kan Filipinas * ceb, Republika sa Pilipinas * cbk, República de Filipinas * hil, Republ ...
—many more resources, especially Imperial Army resources, were devoted to these attacks as compared to Pearl Harbor. Many in the Japanese military (both Army and Navy) had disagreed with Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's idea of attacking the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor when it was first proposed in early 1941, and remained reluctant after the Navy approved planning and training for an attack beginning in spring 1941, and through the highest level Imperial Conferences in September and November which first approved it as policy (allocation of resources, preparation for execution), and then authorized the attack. The Japanese focus on Southeast Asia was quite accurately reflected in U.S. intelligence assessments; there were warnings of attacks against
Thailand Thailand ( ), historically known as Siam () and officially the Kingdom of Thailand, is a country in Southeast Asia, located at the centre of the Indochinese Peninsula, spanning , with a population of almost 70 million. The country is bo ...
(the Kra Peninsula), Malaya,
French Indochina French Indochina (previously spelled as French Indo-China),; vi, Đông Dương thuộc Pháp, , lit. 'East Ocean under French Control; km, ឥណ្ឌូចិនបារាំង, ; th, อินโดจีนฝรั่งเศส, ...
, the
Dutch East Indies The Dutch East Indies, also known as the Netherlands East Indies ( nl, Nederlands(ch)-Indië; ), was a Dutch colony consisting of what is now Indonesia. It was formed from the nationalised trading posts of the Dutch East India Company, which ...
(Davao-Weigo Line), the Philippines, even
Russia Russia (, , ), or the Russian Federation, is a List of transcontinental countries, transcontinental country spanning Eastern Europe and North Asia, Northern Asia. It is the List of countries and dependencies by area, largest country in the ...
. Pearl Harbor was not mentioned. In fact, when the final part of the "14-Part Message" (also called the "one o'clock message") crossed Kramer's desk, he cross-referenced the time (''per'' usual practice, not the brainwave often portrayed) and tried to connect the timing to a Japanese convoy (the Thai invasion force) recently detected by Admiral Hart in the Philippines. The U.S. Navy was aware of the traditional planning of the Imperial Japanese Navy for war with the U.S., as maintained throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. The Japanese made no secret of it, and in the 1930s American radio intelligence gave U.S. war planners considerable insight in Japanese naval exercises. These plans presumed there would be a large ''decisive battle'' between Japanese and U.S. battleships, but this would be fought near Japan, after the numerical superiority of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (assured by the Washington Naval Treaty, and still taken as given) was whittled down by primarily night attacks by light forces, such as destroyers and submarines. This strategy expected the Japanese fleet to take a defensive posture, awaiting U.S. attack, and it was confirmed by the Japanese Navy staff only three weeks before Pearl Harbor. In the 1920s, the decisive battle was supposed to happen near the Ryukyu islands; in 1940 it was expected to occur in the central Pacific, near the Marshall islands.
War Plan Orange War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) is a series of United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Empire of Japan, Japan during the interwar years, years bet ...
reflected this in its own planning for an advance across the Pacific. Yamamoto's decision to shift the focus of the confrontation with the U.S. as far east as Pearl Harbor, and to use his aircraft carriers to cripple the American battleships, was a radical enough departure from previous doctrine to leave analysts in the dark. There had been a specific claim of a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor from the
Peru , image_flag = Flag of Peru.svg , image_coat = Escudo nacional del Perú.svg , other_symbol = Great Seal of the State , other_symbol_type = Seal (emblem), National seal , national_motto = "Fi ...
vian Ambassador to Japan in early 1941. (The source of this intelligence was traced to the Ambassador's Japanese cook. It was treated with skepticism, and properly so, given the nascent state of planning for the attack at the time and the unreliability of the source.) Since Yamamoto had not yet decided to even argue for an attack on Pearl Harbor, discounting Ambassador Grew's report to Washington in early 1941 was quite sensible. Later reports from a Korean labor organization also seem to have been regarded as unlikely, though they may have had better grounding in actual IJN actions. In August 1941, British Intelligence, MI6, dispatched its agent Duško Popov, code name Tricycle, to Washington to alert the FBI about German requests for detailed intelligence about defenses at Pearl Harbor, indicating that the request had come from Japan. Popov further revealed that the Japanese had requested detailed information about the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. For whatever reason, the FBI took no action.


British advance knowledge and withholding claims

Several authors have controversially claimed that
Winston Churchill Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (30 November 187424 January 1965) was a British statesman, soldier, and writer who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom twice, from 1940 to 1945 Winston Churchill in the Second World War, dur ...
had significant advance knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor but intentionally chose not to share this information with the Americans in order to secure their participation in the war. These authors allege that Churchill knew that the Japanese were planning an imminent attack against the United States by mid-November 1941. They furthermore claim that Churchill knew that the Japanese fleet was leaving port on November 26, 1941 to an unknown destination. Finally, they claim that on December 2, British intelligence intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's signal indicating December 7 as the day of an attack. One story from author Constantine Fitzgibbon claimed that a letter received from
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Victor Frederick William Cavendish-Bentinck, 9th Duke of Portland, (18 June 1897 – 30 July 1990), known as Victor Cavendish-Bentinck until 1977 and Lord Victor Cavendish-Bentinck from 1977 to 1980, and informally as Bill Bentinck, was a Britis ...
stated that Britain's JIC met and discussed at length the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. From a Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee session of 5 December 1941 it was stated "We knew that they changed course. I remember presiding over a J.I.C. meeting and being told that a Japanese fleet was sailing in the direction of Hawaii, asking 'Have we informed our transatlantic brethren?' and receiving an affirmative reply." However the author was incorrect. There was no session on 5 December nor was Pearl Harbor discussed when they did meet on 3 December.


Official U.S. war warnings

In late November 1941, both the U.S. Navy and Army sent explicit warnings of war with Japan to all Pacific commands. On November 27 Washington sent a final alert to Pacific American military commanders, such as the message sent to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, which read in part: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning...an aggression move by Japan is expected within the next days." Although these plainly stated the high probability of imminent war with Japan, and instructed recipients to be accordingly on alert for war, they did not mention the likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor itself, instead focusing on the Far East. Washington forwarded none of the raw intelligence it had, and little of its intelligence estimates (after analysis), to Hawaiian commanders, Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel Husband Edward Kimmel (February 26, 1882 – May 14, 1968) was a United States Navy four-star admiral who was the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He was removed fro ...
and General
Walter C. Short Walter Campbell Short (March 30, 1880 – September 3, 1949) was a lieutenant general (temporary rank) and major general of the United States Army and the U.S. military commander responsible for the defense of U.S. military installations i ...
. Washington did not solicit their views about likelihood of war or Hawaiian special concerns. Washington's war warning messages have also been criticised by some (e.g., the U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board – "Do/Don't Messages") as containing "conflicting and imprecise" language. Since the Army was officially responsible for the security of the Pearl Harbor facilities and Hawaiian defense generally, and so of the Navy's ships while in port, Army actions are of particular interest. Short reported to Washington he had increased his alert level (but his earlier change in meaning for those levels was not understood in Washington and led to misunderstanding there about what he was really doing). In addition, Short's main concern was sabotage from
fifth columnist A fifth column is any group of people who undermine a larger group or nation from within, usually in favor of an enemy group or another nation. According to Harris Mylonas Harris Mylonas is Associate Professor of Political Science and Internat ...
s (expected to precede the outbreak of war for decades preceding the attack), which accounts for his orders that Army Air Corps planes be parked close together near the center of the airfields. There seems to have been no increased Army urgency about getting its existing radar equipment properly integrated with the local command and control in the year it had been available and operational in Hawaii before the attack. Leisurely radar training continued and the recently organized early warning center was left minimally staffed. Anti-aircraft guns remained in a state of low readiness, with ammunition in secured lockers. Neither Army long-range bombers nor Navy PBYs were used effectively, remaining on a peacetime maintenance and use schedule. Short evidently failed to understand he had the responsibility to defend the fleet. In Short's defense, it should be noted he had training responsibilities to meet, and the best patrol aircraft, B-17s and B-24s, were in demand in the Philippines and Britain, both of which had higher priority (he wanted ''at least 180 heavy bombers'', but already had 35 B-17s, and was getting 12 more). Little was done to prepare for air attack. Inter-service rivalries between Kimmel and Short did not improve the situation. Particularly, most intelligence information was sent to Kimmel, assuming he would relay it to Short, and ''vice versa''; this assumption was honored mostly in the breach. Hawaii did not have a Purple cipher machine (although, by agreement at the highest levels between U.S. and UK cryptographic establishments, four had been delivered to the British by October 1941), so Hawaii remained dependent on Washington for intelligence from that (militarily limited) source. However, since Short had no liaison with Kimmel's intelligence staff, he was usually left out of the loop.
Henry Clausen Henry Christian Clausen (30 June 1905 – 4 December 1992) was an American lawyer, and investigator. He authored the ''Clausen Report'', an 800-page report on the Army Board's Pearl Harbor Investigation. He traveled over 55,000 miles over seven ...
reported the war warnings could not be more precise because Washington could not risk Japan guessing the U.S. was reading important parts of their traffic (most importantly Purple), as well as because neither was cleared to receive Purple. Clausen does not answer why Washington could not have said "an exceptionally reliable source" was involved, with very strong instructions to pay attention. Additionally, Clausen claims military men of Kimmel and Short's seniority and background should have understood the significance of the warnings, and should have been more vigilant than they were, as for instance in scouting plane flights from Hawaii, which were partial at best in the period just before the attack. All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures for their situations. Like most commentators, Clausen ignores what the "war warnings" (and their context) explicitly warn, though indistinctly, against. Washington, with more complete intelligence than any field command, expected an attack anywhere on a list of possible locations (Pearl Harbor not among them), and since the Japanese were already committed to Thailand, it seems to have been expected another major operation by them was impossible. Clausen, like most, also ignores what actions Kimmel, Short, and Admiral
Claude C. Bloch Claude Charles Bloch (July 12, 1878 – October 4, 1967) was a United States Navy admiral who served as Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet (COMBATFOR) from 1937 to 1938; and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS) from 1938 to 1940. Early year ...
(Commander, Fourteenth Naval District, responsible for naval facilities in Hawaii) actually took. They took precautions against sabotage, widely expected as a precursor to war, and reported their preparations. The Hawaii commanders did not anticipate an air attack; no one did so explicitly. Indeed, the prevailing view at the time was Japan could not execute two major naval operations at once, so with the Thailand invasion convoy known to be at sea, the Hawaii commanders had good reason to feel safe. One major point often omitted from the debate (though Costello covers it thoroughly) is the Philippines, where MacArthur, unlike Kimmel or Short, had complete access to all decrypted Purple and JN-25 traffic CAST could provide (indeed, Stinnet quotes Whitlock to that effect), and was nonetheless caught unprepared and with all planes on the ground nevertheless, nine hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. Caidin and Blair also raise the issue. Although it has been argued that there was sufficient intelligence at the time to give commanders at Pearl Harbor a greater level of alert, some factors may take on unambiguous meaning not clear at the time, lost in what
Roberta Wohlstetter Roberta Mary Morgan (married name Roberta Wohlstetter) (August 22, 1912 – January 6, 2007) was one of a historian of American military intelligence. She authored ''Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision'', which former Secretary of Defense Donald ...
in her masterful examination of the situation called "noise", "scattered amid the dross of many thousands of other intelligence bits, some of which just as convincingly pointed to a Japanese attack on the Panama Canal."


Role of American carriers

None of the three U.S. Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were in Pearl Harbor when the attack came. This has been alleged by some to be evidence of advance knowledge of the attack by those in charge of their disposition; the carriers were supposedly away so as to save them (the most valuable ships) from attack. In fact, the two carriers then operating with the Pacific Fleet, ''Enterprise'' and ''Lexington'', were on missions to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands, which were intended in part to protect the route used by planes (including B-17s) bound for the Philippines (the third, ''Saratoga'', was in routine
refit Refitting or refit of boats and marine vessels includes repairing, fixing, restoring, renewing, mending, and renovating an old vessel. Refitting has become one of the most important activities inside a shipyard. It offers a variety of services for ...
in
Puget Sound Puget Sound ( ) is a sound of the Pacific Northwest, an inlet of the Pacific Ocean, and part of the Salish Sea. It is located along the northwestern coast of the U.S. state of Washington. It is a complex estuarine system of interconnected ma ...
, at the Bremerton shipyard). At the time of the attack, ''Enterprise'' was about west of Pearl Harbor, heading back. In fact, ''Enterprise'' had been scheduled to be back on December 6, but was delayed by weather. A new arrival estimate put her arrival at Pearl around 07:00, almost an hour before the attack, but she was also unable to make that schedule. Furthermore, at the time, aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable. They were not
capital ship The capital ships of a navy are its most important warships; they are generally the larger ships when compared to other warships in their respective fleet. A capital ship is generally a leading or a primary ship in a naval fleet. Strategic im ...
s. The most important vessels in naval planning even as late as Pearl Harbor were battleships (''per'' the
Mahan Mahan or Mahaan may refer to: * Mahan (name) * Mahan confederacy, chiefdoms in ancient Korea * Mahan, Iran, a city in Kerman Province * Mahan District, an administrative subdivision of Kerman Province * Mahan Rural District, an administrative subdi ...
doctrine followed by both the U.S. and Japanese navies at the time). Carriers became the Navy's most important ships only following the attack. At the time, naval establishments all over the world regarded battleships, not carriers, as the most powerful and significant elements of naval power. Had the U.S. wanted to preserve its key assets from attack, it would almost certainly have focused on protecting battleships. It was the attack on Pearl Harbor itself that first helped vault the carrier ahead of the battleship in importance. The attack demonstrated the carrier's unprecedented ability to attack the enemy at a great distance, with great force and surprise. The U.S. would turn this ability against Japan. Elimination of battleships from the Pacific Fleet forced the Americans to rely on carriers for offensive operations.


Lack of court-martial

Another issue in the debate is the fact neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short ever faced court martial. It is alleged this was to avoid disclosing information showing the U.S. had advanced knowledge of the attack. When asked, "Will historians know more later?", Kimmel replied, "' ... I'll tell you what I believe. I think that most of the incriminating records have been destroyed. ... I doubt if the truth will ever emerge.' ..." From Vice Admiral Libby, "I will go to my grave convinced that FDR ordered Pearl Harbor to let happen. He must have known." It is equally likely this was done to avoid disclosing the fact that Japanese codes were being read, given that there was a war on.


Unreleased classified information

Part of the controversy of the debate centers on the state of documents pertaining to the attack. There are some related to Pearl Harbor which have not yet been made public. Some may no longer exist, as many documents were destroyed early during the war due to fears of an impending Japanese invasion of Hawaii. Still others are partial and mutilated. Information that is still currently classified includes key reports in Churchill's records, including the PREM 3 file in the UK's Public Records Office, which contains Churchill's most secret wartime intelligence briefs. In it, the 252 group dealing with the Japanese situation in 1941 is open, save for the omission of Section 5, dealing with events from November 1941 through March 1942, and is marked with official finality as "closed for 75 years." Unlike the Magic intelligence files released by the United States, none of the Ultra intelligence files pertaining to Japan have been released by the British government. Conflicting stories regarding FOIA (
Freedom of Information Act Freedom of Information Act may refer to the following legislations in different jurisdictions which mandate the national government to disclose certain data to the general public upon request: * Freedom of Information Act 1982, the Australian act * ...
) requests for the source materials used, e.g., Sheet Number 94644, or materials available at the National Archives are also common among the debate. However, much information has been said to have been automatically destroyed under a destruction of classified information policy during the war itself. Various authors have nevertheless continued to bring classified Pearl Harbor materials to light via FOIA. For instance, Sheet No. 94644 derives from its reference in the FOIA-released Japanese Navy Movement Reports of Station H in November 1941. Entries for 28 November 1941 have several more items of interest, each being a "movement code" message (indicating ship movements or movement orders), with specific details given by associated Sheet Numbers. Examples are: Sheet No. 94069 has information on "KASUGA MARU" – this being hand-written (''Kasuga Maru'' was later converted to CVE '' Taiyo''); Sheet No. 94630 is associated with IJN oiler ''Shiriya'' (detailed to the Midway Neutralization Force, with destroyers ''Ushio'' and ''Sazanami'', not the ''Kido Butai''); and finally for Sheet No. 94644 there is another hand-written remark "FAF using Akagi xtmr" (First Air Fleet using ''Akagis transmitter). It is known that the movement reports were largely readable at the time. These three documents (Sheet Numbers 94069, 94630, and 94644) are examples of materials which yet, even after decades and numerous specific FOIA requests, have not been declassified fully and made available to the public. Sheet Number 94644, for example, noted as coming from ''Akagis transmitter and as being a "movement code" report, would have likely contained a reported position.


Forgeries

A purported transcript of a conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill in late November 1941 was analyzed and determined to be fake. There are claims about these conversations; much of this is based on fictional documents, often cited as "Roll T-175" at the National Archives. There is no Roll T-175; NARA does not use that terminology.See also
THE CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT FORGERIES
at ''American Heritage'' magazine.


See also

*
September 11 attacks advance-knowledge conspiracy theories Various conspiracy theories allege that certain institutions or individuals had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks in the United States in 2001. Some of the primary debates include whether the Bush administration or the United States Arme ...
* Coventry Blitz#Coventry and Ultra *
Pacific war The Pacific War, sometimes called the Asia–Pacific War, was the theater of World War II that was fought in Asia, the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and Oceania. It was geographically the largest theater of the war, including the vast ...
*
Battle of Port Arthur The of 8–9 February 1904 marked the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers on the neutral Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur, Manchuria, and continued with an en ...
* Battle between HMAS ''Sydney'' and German auxiliary cruiser ''Kormoran'' *
Winds Code The "Winds Code" is a confused military intelligence episode relating to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, especially the advance-knowledge debate claiming that the attack was expected. The Winds Code was an instruction from Tokyo to Japanese legat ...


Notes


References


Further reading

* David Kahn, '' The Codebreakers – The Story of Secret Writing'' (Macmillan Company, 1967). An early, comprehensive account of cryptography. Includes much material on Pearl Harbor issues. *
Roberta Wohlstetter Roberta Mary Morgan (married name Roberta Wohlstetter) (August 22, 1912 – January 6, 2007) was one of a historian of American military intelligence. She authored ''Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision'', which former Secretary of Defense Donald ...
, ''Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision'' (Stanford Univ Press, 1962). A book published early in the debate saying Pearl Harbor was a failure of strategic analysis and ineffective anticipation. In particular, she suggests that inter-Service friction accounted for much of the poor liaison in Hawaii. *
John Toland John Toland (30 November 167011 March 1722) was an Irish people, Irish rationalist philosopher and freethought, freethinker, and occasional satirist, who wrote numerous books and pamphlets on political philosophy and philosophy of religion, whi ...
, ''Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath'' (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986) Some of his sources later claimed his interpretation of their experiences is incorrect. *George Victor, ''The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable'' (Potomac Books, 2007) asserts that Washington had advanced knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack, its "whys and wherefores", blames FDR and alleges a cover-up. *Donald G. Brownlow, ''The Accused: The Ordeal of Rear Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, USN'' (Vantage Press, 1968). One of the earliest independent Pearl Harbor accounts. Contains materials based on extensive interviews and personal letters. *
James Rusbridger James Rusbridger (26 February 1928 – 16 February 1994) was a British author and historian on international espionage during and after World War II. Biography He was born in Jamaica, son of Gordon Rusbridger an Army colonel, and died in Tremo ...
and
Eric Nave Captain Eric Nave (18 March 1899 – 23 June 1993) was an Australian cryptographer and intelligence officer in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Navy, noted for his work with joint Allied intelligence units during World War II. He serve ...
, ''Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII'' (Summit, 1991). This book claims the British intercepted and could read JN-25 but deliberately withheld warning the U.S. because the UK needed their help. Despite Rusbridger's claim to be based on Nave's diaries and recollections, some entries do not match his account. Dufty (below; pages 95,96) says that Nave was appalled by the book's claims about Churchill which he publicly disowned on Japanese television, and that Rusbridger "did not understand code-breaking." * *
Henry C. Clausen Henry Christian Clausen (30 June 1905 – 4 December 1992) was an American lawyer, and investigator. He authored the ''Clausen Report'', an 800-page report on the Army Board's Pearl Harbor Investigation. He traveled over 55,000 miles over seven ...
and Bruce Lee, ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement'', (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "
Clausen Inquiry Henry Christian Clausen (30 June 1905 – 4 December 1992) was an American lawyer, and investigator. He authored the ''Clausen Report'', an 800-page report on the Army Board's Pearl Harbor Investigation. He traveled over 55,000 miles over seven ...
" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Stimson. Clausen carried a vest bomb to protect the copies of decrypts he was allowed to carry with him. Background notes: (A) Clausen was the assistant recorder for the APHB (Army Pearl Harbor Board) and (B) Bruce Lee was the editor for Prange's ''At Dawn We Slept'' and Layton's ''And I Was There'' (See Layton, pages 508–509). *
Martin V. Melosi Martin may refer to: Places * Martin City (disambiguation) * Martin County (disambiguation) * Martin Township (disambiguation) Antarctica * Martin Peninsula, Marie Byrd Land * Port Martin, Adelie Land * Point Martin, South Orkney Islands Austral ...
, ''The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Political Controversy of the Surprise Attack, 1941–1946'' (Texas A&M University Press, 1977). Central focus is on the political motivations and partisanship during the war years which delayed public disclosure of the details surrounding this attack, and forced the decision not to court martial Kimmel or Short. *
Ladislas Farago Ladislas Faragó or Faragó László (21 September 1906 – 15 October 1980) was a Hungarian military historian and journalist who published a number of best-selling books on history and espionage, especially concerning the World War II era. Bi ...
, ''The Broken Seal: The Story of Operation Magic and the Pearl Harbor Disaster'' (Random House, 1967). Bantam paperback edition Postscript contains an account of ''Lurlines "interception" and the "disappearing logbook". *
Edwin T. Layton Edwin Thomas Layton (April 7, 1903 – April 12, 1984) was a rear admiral in the United States Navy. Layton is most noted for his work as an intelligence officer before and during World War II. He was also the father of the historian Edwi ...
(with
Pineau Pineau des Charentes, (Pineau Charentais, or simply Pineau) is a regional aperitif of western France, made in the départements of Charente, Charente-Maritime, and (to a lesser extent) Dordogne. While popular within its region of production, i ...
and Costello), ''And I Was There – Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets'' (William Morrow and Company, 1985) Layton was Kimmel's Intelligence Officer. * Robert Stinnett, '' Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor'' (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct the military to clear Kimmel and Short's records. Full of questionable claims, unsupported allegations, and errors of fact and reasoning. *L. S. Howeth, USN (Retired), ''History of Communications – Electronics in the United States Navy'', GPO (Government Printing Office), Washington, DC, 1963. A very good source of material, especially on equipment and capabilities. Chapter XV comments on identifying transmitters by their unique "tone" and a Navy radio operator's court-martial, resulting in conviction. *Frederick D. Parker, ''Pearl Harbor Revisited – United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941'' from the Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1944 – now available onlin
here
Of note are the SRNs given, and there to especially highlight are, for example: (a) the clear distinction the IJN made between shortware versus longwave radio transmissions (see SRN-115397 on page 59), (b) missing paragraphs: "2. Other forces at the discretion of their respective commanders." and "3. Supply ships, repair ships, hospital ships, etc., will report directly to parties concerned." (see SRN-116866 on page 62). *Mark Emerson Willey, ''Pearl Harbor – Mother of All Conspiracies'' (self-published in 1999, now available in paperback). Has a detailed timeline of events leading to Pearl Harbor, discusses codebreaking and radio silence, with Appendix A highlighting the many contextural differences as evidenced in SRH-406 – ''Pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese Naval Dispatches''. Known for having some of the more outlandish claims. Chapter Two "Japanese Navy Codes" provides an excellent tutorial on "hatted" codes, especially JN25. [SRH-406 had several titles, an original non-censored version exits in private hands. A number of "GZ" comments have been removed from today's public version. FOIA requests for this original document have been denied.] *A. J. Barker, ''Pearl Harbor – Battle Book No. 10'' (Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II from 1969). An interesting approach to the sequence of events, rare photographs, having as military consultant/historian the well-known Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart. Claims others are mistaken as the belief of ''Lurlines radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. *
Stephen Budiansky Stephen Budiansky (born March 3, 1957) is an American chemist, writer, historian and biographer, best known for his books on animal behaviour and his criticism of animal rights. He is also the author of a number of scholarly publications about th ...
, ''Battle of Wits – The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II'', (Free Press, 2000). An account of cryptography and cryptanalysis during World War II. Uncovered a vast amount of detailed information regarding JN-25. *Michael V. Gannon, ''Pearl Harbor Betrayed – The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack'' (Henry Holt and Company, 2001). Includes letter addressed to Admiral Stark by Admiral Kimmel but never sent – "You betrayed the officers and men of the Fleet by not giving them a fighting chance for their lives and you betrayed the Navy in not taking responsibility for your actions; you ..." Also of note, critiques claims made by R. Stinnett regarding the McCollum memo. * Gordon W. Prange, with Donald W. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, ''At Dawn We Slept (1981)'', ''Verdict of History'', ''Pearl Harbor Papers'', ''Miracle at Midway'' The semi-official account of Pearl Harbor by MacArthur's historian during the Occupation. Prange had considerable official access to the Japanese immediately after the war. *John Prados, ''Combined Fleet Decoded – The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II'' (Random House, 1995). Quite a lot of new information on Japanese cryptography during the War. Pages 167–172 have more on the "Winds" Message, and on pages 698–699 is a recounting the recovery of the ''Nichi'' papers by U.S. Navy divers from the in Manila Bay (last two photographs prior to page 423). *Fred B. Wrixon, ''Codes, Ciphers & Other Cryptic & Clandestine Communication: Making & Breaking of Secret Messages from Hieroglyphs to the Internet'' (Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers, 1998). An introductory account with many examples – and on page 104 and page 114, are descriptions of the 1943 BRUSA Agreement and 1947 UKUSA Agreement respectively. *Timothy Wilford, ''Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941'', (University Press of America, 2001); from his Masters thesis in History from the University of Ottawa – the thesis is available online (ProQuest) with additional materials not included in the book, e.g., the Appendix materials, appendices begin on page 143. Provided on page 143 is a still censored letter from Fabian to Safford from 30 August 41. Presented are also other newer materials recently declassified on radio silence, codebreaking, RFP (Radio Finger-Printing), and "Fundamental Ripple" displays. *Philip H. Jacobsen ''Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and his Misidentified Signals'' (Cryptologia April 2005) Details errors, and conflicting stories within the works of Villa, Wilford, Stinnett, Toland, and Farago. Also covers the missing report of Leslie Grogan dated December 10, 1941 titled "Record for Posterity" and compares this with the 26‑year‑old "remembrances" within Farago's "The Broken Seal". Jacobsen concludes what Grogan heard were Japanese commercial ships sending routine plain language radio messages in their specialized Kata Kana telegraphic code. *Philip H. Jacobsen ''Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force'' (Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No.4 Winter 2004) Author reviews and refutes various claims of Robert Stinnett and most notably the works of Timothy Wilford regarding radio silence. *Philip H. Jacobsen ''No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force: No Conspiracy!'' (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 18, Issue 1, Spring 2005, pp. 142–149) *John C. Zimmerman ''Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit'' (Intelligence and National Security, Vol 17, No.2 Summer 2002) Various claims examined and refuted. Of special note: Toland and Stinnett claims of radio silence violations. *History of GYP-1 General History of OP-20-3-GYP; Activities and Accomplishments of GY-1 During 1941, 1942 and 1943, RG38 CNSG Library, Box 115, 570/197 NA CP "JN-25 has no part to play in the story of Pearl Harbor". *Duane L. Whitlock, ''The Silent War Against the Japanese Navy'' available online from the Corregidor Historical Society. Between June 1939 and December 1941 Washington did decrypt a few JN-25 messages, but they provided little insight into the current operational or intelligence picture. * Costello, John ''Days of Infamy''. Pocket Books hardback, 1994. Covers the issue of why MacArthur was unprepared in detail, including mention of access to intelligence. *Bartlett, Bruce. ''Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941–1946'' (1979). Reviews the findings of the various congressional inquiries into this attack. *Kimmel, Husband Adm. ''Admiral Kimmel’s Story'' (1955). During the attack Kimmel was the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander at Pearl Harbor (1 February – 17 December 1941). *Ed., Colin Burke editing. (Posthumously published article, by Phillip H. Jacobsen) "Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers." ''Cryptologia'' 31, no. 3 (July 2007): 223–232 Abstract: "By analyzing all the available Secret Message Serial (SMS) numbers originated by the Japanese CinC 1st Air Fleet, it is clear that no messages were sent by radio during the formation of the Strike Force or during its transit to Hawaii."


External links


Pearl Harbor: Henry Stimson's View
''
Time Magazine ''Time'' (stylized in all caps) is an American news magazine based in New York City. For nearly a century, it was published weekly, but starting in March 2020 it transitioned to every other week. It was first published in New York City on Mar ...
'', Apr. 1, 1946
''Did Roosevelt know in advance about the attack on Pearl Harbor yet say nothing?''
– The Straight Dope, Straight Dope Science Advisory Board, February 28, 2001
The Independent Institute: Pearl Harbor Archive
– Mostly a Stinnett site, but also has Pearl Harbor articles, debates, interviews, transcripts, book reviews, books, and Pearl Harbor documents
The National Defense Authorization Act
(where it is noted that available intelligence regarding an impending attack was not conveyed to the American commanders at Pearl Harbor; page 121, section 546).
Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor
– Stephen Budiansky on OP-20-G's progress breaking JN-25 from its appearance in 1939 to 12.7.41. In part a response to Stinnett's (and others') claims of major JN-25 breaks prior to the Attack.

– Anthony Kubek's article proposes that the Russians maneuvered the U.S. into war.
Day of Deceit – The Truth About Pearl Harbor
An Interview with Robert Stinnett and WWII Vet O'Kelly McCluskey.
Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!: The story of the U. S. Navy's efforts on JN-25B
– Excellent in depth article illustrating the problems with Stinnett and Wilford's claims regarding JN-25.
Rebuttal of Robert Stinnett's "Day of Deceit" with extensive, updated citations by Rear Admiral Richard E. Young, USN (Ret)The Myths of Pearl Harbor
– Extensive site debunking claims of advance knowledge of the attack.
Japan Strikes: 1941
By
William H. Honan William Holmes Honan (May 11, 1930 – April 28, 2014) was an American journalist and author who directed coverage of the arts at ''The New York Times'' as its culture editor in the 1980s. Honan held senior editorial positions at the ''New York Tim ...
. ''
American Heritage American Heritage may refer to: * ''American Heritage'' (magazine) * ''The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language'' * American Heritage Rivers * American Heritage School (disambiguation) See also *National Register of Historic Place ...
'', December 1970, volume 22, issue 1. In 1925 (sixteen years before Pearl Harbor) the English naval expert Hector Charles Bywater uncannily prophesied in detail the war in the Pacific, in his book '' The Great Pacific War''.
Pearl Harbor Inset: In the Wake of the Prophet
Frank Pierce Young's article about Bywater and his book.
Pearl Harbor: The Controversy Continues
By Sheldon Richman. The Future of Freedom Foundation, December 1991. Article on foreknowledge as well as steps that might have provoked Japan

''National Archives'' {{DEFAULTSORT:Pearl Harbor Advance-Knowledge Debate Attack on Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor debate Conspiracy theories in the United States Espionage Pseudohistory