Background
{{Further, History of Mali Since independence, pressures from government policies aimed at crushing traditional power structures, social mores, and local justice customs have caused several rebellions by the Tuaregs. Repeated promises of autonomy made in the aftermath of these uprisings were ignored, and Tuareg leaders were frequently sidelined from national politics.{{Cite journal , last=Miroiu , first=Andrei , last2=Alecu , first2=Ana Raluca , date=July 2024 , title=Mali: Conflict, Social Order and the Crime-Terror Nexus , url= , journal=Conflict Studies Quarterly , doi=10.24193/csq.48.4 By late 2010, Tuareg political activists were renewing calls for Azawadi independence,{{Cite journal , last=Skretting , first=Vidar B. , date=June 2021 , title=Pragmatism and Purism in Jihadist Governance: The Islamic Emirate of Azawad Revisited , journal=Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , doi=10.1080/1057610X.2021.2007562 asserting that they were marginalized and consequently impoverished in both Mali and Niger, and that mining projects had damaged important pastoral areas. Contributing to these grievances were broader issues such as climate change and a long history of forced modernization imposed on the nomadic societies of northern Mali, which deepened the divide between Tuareg communities and the central government. During the 2000s, Salafi jihadists and preachers associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) began infiltrating northern Mali from southern Algeria. Seeking refuge from Algerian security forces, they established the region as a strategic rear base, a hub for illicit trade, and a training ground. They radicalized local youth, leading them to attempt to seek a better future through joining the ranks of Al-Qahda. Meanwhile, Southern Algeria AQIM leaders cultivated relationships with tribal and community leaders in northern Mali. By 2012, AQIM had entrenched itself in the region's political, social, and economic networks. Internal disagreements over the Algerian-centric focus of the group led to a split in 2011. The breakaway faction, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), aimed to expand operations across the Sahel and West Africa. From February 2011, with the collapse of Gaddafi's Libya, hundreds of his Tuareg fighters, many veterans of the previous rebellions and now unemployed, returned to Mali with large stockpiles of weapons. Rebels in theTuareg rebellion (January–April 2012)
{{further, Tuareg rebellion (2012) According to '' Stratfor'', the first attack began on 16-17 January 2012 by MNLA militants against a military barracks and a national guard base in Menaka. The attack was thrawed by a government helicopter, forcing the attackers to retreat, though there were reports that Tuareg rebels led by Malian army defector Ag Assalat Habbi may still be in the Menaka area.{{cite web , title=Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya , url=http://stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya , url-status=live , archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121017142528/http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya , archive-date=17 October 2012 , access-date=22 March 2012 , publisher=Stratfor Attacks continued on the morning of 17 January against the disorganized and underresourced government forces in the cities of Ménaka, Aguelhok, and Tessalit.{{Cite book , last=Issaev , first=Leonid , title=New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region: A Comparative Perspective , last2=Korotayev , first2=Andrey , publisher=Springer International Publishing , year=2022 , isbn=9783031151354 , pages=191–218 Conflicting reports emerged regarding control of these locations during the clashes, with the Malian government releasing a statement on 20 January indicating that the three towns of Menaka, Aguelhoc, and Tessalit had been reclaimed. The strength of this uprising and the use of heavy weapons, which were not present in the previous conflicts, were said to have "surprised" Malian officials and observers.{{cite news , author=Adam Nossiter , date=5 February 2012 , title=Qaddafi's Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate an Insurgent Army in Mali , url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in-mali.html?pagewanted=all , access-date=26 March 2012 , work=The New York Times On 24 January, after cutting off supply lines for two days and receiving reinforcements, rebel forces managed to retake Aguelhok, either due to the Malian army's depletion of ammunition or as part of a tactical withdrawal intended to consolidate forces in Kidal. The following day, the Malian military, with the help of airstrikes, once again recaptured the town. Control of Aguelhok and other settlements continued to shift multiple times. In response to complaints from soldiers regarding inadequate supplies, poor strategic planning, and a sense of abandonment, the president attempted to reorganize his senior command. Communiqués emphasized the urgent need for a rapid recovery of lost territory. Mali launched air and land counter operations to take back the seized territory, amid protests in southern Mali due growing dissatisfaction over the government's handling of the rebellion.{{cite news , date=2 February 2012 , title=Mali capital paralysed by anti-rebellion protests , url=https://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5E8CV5ZF20120202 , url-status=dead , archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150114221944/http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5E8CV5ZF20120202 , archive-date=14 January 2015 , access-date=7 March 2012 , work=Reuters On 1 February, the MNLA took captured Ménaka, followed by Kidal on 6 February. In March, Ansar Dine emerged publicly through Malian social media, releasing a video showing its fighters taking over the military base at Aguelhok. In the video, the group's deputy leader, Cheikh Ag Aoussa, declared their objective of establishing Sharia law in Mali. Although theCoup d'état
{{Main, 2012 Malian coup d'étatContinued offensive
During the uncertainty following the coup, resistance put up by government forces in the north began to melt away, allowing the rebels to take over the three provincial capitals of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao from 30 March to 1 April. The speed and ease with which the rebels took control of the north was attributed in large part to the confusion created in the army's coup, leadingIslamist–Tuareg nationalist conflict (June–November 2012)
{{Main, Internal conflict in Azawad As soon as independence was declared, tensions emerged between the MNLA and jihadist groups due to differences in goals with their common enemy defeated. Tuareg nationalists sought to maintain an independent state, while the jihadist wished to spread Islamic rule to the rest of Mali and neighboring states. To avoid open conflict that would jeopardize their control over northern Mali, the MNLA and Ansar Dine entered negotiations in an attempt to reach a political settlement that would satisfy both parties. On 5 April 2012, Islamists, possibly from AQIM or MOJWA, entered the Algerian consulate in Gao and took hostages. The MNLA succeeded in negotiating their release without violence, and one MNLA commander said that the movement had decided to disarm other armed groups. On 8 April, a mostly Arab militia calling itself the National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA) announced its intention to oppose Tuareg rule, battle the MNLA, and "return to peace and economic activity"; the group claimed to consist of 500 fighters. On 26 April, this group briefly took over a part of the region, before withdrawing on the request of AQIM to avoid civilian deaths. Later, they split into several factions, including the pro-rebel MAA-Dissident and pro-government MAA-Tabankort. The MNLA clashed with protesters in Gao on 14 May, reportedly injuring four and killing one. On 26 May, the MNLA and Ansar Dine to signed a provisional plan make Azawad an Islamic state and merge the two groups into a single regular army. Less than a week later, the agreement was denounced by MNLA political leadership as a betrayal of its secular values, leading their representives to walk back on the promises in the initial agreement. On 6 June, residents of Kidal protested against the imposition of Sharia in the town and in support of MNLA, protests which were violently dispersed by Ansar Dine members. The following day, the MNLA announced the formation of its own Transitional Council to govern Azawad, composed entirely of MNLA members. Ansar Dine condemned the move as a violation of the earlier Gao Agreement. The next day, the MNLA encouraged local women and youth to protest against Ansar Dine's implementation Sharia, leading to the two goups clashing in the city with automatic weapons.{{cite news, url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18377168 , title=Mali rebel groups 'clash in Kidal' , date=8 June 2012 , work=BBC News , url-status=dead , archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121223052848/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18377168 , archive-date=23 December 2012 In early June, Nigerien president Mahamadou Issoufou stated that Afghan and Pakistani jihadists were training Touareg Islamist rebels.Battle of Gao and aftermath
{{further, Battle of GaoTakeover of Douentza and Ménaka
Foreign intervention (January–June 2013)
MNLA realigns with the Malian Government
The alliance between the Tuareg nationalists and jihadist groups severely damaged the international legitimacy of the broader Tuareg movement. As a result, by December, the now displaced MNLA began peace talks with the Malian government and relinquished its previous goal of Azawadi independence in favor of a request for self-rule within Mali. After the French entry in January 2013, the MNLA spokesman in Paris, Moussa Ag Assarid (who had criticized the splinter group FPA months earlier for giving up on independence) declared that the MNLA was "ready to help" their former opponents in the fight against the Islamists. At that time, the MNLA controlled no big localities and was only strong in rural and desert areas near the borders with Mauritania, Algeria and Niger, having been driven off from most of its claimed territory by Islamist groups. Soon, it would begin to support French and Chadian forces in restoring state authority to the cities in the north and in operations against their mountain strongholds, particularly with intelligence, while still opposing the Malian army.Battle of Konna and French intervention
{{further, Battle of KonnaIn Aménas hostage crisis
{{Main, In Aménas hostage crisis On 16 January, it was reported that a group of AQIM militants had crossed the border from Mali intoMalian northward advance
{{further, Battle of Diabaly, Second battle of Gao, 3rd battle of Gao, 4th battle of Gao, Battle of Khalil, Battle of Iminenas, Battle of Tin Keraten, Battle of Timbuktu, 5th Battle of Gao, 2nd Battle of Timbuktu, Battle of In Arab On 16 January, French special forces, along with the Malian army, began fighting small and mobile groups of jihadists inside the city of Diabaly, but the French defense minister denied the presence of French troops fighting in Diabaly. The government of Spain approved the dispatch of one transport aircraft to Mali for logistical and training support. Meanwhile, the government of Germany authorized the contribution of two Transall C-160 transport aircraft to ferry African troops into the capital Bamako. Likewise, the government of Italy pledged air transport-based logistical support. On 17 January, Banamba was put on alert after Islamists were reportedly spotted near the town. The Malian army immediately deployed 100 soldiers to the town, which were reinforced later. A convoy of Islamists reportedly left Diabaly and was heading towards Banamba, but ultimately no fighting took place in the town. On 18 January, theInsurgency (2013–2023)
{{Main, Operation BarkhaneBeginning of guerrilla phase
Keïta presidency
2020 coup
According to some experts, Keita's presidency was among the worst in Mali's history. Not only had severe military defeats occurred under his rule, his administration failed to diversify the economy among several deeply rooted problems. His rule was marked by widespread corruption and nepotism, such as when he appointed his son to head the National Defense Committee, whose funds were allegedly misused for personal expenses, according to investigative journalists. While most Malians struggled to make ends meet, footage of his son vacationing on a luxury yacht circulated on social media in the summer of 2020, fueling public outrage. Additionally, he was suspected by the international community of involvement in the disappearance of ''Le Sphinx'' journalist Birama Touré, who had reportedly been investigating his affairs. Meanwhile, incompetence in Keita's administration led to the collapse of essential public services, including education, healthcare, and the justice system. Economic hardship was further exacerbated by famine and restrictions related to the2021–2022: growing French resentment and Russian and Turkish intervention
{{see also, 2021 Malian coup d'état, Operation Éclipse, Ménaka offensive, French military withdrawal from West Africa (2022–present) In January 2021, French forces launched a counterinsurgency campaign known as Operation Éclipse, which included a controversial French airstrike that killed 19 civilians taking part in a wedding. Despite pro-independence protests, disarmament. demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) talks between the CMA and Mali continued into 2021. In May, following negotiations aimed at resolving disputes over the Algiers Accords, the CMA and Platform formed the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-PSD, shorten to CSP) coalition. Their first provisional president was Acherif.2021 coup and aftermath
After coming to power, Ndaw began to clash with members of the National Transitional Council (CNT) over policy differences. Ndaw and his Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, were in favor of cooperation with France, while Vice President Goïta and Defense Minister Sadio Camara were in favor of cooperation with Russia. On May 24, 2021, Ndaw and Ouane were detained by the military and taken to the Kati military base. Two days later, Goïta announced that both had been stripped of their powers, accusing them of attempting to "sabotage" the transition to a democratically elected government. In addition, Goïta announced that next elections would be held in 2022. Following these events, Goïta assumed the presidency and legislative functions were transferred to the CNT. In September 2021, the junta began negotiations to hire 1,000 mercenaries from theCMA rebels, Mali counteroffensive, and JNIM escalation (August 2022–present)
In August, negotiations resumed between the CSP and kunta to address the stalled implementation of the Algiers Accords and continue DDR talks. They agreed on the gradual integration of 26,000 CSP fighters into the national army, including the incorporation of senior CSP officers into the military hierarchy, which the CMA criticised due to the lack of clarity regarding the future roles of CSP commanders within the integrated units. Tensions between the parties escalated following the agreement. By December, the CSP withdrew from peace talks, accusing the junt of refusing to negotiate or implement the 2015 agreement, and inaction in response to escalating jihadist and state violence in northern cities, which had left hundreds dead and thousands displaced. Intensified Inter-Jihadist fighting over control of the north occured between September 2022 and July 2023, before abading in August 2023.Renewed conflict with CMA, CSP split
Throughout 2023, the transitional government consistently obstructed the CSP's efforts to activate the accord's international mediation framework, repeatedly rejecting Algerian offers to host dialogue sessions. Jihadists took advantage of the resulting deadlock, and later vacuum created by the departure of international forces, expanding their control over vast rural areas of the north.{{Cite web , date=2024-02-20 , title=Northern Mali: Return to Dialogue {{! International Crisis Group , url=https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/314-nord-du-mali-revenir-au-dialogue , access-date=2025-06-16 , website=www.crisisgroup.org , language=en In February, the groups making up the CMA formally merged into a single organization. In June, Goïta further strengthened his control through a cabinet reshuffle and the adoption of a new constitution, which passed in a questionable referendum. The CSP, which prevented the referendum from taking place in its stronghold of Kidal, subsequently lost two of the four ministerial posts it previously held, which were reassigned to regime loyalists. On 16 June 2023, the junta requested that MINUSMA peacekeepers withdraw from Mali without delay. On 30 June 2023, the UN Security Council approved the request for the removal of peacekeepers. In July, MINUSMA, which at that point numbered 10,116 troops,{{Cite web , title=MINUSMA , url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma , access-date=2025-06-16 , website=United Nations Peacekeeping , language=en started to transfer control of its 12 military bases to the Malian authorities. This sparked tensions between the government and the CSP, particularly over bases located at Ber and in the Kidal region, which they argued, under the accords, they were entitled to, even if small army units may be located there. They would not allow the army to take over the bases without prior negotiations.{{Cite web , date=2023-10-13 , title=Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors {{! International Crisis Group , url=https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur , access-date=2025-06-16 , website=www.crisisgroup.org , language=en On 11 August, the CSP and junta forces, along with Wagner, clashed as they vied for control of the Ber base, from which MINUSMA had not yet fully withdrawn. The army seized the base two days later, following the departure of the last UN personnel. The next month, after previously accusing the junta and Wagner of multiple ceasefire and human rights violations, the CMA declared war on the government, leading to the Platform, with the exception of a GATIA faction led byMali counteroffensive
Following the CSP's capture of Anefis in October, Mali and Wagner forces launched an offensive towards the CMA stronghold of Kidal. Their primary targets were the towns of Tessalit and Aguelhok, both of which still housed MINUSMA military bases at the time. Clashes erupted around Anefis on 6 October, with both the Malian army and the rebels claiming control of the town by day's end. A CSP spokesman later acknowledged that the Malian army had secured Anefis. Ben Bella of the CMA claimed that fighters fromJNIM escalates attacks
On 23 May 2025, an attack by JNIM militants occurred in Dioura, where they temporarily took control of the nearby military base. During the attack, 41 soldiers died. On 1 June 2025, JNIM militants attacked and took control of a Malian army base in Boulkessi. Around 30 Malian soldiers died before they retreated. On 2 June 2025, JNIM attacked an army camp and airport in Timbuktu. Residents reported hearing gunfire, and the airport was also shelled. An official estimated the death toll of around 40 soldiers. On 3 June 2025 the Malian Armed Forces launched airstrikes on terrorist postions in Diafarabé, Mopti region and Niagassadou, Douentza region, claiming to have caused heavy losses and disrupting terrorist plans. On 3 June 2025, JNIM attacked militiamen between the cities of Soumabougou and Saoura, killing at least 23 militiamen. On 4 June 2025, terrorists, alleged to be ISGS, attacked an army camp in Tessit, Gao Region, causing significant damage and taking equipment. The Malian Armed Forces claimed that over 40 terrorist casualties were left abandoned in the aftermath of the attack, including leader Mamoudou Akilou. Additionally, retaliatory airstrikes were being conducted in response to the raid. On 5 June 2025, more than 50 JNIM militants attacked a military camp in Mahou, Sikasso region, killing at least 5 soldiers and injuring 10. On 6 June 2025, theCasualties
{{See also, Casualty recording, Mali attacks In total, from 2012-2023, 13,105 civilians and combatants were killed in armed conflict.International forces
In the entire mission, the MINUSMA lost 311 peacekeepers. EUTM Mali lost only two.Jihadists
According to Mediapart in February 2022, the number of Jihadists killed by French forces since 2013 was at least 2,800.{{Cite web , last=Fouchard , first=Anthony , date=2022-02-16 , title=Au Sahel, l’armée française a tué au moins 2 800 présumés djihadistes , url=https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/160222/au-sahel-l-armee-francaise-tue-au-moins-2-800-presumes-djihadistes , access-date=2025-06-15 , website=Mediapart , language=frDisplaced
As of 2020, 600,000 have been displaced by this conflict.Human rights concerns
{{Further, International Criminal Court investigation in Mali Following several reports of abuse from both sides, the prosecutor of theClaims against separatists and Islamists
In May 2012,Claims against Islamists
Destruction of ancient monuments in Timbuktu
During the conflict, Islamists also damaged or destroyed a number of historical sites on the grounds that they said were idolatrous, particularly in Timbuktu, aClaims against the Malian Army and loyalists
The Tuaregs and Arabs who lived in Bamako and elsewhere in southern Mali were subjects of a rash of ethnic attacks by black Malians, despite many of them being hostile to Azawad separatism as well as the Islamists. In fact, a large part of them actually had only recently arrived to the government-held south, fleeing the violence in the north.{{cite news, url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18057916 , title=Mali coup: Tuaregs tell of ethnic attacks , date=17 May 2012 , work=BBC News , url-status=dead , archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120830015611/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18057916 , archive-date=30 August 2012 An incident arose on 8 September 2012 when a group of Malian soldiers detained 17 unarmed Tablighi preachers from Mauritania in Dogofry, north-east of Diabaly, while en route to a religious conference in Bamako and executed all but one of them without reporting to their own command. The Malian government expressed its condolences for the event, whichIn popular culture
Mali earned the first win in theCeasefire
A ceasefire was agreed upon on 20 February 2015 between the Malian government and the northern rebels. The terms of the truce state that both sides agreed to "tackle the causes of lasting tensions in the region" as the AFP news agency puts it. The BBC mentioned that "Mali's leaders have rejected autonomy, but are willing to consider devolved local powers."{{cite news, url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31544438, title=Mali signs UN ceasefire to end conflict with northern rebels, work=BBC News, date=2015-02-20, access-date=2015-02-20Notes
{{NotelistReferences
{{Reflist, 30emBibliography
* {{cite book, last=Comolli , first=Virginia , title=Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency , date=2015 , publisher=Further reading
External links
{{Commons category, Mali War