Fountain Fire

The 1992 Fountain Fire was a large and destructive wildfire in the U.S. state of California's Shasta County. After igniting on August 20, the fire burned for 8 days, consuming 63,960 acres and destroying 636 structures, including more than 300 homes. At the time, the Fountain Fire was the third most destructive wildfire in recorded California history (though as of 2022 it no longer ranks among even the top 20 most destructive California wildfires), and at more than $22 million it was then the most expensive fire to contain in recorded California history.

The Fountain Fire primarily burned northeast along the California State Route 299 (or 'Highway 299') corridor, from north of Oak Run all the way to the outskirts of Burney. It destroyed most of the communities of Round Mountain and Montgomery Creek, among others. For its first two days it outpaced firefighters' attempts to control it, driven by strong winds that caused long-range spotting, crown fire runs, pyrocumulonimbus clouds that generated dry lightning, and other extreme fire behavior. During this time it burned more than 35,000 acres of largely private timberlands. Only once weather conditions changed for the better did the fire slow, and crews were able to corral and ultimately contain it.

The fire's cause was narrowed down to probable arson by California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) investigators as they eliminated other possible causes, but no precise method, motive, or perpetrator was ever identified, and the statute of limitations expired several years later.

When it occurred, the Fountain Fire was recognized not just a devastating wildfire, being one of the largest and most destructive in California's history, but also as a "fire of the future". The fire's drought-fueled ferocity as it moved through communities where homes intermingled with vegetation, in a difficult and high-stakes environment for firefighters, made it emblematic of the challenges fire crews face in the wildland-urban interface. The Fountain Fire has since been surpassed by many modern California wildfires in metrics for structures lost and dollars, but it remains notable for its speed, the destruction of multiple communities, and the long-term alteration of the landscape within its footprint.

Background factors

Both long-term climatic patterns and short-term weather conditions combined to create an environment conducive to a large and uncontrollable wildfire in late August 1992. Between 1987 and 1992, California experienced a six-year drought in the state's first extended such period since the 1920s and 1930s. All 6 years ranked in the driest 10% by runoff, and the stress on forests led to widespread bark beetle infestations. Less than a year before the Fountain Fire, the Oakland firestorm of 1991 killed 25 people and destroyed more than 3,000 structures in an example of a drought and wind-fueled conflagration in the wildland-urban interface.

Several weeks of high temperatures, at or exceeding for 22 days, preceded the fire in Shasta County. There were also fewer than normal available firefighters due to an already-active fire season throughout California and the rest of the western United States, with many firefighters tasked to the destructive Old Gulch Fire in Calaveras County, among others.

Lastly, a highly conducive fire weather pattern developed for the portion of Northern California that included the Fountain Fire's path. The influence of an upper-level trough moving onshore in the Pacific Northwest and a strong upper-level jet situated over Northern California created strong flow out of the southwest, and Foehn winds on the eastern slopes of the Cascade Range and the Sierra Nevada. Those winds also brought dry air, courtesy of the dry slot—a zone of clear, dry air which often accompanies low-pressure systems. The Northern California Geographical Coordination Center identifies this as a typical critical fire weather setup in northeastern California and the southern Cascades: "Pre-frontal conditions occur when strong, southwesterly or westerly winds are generated by the dry, southern tail of a rapidly moving cold front." In the area of the Fountain Fire on August 20, southwest winds were gusting up to 25 miles per hour.

Fire progression

August 20

The Fountain Fire was first spotted by a fire lookout atop Hogback Mountain in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest at around 12:50 p.m. PDT on August 20. The lookout reported a smoke column behind a ridge, near a historic drinking fountain along Highway 299 (which gave the incident its name). The lookout could not see the actual ignition point of the growing fire, which was confirmed by the Shasta Bear Mountain lookout's cross-check to be about 2 miles from the fountain in dry grass off of Buzzard Roost Road, just west of Phillips Road and south of Highway 299. By the time John Thompson, a resident of Phillips Road, spotted the fire shortly before 1:00 p.m., it was already 30 feet wide and had climbed into the trees.

Resources attempt to stop the fire

Firefighting resources were dispatched over the next 10 minutes: aircraft arrived overhead by 1:07 p.m., reporting that the fire was 2–3 acres and spreading north quickly, threatening structures within minutes. The first ground units arrived at 1:19 p.m., 29 minutes after the first report. The first two fire engines on scene were forced to defend a house that was under construction and at risk from blowing embers. Firefighters saved multiple homes, but the fire still grew rapidly. By 2:17 p.m. the Fountain Fire had burned 50 acres in its first 90 minutes, and at around 3:30 p.m. fire activity intensified further.

Officials were initially hopeful that they could hold the fire at Highway 299 outside of Round Mountain and keep it to less than 200 acres. They were nearly successful, but the high winds drove the fire into brush beneath power lines. The lines arced, causing nine simultaneous spot fires, and the firefighters were unable to keep the Fountain Fire from continuing towards and through Round Mountain. Round Mountain, Montgomery Creek, and the small subdivision of Moose Camp were all evacuated around 4:00 p.m. By 4:30 p.m., the fire had crossed Highway 299.

Fire behavior increases

The Fountain Fire's northeastern push became an intense, high-severity crown fire, with flame lengths of up to 300 feet tall that kept ground crews from safely engaging. The wind helped embers ignite spot fires at least 1 mile ahead of the main fire. In a sign of extreme fire behavior, the pyrocumulus (or possibly pyrocumulonimbus) plume generated by the Fountain Fire reached at least 25,000 feet in altitude, as detected by weather radar in Medford, Oregon, and generated numerous lightning strikes. The 50–70 mph jet stream blowing out of the west created a chimney effect when it met the billowing smoke plume, ventilating the fire and increasing fire behavior.

A Forest Service meteorologist with California's Northern Operations Service Center speculated that, based on witness reports and debris, the fire may also have formed fire-generated tornadic vortices, or FGTVs, more commonly known as fire whirls. A National Weather Service meteorologist in Redding assigned to the incident concurred, noting possible "fire tornadoes". Investigators found pine trees 2 to 3 feet in diameter snapped in half. Fire whirls can rival traditional tornados in size and strength, and multiple such strong vortices have been recorded in Northern California wildfires. Vortices produced by the 2014 Eiler Fire near Hat Creek resulted in EF1 equivalent damage, and the 2018 Carr Fire infamously resulted in a "fire tornado" with winds of up to 165 miles per hour, or EF3 strength, when it jumped the Sacramento River into subdivisions on the western fringes of Redding.

Fire burns through Round Mountain

As the fire swept through the community of Round Mountain, it burned with temperatures estimated at , hot enough to melt a cast-iron bathtub, stainless steel knives, chrome car bumpers, glass bottles, and even cook potatoes growing underground. No one died or was severely injured when the fire front pushed through the town, but multiple people reported driving out through the flames or leaving their properties just before flames reached them.

By 5:00 p.m., fifteen people were trapped in an 80-acre meadow at the end of Frisby Road when they found the way out to Highway 299 blocked by flames. The McMillan family, ranchers and owners of the meadow property, had planned to go there in case of a fire and were able to both wet the area down with water trucks and flood it by blocking irrigation ditches. The group of people and vehicles remained there as the fire moved through with 200-foot flame lengths, blowing the roofs off of nearby barns with the force of its passage. Two men put out spot fires with a bulldozer. A helicopter looking for people who had not evacuated discovered the group, surrounded by flames. It was able to land and extricate two of the women and a 2-year-old child, but could not return. Firefighters could not safely reach the remaining people and evacuate them until 10:00 p.m., five hours after they took shelter.

Meanwhile, the fire continued moving north and east: by midnight, the fire had pushed further along the Highway 299 corridor and was south of Montgomery Creek. It had so far burned approximately 12,000 acres and forced between 1,000 and 2,000 people in the area to evacuate.

August 21

The second day marked the single largest day of growth on the Fountain Fire, as similar weather conditions continued to fuel extreme fire behavior. At one point the fire was burning 80 acres every minute, and spreading at a rate of 6 miles per hour. This growth was also marked by more long-range spotting, of distances between 1/4 of a mile and 2 miles ahead of the fire.

In the morning, fire crews focused on protecting Montgomery Creek by attempting to stop one branch of the fire's advance at Fenders Ferry Road off of Highway 299, south of the community and north of Round Mountain. While firefighters were able to protect many structures along the road itself, they were unable to prevent the winds (a combination of continuing gusts from the southwest and inflow winds towards the Fountain Fire's massive plume to the east) from pushing flames across the road. This happened shortly after noon, and the fire then pressed towards Montgomery Creek. The fire entered the center of the community along Highway 299 by 3:00 p.m. Multiple homes were destroyed, but firefighters protected the local school, post office, and other major structures with assistance from aircraft.

Meanwhile, the much larger head of the fire to the east continued advancing, causing the communities of Big Bend, Hillcrest, and Moose Camp to be evacuated. Later that day, the fire burned through Moose Camp, another community of 60 summer cabins and other structures between Montgomery Creek and Burney off Highway 299, and left only about 20 remaining. By 6:00 p.m. on August 21, the larger town of Burney was placed under a voluntary evacuation advisory—California Highway Patrol officers used bullhorns to warn residents, and the Red Cross shelter that had been established because of the fire was also forced to move.

The fire moved so quickly and fiercely that firefighters did not expect to be able to stop it short of where the conifer forests gave way to old lava beds east of Burney. By dusk, the fire had advanced all the way to Hatchet Mountain and Hatchet Mountain Pass, damaging radio equipment on the mountain's summit. The flames were visible from Burney itself. By 10:00 p.m., the fire front was within 1.5 miles of the town, and had set a log deck on fire at Sierra Pacific Industries' mill on its western outskirts. However, once the Fountain Fire's flame front crested the hills west of Burney, it was no longer in alignment with the wind and up-slope terrain that had driven it along the Highway 299 corridor for the previous 36 hours. By midnight, the fire had burned more than 35,000 acres in total.

August 22 and beyond

The fire's behavior and growth over its first two days were sobering to firefighters. On August 22, the third day of the fire, Cal Fire deputy incident commander Bill Clayton predicted the fire would grow to 100,000 acres. A Cal Fire memo posted for crews that same day read: "The fire has moved 7 miles in 6.5 hours the first day, faster the second day (Friday). Prepare for more of the same today. It is critically dry, fueled with variable winds, produced rapid fire runs and heavy spotting which ran out crews many times."

However, August 22 ended up bringing much more moderate weather conditions and fire behavior. Cooler temperatures and lighter winds allowed firefighters to gain ground. On the morning of August 22, firefighters lit backfires off of Highway 299 near Hatchet Mountain to prepare and strengthen control lines. By the end of the day, it was clear that the fire was progressing to the northeast of Burney and not towards it.

During the 22nd and 23rd, the flanks of the fire proved problematic: the fire moved northeast towards the Pit River, and southwest towards Oak Run and other communities. On August 23, fire crews and aircraft worked to stop the Fountain Fire from getting too close to the Pit River, citing both the steepness of the terrain beyond it, dense fuels, and the high resource values (such as old-growth forests and endangered spotted owl habitat) that would be at risk if it crossed. In that case, officials feared a "whole new ball game" with "uncontrollable" fire conditions. However, crews were aided by strong winds from the north, though the same winds made containing the fire difficult on its southern side closer to Oak Run. Residents of Round Mountain and Montgomery Creek were briefly allowed to return to their properties to assess the damage.

Before dawn on August 24, low humidity and winds of up to 25 miles per hour that had generated a red flag warning for much of Northern California also briefly caused the fire to become more active, jumping the fire line into the Cow Creek drainage. Some evacuation orders were issued again, including in Oak Run and Mill Creek, but the fire did not burn any more structures and by that afternoon it was 40% contained in all.

The winds failed to rematerialize on the 25th, and though weather remained hot and dry, crews continued to work on the fire's flanks. Firefighters constructed hand line in the Pit River canyon, in terrain too rugged for bulldozers and described by a Shasta-Trinity National Forest spokesperson as "steeper than a cow's face." At this point, Big Bend, Moose Camp, and Hillcrest were the only communities remaining under mandatory evacuation orders. Firefighters also reported re-burning and flare-ups of activity near unburned islands (ranging from 30 to 400 acres in size) of vegetation and structures within the fire. By midday August 26, the fire was 75% contained. On August 27 it remained hot and dry with calm winds.

On August 28, the Fountain Fire was declared 100% contained, having burned a total area just shy of 64,000 acres. However, firefighters continued to monitor 12,000 acres of unburned vegetation within the perimeter that risked reigniting, primarily on Hatchet Mountain and Lookout Mountain. The fire was officially declared controlled on November 1. Other fire suppression operations continued until mid-November.

Firefighting effort

A deadlock between the Democratic California state legislature and Republican Governor Pete Wilson meant that the state was without a budget from July 1 to September 3 in 1992, and consequently unable to pay many state employees or contractors in anything but official IOUs during that period. These included Cal Fire firefighters, many of whom bought and wore T-shirts while working on the Fountain Fire that displayed the names of major fires, a "beleaguered firefighter" illustration, and the words "All this for an IOU?"

Additionally, on August 23 the Fountain Fire was reported to be short of 105 wildland firefighters—equivalent to seven handcrews—primarily because of resources taken up by the Old Gulch Fire in Calaveras County. There were also fewer replacements in part because the budget stalemate meant that fire departments throughout the state were in some cases unwilling to send their idle units, worried about potential budget cuts and the need to maintain their own operations in the face of uncertain funding and reimbursement.

At the peak of the suppression effort around 4,464 personnel, at least 600 of them California Conservation Camp Program prison inmates paid a dollar a day, worked to fight the fire. Firefighters worked shifts as long as 24 hours.The Shasta County fairgrounds in the town of Anderson, south of Redding, served as the main base camp for firefighters in the effort to contain the fire. On Sunday, August 23, air tankers dropped 212,000 gallons of fire retardant on the Fountain Fire, a then-record for the Forest Service air attack base in Redding. Aircraft, including Grumman S2Fs and Lockheed P-3 Orion

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