Disinformation Attack

Disinformation attacks are the intentional dissemination of false information, with an end goal of misleading, confusing, or manipulating an audience. Disinformation attacks may be executed by state or non-state actors to influence domestic or foreign populations. These attacks are commonly employed to reshape attitudes and beliefs, drive a particular agenda, or elicit certain actions out of a target audience. Tactics include the presentation of incorrect or misleading information, the creation of uncertainty, and the undermining of both correct information and the credibility of information sources.

Disinformation attacks can be employed through traditional media outlets, such as state-sponsored TV channels and radios. However, disinformation attacks have become increasingly widespread and potent with the advent of social media. Digital tools such as bots, algorithms, and AI technology are leveraged to spread and amplify disinformation and micro-target populations on online platforms like Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. Due to their nature, disinformation attacks have been called to be formally classified as an actual cyber threat by advocates.

Disinformation attacks are being used against governments, organizations, and individuals. They can pose threats to democracy in online spaces, the integrity of electoral processes such as the 2016 United States presidential election, and national security in general. Disinformation attacks are also used to undermine the credibility of science and to influence individual action and public policy, particularly in areas of public health and environmental science.

Defense measures include machine learning applications that can flag disinformation on platforms, fact-checking and algorithmic adjustment systems, and collaboration between private social media companies and governments in creating solutions and sharing key information. Educational programs are also being developed to teach people how to better discern between facts and disinformation online and best practices for countering disinformation. Research into scientific disinformation suggests that a number of tactics can prove useful against disinformation. Individually-focused Interventions include actions that can be taken by websites and information providers to encourage more thoughtful interaction on the part of individuals (warning and fact-checking labels, accuracy prompts, friction and self-reflection tools); actions that can be taken by individuals to improve their own skills in dealing with information (lateral reading, media-literacy tips); actions that can be taken by individuals or organizations to challenge disinformation (debunking, inoculation, rebuttals of science denialism, strengthening of social norms).

Disinformation attack methods

Traditional media outlets

Traditional media channels can be utilized to spread disinformation. For example, Russia Today is a state-funded news channel that is broadcast internationally. It aims to boost Russia's reputation abroad and also depict Western nations, such as the U.S., in a negative light. It notably covers negative aspects of the U.S. and presents conspiracy theories aimed to mislead and misinform its audience.

Social media

Perpetrators primarily utilize social media channels as a medium to spread disinformation. They leverage a variety of tools to carry out disinformation attacks, such as bots, algorithms, deep fake technology, and psychological principles.

* Bots are automated agents that can produce and spread content on online social platforms. Many bots can engage in basic interactions with other bots and humans. In disinformation attack campaigns, they are leveraged to rapidly disseminate disinformation and breach digital social networks. Bots can produce the illusion that one piece of information is coming from a variety of different sources. In doing so, disinformation attack campaigns make their content seem believable through repeated and varied exposure. By flooding social media channels with repeated content, bots can also alter algorithms and shift online attention to disinformation content.
* Algorithms are leveraged to amplify the spread of disinformation. Algorithms filter and tailor information for users and modify the content they consume. A study found that algorithms can be radicalization pipelines because they present content based on its user engagement levels. Users are drawn more to radical, shocking, and click-bait content. As a result, extremist, attention-grabbing posts can garner high levels of engagement through algorithms. Disinformation campaigns may leverage algorithms to amplify their extremist content and sow radicalization online.
* A deep fake is digital content that has been manipulated. Deep fake technology can be harnessed to defame, blackmail, and impersonate. Due to its low costs and efficiency, deep fakes can be used to spread disinformation more quickly and in greater volume than humans can. Disinformation attack campaigns may leverage deep fake technology to generate disinformation concerning people, states, or narratives. Deep fake technology can be weaponized to mislead an audience and spread falsehoods.
* Human psychology is also applied to make disinformation attacks more potent and viral. Psychological phenomena, such as stereotyping, confirmation bias, selective attention, and echo chambers, contributes to the virality and success of disinformation on digital platforms. Disinformation attacks are often considered a type of psychological warfare because of their use of psychological techniques to manipulate populations.

Examples

Domestic voter disinformation attacks

Domestic voter disinformation attacks are most often employed by autocrats aiming to cover up electoral corruption. Voter disinformation includes public statements that assert local electoral processes are legitimate and statements that discredit electoral monitors. Public-relations firms may also be hired to execute specialized disinformation campaigns, including media advertisements and behind-the-scenes lobbying. For example, state actors employed voter disinformation attacks to reelect Ilham Aliyev the 2013 Azerbaijani presidential election. They restricted electoral monitoring, allowing only certain groups like ex-Soviet republic allies to observe the electoral process. Public-relations firms were also hired to push the narrative of an honest and democratic election.

Russian campaigns

* A Russian operation known as The Internet Research Agency (IRA) spent thousands on social media ads to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. These political ads leveraged user data and to micro-target and spread misleading information to certain populations, with an end goal of exacerbating polarization and eroding public trust in political institutions. The Computation Propaganda Project at Oxford University found that the IRA's ads specifically sought to sow mistrust towards the U.S. government among Mexican Americans and discourage voter turnout among African Americans.
* Russia Today is a state-funded news channel that aims to boost Russia's reputation abroad and depict Western nations in a negative light. It has served as a platform to disseminate propaganda and conspiracies concerning Western states such as the U.S.
* During the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2014, Russia's combined traditional combat warfare with disinformation attacks in its offensive strategy. Disinformation attacks were leveraged to sow doubt and confusion among enemy populations and intimidate adversaries, erode public trust in Ukrainian institutions, and boost Russia's reputation and legitimacy. This hybrid warfare allowed Russia to effectively exert physical and psychological dominance over target populations during the conflict.

Other notable campaigns

An app called “Dawn of Glad Tidings,” developed by Islamic State members, assists in the organization's efforts to rapidly disseminate disinformation in social media channels. When a user downloads the app, they are prompted to link it to their Twitter account and grant the app access to tweeting from their personal account. As a result, this app allows for automated Tweets to be sent out from real user accounts and helps create trends across Twitter that amplify disinformation produced by the Islamic State on an international scope.

Ethical concerns

* There is growing concern that Russia could employ disinformation attacks to destabilize certain NATO members, such as the Baltic states. States with highly polarized political landscapes and low public trust in local media and government are particularly vulnerable to disinformation attacks. Russia may employ disinformation, propaganda, and intimidation to coerce such states into accepting Russian narratives and agenda.
* Disinformation attacks can erode democracy in the digital space. With the help of algorithms and bots, disinformation and fake news can be amplified, users' content feeds can be tailored and limited, and echo chambers can easily develop. In this way, disinformation attacks can breed political polarization and alter public discourse.
* During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian influence campaigns employed hacking techniques and disinformation attacks to confuse the public on key political issues and sow discord. Experts worry that disinformation attacks will increasingly be used to influence national elections and democratic processes.

Defense measures

Federal

The Trump Administration backed initiatives to evaluate blockchain technology as a potential defense mechanism against internet manipulation. The Blockchain is a decentralized, secure database that can store and protect transactional information. Blockchain technology could be applied to make data transport more secure in online spaces and the Internet of Things networks, making it difficult for actors to alter or censor content and carry out disinformation attacks.

"Operation Glowing Symphony" in 2016 was another federal initiative that sought to combat disinformation attacks. This operation attempted to dispel ISIS propaganda in social media channels. However, it was largely unsuccessful: ISIS actors continued to disseminate propaganda on other unmonitored online platforms.

Private

Private social media companies have engineered tools to identify and combat disinformation on their platforms. For example, Twitter uses machine learning applications to flag content that does not comply with its terms of services and identify extremist posts encouraging terrorism. Facebook and Google have developed a content hierarchy system where fact-checkers can identify and de-rank possible disinformation and adjust algorithms accordingly. Many companies are considering using procedural legal systems to regulate content on their platforms as well. Specifically, they are considering using appellate systems: posts may be taken down for violating terms of service and posing as a disinformation threat, but users can contest this action through a hierarchy of appellate bodies.

Collaborative measures

Cyber security experts claim that collaboration between public and private sectors is necessary to successfully combat disinformation attacks. Cooperative defense strategies include:

* The creation of "disinformation detection consortiums" where stakeholders (i.e. private social media companies and governments) convene to discuss disinformation attacks and come up with mutual defense strategies.
* Sharing critical information between private social media companies and the government, so that more effective defense strategies can be developed.
* Coordination among governments to create a unified and effective response against transnational disinformation campaigns.

Education and awareness

Following a 2007 cyberattack that included disinformation tactics, the country of Estonia focused on improving its cyberdefenses and also made media literacy education a major focus from kindergarten through to high school.
In 2018, the Executive Vice President of the European Commission for A Europe Fit for the Digital Age gathered a group of experts to produce a report with recommendations for teaching digital literacy. Proposed digital literacy curricula familiarizes students with fact-checking websites such as Snopes and FactCheck.org. This curricula aims to equip students with critical thinking skills to discern between factual content and disinformation online.

Training and best practices for identifying and countering disinformation are being developed and shared by groups of journalists, scientists, and others (e.g.
Climate Action Against Disinformation,
PEN America,
UNESCO,
Union of Concerned Scientists,
Young African Leaders Initiative).

Research suggests that a number of tactics have proven useful against scientific disinformation around climate change. These include: 1) providing clear explanations about why climate change is occurring 2) indicating that there is scientific consensus about the existence of climate change and about its basis in human actions 3) presenting information in ways that are culturally aligned with the listener 4) "inoculating" people by clearly identifying misinformation (ideally before a myth is encountered, but also later through debunking).

A "Toolbox of Interventions Against Online Misinformation and Manipulation" reviews research into Individually-focused Interventions to combat misinformation and their possible effectiveness. Tactics include:
* Accuracy prompts - Social media and other sources of information can cue people to think about accuracy before sharing information online
* Debunking - To expose false information, first focus on highlighting the true facts, before pointing out that misleading information is going to be given, and only then specifying the misinformation and explaining why it is wrong. Finally, the correct explanation should be reinforced.
* Friction - Clickbait aimed at spreading disinformation tries to get people to react quickly and emotionally. Cueing people to slow down and think about their actions (e.g. by displaying a prompt like "Want to read this before sharing?") can limit the spread of disinformation.

* Inoculation - Preemptively warning people about possible disinformation and techniques sued to spread disinformation, before they are exposed to an intended false message, can help them to identify false messages and attempts at manipulation. Short videos that describe specific tactics like fearmongering, the use of emotional language, or fake experts, help people resist online persuasion techniques.

* Lateral reading - Fact check information by looking for independent and reputable sources. Verify the credibility of information on a website by independently searching the Web, not just looking at the original site.
* Media-literacy tips - Specific strategies for spotting false news, such as those used in Facebook’s 2017 “Tips to Spot False News" (e.g. "be sceptical of headlines," "look closely at the URL") can help users to better discriminate between real and fake news stories.
* Rebuttals of science denialism - Scientific denial can involve both inaccurate assertions about a particular topic (topic rebuttal) and rhetorical techniques and strategies that undermine, mislead or deny the validity of science as an activity (technique rebuttal). Countering science denial must address both types of tactics. Research into science denial raises questions about the societal understanding of science and scientific processes and how to improve science education.
* Self-reflection tools - Various cognitive, social and affective factors are involved in beliefs, judgments and decisions. Individual differences in personality traits such as extroversion and the tendency to feel anger, anxiety, stress or depression, and fear are associated with a higher likelihood of sharing rumors online. Higher levels of agreeableness, conscientiousness and open-mindedness, and lower levels of extraversion are related to greater accuracy when identifying headlines as true or false. People who are more accurate in identifying headlines also report spending less time reading the news each week. Self-reflection tools that help people to be aware of their possible vulnerability may help them to identify microtargeting directed at individual traits.
* Social norms - Disinformation often works to undermine social norms, normalizing and thriving on an atmosphere of confusion, distrust, fear and violence. In contrast, changing or emphasizing positive social norms is often a focus in programs attempting to improve health and social behaviors. Social norms may help to reinforce the importance of accurate information, and discourage the sharing and using of false information. Strong social norms may encourage the adoption of best practices and higher standards for dealing with disinformation, on the part of the news industry, technology companies, educational institutions, and individuals.
* Warning and fact-checking labels - Online platforms have made intermittent attempts to flag information whose content or source is considered questionable. Warning labels can indicate that a piece of information or a source may be misleading. Fact-checking labels can give the ratings of professional or independent fact-checkers using a rating scale (e.g., as false or altered) or indicating grounds for their rating.

See also

* Disinformation
* Propaganda
* Russian web brigades
* Media manipulation
* Deepfake
* Algorithm
* Psychological warfare
* Social media
* Fake news
* Internet Research Agency

References

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