Background
On 2 December 1853, after the defeat at the Battle of Başgedikler, the beaten and demoralized Anatolian army fell back to the Turkish fortress of Kars. In January 1854, after the defeat at Başgedikler was blamed on Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha was appointed ''mushir'' or field-marshal of the Anatolian army. During the winter of 1853-1854, Abdi Pasha severely neglected the welfare of his conscripted army at Kars and as many as 20,000 men died of malnutrition and disease. As the winter came to an end, Ahmed Pasha was removed as the field marshal and recalled to Istanbul. In the spring of 1854, the former governor of the province of Erzurum, Zarif Mustafa Pasha, was appointed as the new field-marshal. Although he had attained the rank of Pasha, Zarif Mustafa was not a man with a strong background of military leadership. His early military experience had been as a regimental clerk and later in his military career he served in commissaries. While the army was reinforced with Armenian conscripts under his command, little was done to improve or correct equipment deficiencies. Nevertheless, Zarif Pasha was under great pressure to confront and defeat the Russian forces in the Trans-Caucasus.Maneuvers
By the summer of 1854, the Anatolian army had been reinforced to the extent that the Turks had numerical superiority over the Russian forces in the southern Caucasus. During this time, Zarif Pasha had numerous opportunities to take the offensive and attack Russian outposts and garrisons; however, he initiated no activity against the Russians even when members of his staff urged him to do so. Because of Zarif Pasha's passive conduct, the Russians felt safe to move about actively and strike the Turks when they had the advantage. On 1 July, Russian General Bebutov led an expedition of 15,000 men across the Akhuryan River and established an encampment near the village of Kürekdere approximately an hour's march from Turkish outposts at Sobattan and Hadgi-Velikoi. After Zarif Pasha learned of the Russian encroachment, he moved his army from the fortress at Kars to the Turkish outpost at Hadgi-Velikoi and prepared to confront the Russians. For the month of July the two armies remained in the field but there was no battle. One day the armies formed up ready to fight but withdrew due to a violent thunderstorm. During the period that the two armies were encamped, theBattle plan
It then became apparent that the Turks must take action. Without a plan of his own, Zarif Pasha held a council with his officers to discuss options. There were more than twenty Ottoman pashas and also more than twenty European staff officers, includingBattle
On Sunday, 6 August 1854, the two armies met at Kürekdere and the battle started by means of a 30 minute exchange of cannon fire. The Turkish artillery was more effective at the outset and drove the Russians off of an elevated hillside. At the beginning of the fighting on the battlefield, the first division of the Turks was successful at driving back the Russian infantry. The Russian dragoons, however, followed-up and rode into the Turkish infantry at a high speed. This caused the Turkish infantry to panic and retreat leaving their artillery unprotected. In a series of attacks, the dragoons and the Russian infantry then attempted without success to capture the Turkish artillery. During that struggle, the Russian infantry routed a Turkish battalion composed of inexperienced conscripts who quickly broke and fled. Shortly thereafter, the dragoons captured the Turkish artillery and then began an indiscriminant attack upon the Turkish infantry, cavalry, and artillery corps. The entire Turkish force started to break and give way. Efforts by Kerim Pasha to re-form and fight were in vain. About that time, the second division arrived and immediately attacked the Russians by means of a cannonade. The battle began to turn back in the favor of the Turks. Guyon and Resul Pasha then brought the Turkish cavalry into the fight advancing at a gallop. As the force advanced toward the Russians encampment and crested the top of a hill, they rode headlong into a Russian infantry regiment. When the cavalry reined in, it caused great disorder and confusion which turned into panic and spread to the Bashi-bazouks. Quickly, all the mounted Turkish forces fled back toward their own lines riding into their own infantry and causing such a disruption that the organization and control of the infantry was lost. As a result, the entire Turkish force panicked and fled in confusion. As the cavalry began to disrupt the infantry, Guyon ordered Vely Pasha and the second division to advance and support the first division. Vely Pasha, however, refused to do so until ordered by Zarif Pasha. When the mushir was located an hour later, the order was then given to Vely Pasha to support the first division, but it was too late. The first division was already retreating pursued by Russian dragoons. Guyon was able to regroup four battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one artillery battery, and lead them in a charge. He was successful in regaining some lost ground, but was overcome by the greater number of Russians. The battle was over. Quickly the Turks fled back to their encampment, gathered what they could and proceeded to retreat in great disorder. Soon there was a caravan of the remnants of an army stretching for miles on the road to Kars. Included among the shattered remains of the army were disorganized units of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the walking wounded; bullock carts carrying materials and the wounded; baggage carts; horses, mules, and camels; and non-combatants. Although the caravan was an easy target, the Russians did not pursue their beaten enemy. At the Kars fortress chaos reigned. Bashi-Bazouk riders had ridden back in haste to warn that the Russians were coming. People were collecting their valuables and fleeing the city. Zarif Pasha ultimately brought his defeated army back to Kars and took refuge in the fortress expecting the Russians to attack. The Russians, however, chose not to attack the strongly fortified city at that time. The defeat of the Anatolian army at Kürekdere can be attributed to the incompetence of Zarif Pasha and the cowardice of the majority of the Turkish officers. The implementation of the battle plan by Zarif Pasha was poor. The Turkish forces were divided into three groups that became widely separated. As a result, the individual Turkish groups fought individually rather than as a group taking advantage of their numerical superiority. The artillery performed well and fought bravely. The performance of the Turkish cavalry was a disgrace as was the conduct of the Bashi-bazouks. The conduct of the Turkish officers in general was shameful as they deserted their men and fled back to their camp to secure their baggage and retreat to Kars. The Times correspondent, Humphry Sandwith witnessed the battle and wrote: Guyon attempted to lead the Turks in the battle, however, he was only the chief of staff and had no line authority to command; as such, the commanders of Turkish forces weren't authorized to obey his orders without approval from Zarif Pasha.Aftermath
The battle of Kürekdere demonstrated again that the Turkish army was incapable of pushing the Russians out of the Trans-Caucasus without the assistance of its allies. Both Zarif Pasha and Guyon were recalled and put on trial by theCitations
References
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* * {{DEFAULTSORT:Kurekdere Battles of the Crimean War Conflicts in 1854 1854 in the Ottoman Empire 19th century in Armenia August 1854 events