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Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" or "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining." The first author to note this apparent absurdity was
G. E. Moore George Edward Moore (4 November 1873 – 24 October 1958) was an English philosopher, who with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and earlier Gottlob Frege was among the founders of analytic philosophy. He and Russell led the turn from ideal ...
. These 'Moorean' sentences, as they have become known, are paradoxical in that while they appear absurd, they nevertheless # Can be true; # Are (logically) consistent; and # Are not (obviously)
contradiction In traditional logic, a contradiction occurs when a proposition conflicts either with itself or established fact. It is often used as a tool to detect disingenuous beliefs and bias. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle's ...
s. The term 'Moore's paradox' is attributed to
Ludwig Wittgenstein Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein ( ; ; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. He is considere ...
, who considered the paradox Moore's most important contribution to philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote about the paradox extensively in his later writings, which brought Moore's paradox the attention it would not have otherwise received. Moore's paradox has been connected to many other well-known
logical paradoxes A paradox is a logically self-contradictory statement or a statement that runs contrary to one's expectation. It is a statement that, despite apparently valid reasoning from true premises, leads to a seemingly self-contradictory or a logically u ...
, including, though not limited to, the
liar paradox In philosophy and logic, the classical liar paradox or liar's paradox or antinomy of the liar is the statement of a liar that they are lying: for instance, declaring that "I am lying". If the liar is indeed lying, then the liar is telling the truth ...
, the knower paradox, the
unexpected hanging paradox The unexpected hanging paradox or surprise test paradox is a paradox about a person's expectations about the timing of a future event which they are told will occur at an unexpected time. The paradox is variously applied to a prisoner's hanging or ...
, and the
preface paradox The preface paradox, or the paradox of the preface, was introduced by David Makinson in 1965. Similar to the lottery paradox, it presents an argument according to which it can be rational to accept mutually incompatible beliefs. While the preface p ...
. There is currently no generally accepted explanation of Moore's paradox in the philosophical literature. However, while Moore's paradox remains a philosophical curiosity, Moorean-type sentences are used by
logician Logic is the study of correct reasoning. It includes both formal and informal logic. Formal logic is the science of deductively valid inferences or of logical truths. It is a formal science investigating how conclusions follow from premises ...
s,
computer scientist A computer scientist is a person who is trained in the academic study of computer science. Computer scientists typically work on the theoretical side of computation, as opposed to the hardware side on which computer engineers mainly focus (al ...
s, and those working in the
artificial intelligence Artificial intelligence (AI) is intelligence—perceiving, synthesizing, and inferring information—demonstrated by machines, as opposed to intelligence displayed by animals and humans. Example tasks in which this is done include speech re ...
community as examples of cases in which a knowledge, belief, or information system is unsuccessful in updating its fund of knowledge, belief, or information in light of new or novel data.


The problem

Since
Jaakko Hintikka Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka (12 January 1929 – 12 August 2015) was a Finnish philosopher and logician. Life and career Hintikka was born in Helsingin maalaiskunta (now Vantaa). In 1953, he received his doctorate from the University of Helsin ...
's seminal treatment of the problem, it has become standard to present Moore's paradox by explaining why it is absurd to assert sentences that have the logical form: "P and NOT(I believe that P)" or "P and I believe that NOT-P." Philosophers refer to these, respectively, as the omissive and commissive versions of Moore's paradox. Moore himself presented the problem in two ways. The more fundamental way of setting up the problem starts from the following three premises: # It can be true at a particular time both that P, and that I do not believe that P. # I can assert or believe one of the two at a particular time. # It is absurd to assert or believe both of them at the same time. I can assert that it is raining at a particular time. I can assert that I don't believe that it is raining at a particular time. If I say both at the same time, I am saying or doing something absurd. But the content of what I say—the
proposition In logic and linguistics, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence. In philosophy, " meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning. Equivalently, a proposition is the no ...
the sentence expresses—is perfectly consistent: it may well be raining, and I may not believe it. So why can I not assert that it is so? Moore presents the problem in a second, distinct, way: # It is not absurd to assert the past-tense counterpart; e.g., "It was raining, but I did not believe that it was raining." # It is not absurd to assert the second- or third-person counterparts to Moore's sentences; e.g., "It is raining, but ''you'' do not believe that it is raining," or "Michael is dead, but ''they'' do not believe that he is." # It is absurd to assert the present-tense "It is raining, and I don't believe that it is raining." I can assert that I ''was'' a certain way—e.g., believing it was raining when it wasn't—and that you, he, or they ''are'' that way but not that I ''am'' that way. Subsequent philosophers have further noted that there is an apparent absurdity in asserting a first-person ''future-tense'' sentence such as "It will be raining, and I will believe that it is not raining." However, when it does not specify an exact time for when the belief is mistaken, the proposition will tend to be true at some point in the future; its negation would imply that "Every time I believe it's not raining, it will not be raining", which is unlikely since human beliefs are often mistaken. Many philosophers hold that Moore's paradox arises not only at the level of assertion, but also at the level of
belief A belief is an attitude that something is the case, or that some proposition is true. In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false. To believe something is to take i ...
. One who believes an instance of a Moorean sentence is tantamount to one who is subject to or engaging in
self-deception Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the relevance, significance, or importance of opposing evidence and logical argument. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of a truth (or lack of truth) so that one does not rev ...
, at least on one standard way of describing it.


Proposed explanations

Philosophical interest in Moore's paradox, since Moore and Wittgenstein, has undergone a resurgence, starting with, though not limited to,
Jaakko Hintikka Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka (12 January 1929 – 12 August 2015) was a Finnish philosopher and logician. Life and career Hintikka was born in Helsingin maalaiskunta (now Vantaa). In 1953, he received his doctorate from the University of Helsin ...
, continuing with Roy Sorensen, David Rosenthal, Sydney Shoemaker and the first publication, in 2007, of a collection of articles devoted to the problem. There have been several proposed constraints on a satisfactory explanation in the literature, including (though not limited to): *It should explain the absurdity of both the omissive and the commissive versions. *It should explain the absurdity of both asserting and believing Moore's sentences. *It should preserve, and reveal the roots of, the intuition that contradiction (or something contradiction-like) is at the root of the absurdity. The first two conditions have generally been the most challenged, while the third appears to be the ''least'' controversial. Some philosophers have claimed that there is, in fact, no problem in believing the content of Moore's sentences (e.g. David Rosenthal). Others (e.g. Sydney Shoemaker) hold that an explanation of the problem at the level of belief will automatically provide us with an explanation of the absurdity at the level of assertion via the linking principle that what can reasonably be asserted is determined by what can reasonably be believed. Some have also denied (e.g. Rosenthal) that a satisfactory explanation to the problem need be uniform in explaining both the omissive and commissive versions. Most of the explanations offered of Moore's paradox are united in holding that
contradiction In traditional logic, a contradiction occurs when a proposition conflicts either with itself or established fact. It is often used as a tool to detect disingenuous beliefs and bias. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle's ...
is at the heart of the absurdity. One type of explanation at the level of assertion exploits the view that assertion implies or expresses
belief A belief is an attitude that something is the case, or that some proposition is true. In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false. To believe something is to take i ...
in some way, so that if someone asserts that ''p'' they imply or express the belief that ''p''. Several versions of this view exploit elements of
speech act In the philosophy of language and linguistics, speech act is something expressed by an individual that not only presents information but performs an action as well. For example, the phrase "I would like the kimchi; could you please pass it to me?" ...
theory, which can be distinguished according to the particular explanation given of the link between assertion and belief. Whatever version of this view is preferred, whether cast in terms of the Gricean intentions (see
Paul Grice Herbert Paul Grice (13 March 1913 – 28 August 1988), usually publishing under the name H. P. Grice, H. Paul Grice, or Paul Grice, was a British philosopher of language. He is best known for his theory of implicature and the cooperative prin ...
) or in terms of the structure of Searlean illocutionary acts (see
speech act In the philosophy of language and linguistics, speech act is something expressed by an individual that not only presents information but performs an action as well. For example, the phrase "I would like the kimchi; could you please pass it to me?" ...
), it does not obviously apply to explaining the absurdity of the commissive version of Moore's paradox. To take one version of this type of explanation, if someone asserts ''p'' and conjoins it with the assertion (or denial) that he does not believe that ''p'', then he has in that very act contradicted himself, for in effect what the speaker says is: I believe that ''p'' and I do not believe that ''p''. The absurdity of asserting p'' & I do not believe that ''p is thus revealed as being of a more familiar kind. Depending on one's view of the nature of contradiction, one might thus interpret a speaker of the omissive Moorean sentence as asserting everything (that is, asserting ''too'' much) or asserting nothing (that is, not asserting ''enough''). An alternative view is that the assertion "I believe that ''p''" often (though not always) functions as an alternative way of asserting "''p''", so that the semantic content of the assertion "I believe that ''p''" is just ''p'': it functions as a statement about the world and not about anyone's state of mind. Accordingly, what someone asserts when they assert "''p'' and I believe that not-''p''" is just "''p'' and not-''p''" Asserting the commissive version of Moore's sentences is again assimilated to the more familiar (putative) impropriety of asserting a
contradiction In traditional logic, a contradiction occurs when a proposition conflicts either with itself or established fact. It is often used as a tool to detect disingenuous beliefs and bias. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle's ...
. At the level of belief, there are two main kinds of explanation. The first, much more popular one, agrees with those at the level of assertion that contradiction is at the heart of the absurdity. The contradiction is revealed in various ways, some using the resources of
doxastic logic Doxastic logic is a type of logic concerned with reasoning about beliefs. The term ' derives from the Ancient Greek (''doxa'', "opinion, belief"), from which the English term ''doxa'' ("popular opinion or belief") is also borrowed. Typically, a d ...
(e.g. Hintikka), others (e.g. Sorensen) principles of
rational belief Rationality is the quality of being guided by or based on reasons. In this regard, a person acts rationally if they have a good reason for what they do or a belief is rational if it is based on strong evidence. This quality can apply to an abil ...
maintenance and formation, while still others appeal to our putative capacity for self-knowledge and the
first-person authority First person or first-person may refer to: * First person (ethnic), indigenous peoples, usually used in the plural * First person, a grammatical person * First person, a gender-neutral, marital-neutral term for titles such as first lady and first ...
(e.g. Shoemaker) we have over our states of mind. Another alternative view, due to Richard Moran, views the existence of Moore's paradox as symptomatic of creatures who are capable of self-knowledge, capable of thinking ''for'' themselves from a deliberative point of view, as well as ''about'' themselves from a theoretical point of view. On this view, anyone who asserted or believed one of Moore's sentences would be subject to a loss of self-knowledge—in particular, would be one who, with respect to a particular 'object', broadly construed, e.g. person, apple, the way of the world, would be in a situation which violates, what Moran calls, the Transparency Condition: if I want to know what I think about X, then I consider/think about nothing but X itself. Moran's view seems to be that what makes Moore's paradox so distinctive is not some contradictory-like phenomenon (or at least not in the sense that most commentators on the problem have construed it), whether it be located at the level of belief or that of assertion. Rather, that the very possibility of Moore's paradox is a consequence of our status as agents (albeit finite and resource-limited ones) who are capable of knowing (and changing) their own minds.


See also

*
Belief A belief is an attitude that something is the case, or that some proposition is true. In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false. To believe something is to take i ...
*
Consistency In classical deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not lead to a logical contradiction. The lack of contradiction can be defined in either semantic or syntactic terms. The semantic definition states that a theory is consistent ...
*
Doublethink Doublethink is a process of indoctrination in which subjects are expected to simultaneously accept two conflicting beliefs as truth, often at odds with their own memory or sense of reality. Doublethink is related to, but differs from, hypocrisy. ...
*
Doubt Doubt is a mental state in which the mind remains suspended between two or more contradictory propositions, unable to be certain of any of them. Doubt on an emotional level is indecision between belief and disbelief. It may involve uncertainty, ...
*
Doxastic logic Doxastic logic is a type of logic concerned with reasoning about beliefs. The term ' derives from the Ancient Greek (''doxa'', "opinion, belief"), from which the English term ''doxa'' ("popular opinion or belief") is also borrowed. Typically, a d ...
*
Epistemology Epistemology (; ), or the theory of knowledge, is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Epistemology is considered a major subfield of philosophy, along with other major subfields such as ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Episte ...
*
Contradiction In traditional logic, a contradiction occurs when a proposition conflicts either with itself or established fact. It is often used as a tool to detect disingenuous beliefs and bias. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle's ...
*
Irrationality Irrationality is cognition, thinking, talking, or acting without inclusion of rationality. It is more specifically described as an action or opinion given through inadequate use of reason, or through emotional distress or cognitive deficiency. ...
*
List of paradoxes This list includes well known paradoxes, grouped thematically. The grouping is approximate, as paradoxes may fit into more than one category. This list collects only scenarios that have been called a paradox by at least one source and have their ...
*
Philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind and its relationship with the body. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a number of other issues are addre ...
*
Rationality Rationality is the quality of being guided by or based on reasons. In this regard, a person acts rationally if they have a good reason for what they do or a belief is rational if it is based on strong evidence. This quality can apply to an abil ...
*
Self-knowledge (psychology) Self-knowledge is a term used in psychology to describe the information that an individual draws upon when finding an answer to the question "What am I like?". While seeking to develop the answer to this question, self-knowledge requires ongoing ...
*
Self-deception Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the relevance, significance, or importance of opposing evidence and logical argument. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of a truth (or lack of truth) so that one does not rev ...


Notes


References


External links


"Epistemic Paradoxes" (including Moore's) at the ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''
{{DEFAULTSORT:Moore's Paradox Epistemology Philosophical paradoxes Pragmatics