Kediri campaign (1678)

In a campaign that took place from August to December 1678 in Kediri (in modern-day East Java, Indonesia) during the Trunajaya rebellion, the forces of the Mataram Sultanate, led by Amangkurat II, and the Dutch East India Company (VOC), led by Anthonio Hurdt, marched inland into eastern Java against Trunajaya's forces. After a series of marches beset by logistical difficulties and harassment by Trunajaya's forces, the Mataram–VOC army crossed the Brantas River on the night of 16–17 November. They then marched on Trunajaya's capital and stronghold at Kediri and took it by direct assault on 25 November. Kediri was plundered by the Dutch and Javanese victors, and the Mataram treasury—captured by Trunajaya after his victory at Plered—was completely lost in the looting. Trunajaya himself fled Kediri and continued his greatly weakened rebellion until his capture at the end of 1679.

During the march to Kediri, the Mataram–VOC army purposefully split itself into three columns which took different, indirect routes to Kediri, as suggested by Amangkurat. This enabled the army to meet more factions and to win over those with wavering allegiance, swelling its forces. The army marched through areas previously unexplored by the Dutch. The Dutch account was recorded in a journal by Hurdt's secretary Johan Jurgen Briel. Accounts of the campaign also appear in the Javanese chronicles, known as .

Background

When Amangkurat I took the throne of Mataram in 1646, the Mataram Sultanate had expanded its control to most of central and eastern Java, as well as to Madura and to a few overseas vassals in southern Sumatra and Borneo—parts of today's Indonesia. In 1674, the Madurese prince Trunajaya allied with a group of Makassarese fighters started a rebellion against Amangkurat. The rebellion was initially successful: the rebels took Surabaya, the principal city of eastern Java, in late 1675, defeated the royal army at Gegodog in 1676, and captured most of the Javanese north coast by January 1677. Facing the imminent collapse of his authority, Amangkurat sought help from the Dutch East India Company (known as the "VOC", short for its Dutch name ''Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie'') which had by then established its trading and military presence in Batavia. What happened in Mataram was of a great importance to the VOC, because Batavia could not survive without food imports from central and eastern Java. The VOC also depended on timber from the Javanese north coast in order to build and repair ships for its trading fleet, and for new construction in the city. The VOC and Mataram agreed to a contract of alliance in February 1677, which was ratified by Amangkurat in March.

In May 1677, the VOC dispatched a large fleet to Surabaya, where Trunajaya held his court, and drove him out of the city. He retreated inland to establish a new rebel capital in Kediri, the capital city of the ancient Kediri Kingdom. However, one month later, Trunajaya's forces overran the Mataram court in Plered. The royal capital was sacked, the entire treasury was taken by the rebels, and King Amangkurat I—who was gravely ill—died during his retreat, throwing the Mataram government into disarray. He was succeeded by his son, Amangkurat II, who had fled with his father. Lacking an army, a treasury, and a working government, Amangkurat II went to Jepara, the headquarters of a VOC fleet under Admiral Cornelis Speelman, and in October signed a treaty renewing their alliance. In exchange for helping Mataram against his enemies, Amangkurat promised to pay the VOC 310,000 Spanish reals and about of rice. This covered payments for all previous VOC campaigns on Mataram's behalf up to October. In further agreements, he agreed to cede districts east of Batavia, as well as Semarang, Salatiga and its surrounding districts, and awarded the company a monopoly on the imports of textiles and opium into Mataram, as well as on the purchase of sugar from the Sultanate.

With the agreement concluded, Speelman and Amangkurat were eager to march quickly against the rebels, but this was delayed by the cautious policy of the VOC Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker, internal strife in the Mataram court, and some courtiers' opposition to the Dutch involvement. In November and December, there were only limited operations by Mataram forces with VOC support on the north coast, which were partial successes. In January 1678, Maetsuycker died and was succeeded by Rijklof van Goens, causing a shift in VOC policy, and by mid-1678 various challengers of Amangkurat or the VOC-Mataram alliance had died, paving the way for a more aggressive campaign. Speelman became director-general replacing the promoted van Goens. He left for Batavia and the VOC appointed Anthonio Hurdt, a former governor of Ambon, to replace him as commander, granting him the title "Superintendent, Admiral, Campaign- and War-Commander." Despite his long administrative service in Eastern Indonesia, at this time Hurdt had no experience in Java or in military campaigns, and was only selected due to a lack of more suitable candidates. The VOC was also joined by the forces of Arung Palakka, the Bugis warrior who had been the VOC's ally in the Makassar War (1666–69).

Forces involved

When the campaign began, the Mataram forces numbered 3,000 armed men and 1,000 porters. As the march progressed, new troops were levied along the way, and some lords declared their allegiance to the Mataram King, enlarging the royal army to 13,000 men. However, desertion reduced this army again, and during the assault on Kediri, the Mataram forces had only about 1,000 armed men. The initial 3,000 men were armed with pikes, but some of the later levies had firearms.

Before the start of the campaign, the VOC had 900 soldiers on Java's north coast, deployed as garrisons in various towns. An additional expeditionary force of 1,400 arrived at the start of the campaign. As the army marched, it was joined by the garrisons in the cities it passed. Indonesians of various ethnicities made up the majority of the VOC forces; European soldiers, marines and officers made up a minority. Desertion and disease caused the forces to dwindle—at the time of the assault on Kediri, the VOC had 1,750 men and only 1,200 joined the assault. The VOC-Mataram forces had artillery, but due to the limited ammunition, it was saved for the final assault.

The size of Trunajaya's forces is uncertain. VOC-Mataram reports put the number at 1,000, but later, Trunajaya's uncle Pangeran Sampang said that Trunajaya's followers numbered 14,500 just before the assault on Kediri. This force included hundreds of cavalry with chain mail armour. Trunajaya also built fortifications along the Brantas, particularly on the eastern side of the river where Kediri stood. Trunajaya's artillery generally outgunned the loyalists', and at some point the camps of Hurdt and Amangkurat were hit by his cannon. According to the historian of Indonesia M. C. Ricklefs, "it must have been emphasized that there appears to have been no significant technological difference" between the land forces of Trunajaya, those of the Javanese in general, and those of the VOC. The people of Java had manufactured gunpowder, muskets and cannon since at least the 1620s and probably long before, and they were also quick to adopt newer European military technologies. The VOC had an advantage in terms of discipline, strategy, and tactics, but not technology.

Campaign

Planning

Hurdt wanted to attack Trunajaya's stronghold Kediri from Surabaya in coastal East Java, which would be the shortest route. In contrast, Amangkurat II proposed that the troops be divided into columns and march along multiple lengthy overland routes. He wanted the VOC-Mataram forces to march slowly through more areas in order to impress factions that were wavering over which side to take. This argument convinced Hurdt, and they decided to split the army into three different columns travelling via different overland routes from coastal Central Java to Kediri in inland East Java. In addition, a VOC merchant, Willem Bastinck, was to go to Surabaya to seek out Karaeng Galesong—a former Trunajaya ally, whose allegiance was wavering, and whose help and followers Mataram and the VOC hoped to enlist.

March to Kediri

The VOC and Mataram forces marched in three columns using different routes from coastal central Java to Kediri. Captain François Tack led what was to be the westernmost column and he left Jepara on 21 August for Semarang where the column started its overland march. To the east, a column led by Captains Abraham Daniel van Renesse and Frederik Hendrik Mulder left Rembang on 26 August. Meanwhile, the central column, which was to be the main force, was mobilized in Jepara led by Hurdt and Amangkurat. The central column sent advance detachments southward on 27 August and 2 September, while Hurdt and Amangkurat departed on 5 September.

The western column was reinforced by the garrison of Semarang and marched southward to the Pajang district, where it fought the followers of Trunajaya's ally Raden Kajoran. After an initial march, the central column re-assembled in Godong on the Serang River

HOME


Content is Copyleft
Website design, code, and AI is Copyrighted (c) 2014-2017 by Stephen Payne


Consider donating to Wikimedia



As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases