Characteristics of Distributive Politics
Disaggregation
According to many, distributive politics must be in some way disaggregable.Saltman, Roy G. Copyright in Computer-Readable Works: Policy Impacts of Technological Change. Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, 1977. Internet resource.Rich, Michael J. "Distributive politics and the allocation of federal grants." The American Political Science Review (1989): 193-213. That is, the legislation must be able to be broken down into multiple benefits dispersed among recipients and “what is being distributed can be dispensed in small units”. Lowi says distributive policies "are virtually not policies at all but are highly individualized decisions that only by accumulation can be called a policy."Universalism
The concept of universalism also defines distributive politics.Mayhew, David R. Congress: The electoral connection. Vol. 26. Yale University Press, 2004.Soherr-Hadwiger, David. "Military Construction Policy: A Test of Competing Explanations of Universalism in Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly (1998): 57-78.Fiorina, Morris P. Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment. Yale University Press, 1989. Universalism refers both to the broad allocation of benefits to recipients and the wide support these legislative measures receive in Congress. In terms of the people’s reception of benefits, universal distributive policies benefit wide ranges of people and the “unanimous inclusion of representatives’ projects in omnibus-type legislation produced by one committee.” Universalism also points to the legislative support needed to pass these distributive measures and the “coalitions of near-unanimous size rather than coalitions of narrower or minimal winning size” that pass distributive legislation. Universalism has two variants, one broad-based universalism which is more inclusive and the narrow based universalism or universalism among "own" party members or districts ruled by them. The latter kind of universalism is called particularism (see Cox and McCubbins’ universalism‐within‐party hypothesis). Weingast notes that universalism should not be taken as the sole definition of distributive politics and that “universalism is one principle among many that govern congressional behavior over distributive politics.” Chanchal Kumar SharmaSharma,Chanchal Kumar, 2017, A Situational Theory of Pork-Barrel Politics:The shifting logic of discretionary allocations in India, India Review, Vol 16, No.1, pp 14-41(Published in India Review Special Issue on Indian Federalism)Omnibus
Distributive legislation is consideredCompeting Theories
There are several competing theories on the precise definition of distributive politics, as political scientists approach the concept from different angles. The distribution and overall concentration of benefits and projects is how Lowi defines distributive politics, saying they are those that “can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule.”Stein, Robert M., and Kenneth N. Bickers. "Universalism and the Electoral Connection: A Test and Some Doubts." Political Research Quarterly 47.2 (1994): 295-317. JSTOR. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. Ferejohn and Rundquist also accept the disaggregation as a main part of defining distribution, but they refine their definition by only including those pieces of legislation that are dispersed geographically.Liske, Craig, William Loehr, and John F. McCamant. Comparative public policy: issues, theories, and methods. Vol. 1. Halsted Press, 1975. 87-108. Ferejohn and Rundquist rely on the notion that Congressmen strive only to serve their constituents, who are part of geographically sorted voting districts. Fiorina subscribes to this same idea, noting “Congressmen understand national interest only when it speaks in a local dialect." The role of targeted populations and recipients of distributive benefits is debated among scholars. Stockman claims that distributive policy is actually less efficient than alternatives, as it creates a widespread blanket of benefits rather than concentrating those benefits on the needy populations. Lowi and Schneider argue that distributive policies are rather more concentrated on those "powerful and positively constructed" groups, such as the elderly, business, veterans, and scientists.Schneider and Ingram, “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 These groups are given more benefits because they hold less opposition and controversy and are "met instead with general approval." Other contributions to the definition of distributive politics emphasize the evolution of policy and how this impacts the creation of a distributive bill. Sharma argues that if a party controls majority seats in the national legislature as well as a vast majority of the state legislatures, then the distributive funds (or pork barrel funds) are allocated to 'own party' ruled states (i.e., affiliated states). However, if the ruling party loses support in a vast majority of states then it alters its distributive strategy to appease those constituencies which it has lost, leading to more welfare-grants being channeled to nonaffiliated states, although affiliated states continue to receive a respectable amount of such (visible or credit conferring) grants. This theory has been termed as "situational theory of distributive politics". More precisely, the theory holds that particularization or universalization of federal grants depends on the party system type under which the national government is operating. It states that incentives for exclusive targeting of affiliated states in dominant‐party systems drive national ruling parties towards particularism, while the shrinking opportunity to indulge in such a policy in multiparty‐coalition systems creates a universalisation effect. (see for example Sharma) Stockman argues that distributive legislation begins as a narrow bill, and expands to incorporate more projects to gain a broader support base of legislators. Stein strays away from the idea that Congressmen’s main motivation for distributing benefits is for constituent support, as he claims there is no way to fully ensure reasons for voting, and “the electoral impact of helping to direct benefits to the district will be muted to the extent that voters are unaware of the benefits and to the extent that voters do not credit their member for securing them."Stein, Robert M., and Kenneth N. Bickers. "Universalism and the Electoral Connection: A Test and Some Doubts." Political Research Quarterly 47.2 (1994): 312. JSTOR. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. Overall, these theories all accept the idea that distributive politics must in some way be disaggregable, universal, and omnibus.Implications
Uncontroversial Passage of Legislation
The combination of multiple projects benefiting multiple districts helps ensure the uncontroversial passage of legislation. In contrast toPolitical Gain
Allocations of distributive programs and particularized benefits are often made strategically in order to cater to a particular group and build and maintain political support for members within their districts. Distributive programs thrive on political gain because "congressmen are motivated by a desire to serve the economic interests of their constituencies." Oftentimes, the benefits are distributed geographically to match voting districts,Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. "Political preferences for the pork barrel: A generalization." American journal of political science (1981): 96-111.Arnold, R. Douglas. The logic of congressional action. Yale University Press, 1992. but distribution is not limited strictly to geographic location. Other interest groups such as senior citizens and environmentalists are influential in the distribution of benefits and the support incentives of Congressmen.Examples
Examples of Distributive Policies
Modern political scholars argue that distributive policies encompass programs and grants that emphasize the general taxation distributing benefits to narrow constituencies. These include the traditional pork barrel of public works,Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen ,“The political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No.4 rivers and harbors projects,Ferejohn, John A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. highway construction, categorical grants-in-aid,Examples of Non-distributive Policies
These distributive policies are distinguished from non-distributive programs in that non-distributive policies are often designed to serve nongeographic constituencies. The most representative example is entitlement programs targeting specific socioeconomic groups in mind, such as “the malnourished (See also
*Further reading
*Ellwood, John W., and Eric M. Patashnik. "In praise of pork." Public Interest (1993): 19-19. * Frank J. Thompson and Michael J. Scicchitano. "State Implementation Effort and Federal Regulatory Policy: The Case of Occupational Safety and Health." The Journal of Politics 47 (1985): 686-703. *Owens, Michael Leo, and Amy Yuen. "The Distributive Politics of “Compassion in Action” Federal Funding, Faith-Based Organizations, and Electoral Advantage." Political Research Quarterly 65.2 (2012): 422-442.References
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