Collision
The crash occurred at about 1:45a.m. on 2August, 1999, when theFailures
Three of the four lines at Kishanganj station were non-operational because a doubling of lines was in progress. Only one line was being used to carry the load usually carried by four: 31 trains per day. Track circuiting and interlocking were also not correctly functioning at the station, because of the work in progress. Track circuiting is an electrical procedure by which the station master, and consequently the train driver, can know that the track ahead is occupied. The signals remain red, interlocking the track, which effectively means that the series of signals cannot be turned green unless the station master allows it. The signals can be changed from the relay room, which can only be opened jointly by the station master and the signal inspector. In such a situation, the points in the track have to be set manually by a "cranking" procedure, whereby a crank handle, available at stations, is rotated manually on the orders of the station master for setting the points, which are then clamped and locked. The entire process takes around 30 minutes. The Avadh Assam Express driver, B.N. Roy, had already moved the train to the down line, and on the same track, B.C. Bardhan, heading the Delhi-bound Brahmaputra Mail, was traveling. The cause of the disaster was negligence by the manager of Kishanganj Railway Station: due to the track workers setting the wrong points manually, the Avadh Assam Express shifted to the down line rather than the up line. At the same time, incorrect information was passed to the next station that the Avadh Assam Express had been sent to the up line from Kishanganj station. The convergence point of the two trains was at Gaisal railway station (near to Kishanganj) where both trains collided. According to witnesses, the engine of Avadh Assam Express jumped several feet high and the engine of Brahmaputra Mail rammed into several coaches of the Avadh Assam Express, resulting in one of the deadliest disasters of the Indian Railways. The driver, B.N. Roy of Avadh Assam Express, failed to notice that all signals were facing the opposite side instead of the green light facing towards the locomotive as usual. The opposite green signals were for the driver of the Delhi-bound Brahmaputra Mail. If the station cabin of Kishanganj had checked that the green signals of the up line had not turned to red, the disaster could have been averted. Whenever any train crosses the "Advance Starter" point of a railway station, a green signal is turned to red either manually or automatically and again becomes green after the train crosses near one or two stations, a practice similar to block signaling. Since the Avadh Assam Express had not touched the up line, green signals on the up line remained green and had not turned red. The cabin staff of Kishanganj railway station failed to notice the problem in time. Assistant Station Master (ASM) of Kishanganj station, S P Chandra, later admitted to sending the Avadh Assam Express on the wrong (down) line, causing it to collide with the Brahmaputra Mail on August 1. Chandra's testimony was first presented by a preliminary inquiry report of Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety (CCRS). Immediately after the incident, Chandra absconded and was arrested inEmergency services
The line was blocked by wreckage, and the Gaisal emergency services were utterly overwhelmed, as fire swept through the ruined vehicles and station buildings, killing many of the injured people trapped in the trains. Many vehicles and aid support services had to undertake the 14-hour drive from Calcutta to reach the site, by which time many of those they could have helped were already dead. Those who were picked up by rescuers were taken to hospitals in Kishanganj and Islampur, which were also overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster. Heavy rains helped dampen fires the following day, and rescue workers began trying to separate the twelve mangled carriages of the train and identify the bodies contained inside. Many were unrecognizable and never identified. Many bodies were not even found.Death toll
The official death toll released was set at 285 killed and over 300 injured in the crash. Unofficial tolls have claimed that up to 1000 or even more were killed, including 90 soldiers. This is possible because although there were only 72 seats in each of the seven general compartments that were involved in the crash, all of them were crowded far beyond capacity. Moreover, there were many ticketless travelers who were not included in the official count. Because of the nature of the crash and fire, as well as the large number of ticketless people who may have been on the trains, the bodies could not be separately identified. There has also been speculation that explosives carried on the military train may have been the cause of the explosion following the impact, rather than the trains themselves. This has been denied by the Indian military, but has remained a controversial issue. Railway Minister Nitish Kumar resigned on moral grounds, only second railway minister to do so, after Lal Bahadur Shastri since 1963 Udyan Abha Toofan Express crash which killed 100+ passengers.Other Indian rail disasters
This was the worst Indian rail disaster since theSee also
* 1981 Bihar train derailment *References
External links
*http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/03rail3.htm *https://web.archive.org/web/20131217221449/http://www.financialexpress.com/old/ie/daily/19990814/ige14049.html *https://web.archive.org/web/20130726151415/http://archives.digitaltoday.in/indiatoday/19990816/nation2.html {{1999 railway accidents 1999 in India Explosions in 1999 Railway accidents in 1999 August 1999 events in Asia 1990s in Assam 1990s in West Bengal Railway accidents and incidents in Bihar Disasters in Assam Disasters in West Bengal Train collisions in India Uttar Dinajpur district 1999 disasters in India