Naccache–Stern Knapsack Cryptosystem

The Naccache–Stern Knapsack cryptosystem is an atypical public-key cryptosystem developed by David Naccache and Jacques Stern in 1997. This cryptosystem is deterministic, and hence is not semantically secure. While unbroken to date, this system also lacks provable security.

System overview

This system is based on a type of knapsack problem. Specifically, the underlying problem is this: given integers ''c'',''n'',''p'' and ''v''₀,...,''v''_''n'', find a vector $x \in \^n$ such that
:$c \equiv \prod_^n v_i^ \mod p$

The idea here is that when the ''v''_''i'' are relatively prime and much smaller than the modulus ''p'' this problem can be solved easily. It is this observation which allows decryption.

Key Generation

To generate a public/private key pair

*Pick a large prime modulus ''p''.
*Pick a positive integer ''n'' and for ''i'' from 0 to ''n'', set ''p''_''i'' to be the ''i''th prime, starting with ''p''₀ = 2 and such that $\prod_^np_i < p$.
*Pick a secret integer ''s'' < ''p''-1, such that gcd(''p''-1,''s'') = 1.
*Set v_i = \sqrt \mod p.

The public key is then ''p'',''n'' and ''v''₀,...,''v''_''n''. The private key is ''s''.

Encryption

To encrypt an ''n''-bit long message ''m'', calculate

:$c = \prod_^n v_i^ \mod p$

where ''m''_''i'' is the ''i''th bit of the message ''m''.

Decryption

To decrypt a message ''c'', calculate

:$m = \sum_^n \frac \times \left( \gcd(p_i,c^s \mod p) -1 \right)$

This works because the fraction

:$\frac$

is 0 or 1 depending on whether ''p''_''i'' divides ''c''^''s'' mod ''p''.

Security

The security of the trapdoor function relies on the difficulty of the following
multiplicative knapsack problem: given $c = \prod_^n v_i^\pmod p,$ recover the $m_i$. Unlike additive knapsack-based cryptosystems, such
as Merkle-Hellman, techniques like Euclidean
lattice reduction do not apply to this problem.

The best known generic attack consists of solving the discrete logarithm problem to recover $s$ from $p, p_i, v_i$, which is considered difficult for a classical computer. However, the quantum algorithm of Shor efficiently solves this problem. Furthermore, currently (2023), there is no proof that the Naccache-Stern
knapsack reduces to the discrete logarithm problem.

The best known specific attack (in 2018) uses the birthday
theorem to partially invert the function without knowing the trapdoor, assuming that the message has
a very low Hamming weight.

References

Original PaperRecent bandwidth improvement

See also

*Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem
* Graham–Shamir knapsack cryptosystem

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Public-key encryption schemes