Passage Of Humaitá

The Passage of Humaitá ( Portuguese: ''Passagem de Humaitá'') was an operation of riverine warfare during the Paraguayan War − the most lethal in South American history − in which a force of six Imperial Brazilian Navy armoured vessels was ordered to dash past under the guns of the Paraguayan fortress of Humaitá. Some competent neutral observers had considered that the feat was very nearly impossible.

The purpose of the exercise was to stop the Paraguayans resupplying the fortress by river, and to provide the Empire of Brazil and its Allies with a much-needed propaganda victory. The attempt took place on 19 February 1868 and was successful – the attackers had hit upon the fortress' Achilles heel. It restored the reputation of the Brazilian navy and the Brazilian Empire's financial credit, and caused the Paraguayans to evacuate their capital Asunción. Some authors have considered that it was the turning point or culminating event of the war. The fortress, by then fully surrounded by Allied forces on land or blockaded by water, was captured on 25 July 1868.

Historical background

The Fortress of Humaitá was a defensive system, long considered to be almost impregnable, near the mouth of the River Paraguay. It prevented enemy shipping ascending the river and hence invading the Republic of Paraguay. There may have been other routes by which Paraguay could have been invaded, but they were considered more difficult still. From the main article on the Fortress of Humaitá it appears that Marshal-President López of Paraguay may have calculated that, because the fortress could not be bypassed except at ruinous expense, he could risk making war on the much more populous Brazil and Argentina.

The Paraguayan War (also known as the War of the Triple Alliance) of 1864–1870 was the most lethal in South American history, and − in terms of its relative mortality − very possibly the worst in modern history, anywhere. It actually commenced when López seized the Brazilian ship ''Marques de Olinda'' on her routine voyage up the River Paraguay to the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso, then sent military forces to invade the province itself. It developed further when he seized Argentine naval vessels moored in the port of Corrientes, north east Argentina. Thereafter López sent two further armies, one to invade the Argentine province of Corrientes along the River Paraná and the other to invade the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul along the River Uruguay. On 1 May 1865 Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay signed the Treaty of the Triple Alliance by which they would not negotiate peace with Paraguay until the government of López had been deposed.

Further, for Brazil the river was the only practicable route to its interior province of Mato Grosso, which had been invaded by the forces of López earlier in the War. The war aims of the Allies (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) explicitly included the capture and destruction of Humaitá, and it was the prime military objective of the Allied high command.

The Allies' strategic problem

It took the Allies about a year to defeat the invading Paraguayan forces in the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul and expel them from Argentina. According to their treaty they now had to neutralise Humaitá and depose López. In April 1866 the Allies crossed the River Paraná into southwestern Paraguay, occupying a small strip of territory. Their next strategic problem was how to proceed up the River Paraguay, getting past the Fortress of Humaitá.

Briefly, the fortress of Humaitá was built on a sharp concave bend in the river and comprised more than a mile of heavy artillery batteries atop a low cliff. The channel was only 200 yards wide, and ran within easy range of the batteries; a heavy chain boom could be raised to block the navigation and detain the shipping under the guns. 'Torpedoes' (improvised contact naval mines) could be released or anchored in the stream. On its landward side the fortress was protected either by impassable terrain or by 8 miles of trenches with 120 heavy guns and a garrison of 18,000 men. An attempt to capture one of its outworks by frontal attack failed disastrously at the Battle of Curupayty (22 September 1866); another frontal attack was out of the question.

From a naval perspective the heavy guns of the fortress might – in principle – be bypassed by the latest ironclads (armoured vessels), provided the chain boom could be cut and any 'torpedoes' avoided. But those vessels could not have operated ahead of their forward bases for long, because they would need to be resupplied with fuel, ammunition and provisions. Furthermore, the Brazilian navy command claimed there was no room inside the ironclads for the conveyance of troops; the wooden transport vessels could not have accompanied them.

The land operation in which the Allied land forces did succeed in capturing the Humaitá complex, known as the Siege of Humaitá, is outside the scope of this Article. However, to starve out Humaitá it was necessary to stop the Paraguayans resupplying it by river. But, in order to do that, it was necessary to obtain command of the river, in other words, to steam past Humaitá.

Difficulties facing the Allies

1. The home front

By the end of 1867 the Allies were badly in need of a propaganda victory. The war had cost them a lot of men and money; though they still had superior manpower yet they were stuck in the small area of southwestern Paraguay shown in the map. The disaster of Curupayty had sunk their morale and led to a year's inactivity. And it had fostered an already strong anti-war faction in Argentina. Armed revolutions had broken out in that country – especially in the Andean provinces – demanding peace with Paraguay. It had got to the point that the Allied commander-in-chief General Bartolomé Mitre had temporarily quit Paraguay with 4,000 Argentine troops in order to put down the revolts, leaving the Brazilian General the Marquis of Caxias in charge.

Brazil financed its warlike operations partly by borrowing in the financial markets especially the City of London, and advanced money to Argentina and Uruguay. The lack of progress in the war was affecting its financial credit.

In June 1867 Caxias wrote to a colleague:

My friend, let us see if we can conclude this cursed war which has ruined our country, and whose duration shames us.

2. Extended lines of communication

Lengthy lines of communication vastly increased the difficulty and cost of the war for Brazil. According to the American envoy to Paraguay, López had banked on that fact when deciding to make war on the Brazilian Empire in the first place.

Steam vessels were the only practicable means of communication. Thus in Brazil the overland journey from São Paulo to Mato Grosso took two and a half months by fast mule; by steamship, although the detour south through the River Plate and up through the River Paraguay was vast, it could be done in little over a fortnight. Tension over this route had been one of the causes of the Paraguayan war.

Ammunition or other stores shipped from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to the naval arsenal at Isla del Cerrito, near the mouth of the river Paraguay, had to travel an extensive water route.

Vessels requiring to be repaired could not be sent down to Buenos Aires for lack of facilities, and Rio de Janeiro was too far. Isla del Cerrito ("island of the hillock") was and is a small island at the confluence of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers. There the navy established a machine shop employing 20 men; a boatyard manned by 50 carpenters, etc; a coal bunker; a gunpowder mill; a naval hospital; and even a church. Good naval timber required for repairs was harvested locally.

Because the river was blocked at Humaitá, stores required further north had to go by oxcart convoys on a route flanking Humaitá to the east. Those convoys were the object of repeated Paraguayan ambushes.

3. Inherent difficulty in effecting the naval passage of Humaitá

Although some foreign observers were critical of the Brazilian navy's lack of zeal and implied that it should have forced the passage long ago, those observers were not naval men. One who was, Commander Kennedy of the Royal Navy, wrote that there were real difficulties, which he identified as these:

#The river approach to Humaitá – which included the heavily armed preliminary fortifications at Curupayty – was shallow, narrow, and uncharted.
#It lent itself to the release of "torpedoes" (improvised contact naval mines).
#It was too shallow for the heaviest ironclad vessels, except during the river's seasonal rise. The seasonal difference between high and low water could be as much as .
#But if these vessels did proceed at high water, they might be grounded, or trapped (neither able to advance or retreat), when the waters fell again.
Commander Kennedy's evaluation:

It is difficult to conceive a more formidable obstacle to an advancing squadron than this small portion of the river between Tres Bocas and Humaitá.

Further, although ironclad vessels were not supposed to be sunk by river batteries of the type possessed by Paraguay, they could be badly damaged. Cannonballs sometimes did penetrate the hull by going through a porthole or gunport. When this happened the shot could fracture or ricochet around inside the casemate producing appalling carnage. And even though most shots did not get inside the hull their force could start the bolts of the iron plating, or produce combat wounds by splintering the wooden backing. For inexperienced seamen inside these vessels the effect could be terrifying.

In any case it would have been necessary, somehow, to cut or evade the chain boom, or else be detained under the Paraguayan artillery indefinitely.

According to the English-language ''Buenos Ayres Standard''

Experienced American and English and French naval officers, who had seen Humaitá, inspected the position, and gone through the batteries, all unanimously agreed on its extreme strength.

4. Dissension amongst the commands

The capture of Humaitá was an early example in modern warfare of combined operations, requiring cooperation between land and naval forces but as will now be described there were serious problems.

Argentina and Brazil were traditional enemies. The alliance between them was that of "dog and cat", only brought about when López declared war on them both; it was fraught with mistrust and veiled antagonism. For political reasons the Argentine General Bartolomé Mitre was nominally commander-in-chief, but this went down badly in Brazil whose land forces were much larger; in reality Mitre had to seek consensus with the Brazilian and Uruguayan commands.

Further, the Treaty of the Triple Alliance had stipulated that the naval forces (to all intents and purposes the Brazilian navy, for the Argentine naval forces were small) were to be "under the immediate command" of the Brazilian admiral; and the Brazilian government made it plain that the navy was not taking orders from Mitre.

During the war the Brazilian navy had been criticised for its inertia. It was the modern ironclad vessels of the Brazilian navy that had stood by and allowed the retiring Paraguayan army to escape across the River Paraná on rafts – together with 100,000 head of rustled cattle – without doing anything to stop them. Those same vessels had been defied by two Paraguayan ''chatas'' (flat-bottomed, towable barges mounting a single gun). Although the Brazilian naval command protested that the shallow river waters enjoined caution, the Brazilian soldiery and the Emperor Pedro II were disgusted. As a result, the Brazilian Admiral Tamandaré had been relieved of his command and Joaquim José Inácio (1808–1869) had taken over his functions on 2 December 1866.

The naval command was thoroughly distrusted by General Mitre and the distrust was mutual, for the Brazilian commands, military and naval, suspected the Argentines would be only too pleased if the Brazilian navy was destroyed in the war, since it would weaken Brazilian power in the River Plate region. The more Mitre asked the navy to be bold, the more they suspected him.

In practice Mitre never attempted to give direct orders to the Brazilian navy, instead seeking to persuade it through the senior Brazilian land commander.

5. Ageing naval command

The new admiral Inácio had had a distinguished and brave fighting career in the days of the blue-water sailing navy. But he had not been to sea for years, pursuing a career as a bureaucrat and then a politician. In Paraguay Inácio became unwell, a prematurely old man, "a ghost of an admiral", as the modern Brazilian historian Francisco Doratioto put it.

According to Artur Silveira da Mota, commander of the ironclad ''Barroso'' (who was a full naval captain by the age of 26, and later in life given the rank of admiral and made Baron of Jaceguai) "most of the senior naval command showed themselves to be incompetent for war service, whether for advancing years or for being too long in sedentary jobs", an assertion with which Doratioto was inclined to agree.

Difficulties facing Paraguay

Paraguay was fighting on her home territory; her artillerymen were good; she could cast large guns at her foundries at Asunción and Ibicuy; and foreign observers − including the Allies − were unanimous that her men were superbly brave fighters. However early in the war she had been cut off from the outside world by the Brazilian naval blockade and had to make do with the resources within the country.

No armoured vessels

In particular, she did not possess a single ironclad vessel. She had placed orders for ironclads at British and French shipyards, but López had attacked Brazil and Argentina without waiting for these to be delivered. Because of the blockade he stopped making payments. Brazil negotiated to purchase the work-in-progress and to have it completed; and hence took delivery of the ironclads ''Bahia'', ''Colombo'', ''Lima Barros'', ''Cabral'' and ''Silvado'', all of which were originally destined for Paraguay. According to Burton it was the general opinion that with just one ironclad Paraguay could have cleared the river.

Little armour-piercing weaponry

She also had little armour-piercing shot, and for the same reason. According to the diplomat Gregorio Benítes, who represented Paraguay abroad during the war:

If Marshal López had not been precipitate in accepting the war, to which he was provoked by the Empire of Brazil, and had he given himself time enough to take delivery of the great monitors and armaments which he had ordered in Europe, among the last some 36 coastal artillery pieces made on the Krupp system, contracted for in Germany with the personal intervention of the undersigned, then not a single fresh-water ironclad would have been able to attack the aforementioned fortresses with success, if they had been armed with that powerful artillery.

In effect, whoever has any idea of the formidable power of Krupp artillery, will understand that such cannon being mounted in the batteries of Curuzú, Curupaity and Humaitá, the triple alliance would not have had one single ironclad which could venture under their fires, on pain of certain disaster. Furthermore, López left it too late to order these weapons; so that the Baron of Itajubá the Brazilian accredited diplomat in Berlin, on finding out about the acquisition of those cannon on behalf of Paraguay, made use of his right under international law to require the detention of the said artillery.

Allied initiative

On 5 August 1867 Mitre presented a plan to his nominal subordinate the commander of the Brazilian land forces the Marquis of Caxias. Its preferred feature was the capture of Humaitá by cutting off its lines of communication: the land forces would flank the fortress to the east and the naval forces would interdict river communications. For this to be done, the Brazilian naval forces had to force the river passage. Caxias agreed, and ordered the Brazilian admiral Joaquim José Inácio to proceed. But the latter was not at all keen: Humaitá was a very strong point and, if the Brazilian squadron did get past it, how would it communicate with its forward base presently at Curuzú? It would be trapped.

Caxias was impressed by Inácio's reasoning and told Mitre so. Mitre was for once insistent, and there followed a correspondence in which, eventually, the Brazilian admiral agreed to attack the preliminary outwork of Curupayty – a few miles down the river – and, if he got past there, to assail Humaitá at a later date.

Passage of Curupayty

Curupayty was an outwork a few miles downriver from the fortress of Humaitá, and part of the Humaitá defensive complex. It lay at the corner of the Quadrilateral – the line of earthworks that protected Humaitá from seizure on its landward side – at the site where the disastrous land battle had taken place. Its river artillery alone comprised 35 heavy guns; indeed the Paraguayans had partly denuded Humaitá of guns to reinforce Curupayty. The largest gun threw a spherical 10-inch (25 cm) shot; it was called the ''Cristiano'' (because it was made by melting down bells contributed by all the churches of Paraguay).

The Brazilian ironclads dash past the lower fort

On 15 August 1867 at 0640 hours the Brazilian ironclads went into action. They were:

In the table the symbol P denotes that the vessel had originally been ordered by Paraguay, but obtained by Brazil in the circumstances already explained.

The Brazilian admiral Joaquim Inácio was in overall command from the bridge of ''Brasil''. Lashed to the port side of ''Brasil'' was the steam messenger ''Lindoya'' (to assist her in turning); ''Colombo'' and ''Cabral'' each towed a ''chata'' (flat-bottomed barge).

At this point the river had two channels. One was deeper, but it ran closer to ("within pistol shot of"") the enemy batteries, and the current was stronger. In the other, or shallow, channel the risk of running aground was far greater; furthermore, a Paraguayan deserter claimed torpedoes had been placed there recently. Inácio chose to proceed by the channel closer to the batteries, and his choice was vindicated. While wooden vessels of the Brazilian navy provided covering fire the ironclads dashed past Curupaty. It took each vessel about 40 minutes to get past.

Even so, some vessels were badly damaged. A shot penetrated ''Tamandaré'' through a gunport killing or wounding 14 of her crew. Her engine was damaged and stopped leaving her adrift under the guns of the fort; she was rescued by ''Silvado'' who threw her a cable and took her in tow. ''Tamandaré's'' commander Elisário Barbosa lost his left arm. According to Commander Kennedy RN the accident to ''Tamandaré'' obliged ''Colombo'', which was following astern, to stop her engines in order to avoid fouling her. The strong current brought her broadside on, making her unmanageable. She drifted close to the Paraguayan guns, which did some very serious damage before she could be backed out of her dangerous position. There were 25 Brazilian casualties including three killed. The ironclads, by taking the channel nearest to the Paraguayan guns, had escaped a more serious danger, for a number of torpedoes were afterwards found laid down in the other channel.

For this feat on 27 September Joaquim Inácio was awarded the noble title of Barão de Inhaúma (Baron of Inhaúma).

According to Paraguay's then chief engineer George Thompson, López gave it out that he had allowed the fleet to pass Curupayty on purpose, to trap it and starve it out, and that it would soon have to repass Curupayty, where he would sink it. This is corroborated by Juan Crisóstomo Centurión, a Paraguayan journalist working for the López regime at the time. The government newspaper ''El Semanario de Avisos y Conocimientors Útiles'' claimed a victory, writing: "The

_The_chain_boom_of_Humaitá_deters_Inácio

Inácio_sent_''Barroso''_upriver_to_reconnoitre_Humaitá;_she_reported_that_the_river_was_indeed_blocked_by_a_

_The_chain_boom_of_Humaitá_deters_Inácio

Inácio_sent_''Barroso''_upriver_to_reconnoitre_Humaitá;_she_reported_that_the_river_was_indeed_blocked_by_a_Boom_(navigational_barrier)">boom_

Boom_may_refer_to:

_Objects
*_Boom_(containment),_a_temporary_floating_barrier_used_to_contain_an_oil_spill
*__Boom_(navigational_barrier),_an_obstacle_used_to_control_or_block_marine_navigation
*_Boom_(sailing),_a_sailboat_part
*_Boom_(windsurfi_...
_of_three_parallel_chains_floating_on_pontoons._The_tactical_problem_now_was_how_to_get_past_the_chain_boom.

There_was_some_military_knowhow_about_this.__According_to_a_professional_paper_published_some_years_before_by_the_Corps_of_Royal_Engineers_in_Dublin_a_heavy_steamship_could_snap_almost_any_chain_provided_it_was_moving_fast_enough;_for_this_reason_it_was_prudent_for_the_defenders_to_provide_three_chains_−_breaking_the_first_reduced_the_ship's_velocity._The_paper_said_that_a_1,000_ton_ship_steaming_at_15_knots_could_snap_a_chain_of_2.5-inch_round_iron_links.__The_chain_link_diameter_at_Humaitá_was_not_known_to_the_attackers;_the_largest_ironclad_(''Brasil'')_was_1,500_tons_but_her_top_speed_was_only_11.3_knots;_she_would_be_steaming_against_an_adverse_current_of_up_to_3_knots;_and_not_one,_but_three_chains_were_reported.

In_his_memoirs_the_Brazilian_minister_of_marine_wrote_they_knew_that_their_ships_would_have_to_proceed_single_file_in_the_narrow_channel:_if_the_first_failed_to_snap_the_chain_it_could_neither_back_up_nor_turn_round,_nor_get_up_enough_way_(vessel).html" "title="Boom_(navigational_barrier).html" "title="razilian squadron is wounded in the heart, and we have one part of its ironclads prisoner between Curupaty and Humaitá, devoid of resources, without means of repair, and given over to the fury of our cannon; the rest will have to come to its aid, and follow the same road of shame and defeat". And "The ironclads must now make every effort to patch themselves up; but the impacts made by the solid shot of Curupayty cannot be repaired, except in arsenals, and none of those can be found between Curupaty and Humaità.

The chain boom of Humaitá deters Inácio

Inácio sent ''Barroso'' upriver to reconnoitre Humaitá; she reported that the river was indeed blocked by a Boom (navigational barrier)">boom of three parallel chains floating on pontoons. The tactical problem now was how to get past the chain boom.

There was some military knowhow about this. According to a professional paper published some years before by the Corps of Royal Engineers in Dublin a heavy steamship could snap almost any chain provided it was moving fast enough; for this reason it was prudent for the defenders to provide three chains − breaking the first reduced the ship's velocity. The paper said that a 1,000 ton ship steaming at 15 knots could snap a chain of 2.5-inch round iron links. The chain link diameter at Humaitá was not known to the attackers; the largest ironclad (''Brasil'') was 1,500 tons but her top speed was only 11.3 knots; she would be steaming against an adverse current of up to 3 knots; and not one, but three chains were reported.

In his memoirs the Brazilian minister of marine wrote they knew that their ships would have to proceed single file in the narrow channel: if the first failed to snap the chain it could neither back up nor turn round, nor get up enough way (vessel)">way