Noerr–Pennington Doctrine

Under the ''Noerr''–''Pennington'' doctrine, private entities are immune from liability under the antitrust laws for attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws, even if the laws they advocate for would have anticompetitive effects.''Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.'', ; '' United Mine Workers v. Pennington'', . The doctrine is grounded in the First Amendment protection of political speech, and "upon a recognition that the antitrust laws, 'tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.'"

Origins

The doctrine was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in ''Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.'' and '' United Mine Workers v. Pennington''. The Court later expanded on the doctrine in ''California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited''..

In ''Noerr'', the Court held that "no violation of the hermanAct can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws". Similarly, the Court wrote in ''Pennington'' that " int efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition." Finally, in ''California Motor Transport'', the Court added that "the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government nd e right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition."

Pursuant to this doctrine, immunity extends to attempts to petition all departments of the government. And "if . . . conduct constitutes valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from antitrust liability whether or not the injuries are caused by the act of petitioning or are caused by government action which results from the petitioning."

Doctrine

Under the ''Noerr''–''Pennington'' doctrine," party who petitions the government for redress generally is immune from antitrust liability." Petitioning is immune from liability even if there is an improper purpose or motive.

''Noerr''–''Pennington'' immunity applies to actions which might otherwise violate the Sherman Act because "the federal antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government." The antitrust laws are designed for the business world and "are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena." This was evident in ''Noerr'', where defendant railroads campaigned for legislation intended to ruin the trucking industry. Even though defendants employed deceptive and unethical means, the Supreme Court held that they were still immune. This is because the Sherman Act is designed to control "business activity" and not "political activity." With this underpinning, the Court stated, " ecausethe right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, . . . we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." The antitrust laws were enacted to regulate private business and do not abrogate the right to petition.

Limited scope

The scope of ''Noerr''–''Pennington'' immunity, however, depends on the "source, context, and nature of the competitive restraint at issue."
*If the restraint directly results from private action there is no immunity. Passive government approval is insufficient. Private parties cannot immunize an anticompetitive agreement merely by subsequently requesting legislative approval.
*Private parties may be immunized against liability stemming from antitrust injuries flowing from valid petitioning. This includes two distinct types of actions.
::#A petitioner may be immune from the antitrust injuries which result from the petitioning itself.
::#Also, parties are immune from liability arising from the antitrust injuries caused by government action which results from the petitioning. Therefore, if its conduct constitutes valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from antitrust liability whether or not the injuries are caused by the act of petitioning or are caused by government action which results from the petitioning.

Expansion of the doctrine beyond the antitrust arena

Since its formulation, the doctrine has been extended to confer immunity from a variety of tort claims, including claims of unfair competition