Consensus estimate is a technique for designing
truthful mechanism
In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game form in which each player has a weakly- dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying" over the other players to know what they are going to play. When the players have privat ...
s in a
prior-free mechanism design setting. The technique was introduced for
digital goods auctions
and later extended to more general settings.
Suppose there is a digital good that we want to sell to a group of buyers with unknown valuations. We want to determine the price that will bring us maximum profit. Suppose we have a function that, given the valuations of the buyers, tells us the maximum profit that we can make. We can use it in the following way:
# Ask the buyers to tell their valuations.
# Calculate
- the maximum profit possible given the valuations.
# Calculate a price that guarantees that we get a profit of
.
Step 3 can be attained by a
profit extraction mechanism, which is a
truthful mechanism
In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game form in which each player has a weakly- dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying" over the other players to know what they are going to play. When the players have privat ...
. However, in general the mechanism is not truthful, since the buyers can try to influence
by bidding strategically. To solve this problem, we can replace the exact
with an approximation -
- that, with high probability, cannot be influenced by a single agent.
As an example, suppose that we know that the valuation of each single agent is at most 0.1. As a first attempt of a consensus-estimate, let
= the value of
rounded to the nearest integer below it. Intuitively, in "most cases", a single agent cannot influence the value of
(e.g., if with true reports
, then a single agent can only change it to between
and
, but in all cases
).
To make the notion of "most cases" more accurate, define:
, where
is a random variable drawn uniformly from