Origins
The origin of the practice has been traced to ancient Rome. Here relationships between the patron ''(patronus)'' and client ''(cliens)'' were seen as crucial to understanding the political process. While the obligations between these were mutual, the key point is they were hierarchical. These relationships might be best viewed not as an entity but rather as a network ''(clientela)'', with the ''patronus'' himself perhaps being obligated to someone of greater power, and the ''cliens'' perhaps having more than one patron. These extensions increase the possibilities of conflicting interests arising. While the ''familia'' was the basic unit underlying Roman society, the interlocking networks ''(clientela)'' acted as restrictions on their autonomy but allowed a more complex society to develop. Historians of the late medieval period evolved the concept into bastard feudalism. There is, as is usual, ambiguity in the use of political terminology and the terms "clientelism", the "patron–client relationship", "Mechanics
Susan Stokes et al. distinguish clientelism as a form of non-programmatic policy within distributive politics. It meets the criteria through failing to meet the two requirements of programmatic distribution, that are (1) 'formalized and public' and (2) 'shape actual distribution of benefits or resources'. Within non-programmatic policy, clientelism is then distinguished from 'pork-barrel politics' in that voters are given a benefit or are able to avoid a cost conditional on their returning the favor with a vote. The patron/client system can be defined as a mutual arrangement between a person that has authority, social status, wealth, or some other personal resource (patron) and another who benefits from their support or influence (client). The patron provides selective access to goods and opportunities, and place themselves or their support in positions from which they can divert resources and services in their favor. Their partners-clients- are expected to buy support, and in some cases, votes. Patrons target low-income families to exchange their needed resources for their abundant resources: time, a vote, and insertion into networks of other potential supporters whom they can influence. However, patrons are unable to access the information needed to effectively form the exchange; thus they hire intermediaries, brokers, that more equipped to find out what the targeted voter needs, which voters will require less prodding, and if the voter followed through on their end of the bargain. As Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco emphasize, brokers in turn serve political leaders, and they may also not target resources exactly as leaders would wish; the resulting principal-agent problems can have important implications for understanding how clientelism works. Standard modeling of clientelism assumes that politicians are able to monitor votes, and in turn, reward or punish voters based on their choices. Quid pro quo would dissolve in the absence of such monitoring, rendering clientielism highly inefficient at best and completely ineffective at worst. However, evidence suggests that systematic monitoring of voter choice at the polls is surprisingly uncommon. Patronage, turnout buying, abstention buying, and vote buying are subcategories of clientelism. Patronage refers to an intra-party flow of benefits to members. Turnout buying, coined by Nichter, treats or bribes voters to the polls whereas abstention buying treats or bribes voters to keep them from going to the polls. Vote buying is a direct transfer of goods or services, in exchange for one's support and vote. The result for the good or service is a question of did you or will you vote for me? A key to understanding clientelism might come in stressing not only the mutually beneficial relationships of exchange but also asymmetries in power or standing. Implied is a certain selectivity in access to key resources and markets. Those with access, the ''patrons'' (and/or sometimes ''sub-patrons'' or ''brokers'') rely on the subordination and dependence of the clients. In return for receiving some benefits the clients should provide political support.Forms of clientelism
Politicians can engage in clientelism on either (or both) a group or individual level. One way individual level clientelism can manifest itself is in a vote buying relationship: a politician gives a citizen goods or services, and, in exchange, that individual citizen promises to vote for that politician in the next election. Individual level clientelism can also be carried out through coercion where citizens are threatened with lack of goods or services unless they vote for a certain politician or party. The relationship can also work in the opposite direction, where voters pressure politicians into clientelistic relationships in exchange for electoral support. Stokes' research on clientelism in Argentina assumed that theClientelism in context
Clientelism may not look the same from context to context. Several individual and country-level factors may shape if and how clientelism takes hold in a country including the types of individual leaders, socio-economic status of individuals, economic development, democratization, and institutional factors. In some contexts, clientelistic behavior is almost expected, as such interactions can become embedded in the formal political structures. Some types of leaders such as hereditary traditional leaders, who remain in power for extended periods of time, are more effective in carrying out clientelistic relationships than others such as elected officials. Research has also shown that politicians can benefit electorally from clientelistic relationships by gaining support from those who receive goods from them, but there are also potential costs since clientelistic politicians may lose support from wealthier voters, who do not engage in clientelistic relationships themselves view the practice negatively. Not all voters view clientelistic behavior as a positive trait in politicians, especially voters of higher socioeconomic statuses. In short, there is no single factor that causes clientelism to take hold.Consequences
Clientelism has generally-negative consequences on democracy and government and has more uncertain consequences on the economy. The accountability relationship in a democracy in which voters hold elected officials accountable for their actions, is undermined by clientelism. That is because clientelism makes votes contingent on gifts to clients, rather than the performance of elected officials in office. Clientelism also degrades democratic institutions such as the secret ballot and administrative oversight. Such factors both weaken democratic institutions and negatively impact the efficiency of government. Corruption and the perception of corruption have also been established as strongly correlated with clientelist systems for many reasons. One is that patrons often appear above the law in many clientelist systems. Also, some acts in clientelist systems such as vote buying, could be inherently illegal. Finally, resources needed for patrons to maintain the clientelist system may require illicit means to obtain goods. A 2021 study found that voters in clientelist systems are less willing to punish corrupt politicians electorally. Some scholars believe that because patrons focus on the control and procurement of private goods, they also neglect public goods such as roads and public schools, which aid economic development. Scholars also note that rent-seeking and corruption, prevalent in clientelist systems, could negatively impact the economy as well. Nevertheless, there is still great uncertainty in the economic effects of clientelism.Controversy
It is common to link clientelism with corruption; both involve political actors using public and private resources for personal gain, but they are not synonymous. Corruption is commonly defined as "dishonest and fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery", while political clientelism is seen as "the distribution of benefits targeted to individuals or groups in exchange for electoral support". It is common to associate the two together because they moderately overlap. There are different forms of corruption that have nothing to do with clientelism, such as voter intimidation or ballot stuffing. "Clientelism is considered negative because its intention is to generate 'private' revenue for patrons and clients and, as a result obstruct 'public' revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of the patron-client arrangement."Kawata, Junʼichi. Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2006. Print. Clientelism as a strategy of political organisation is substantially different from other strategies which rely on appeals to wider programmatic objectives or simply emphasize higher degrees of competence. It is often assumed that clientelism is a vestige of political underdevelopment, a form of corruption, and that political modernization will reduce or end it. But alternative views stressing the persistence of clientelism – and the patronage associated with it – have been recognized.Graham, Richard (1997) Clientelismo na cultura política brasileira. Toma lá dá cá, Braudel Center Papers No. 15Examples
Tariffs
An example of this is tariffs on imported goods in order to keep prices high. The public is largely unaware and/or indifferent to a slight increase in the prices of goods while manufacturers are dependent and very aware of the subsidizing effect of tariffs on competing products. Thus, local manufacturers will most likely strive to maintain tariffs and may succeed quite often.Pesticides
Another example with farmers is the common use of potentially harmful pesticides. Due to the sheer amount of pesticides on the market and the difficulty on testing each one, there lacks conclusive evidence that many of the pesticides in use would harm the environment, leading to a lack of public consensus of what to do. Farmers, on the other hand, are extremely sensitive to the benefits that such chemicals have on crop yield and will organize to keep pesticides available for use.Pork barrel legislation
Most pork barrel legislation would be considered to be client politics.See also
* Big man * Politics of the Belly * Corruption * Earmark (politics) * Electoral district * Cronyism * Graft * Identity politics * Interest group liberalism *References
{{Authority control Political terminology Political corruption Public choice theory