Dirk Bergemann is the Douglass & Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Computer Science at

Yale University Yale University is a private research university in New Haven, Connecticut. Established in 1701 as the Collegiate School, it is the third-oldest institution of higher education in the United States and among the most prestigious in the wo ...

. He received his

Vordiplom A ''Diplom'' (, from grc, δίπλωμα ''diploma'') is an academic degree in the German-speaking countries Germany, Austria, and Switzerland and a similarly named degree in some other European countries including Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, ...

economics Economics () is the social science that studies the Production (economics), production, distribution (economics), distribution, and Consumption (economics), consumption of goods and services. Economics focuses on the behaviour and intera ...

Goethe University Frankfurt Goethe University (german: link=no, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main) is a university located in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. It was founded in 1914 as a citizens' university, which means it was founded and funded by the wealt ...

in 1989, and both his M.A. and Ph.D. at the

University of Pennsylvania The University of Pennsylvania (also known as Penn or UPenn) is a private research university in Philadelphia. It is the fourth-oldest institution of higher education in the United States and is ranked among the highest-regarded universitie ...

in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Bergemann's research is concerned with

game theory Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. Myerson, Roger B. (1991). ''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard University Press, p.&nbs1 Chapter-preview links, ppvii–xi It has appli ...

contract theory From a legal point of view, a contract is an institutional arrangement for the way in which resources flow, which defines the various relationships between the parties to a transaction or limits the rights and obligations of the parties. From an ...

and

mechanism design Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an objectives-first approach to designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where players act rationally. Because it starts a ...

. His research has been supported by grants from the

National Science Foundation The National Science Foundation (NSF) is an independent agency of the United States government that supports fundamental research and education in all the non-medical fields of science and engineering. Its medical counterpart is the National I ...

, the

Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship The Sloan Research Fellowships are awarded annually by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation since 1955 to "provide support and recognition to early-career scientists and scholars". This program is one of the oldest of its kind in the United States. ...

and the German National Science Foundation. Bergemann is the foreign editor for the ''

Review of Economic Studies ''The Review of Economic Studies'' (also known as ''REStud'') is a quarterly peer-reviewed academic journal covering economics. It was established in 1933 by a group of economists based in Britain and the United States. The original editorial team ...

'', and the associate editor of several other publications, including ''

American Economic Journal The ''American Economic Journal'' is a group of four peer-reviewed academic journals published by the American Economic Association. The names of the individual journals consist of the prefix ''American Economic Journal'' with a descriptor of the f ...

'', ''Econometrica'', ''Games and Economic Behavior'', and the ''

Journal of Economic Theory The ''Journal of Economic Theory'' is a bimonthly peer-reviewed academic journal covering the field of economic theory. Karl Shell has served as editor-in-chief of the journal since it was established in 1968. Since 2000, he has shared the editor ...

''. Bergemann has made important contributions to the theory of mechanism design. In his work with Stephen Morris on robust mechanism design, they relaxed common knowledge assumptions which were prevalent in the early mechanism design literature. By formulating the mechanism design problem more precisely, they showed that simple mechanisms arise endogenously. This provided a theoretical justification for the relatively simple

auction An auction is usually a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bids, taking bids, and then selling the item to the highest bidder or buying the item from the lowest bidder. Some exceptions to this definition ex ...

designs employed in practice, when compared to the complexity of optimal auctions suggested by the early literature. Bergemann has also pioneered work with

consumer behavior Consumer behavior is the study of individuals, groups, or organizations and all the activities associated with the purchase, use and disposal of goods and services. Consumer behaviour consists of how the consumer's emotions, attitudes, and pr ...

around dynamic

pricing Pricing is the process whereby a business sets the price at which it will sell its products and services, and may be part of the business's marketing plan. In setting prices, the business will take into account the price at which it could acqui ...

structures. He is a fellow of the European Economic Association.

Publications

1. “Robust Monopoly Pricing”, 2011, Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 2527–2543, joint with Karl Schlag. 2. “Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing”, 2011 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, Shanghai, 2011, joint with Ji Shen, Yun Xu, and Edmund Yeh. 3. “Targeting in

Advertising Advertising is the practice and techniques employed to bring attention to a product or service. Advertising aims to put a product or service in the spotlight in hopes of drawing it attention from consumers. It is typically used to promote a ...

Markets: Implications for Online vs Online Media”, 2011,

RAND Journal of Economics ''The RAND Journal of Economics'' (usually called ''RAND Journal'' or simply ''Rand'' ) is a quarterly peer-reviewed academic journal of economics published by Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the RAND Corporation. It publishes theoretical and empirica ...

, 42, 414-443 (lead article) joint with Alessandro Bonatti. 4. “Rationalizable Implementation”, 2011, Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 1253–1274, joint with Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux. 5. “Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms”, 2011, Games and Economic Behavior, 71, 261–281, joint with Stephen Morris. 6. “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism”, 2010, Econometrica, 78, 771–789, joint with Juuso Valimaki. 7. “Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms” 2009, Review of Economic Studies, 76, 1175–1204, (lead article), joint with Stephen Morris. 8. “Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions”2009, Journal of the European Economic Association, 7, 61-89, joint with Xianwen Shi and Juuso Valimaki. 9. “Robust Virtual Implementation” 2009, Theoretical Economics, 4, 45–88, joint with Stephen Morris. 10. “The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation”, 2008, Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 6, 551–559, joint with Stephen Morris. 11. “Pricing without Priors”, 2008, Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 6, 560–569, joint with Karl Schlag. 12. “Ex Post Implementation” 2008, Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 527–566, joint with Stephen Morris. 13. “Information Structures in Optimal Auctions”, 2007, Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 580–609, joint with Martin Pesendorfer. 14. “Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods”, 2006, Journal of Political Economy, 114, 713–743, joint with Juuso Valimaki. 15. “Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems”, 2006, Proceedings of ACM-EC 06 ; 43–51, ACM Press, New York, joint with Deran Ozmen. 16. “Efficient Recommender Systems”, 2006, Proceedings of IEEE-CEC 06; joint with Deran Ozmen. 17. “Dynamic Price Competition”, 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 232–263, joint with Juuso Valimaki. 18. “Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management,”2005, Proceedings of Workshop on Economics of Information Security (WEIS), joint with Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum, and Scott Shenker. 19. “The Financing of Innovation”, 2005, RAND Journal of Economics, 36, 719–752, (lead article) joint with Ulrich Hege.

References

{{DEFAULTSORT:Bergemann, Dirk Living people Fellows of the Econometric Society Goethe University Frankfurt alumni University of Pennsylvania alumni Yale University faculty Year of birth missing (living people) Fellows of the European Economic Association