Early history
Technology roots
The VLIW (for Very Long Instruction Word) design style was first proposed by Joseph A. (Josh) Fisher, aBusiness beginnings
ELI, which was to have 512-bit instruction words and initiate 10-30Technology
Innovative architecture
Multiflow's first computers were called the Trace 7/200 and Trace 14/200. The 7/ in the computer model number signified that the processor could initiate seven operations each cycle, using a 256-bit long instruction composed of 7 32-bit operations and a 32-bit utility field. The 7 operations were 4Hardware
Each 7/ processor datapath comprised a control unit board, an integer ALU board, and a floating point board. The 14/ added a second integer ALU board and a second floating point board. Before many systems were in the field, faster 3rd party floating-point chips became available, and the /200 family was replaced by the object-code incompatible 7/300 and 14/300, and the 14/300 became by far the company's most popular model. In about 1988, a /100 entry level series was introduced as well, but these were essentially /300 systems with a slower clock. All the processors were built usingInnovative software
Multiflow also produced the software tools for the systems it built. The systems ranCustomers and business history
Customers
While a few of Multiflow's sales went to organizations wishing to learn more about the new VLIW design style, most systems were used for simulation in product development environments: mechanical, aerodynamic, defense, crash dynamics, chemical, and some electronic. Customers ranged from a major metropolitan air-quality board to a major consumer detergent, food and sundries company, along with the expected heavy industry companies, research laboratories and universities. In 1987, GEI Rechnersysteme GmbH, a division ofMultiflow's end
Multiflow ended operations on March 27, 1990, two days after a large deal contemplated with Digital Equipment Corporation came apart. At that point, the board determined that the prospects for successful additional financing, in the amounts necessary to bring Multiflow to maturity, were too unlikely to justify the company's continuation. Multiflow's failure is often blamed anecdotally on “good technology, but bad marketing,” on “good software, but slow, conservative hardware,” on some property of its innovative technology, or even on the isolated location of its headquarters. The more likely cause was that its business plan was incompatible with seismic shifts in the computer industry. Building a full-scale, general-purpose computer company seemed to require many hundreds of millions of dollars (US) by 1990. But the killer micro revolution meant there would be a steady march of ever faster and cheaper competition. The economies inherent in microprocessors were inaccessible to startups in general, and incompatible with VLIWs, which would have required too much silicon for the densities of the time. (The first VLIW microprocessor was theCorporate culture
Multiflow was staffed by engineers, computer scientists, and other computer professionals who were attracted to the combination of a novel and challenging technology, an uphill battle, and the remarkable social experience of working in the most uniformly talented group they were ever likely to be a part of. The system was so novel that its engineering was widely expected to fail. Despite that, even though none of the employees (besides Eckdahl) had ever held senior engineering positions, Trace systems and their software were delivered on time, were robust, and exceeded their promised performance. In great part this was due to the talent level of those attracted to the company, and to the tremendous learning environment it was from the outset. Following Multiflow's closing, its employees went on to have a widespread effect on the industry. The small core group of engineers and scientists, numbering about 20, produced 4 fellows in major American computer companies (2 of whom werExternal links