Biography
Michael Mousseau received his Ph.D. from Binghamton University in 1998, after years of ethnographic research in many regions that included the Middle East (1984), Central America (1985 and 1987), the Soviet Union (1991), East Africa (1991), the Indian sub-continent (1992), and China (1992). He joinedEconomic norms theory
Economic norms theory links the economic conditions of clientelism, which prevail in many lower income societies, and contract-intensive economy, which prevails in many higher income societies, with divergent political interests and habits.Michael Mousseau, "Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror," ''International Security'', Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002-2003), 5-29. A contract-intensive economy is one where goods, services, and labor are highly commodified: most individuals obtain livable incomes, goods and services through interacting with strangers in a market where the state makes an active effort to ensure widespread availability of opportunities. In contract-poor societies, on the other hand, most individuals are economically dependent for their needs on social ties such as family, clans and religious/ethnic groups. The prevalent mode of transaction is reciprocal exchange where favors are returned (or withheld) in the light of prior interactions, usually among small in-groups. Thus, individuals have little need for reliably impartial states but have a strong interest in the welfare of their in-groups. Economic norms theory identifies a number of divergent interests that emerge from these divergent economic conditions. In contract-intensive societies individuals have an interest in all strangers having freedom of choice and being protected by reliably-impartial states – features that are essential for the proper functioning of an impersonal market. As a consequence, individuals in these societies prefer that their states enforce contracts reliably and impartially, protect individual rights, and make efforts to enhance the general welfare. Moreover, with the assumption of bounded rationality, individuals routinely dependent on trusting strangers in contract will develop the habits of trusting strangers and preferring universal rights, impartial law, and liberal democratic government. In contrast, individuals in contract-poor societies will develop the habits of abiding by the commands of group leaders, and distrusting those from out-groups. To the extent that control of the state can affect the welfare of groups, groups have an interest in seeking control of the state in order to distribute state rents in ways that favor themselves and help to maintain power. As a consequence, contract-poor societies often lack stable and liberal democracy, and are often plagued with extensiveSelected bibliography
*"The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace," ''International Security'', Vol. 44, No. 1 (Summer 2019), 160-196 *"The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace," ''International Security'', Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009), 52-86 *"The Contracting Roots of Human Rights," (with Demet Yalcin Mousseau) ''Journal of Peace Research'', Vol. 45, No. 3 (May 2008), 327-344 *"The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence," ''International Studies Quarterly'', Vol. 47, No. 4 (December 2003), 483-510 *"Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror," ''International Security'', Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002-2003), 5-29References
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