Convoy PQ 14

Convoy PQ 14 was an Arctic convoy sent from Britain by the Western Allies to aid the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Convoys from Britain had been despatched since August 1941 and advantage had been taken of the perpetual darkness of the Arctic winter. German operations against the convoys had been muted due to the need to support Operation Barbarossa, confidence in imminent victory and the small size of the convoys. In late 1941 and early 1942 the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine had reinforced Norway with aircraft and ships.

The convoy sailed in April 1942, when the hours of daylight were increasing and the Polar ice had yet to recede. On the night of 10/11 April, thirty hours' sailing in fog and pack ice caused so much damage that 16 vessels had to turn back and return to Iceland. On 16 April, air and U-boat attacks sank one merchant ship and the seven remaining ships in the convoy reached Murmansk. The Allies would have to run larger convoys during the hazardous summer months to catch up with deliveries.

The co-ordination of German aircraft and submarine attacks caused the Navy concern as daylight hours increased towards the perpetual daylight of the midnight sun. Despite the recent reinforcement of convoy escorts, the last four days of the voyage would be under continuous observation and submarine attacks would increase just as the escorts were inhibited by shortage of fuel; the Navy predicted serious losses.

Background

Lend-lease

After Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, began on 22 June 1941, the UK and USSR signed an agreement in July that they would "render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany". Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool. In September British and US representatives travelled to Moscow to study Soviet requirements and their ability to meet them. The representatives of the three countries drew up a protocol in October 1941 to last until June 1942 and to agree new protocols to operate from 1 July to 30 June of each following year until the end of Lend-Lease. The protocol listed supplies, monthly rates of delivery and totals for the period.

The first protocol specified the supplies to be sent but not the ships to move them. The USSR turned out to lack the ships and escorts and the British and Americans, who had made a commitment to "help with the delivery", undertook to deliver the supplies for want of an alternative. The main Soviet need in 1941 was military equipment to replace losses because, at the time of the negotiations, two large aircraft factories were being moved east from Leningrad and two more from Ukraine. It would take at least eight months to resume production, until when, aircraft output would fall from 80 to 30 aircraft per day. Britain and the US undertook to send 400 aircraft a month, at a ratio of three bombers to one fighter (later reversed), 500 tanks a month and 300 Bren gun carriers. The Anglo-Americans also undertook to send of aluminium and 3, 862 machine tools, along with sundry raw materials food and medical supplies.

British grand strategy

The growing German air strength in Norway and increasing losses to convoys and their escorts, led Rear-Admiral Stuart Bonham Carter, commander of the 18th Cruiser Squadron, Admiral sir John Tovey, Commander in Chief Home Fleet and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound the First Sea Lord, the professional head of the Royal Navy, unanimously to advocate the suspension of Arctic convoys during the summer months. The small number of Russian ships available to meet Arctic convoys, losses inflicted by based in Norway and the presence of the German battleship in Norway from early 1942, had led to a large number of ships full of supplies to Russia becoming stranded at the west end and empty and damaged ships waiting at the east end. Despite the views of the Navy, Churchill came under pressure from the president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, bowed to political reality and ordered the dispatch of a larger convoy to reduce the backlog,

PQ 13 had been the first convoy to suffer serious casualties, five ships being sunk by submarines, aircraft and surface ships. Tovey asked the Russians for more submarine patrols in the Barents Sea and more destroyer escorts for the final leg of convoys. More escorts were diverted from Western Approaches Command to increase the close escort to about ten vessels. Bomber Command had sent 33 Halifax heavy bombers to attack Tirpitz on 31 March in exceedingly poor weather, through which few aircraft managed to bomb, no hits were obtained and five of the Halifaxes were shot down. PQ 14 was larger than earlier convoys.

Signals intelligence

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts that intercepted and decoded German naval transmissions. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters () settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older ( from 1942, code-named Dolphin by the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to read wireless telegraphy (W/T) transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, interception parties (code-named Headaches) embarked on warships. In February 1942, the German (, Observation Service) of the (MND), the German Naval Intelligence Service, broke the British Naval Cypher No. 3 until it was changed in January 1943.

In March 1942, Adolf Hitler issued a directive for a greater anti-convoy effort to weaken the Red Army and prevent Allied troops being transferred to northern Russia, preparatory to a landing on the coast of northern Norway. ( Hans-Jürgen Stumpff) was to be reinforced and the was ordered to put an end to Arctic convoys and naval incursions. The Luftwaffe and were to work together with a simplified command structure, which was implemented after a conference; the Navy had preferred joint command but the Luftwaffe insisted on the exchange of liaison officers. was to be reinforced by 2./ ''Kampfgeschwader'' 30 (KG 30) which was to increase its readiness for operations. A squadron of (Aufkl.Fl.Gr. 125) was transferred to Norway and more long-range Focke-Wulf Fw 200 ''Kondor'' patrol aircraft from ''Kampfgeschwader'' 40 (KG 40) were sent from France. At the end of March, the air fleet was divided. Alexander_Holle.html" ;"title="Alexander Holle">Alexander Holle the largest command, was based at Kirkenes Airport, Høybuktmoen">Kirkenes