Early life and career
General Kriangsak Chomanan was born on December 17, 1917 in Mahachai district of Samut Sakhon Province. A district of prominent Chinese trading port on the South West of Bangkok. He was born to a wealthy business family who runs Mahachai trading company which deals in importing and exporting goods between Thailand and the Western countries and Japan. Mahachai in the 1800s and 1900s was one of Thailand largest trading port and grow to become the first city district with its own local government in 1897.Krīangsak, Chamanan.Education
From age six to twelve, General Kriangsak attended Samut Sakhon Wittayalai and later in Patumkongka School. After graduating from his primary school, General Kriangsak moved to Bangkok to attend the prestigious Amnuay Silpha School (Its alumni include six prime ministers of Thailand) where he excelled academically. He later attended Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy ( th, โรงเรียนนายร้อยพระจุลจอมเกล้า, Rongreiyn nayroy phra chulachomklao or รร.จปร.), known to have an intense training program and one of the lowest admission rate amongst learning institutions in Thailand, until he graduated in 1938. During his time in the army, he has further attended Thai Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and Thailand National Defence College. After his time at the Korean War, he also got a scholarship to attend United States Army Command and General Staff College atMilitary career
Kriangsak fought in the Korean War as a commander of the Thai Army in the 21st Infantry Regiment, which earned the nickname "Little Tiger" for their valour. Kriangsak Chomanan showed exemplary skills as a Major, playing a pivotal role in defending Pork Chop Hill. Where on 15 March 1953, by direction of the US president and under the provision of the 1942 Act of the US Congress, then a commander in Korean War, Lieutenant Kriangsak Chomanan was only a few of non-U.S. military personnels to be awarded with the distinguished Legion of Merit (Degree of Officer) for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services.General Orders No.8, Order of the Secretary of the US Army, W.C. WESTMORELAND, General United States Army, Chief of Staff. Published HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Washington, D.C., 4 February 1969. TAGO-849A-February 340-472*-69 He became a full general in 1973, and Army chief of staff a year later. Also in 1974, he secretly brokered a prisoner exchange with the Burmese government, in which the opium warlordPremiership
Coup d'état and ascension
Prior to Chomanan, Thanin Kraivixien administration had spiraled the country into a perilous state of civil war. Incidents of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) increasingly sabotages activities in rural areas across all of Thailand and of border clashes with Cambodia and Laos incidents frequent the news headlines. The administration forceful suppressive policy actually helped emboldened the CPT's popularity amongst the population. Furthermore, members and close aides of the royal family also became targets of attacks by the communist insurgents, as recorded in the assault of a helicopter assassinating the queen's secretary and a bomb explosion in same vicinity as the king while he was visiting the south of Thailand. The country-wide deterioration and increase activities of communist incidents induced actions among the Thai armed forces. The first attempt to overthrow the Thanin administration was led by General Chalad Hiranyasiri and took place in March 1977 where the coup was unsuccessful and Chalad was executed on Thanin's order. With increasing unrest, the Thanin government was successfully overthrew when a group of Thai military called Young Turks asked the 1976 coup leader (the coup that ousted the elected civilian government of Seni Pramoj and appointed the current royal favorite Thanin Kraivichien as prime minister) General Sa-ngad Chaloyu and the Supreme Commander General Kriangsak Chomanan to oust Thanin on 20 October 1977. Chomanan was later appointed as the new Prime Minister by a majority votes through both the National Assembly and the NARC, as a new Prime Minister has not yet been selected or volunteered. /sup> As Prime Minister, Kriangsak moved to moderate and neutralize his predecessor Thanin Kraivichien's severe measures, which had driven young Thai intellectuals from multiple universities to join Communist insurgencies in the countryside. In 1978, in a major risk to his political position with his right leaning supporting base, he submitted an amnesty bill to the National Legislative Assembly to release the leftist students and labor activist Bangkok 18, deemed to be wrongly jailed in 1976, in the Thammasat University Massacre. The move have greatly bolstered his international position as a South East Asian humanitarian leader as noted by commemoration from many international bodies such as that expressed by letter of congratulations from US President Jimmy Carter and Assistant Secretary of State Patricia Derian, Chief State Department official responsible for human rights and humanitarian affairs. He also started a successful amnesty program for Communists as part of a reconciliation policy. As Prime Minister, Kriangsak is widely credited for defusing a long-runningInternational Relations and Foreign Policies
One of Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan main accomplishment has been his normalising and improving foreign relations globally. He led the supranational rapprochement of foreign relations with neighbouring including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Myanmar (CLVM) countries and foster closer relationships with Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, he was one of the few leaders of a non-communist country to visitRelations with the United States of America
Prior to Chomanan's office, with America clearly in retreat from military involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland, Thai self-preservation dictated a policy of realignment. Within days of the Congressional cutoff of American bombing in Cambodia in August 1973, the U.S. and Thai governments announced the first drawdown of U.S. personnel in Thailand. The fall of the regime of Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusathien on 15 October 1973, added further impetus, because the student protestors, who had sparked the revolt, demanded, among other things, a more independent foreign policy for Thailand, including the removal of American bases. In May 1974, U.S. forces in Thailand were cut to 34,000 (compared with a wartime high of 50,000 in December 1972), and statements by Thai officials clearly indicated an inclination toward complete U.S. military withdrawal. Concurrently, Thailand sought to add balance to its diplomacy by improving relations with Hanoi and Moscow. Diplomatic recognition was extended to Rumania, Outer Mongolia, and Czechoslovakia; a North Korean trade delegation visited Bangkok; and relations with China continued to warm.' During 1973-1976, a consensus developed within the Thai foreign policy elite, favoring decreased reliance upon the United States and return ing to a more traditional Thai stance of establishing cordial relations with as many contending powers as possible as the most efficacious means of protecting Thailand's sovereignty. The governments of both Seni Promoj and Kukrit Pramoj sought complete withdrawal of American bases, improved relations with North Vietnam, and diplomatic relations with China. In late March 1975, the Thai government decided to cut the lifeline of the Lon Nol regime by stating that the U.S. government "had no right" to transship ammunition through Thailand. As the April denouement approached in Vietnam and Cambodia, Thailand's survival instincts dictated increased public resistance to U.S. security policies in Indochina.' American policymakers in the immediate aftermath of Saigon's fall made public statements indicating that previous commitments to the defense of Thailand might no longer be binding. When Secretary of Defense Schlesingerwiki was asked whether the U.S. would continue to be obligated to defend Thailand from external attack, he replied: " would have to consult my lawyers." Furthermore, Secretary Kissinger omitted Thailand from a listing of defense commitments in Asia.' High American officials. seemed to be publicly undermining what little deterrent value remained in the U.S.-Thai security relationship. Perhaps the absolute nadir in U.S.-Thai security relations was reached in the closing days of 1975, when Senate Majority Leader"The present government is committed to following a policy of equidistance—Thailand should try to keep on the best possible terms with major powers—the U.S., Soviet Union, China, Japan, Western and Eastern Europe. If we allow one power to station troops here, we may get into trouble with another large power, or one of the smaller powers. It was not my personal feelings, but the resolution of the American Congress banning U.S. forces from taking part in overseas operations. If they can't perform military duties why are they here? As tourists? It doesn't make sense. We have seen the sad situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia of the U.S. Congress refusing credits to those countries. Executive agreements are completely meaningless if Congress is not willing to go ahead. What are promises worth if we are unsure of the position of the mericanlegislative branch? If the U.S. Congress was to pass a resolution tomorrow that if Thailand were attacked the U.S. would join Thailand's defense, I would be the first to advocate that American forces remain. At present, however, they are a liability."The year 1976 was dominated by the final withdrawal of American forces from the bases in Thailand. There was a feeble American attempt to maintain a residual force, but this was rejected with a certain amount of political fanfare by Kukrit Pramoj. The U.S. response to the Thai government announcement on 20 March that U.S. military activity in Thailand must end "forthwith" was a forthright "We don't stay where we are not wanted." In the period 1973-1976, Thailand had rapidly readjusted its pattern of international relations: moving away from the U.S. (but without dissolving the relationship entirely); moving toward China (but without becoming a client); and seeking outright accommodation with Hanoi along with limited advances toward the Soviet Union. The policy of moving away from dependence on the United States gradually eliminated American involvement in Thai politics. But when Thanin took over, his policy of suppressing Communist activities within Thailand and limiting external Communist expansion toward Thailand's borders encouraged a new series of American involvements. Yet, even though the policies of the two countries coincided, the American involvement in Thailand during this period did not quite reach the same high level as in the previous period. In 1977, SEATO was dissolved and the U.S. cut back its aid programs to Thailand. Chomanan came to power in November 1977 and quickly adopted a new and actively independent foreign policy, compared to Thanin's rigid stance. He travelled extensively, visiting the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, in addition to the United States. With his own unique style of "survival diplomacy," Chomanan tried to reestablish more balanced relations with the rest of the world. However, Chomanan also succeeded to a certain extent in convincing the U.S. government of Thai land's strategic importance and persuaded the US. to adopt a more "credible" policy toward Thailand. It was becoming apparent that it was in the interest of the United States to help Thailand and ASEAN develop then resilience, and that, bilaterally, the United States could afford to improve close relations with Thailand while playing an important role in encouraging indigenous regionalism capable of coping with political and security problems. Toward the end of his premiership, Chomanan was able to restore close and friendly relations with the United States. Although anti-Americanism still existed, it was at a low level, compared to what it had been during the Thanom-Prapass period.
Relations with neighbouring states
General Kriangsak Chamanan positions toward Vietnam following the December 1978 invasion of Cambodia have been remarkably steadfast, and therefore we tend to forget that Thai foreign policy in 1973-1978 was based on diplomatic flexibility and accommodation with Hanoi and Phnom Penh. This basic policy was present even during the stridently anti-Communist government of Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien (October 1976-October 1977). Immediately after the October 1976 coup, which reasserted the military role in Thai politics. General Kriangsak Chomanan (Secretary-General of the National Administrative Reform Council) reiterated the policy of détente: "We want good relations with Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia" and "our policy towards China has not changed." Clashes with the Khmer Rouge occurred repeatedly along the border." With typical lack of balance, the Khmer Rouge involved themselves in border conflicts with Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand simultaneously. Thai policy in responding to the Khmer Rouge differed markedly from Vietnam ese responses to similar incidents. Whereas the Thais never ceased protest ing the frequent and terrible border violations, Thailand nevertheless continued its pursuit of a diplomatic solution. In contrast, the Vietnamese response to Khmer Rouge activity was entirely military: escalation and counterstrikes by both sides led eventually to full-scale war and invasion. Thailand, especially under the government of General Kriangsak, calculated that the most serious threat to Democratic Kampuchea came from Vietnam and that the Khmer Rouge must eventually come to terms with Thailand if they were to have any chance whatever of survival. In response to a series of vicious raids across the Thai border. Prime Minister Kriangsak stated that the Thai government would accelerate its efforts to establish better relations with Cambodia. Bangkok even provided possible rationales for the border violations. For example. General Kriangsak suggested that confusion and poor communication between the border area and Phnom Penh, or, alternately, inaccurate maps might explain the border incidents, Thailand went out of its way to play down the border incidents.'" As Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea engaged in conflict, both antagonists sought better relations with Thailand. Military security along the Thai-Cambodian border improved slowly after Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun's "goodwill visit" to Phnom Penh in late January 1978, which resulted in an agreement to exchange ambassadors.'^ During 1978, Thailand displayed a nearly awesome ability to fine-tune its foreign policy; even while the border raids into its territory continued in February, government spokesmen reiterated the contention that the border situation had improved. When fifty Thais were killed, Thailand sent a "report" rather than a "protest" note, because "Cambodian leaders might not know what is happening on the border." Kriangsak also strengthened relations with the United States, and was warmly received in his first state visit to the White House with U.S. PresidentHonorable Resignation
Chomanan voluntarily resigned in February 1980, telling parliament that he no longer felt he had the support of the public. He was the first and only leader of a coup in Thailand ever to resign voluntarily, and was celebrated and cited until this day for his honorable decision, often cited in comparison to many of Thailand past Military Government. It was reported that the primary cause for his loss of support was rising prices, particularly of oil, electricity and other commodities. "I have decided to resign the prime ministership so that democracy can be maintained," Kriangsak told a special session of parliament, which had gathered to debate his governments policies before a vote of confidence. He said his intention was "to open the way for other capable people to administer the country." He was succeeded by General Prem Tinsulanonda, his former longtime aide. In 1981 he re-entered politics at the head of a new political party, the National Democratic Party, which emerged as the only credible political opposition to Prem. Kriangsak was survived by his wife Khun Ying (Lady) Virat Chomanan, son Major General Pongpipat Chomanan and daughter Ratanawan.Humanitarian principles
The case of the Cambodian Refugees
Large influxes of Cambodian refugees took place between 1979 and 1980, after Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia and which the Heng Samrin regime overthrew Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime in December 1978, In late 1979, in pursuit of a better life, thousands of Cambodians refugees, victims of a political tragedy that has shocked the world, migrate to Thailand, fleeing war, starvation and disease. After the devastating war, 200,000 Cambodian refugees were estimated to be on the border attempting to enter Thailand. On 18 October 1979, on a visit to the Thai-Cambodian border, Thai prime minister Chomanan was shocked when he saw the appalling condition. After two days, taking a major political risk, he altered the government's policy towards the refugees. Where, he declared a new "open door" policy granting temporary asylum to Cambodian refugees; to political and societal voices of the time, Thailand would still not recognize them as refugees but, prime minister Chomaman way, would rescue them from the perilous border and place them in a freer "holding centers". On 22 October, a Thai colonel contacted UNHCR and said that the Chomanan's government had decided to additionally admit 90,000 Cambodians who were situated on the border. Under, prime minister Chomanan, Thai military planned to begin relocating them to a site near the town of Sa Kaeo within two days. Sa Kaeo Holding Center was about 64 kilometres west of the border near the town of Sa Kaeo and 209 kilometres by road from east of Bangkok.Refoulement of Cambodian Refugees
Also during Chomaman premiership, it was speculated by an official that Thailand's government carried out the forcible repatriation of up to 45,000 Cambodian refugees who were forcibly expelled from the country by having them walk down a steep slope and over a minefield in one of the worst refoulements in history with over 3000 refugees dying in the process and those that refused claimed to be shot by Thai soldiers.Honours
received the following royal decorations in the Honours System of Thailand: * 1978 - Knight Grand Cross of the Most IllustriousForeign Honours
* : 1979 - Honorary Grand Commander of theCitations and References
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