Battle Of Kapyong

The Battle of Kapyong (or Gapyeong) ( ko, 가평전투, 22–25 April 1951), also known as the Battle of Jiaping (), was fought during the Korean War between United Nations Command (UN) forces—primarily Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand—and the 118th Division of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA). The fighting occurred during the Chinese Spring Offensive and saw the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade establish blocking positions in the Kapyong Valley, on a key route south to the capital, Seoul. The two forward battalions—the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) and 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI), both battalions consisting of about 700 men each—were supported by guns from the 16th Field Regiment (16 Fd Regt) of the Royal Regiment of New Zealand Artillery along with a company of US mortars and fifteen Sherman tanks. These forces occupied positions astride the valley with hastily developed defences. As thousands of soldiers from the Republic of Korea Army (ROK) began to withdraw through the valley, the PVA infiltrated the brigade position under the cover of darkness, and assaulted the Australians on Hill 504 during the evening and into the following day.

Although heavily outnumbered, the Australian 3 RAR and American tanks held their positions into the afternoon of April 24 before they were withdrawn from the battlefield to positions in the rear of the brigade headquarters, with both sides having suffered heavy casualties. The PVA then turned their attention to the surrounded Canadians on Hill 677, whose encirclement prevented any resupply or reinforcements from entering. The Canadian 2 PCCLI were ordered to make a last stand on Hill 677. During a fierce night battle on April 24/25 the Chinese forces were unable to dislodge the 2 PPCLI and sustained enormous losses. The next day the PVA withdrew back up the valley in order to regroup, and the Canadians were relieved late on April 26. The fighting helped blunt the PVA offensive and the actions of the Australians and Canadians at Kapyong were critical in preventing a breakthrough against the UN central front, the encirclement of US forces in Korea, and ultimately the capture of Seoul. The Canadian and Australian battalions bore the brunt of the assault and stopped an entire PVA division estimated at 10,000-20,000 in strength during the hard-fought defensive battle. Today, the battle is regarded as the most famous and significant action fought by the Australian and Canadian armies in Korea, and the most famous battle fought by the Canadian Armed Forces since WWII.

Background

Military situation

The UN counter offensive between February and April 1951 had been largely successful, with the US Eighth Army pushing the PVA north of the Han River during Operation Killer, while Seoul was recaptured in mid-March during Operation Ripper and UN forces once again approached the 38th Parallel. Regardless, the strained relationship between UN commander, General Douglas MacArthur and US President Harry S. Truman led to MacArthur's dismissal as Commander-in-Chief, and his replacement by General Matthew B. Ridgway. Consequently, on 14 April 1951, General James Van Fleet replaced Ridgway as commander of the US Eighth Army and the UN forces in Korea. Ridgway flew to Tokyo the same day to replace MacArthur. Meanwhile, the offensive continued with a series of short thrusts. Operation Courageous, in late March, pushed forward to the ''Benton Line'', south of the 38th Parallel, while Operation Rugged in early April pushed just north of the 38th Parallel to the ''Kansas Line''. Finally, in mid-April a further advance moved the US Eighth Army to the ''Utah Line''.O'Neill 1985, pp. 125–127.

Following the Battle of Maehwa-San the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade had enjoyed a period in US IX Corps reserve as the UN forces had continued to push steadily northwards.Horner 1990, p. 444. By April 1951, the brigade consisted of four infantry battalions, one Australian, one Canadian and two British, including: the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment; 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry; 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment and 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Brigadier Basil Coad had departed for Hong Kong on compassionate leave on 23 March and the brigade was now under the command of Brigadier Brian Burke.O'Neill 1985, p. 123. In direct support was the 16th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (16 RNZA) with its 25-pounder field guns.Breen 1992, p. 12.Butler, Argent and Shelton 2002, p. 103. 3 RAR was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Ferguson. 2 PPCLI was commanded at this time by Lieutenant Colonel James Stone. Deployed in the central sector, the brigade was part of US IX Corps which also included the US 24th Infantry Division, ROK 2nd Infantry Division, US 7th Infantry Division and the ROK 6th Infantry Division, under the overall command of Major General William M. Hoge.O'Neill 198, p. 134.

During this time 27th Brigade was attached to the US 24th Division, advancing north through the Chojong valley in late March, reaching the ''Benton Line'' on 31 March. The brigade was then released, advancing with IX Corps up the deep and narrow valley of the Kapyong River, to the east.O'Neill 1985, p. 125. From 3 April, the 27th Brigade moved further up the river, advancing over the next twelve days as part of Operation Rugged. Although the valley was not held in strength by the PVA, it was skilfully defended by small groups of infantry dug-in on the hilltops that overlooked it. Advancing along the flanking hills and ridges the brigade captured successive positions, while encountering heavy resistance before reaching the ''Kansas Line'' on 8 April. Following a brief operational pause, the advance to the ''Utah Line'' began on 11 April, the day after MacArthur's dismissal. PVA resistance strengthened noticeably and the brigade's initial objectives were not captured by the Middlesex until 13 April.O'Neill 1985, p. 127.

The approach to the ''Utah Line'' was dominated by two hills—the 'Sardine' feature north, and 'Salmon' a further north. The Middlesex were repulsed during repeated attempts to capture Sardine on 14 April, before the task was allocated to 3 RAR. A Company, 3 RAR subsequently captured the crest, killing 10 PVA and wounding another 20 for the loss of eight Australians wounded.O'Neill 1985, p. 128. The following morning, Salmon was captured by C Company without firing a shot, amidst light resistance. PVA shelling after its capture resulted in two men wounded, while airstrikes then broke up an attempted PVA counter-attack. Meanwhile, 2 PPCLI continued their advance on the right flank, capturing the 'Turbot' feature (Hill 795) on 15 April. Facing a spirited PVA delaying action on successive positions, the Canadians did not capture their final objective—the 'Trout' feature (Hill 826)—until the following morning.

Chinese Spring Offensive

Preparations

After reaching the ''Utah Line'', 27th Brigade was withdrawn from the front on 17 April, handing over its positions to the ROK 6th Division. Burke subsequently ordered his battalions into reserve positions north of the previously destroyed village of Kapyong, on the main road from Seoul to the east coast. Intelligence indicated that a new Chinese offensive was imminent, and while the brigade settled in to rest it remained on three hours' notice to move to support IX Corps.O'Neill 1985, p. 131. Having been on operations continuously for the past seven months, the British intended to relieve the bulk of the brigade during its period in reserve. The two British battalions—the Argylls and the Middlesex—would be replaced by two fresh battalions from Hong Kong. Advance parties from Brigade Headquarters and the Argylls departed for Seoul en route for Hong Kong on 19 April, while the remaining British battalions were scheduled to depart two weeks later.Breen 1992, p. 18. 3 RAR would not be rotated and remained a part of the brigade for the entire war, operating on an individual reinforcement system instead.

Meanwhile, planning began for Operation Dauntless, a drive into the Iron Triangle—a key PVA/KPA concentration area and communications junction in the central sector between Chorwon and Kumwha in the south and Pyonggang in the north. Contingency planning also included precautions against a new major Chinese offensive, in which the US Eighth Army would conduct a delaying defence on successive positions. Further indications of an imminent communist offensive—including the visible strengthening of PVA/KPA artillery and logistic systems—led Ridgway to order Van Fleet not to exploit any opportunities beyond the ''Wyoming Line''. Confident nonetheless, Ridgway widened the scope of the offensive, designating a secondary objective line in the eastern sector known as the ''Alabama Line''. Fate would intervene, however, and Van Fleet launched his offensive on 21 April only to be met by a much stronger PVA/KPA offensive the following night.

Launch of Chinese Spring Offensive

The Chinese Spring Offensive—also known as the Chinese Fifth Phase Campaign, First Impulse—envisioned the total destruction of US I and IX Corps above the Han River, involving three PVA Army Groups—the 3rd, 9th and 19th Army Groups—and three KPA Corps—the I, III and V Corps—under the overall command of Peng Dehuai.Zhang 1995, p. 145.Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, pp. 309, 326.The Chinese military did not have ranks during the 1950s, except for the title of "Commander" or "Commissar". With the immediate objective of capturing Seoul, the offensive commenced on 22 April on two broad fronts: the main thrust across the Imjin River in the western sector held by the US I Corps involving 337,000 troops driving towards Seoul, and the secondary effort involving 149,000 troops attacking further east across the Soyang River in the central and eastern sectors, falling primarily on US IX Corps, and to a lesser extent on US X Corps' sector.Coulthard Clark 2001, p. 263. A further 214,000 PVA troops supported the offensive; in total more than 700,000 men.O'Neill 1985, p. 132. As part of the preparation, the battle hardened 39th and 40th Armies of the 13th Army Group were transferred to the 9th Army Group under the overall command of Song Shi-Lun, and Commander Wen Yuchen of the 40th Army was given the mission of destroying the ROK 6th Division while blocking any UN reinforcements towards the Imjin River at Kapyong.Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 312.In Chinese military nomenclature, the term "Army" (军) means Corps, while the term "Army Group" (集团军) means Field Army.

Facing the offensive were 418,000 UN troops, including 152,000 ROK, 245,000 Americans, 11,500 British Commonwealth and 10,000 troops from other UN countries. However, with the US Eighth Army not strong enough to prevent large penetrations along its line, masses of PVA infantry soon swept around its flanks, surrounding entire formations in an attempt to cut off their withdrawal. Standing directly in the path of the main PVA attack towards Seoul in the I Corps sector was the 29th British Brigade. The brigade's stand on the Imjin River held off two PVA divisions for two days and ultimately helped prevent the capture of Seoul, but resulted in heavy casualties in one of the bloodiest British engagements of the war. During the fighting, most of the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment were killed or captured during a stubborn resistance at the Battle of the Imjin River that saw the commanding officer—Lieutenant Colonel James Carne—awarded the Victoria Cross after his battalion was surrounded. Ultimately the 29th Brigade suffered 1,091 casualties in their defence of the ''Kansas Line'', and although they destroyed a large portion of the PVA 63rd Army and inflicted nearly 10,000 casualties, the loss of the Glosters caused a controversy in Britain and within the UN Command. Meanwhile, further east, in the IX Corps sector, the PVA 118th Division, 40th Army and the 60th Division, 20th Army prepared to attack the ROK 6th Division on the night of 22 April.

South Korean collapse, 22–23 April 1951

The ROK were holding positions at the northern end of the Kapyong Valley, having advanced since relieving the 27th Brigade. However, anticipating a PVA attack, the divisional commander—General Chang Do Yong—had halted his advance at 16:00 and ordered his two forward regiments—the 19th and the 2nd Infantry Regiments—to tie-in and develop defensive positions. Meanwhile, the 7th Infantry Regiment occupied reserve positions immediately behind the forward regiments.Mossman 1990, p. 382. The ROK 6th Division had been bolstered by the attachment of the New Zealand guns and a battery of M101 howitzers from the US 213th Field Artillery Battalion.Horner 2008, p. 69.Mossman 1990, p. 402. Regardless, left with only one hour to halt its advance and step up defences, the forward ROK units were only able to occupy a series of hill-top positions while leaving the valleys and flanks exposed.Chae, Chung and Yang 2001, p. 630. Two PVA divisions—the 118th and the 60th Division—struck at 17:00, easily infiltrating through numerous gaps between the badly organised defensive positions. Under pressure all along the front, the defenders gave ground almost immediately and soon broke. Abandoning their weapons, equipment and vehicles, they disintegrated and began to stream south out of the mountains and through the valley, and by 23:00 Chang was forced to admit that he had lost all communication with his units.Johnston 2003, p. 91. At 04:00 the decision was made to withdraw the New Zealanders to prevent their loss; however, following reports that the ROK were making a stand they were ordered back up the valley the next morning with the Middlesex accompanying them as protection. By dusk it was clear that the ROK had in fact collapsed, and the guns were withdrawn again.

Meanwhile, the US 1st Marine Division was holding firm against the PVA 39th Army to the east, and the withdrawal of the ROK had left their flank exposed. However, with the PVA 39th and 40th Armies only tasked with protecting the eastern flank of the 9th Army Group against possible counterattacks from the 1st Marine Division, the PVA did not exploit this opportunity and the Americans remained relatively unmolested.Zhang 1995, p. 149. Yet with the forward UN positions in both the US I Corps and US IX Corps sectors increasingly untenable as the PVA exploited gaps between formations, Van Fleet ordered a withdrawal to the ''Kansas Line'' in the mid-morning. Hoge subsequently ordered the US Marines to form a new defensive position beyond the Pukhan River, between the Hwachon Reservoir and the new position to be occupied by the ROK 6th Division. Hoge's plan relied on the ROK reforming and offering some resistance, and although a rearguard of 2,500 men was belatedly established it was in no condition to fight. Fearing a breakthrough, Hoge ordered the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, as the corps' reserve, to establish defensive positions north of Kapyong on the afternoon of 23 April as a precaution in the event the ROK were unable to hold, tasking them with blocking the two approaches to the village and to prevent the PVA from cutting Route 17, a key route south to Seoul and an important main supply route.

The brigade was by now reduced to three battalions, as the Argylls had been withdrawn to Pusan just prior to the battle, in preparation for their embarkation. The Middlesex were also on stand-by for embarkation, and were kept in reserve.Horner 2008, p. 68. As such, with the width of the valley precluding the establishment of continuous linear defensive, Burke was forced to place his two available battalions on the high points on either side of it, with 3 RAR occupying Hill 504 to the east of the river and 2 PPCLI occupying Hill 677 to the west. Meanwhile, Sudok San (Hill 794) to the north-west—a massive hill nearly high—was left undefended by necessity. Together these three hills formed a naturally strong defensive position, well suited to blocking a major advance. Regardless, the brigade position suffered from a number of deficiencies, being exposed without flank protection, while the central sector was not occupied because the Middlesex were away to the north with the guns. Likewise, until the return of the New Zealanders the brigade would have little artillery support; as such if large PVA forces arrived before these two units returned the forward companies would be without support and would have to accept the probability that they would be cut-off. 3 RAR—whose line of communications ran through the exposed central sector of the valley—would be particularly exposed.

Each of the battalions were deployed across the summits and slopes in separate company-sized defensive positions, creating a series of strong-points across a front. Due to the large amount of ground to be defended each of the companies were spread widely, and were unable to offer mutual support. Instead each platoon would support each other, with each company adopting all-round defence. Brigade Headquarters remained in the valley, to the south. With the New Zealand gunners still forward supporting the ROK, US IX Corps placed a battery of howitzers from the US 213th Field Artillery Battalion and the twelve M2 mortars of B Company, 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion, under the command of 27th Brigade. Fifteen Sherman tanks from A Company, US 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion, were also in support.

The Canadians subsequently occupied Hill 677 and began digging-in, deploying their six Vickers machine guns in sections to add depth, and using defensive fire tasks to cover the gaps in their positions. Meanwhile, the Australians occupied Hill 504, with D Company holding the summit itself, A Company the spur-line which ran down to the north-west, and B Company the small hill by the river, while C Company was in reserve on the rear spur. In response to US IX Corps' requirements Burke directed Ferguson to site his headquarters in the low ground of the valley in the vicinity of the hamlet of Chuktun-ni, so as to control the withdrawing ROK. However, this would limit Ferguson's situational awareness and his ability to control the battle, while also leaving them exposed to infiltration. The afternoon was spent on the lightly scrub-covered slopes digging-in and building sangars where the rocky ground proved too hard. In only a few hours the Australians managed to prepare hasty defensive positions, although defensive fire tasks were unable to be registered as the artillery forward observers were unable to reach the company positions until after dark.Horner 2008, p. 70.

The American tank company commander—Lieutenant Kenneth W. Koch—deployed his platoons in support of the Australians. The road skirted the eastern flank of Hill 504, and it offered the best area for the employment of armour. One platoon of five tanks occupied a northern outpost position forward of B Company to prevent the PVA using the road; another platoon occupied the high ground to the west, with B Company; while the final platoon and Koch's command tank was deployed near battalion headquarters, covering a ford by which the road crossed the Kapyong River, approximately south of B Company. Perhaps unwisely the tanks were deployed without infantry support. The command relationship between the Australians and their armoured support was also complicated, as the Americans were not under command as they might normally have been, rather Koch was free to conduct his own battle. Regardless, armed with a cannon and one .50 caliber and two 30 caliber machine guns, the M4 Sherman tanks were formidable assets and bolstered the defence considerably. In contrast, the PVA had no tanks at Kapyong, while their infantry had only a few anti-tank rockets with which to counter them.

By 20:00 that evening a large number of ROK were retreating in disarray through a gap in the line held by the brigade, the majority of them moving through the Australians. The ROK 6th Division later regrouped in positions behind 27th Brigade, but was now reduced to less than half its original strength. Meanwhile, as the 20th Army veered to the west as part of the PVA main effort against Seoul, the PVA 118th Division continued its secondary advance down the Kapyong Valley, closely pursuing the retreating ROK. Racing down the north-east-running valley, the 354th Regiment reached the Australian positions by about 22:00.O'Neill identifies the PVA 60th Division; however, the 60th Division maintained its south-westerly course as part of the 20th Army and had not pursued the ROK 19th Infantry Regiment after routing it in the Kapyong valley. The division next contacted the US 24th Division in the I Corps sector. See Mossman 1990, p. 402 and O'Neill 1985, p. 134. Intent on capturing the important crossroads of Route 17 south of Kapyong, and most likely unaware of the location of the Australian blocking position, the PVA vanguard remained in the low ground, splitting as they approached a long, low north–south running ridge that rose like an island in the mouth of the valley.

Australian 3 RAR Defence of Hill 504, 23-24 April 1951

Night battle

Having successfully prevented the US 1st Marine Division from reinforcing the Imjin River front, the PVA 40th Army turned its attention towards the 27th Brigade on 23 April.Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 314. The battle started during the night of 23/24 April, and continued until late in the day on 25 April, as the entire PVA 118th Division, totaling perhaps 10,000-20,000 men under the command of Deng Yue—engaged the two forward battalions of 27th Brigade. The initial PVA attack at Kapyong engaged the 700 men of 3 RAR on Hill 504, while in the early part of the battle the Middlesex and New Zealand gunners were all but cut off. However, the resistance of the Australians ultimately allowed them to safely withdraw from the battlefield and the Middlesex then moved into a reserve position astride the western bank of the river. The two battalions of the PVA 354th Regiment launched repeated attacks on the two forward Australian companies on the north-west spur of Hill 504. Assaults of massed PVA troops kept up the attack throughout the night, but the defence of the Australians on the brigade's right flank held them back until the 3 RAR was forced to retreat to Brigade HQ on the 24th. The Chinese would then turn their attention to the 700 Canadians of the 2 PPCLI the following day.

Using the retreating ROK troops to cover their movements, the PVA had infiltrated the brigade position in the initial stages of the battle, penetrating between A and B Companies, 3 RAR astride the road, and largely surrounding the latter before moving into the rear positions. The Australians struggled to distinguish the PVA from the ROK in the dark, although the Korean Service Corps porters attached to the battalion were able to provide valuable assistance to the defenders distinguishing the PVA by the sounds of their voices. At 21:30 the PVA launched their first attack on the forward platoon of American tanks, which had been posted on the road without infantry support. The initial moves were easily repelled; however, a stronger attack an hour later forced the tanks to withdraw after two of the tank commanders were killed, including the platoon commander. The PVA then proceeded to assault the Australians on two different axes: one against the two forward companies in front of Hill 504, and the other through the valley astride the road around battalion headquarters. Finally, by 23:00 the New Zealand artillery had returned to the brigade, although they provided only limited support throughout the rest of the night.

Probes began on the A and B Company positions, and a number of assaults occurred during the night. Utilising indirect fires, the PVA charged forward in waves, only to be beaten back by the Australians' Bren light machine guns, Owen submachine guns, rifle fire, and grenades, before again regrouping and attacking again. B Company—under the command of Captain Darcy Laughlin—supported by tanks, drove off each assault, inflicting heavy casualties while emerging almost unscathed. Laughlin's command post was fired upon by a number of PVA that had infiltrated the company position, but they were swiftly driven out. An outpost on the northern knoll reported PVA massing on their flanks at 23:00, and although heavy artillery was directed against the attackers, the section was forced to break contact and withdraw to the main defensive position. The main PVA assault began at 00:50, falling on 4 Platoon but was broken up after an hour of heavy fighting. A second assault was mounted on 6 Platoon at 03:30, following a feint against 5 Platoon. With determination the PVA swept forward, penetrating the Australian perimeter before being ejected by an equally determined counter-attack by 6 Platoon with Sherman tanks in support. At 04:00 a small outpost to the rear of the company position was attacked by more than 50 PVA. Held by just four men under the command of Lance Corporal Ray Parry, the Australians fought off four separate attacks, killing more than 25 and wounding many more over the space of twenty minutes. Parry was later awarded the Military Medal for his actions. A final assault on B Company was made just at dawn at 04:45 by about 70 PVA, and was again repulsed.O'Neill 1985, p. 142.

Further up the ridge, A Company—under Major Ben O'Dowd—faced a tougher task, and came under heavy attack. The first probes began at 21:30, targeting 1 Platoon which was the lowest of the three platoons on the west flank. The initial moves were then followed up by major PVA assaults from three sides over the next three hours. Despite suffering many casualties the PVA continued their attack, closing in and attacking the Australians with hand grenades. The Australians also suffered numerous casualties, with more than half the platoon killed or wounded, including all three Bren gunners. Fighting back with small arms fire, they held against repeated assaults, which increased in frequency and strength as the PVA assaulted. By 01:00 O'Dowd ordered the survivors of 1 Platoon to withdraw through Company Headquarters into a new position in between 2 and 3 Platoons. For his leadership Lieutenant Frederick Gardner was later Mentioned in Despatches. The PVA attacks then continued against 3 Platoon, lasting until 04:30, although they were not made with the same weight as the previous assaults.

Meanwhile, the New Zealand gunline had also been probed during the early morning and the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment was forced to redeploy at 03:00 to a position 4 mi. away behind 27th Brigade HQ. The two American mortar companies simply fled without firing a single round, abandoning their mortars, weapons and 50 trucks full of ammunition and supplies to the enemy.Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 264.

By dawn it was clear that the PVA had succeeded in penetrating the perimeter through a gap between the Australian platoons, and they began to engage them with machine guns from a defilade position covered from fire by a steep dip in the ridgeline, and concealed by thick scrub. In the growing light, 1 and 3 Platoon were soon pinned down and suffered a number of casualties as they attempted to gain better fire positions with which to engage their attackers. At 06:00 a fighting patrol was dispatched to make contact with Company Headquarters, and as the section passed over a false crest on their way down the spur line they encountered the PVA positions by chance. Attacking immediately, six PVA were killed for the loss of one Australian, and the threat to A Company was eliminated. O'Dowd then launched a counter-attack with 3 Platoon assaulting the PVA occupying the original 1 Platoon position. By 07:00 they had regained the feature and the PVA were forced to withdraw under heavy fire from the Australians on the high ground, who again exacted a heavy toll. The night's fighting had cost A Company dearly, however, and among the dead were the two New Zealand forward observers. In total they suffered more than 50 casualties—half their original strength. Meanwhile, on the right flank, D Company—under Captain Norm Gravener—held the summit of Hill 504 and was not heavily engaged during the night, while C Company—commanded by Captain Reg Saunders—was attacked only once.O'Neill 1985, p. 144.

Located to the rear, Battalion Headquarters found itself heavily pressed, however. Protected by a section of Vickers machine guns, two 17-pounder anti-tank guns, the Assault Pioneer Platoon, and the Regimental Police under the Headquarters Company commander—Captain Jack Gerke, plus Koch's own commanding tank platoon—the fighting flared around 22:00 as the PVA infiltrated the position among the retreating ROK. They bypassed the headquarters and the American tanks nearby, surrounding the defenders and establishing blocking positions on the road to the south. During the night the PVA attempted to mount the tanks and destroy them with grenades and satchel charges, but were driven off by fire. Later, one of the tanks received a direct hit from a 3.5 inch rocket, while the forward perimeter was struck heavily by attacking waves of PVA, and was forced back with heavy casualties. Receiving fire from PVA soldiers occupying several houses in the village of Chuktun-ni, the Shermans engaged the roadblock and several houses, killing more than 40 PVA in one house alone. However, at 04:00 a company from the Middlesex battalion had to be dispatched to help restore the situation.

There was a sudden and fundamental restructuring among the Australian commanding officer personnel at this point in the battle. At dawn of 24 April the PVA intensified their attack on the headquarters' perimeter, killing and wounding the bulk of the Medium Machine Gun section and the Assault Pioneer Platoon and driving them off the higher ground they had been occupying, although A Company still commanded the hill. By 05:00, Lt. Col. Ferguson was concerned that the PVA from the direction of the hill could have the potential to fire towards battalion headquarters. Ferguson made a rapid decision to withdraw away from the battlefield to a new position to the rear inside the Middlesex perimeter. Unfortunately, this withdrawal was not conducted in good order. Ferguson did not communicate with his company commanders regarding his decision to relocate, and Major O'Dowd and other officers were surprised in the morning to find that Ferguson had apparently disappeared without explanation. O'Dowd later remarked that "Ferguson was a very capable commander. Where he was at Kapyong, I don't know. He certainly wasn't in the battle area." With Ferguson's abandonment of his field HQ, Major O'Dowd, as the senior company commander, assumed de facto field command of 3 RAR. Ferguson's absence from the battlefield and the intermittent nature of communications with his field officers made it increasingly difficult for him to communicate, monitor and control his units on the battlefield, which would eventually prove costly.

Lt. Col. Ferguson led his battalion HQ staff in the break away between 5:15 and 6:00 a.m., escorted by some of the American tanks. However, difficulties ensued with Ferguson's personal vehicles. A Chinese mortar round blew the wheel off of Ferguson's own jeep, which was abandoned, while the tanks opened fire and drove off the Chinese attackers. Ferguson's subsequent vehicle, a converted two-and-a-half tonne truck, became bogged down during the withdrawal and had to be destroyed. During Ferguson's withdrawal two Australians were left behind and were subsequently captured by the PVA: Private Robert Parker, the battalion despatch rider, and Private Horace Madden, one of the signalers. For his conduct while in captivity Madden was posthumously awarded the George Cross, following his death from malnutrition and ill-treatment.During his captivity Madden resisted repeated Chinese and North Korean attempts to make him collaborate, despite repeated beatings and being deprived of food. He remained cheerful and optimistic for six months, sharing his meagre food with other prisoners who were sick. He grew progressively weaker though and died of malnutrition on 6 November 1951. For his conduct he was posthumously awarded the George Cross. See O'Neill 1985, p. 147.

Cpt. Gerke, in charge of 3 RAR battalion HQ defence, was unaware that Lt. Col. Ferguson had removed himself and his staff from the battlefield, and was searching for Ferguson around the battlefield area, concerned about his disappearance. At 6:00 a.m. Gerke was approached by a jeep from Ferguson's new HQ location, who announced, "Bug-out! Battalion HQ is back down the road." Gerke ordered his men to withdraw gradually, moving one vehicle at a time back along the road, as those that remained provided covering fire. The departure was successfully completed, and with Headquarters Company finally assembled inside the Middlesex perimeter, Gerke was then ordered to secure a key ford across the Kapyong River, east, as a possible withdrawal route for the battalion should it later have to retire from Hill 504.O'Neill 1985, p. 148.

Communications between Ferguson's 3 RAR Headquarters and Burke's Brigade Headquarters had failed early, while communications between Ferguson's HQ and the Australian forward companies were also poor. This was mostly due to the large number of ROK retreating through their position tearing out the line from the 3 RAR HQ, as well the effect of heavy vehicle traffic and gunfire on the exposed line. Likewise, direct radio communication with the forward companies on the 3 RAR command net with the new Type 31 VHF radios was obstructed by the rugged terrain due to the siting of 3 RAR headquarters in low ground relative to the forward companies and the requirement for line-of-sight. The forward companies were able to maintain communications with each other, but not with Ferguson's headquarters, while the company level nets also functioned well. Ultimately contact was maintained between Ferguson and Burke through a radio set in the Middlesex Battalion Headquarters, while messages to the forward companies relied on line and a slow relay through C Company.Breen 1992, pp. 46–47. These issues had only further complicated the conduct of the defence on the first night, with the co-ordination of the battlefield arrangements falling to O'Dowd, who was now the de facto field commander of the 3 RAR in Ferguson's absence.O'Neill 1985, p. 143. The next morning, O'Dowd finally managed to get through on a radio phone to a general in the US 1st Marine Division. The officer was incredulous, thinking it was a Chinese agent speaking. He told O'Dowd that his Australian unit no longer existed and that it had been wiped out the night before. O'Dowd replied "I've got news for you. We're still here and we're staying here."

The PVA attacks had been launched quickly and aggressively, placing their light machine guns on the flank in support and attempting to close to attack the Australian perimeter with grenades. Contrary to some contemporary western accounts, the PVA did not use human wave tactics, rather, using a tactic known as 'one-point-two sides', they used massed forces and infiltration to achieve local numerical superiority and to penetrate the gaps between the forward companies, before attempting to envelop the Australians while drawing their fire to the front, away from their threatened flanks.Horner 2008, p. 71. They would normally attempt to close with UN defensive positions using darkness or poor visibility to cover their movement and to counter American air superiority, before attacking using massed force, co-ordinated with close fire support. However, although normally well planned and closely supported by machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire, PVA attacks in Korea were often inflexible in execution once launched. This was mostly due to the lack of radio communications below battalion-level, with the PVA instead relying on whistle blasts, bugle calls, and runners for command and control, and although their and mortars had provided particularly effective indirect fire support, these problems were again evident during the fighting at Kapyong. Later, it was estimated that more than 500 PVA were killed by the Australians and the American tanks that supported them.

Day battle

As daylight broke, the PVA now found themselves highly exposed in the open ground in front of the Australians. A and B Company supported by artillery, mortars, and tanks directed heavy fire towards the Chinese positions, forcing them to withdraw leaving hundreds of casualties behind on the slopes. With the Australians remaining in possession of their original defensive locations the immediate situation had stabilised, although they were now effectively cut-off behind the front. Ammunition, food, and medical supplies were now extremely low throughout the forward area, and with casualty evacuation increasingly difficult, the battalion was at risk of being overrun unless it could be concentrated, resupplied, and supported. As such, in order to avoid each company being isolated and overwhelmed in a series of PVA attacks, at 07:15 B Company was ordered to leave its position and join the other companies on the high ground to form a defendable battalion position. The Australians subsequently withdrew as instructed, taking several dozen PVA prisoners with them that had been captured earlier by a standing patrol. The New Zealand gunners covered their movement across the open valley, laying a smoke screen to conceal the withdrawal, while the American tanks also provided support. As they moved across the valley the Australians exchanged a number of shots with a small groups of PVA who were still hiding in dead ground and in the riverbed, and saw numerous dead from the fighting the previous night.O'Neill 1985, p. 149. One hundred and seventy-three dead PVA were counted on the B Company perimeter by the Australians before they departed.

With B Company successfully occupying its new positions, Lt. Col. Ferguson returned forward to the hillside below his forward companies as a passenger inside a Sherman tank, which afforded protection from small arms fire.O'Neill 1985, p. 150. During the drive back from his new battalion HQ position, Ferguson found himself assisting in the loading of the tank machine guns when necessary to return fire at the Chinese. Apparently, O'Dowd did not meet with Ferguson during this brief visit to the former battalion HQ area, nor was O'Dowd aware of Ferguson's presence at the forward areas. Communications between the two remained by radio, and Ferguson directly withdrew back to his new HQ to the rear of the battlefield. Just after 09:00, a group of PVA launched an attack at the top of the spur held by C Company. The attack was repulsed, and no further assaults were made against C Company during the day, although they endured sniper fire and mortar bombardment for several hours. Realising the importance of B Company's previous position to a planned counter-offensive, two hours after their withdrawal, Ferguson ordered Laughlin to re-occupy the position which they had just vacated. 27th Brigade was now expecting to be reinforced by American troops and their move forward would possibly be facilitated if the PVA were cleared from the small hill that commanded the road through the valley. Likewise, the defence of this position the previous evening had prevented a PVA assault on the western flank of Hill 504. As such, at 09:30 the order to withdraw was rescinded and B Company was tasked to re-occupy the position. In preparation for the company assault on the summit, Laughlin tasked 5 Platoon to assault a small knoll halfway between C Company and the old B Company position. A frontal assault was launched at 10:30, with two sections attacking and one in fire support. Strongly held by a PVA platoon well dug-in in bunkers, the defenders allowed the Australians to approach to within before opening fire with machine guns, rifles, and grenades. 5 Platoon suffered seven casualties, including the platoon commander, and they were forced to withdraw under the cover of machine-gun and mortar fire.

4 Platoon under Lieutenant Leonard Montgomerie took over the attack, while a number of American tanks moved in to provide further support. Conducting a right flanking attack, the Australians suffered a number of casualties as they moved across the open ground. Advancing to within of the forward trenches, the PVA fire increased. Montgomerie launched a desperate bayonet charge, while a section under Corporal Donald Davie broke in on the right. Amid fierce hand-to-hand fighting the Australians cleared the PVA from the trenches, losing three men. Davie's section was then heavily engaged by machine guns from the rear trenches, and he moved quickly to assault these with his remaining men. Montgomerie reorganised the platoon, and they fought from trench to trench using bayonets and grenades. The Australians then began taking fire from another knoll to their front and, leaving his rear sections to clear the first position, Montgomerie led Davie's section onto the second knoll. Against such aggression the PVA were unable to hold and, although the majority bravely fought to the death, others fled across the open ground. By 12:30 the knoll had been captured by the Australians, with 57 PVA dead counted on the first position and another 24 on the second. A large PVA force was now detected occupying the old B Company position and the Australians were effectively halted halfway to their objective. Before Laughlin could prepare his next move he was ordered to withdraw by Ferguson, and the attempt to dislodge the PVA was subsequently abandoned. During the fighting the tanks had provided invaluable support, moving ammunition forward to B Company, and helping to evacuate the wounded. The entire operation had cost the Australians three killed and nine wounded. For his actions Montgomerie was awarded the Military Cross, while Davie received the Military Medal.

Meanwhile, the PVA shifted their attention to D Company, launching a series of relentless assaults against the summit. D Company's position was vital to the defence of Hill 504, commanding the high ground and protecting the Australians' right flank. Commencing at 07:00 the PVA assaulted the forward platoon—12 Platoon, launching attacks at thirty-minute intervals until 10:30. Using mortars to cover their movement, they attacked on a narrow front up the steep slope using grenades; however, the Australians beat the PVA back, killing more than 30 for the loss of seven wounded during six attacks. The New Zealand artillery again played a key role in defeating the PVA attempts, bringing down accurate fire within of the Australian positions. However, throughout the fighting the supply of ammunition for the guns had caused severe problems, as the PVA offensive had depleted the stock of 25-pounder rounds available forward of the airhead in Seoul. Despite improvements, problems with the logistic system remained and each round had to be used effectively in response to the directions of the artillery forward observers who controlled their fire. Although badly wounded, Corporal William Rowlinson was later awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his leadership, while Private Ronald Smith was awarded the Military Medal. Lance Corporal Henry Richey was posthumously mentioned in dispatches after being fatally wounded attempting to evacuate the last of the Australian casualties.O'Neill 1985, p. 152.

Despite their previous failures, the PVA launched another series of attacks from 11:30 and these attacks continued for the next two hours, again targeting 12 Platoon under the command of Lieutenant John Ward. Failing to break through again, the PVA suffered heavy casualties before the assault ended. From 13:30 there was another lull in the fighting for an hour and a half, although D Company continued to endure PVA mortar, machine-gun, and rifle fire. Believing that the battle may continue into the night, Gravener made the decision to pull 12 Platoon back in order to adopt a tighter company perimeter, lest his forward platoon be overrun and destroyed. The movement was completed without incident and, shortly after, the newly vacated position was assaulted by a large PVA force which had failed to detect the withdrawal. The PVA moved quickly as they attempted to establish their position on the northern end of the ridge, only to be heavily engaged by Australian machine-gun and rifle fire, and artillery.

Brigadier Burke's 27th Brigade HQ was reinforced on the afternoon of 24 April by the arrival of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment. The Americans had been dispatched earlier in the day to assist 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, and one of the battalions was subsequently deployed to the southwest of Hill 677 in order to cover the Brigade HQ left flank. A second American battalion occupied a position across the river, southeast of the Middlesex. Likewise, despite heavy casualties in one of the Australian companies and battalion headquarters, 3 RAR would emerge from the intense battle largely intact and would successfully withdraw to Brigade HQ. Meanwhile, one of the replacement British battalions, the 1st Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, had also arrived during the 24th and it took up positions with the Australians around Brigade Headquarters.Johnston 2003, p. 99. However, these forces would not attempt to re-engage the enemy or to form a relief column to attempt to break the Chinese control of access to the supply trail from Tungmudae for the embattled and surrounded Hill 677, as Brigadier Burke would inform the Canadians on the evening of 24 April.

3 RAR withdraws

Although originally intending on holding until the Australians could be relieved by the US 5th Cavalry Regiment, Burke had decided during the morning to withdraw 3 RAR from Hill 504 and retreat to 27th Brigade Headquarters. This decision had prompted the cancellation of B Company's assault. With the Australians facing encirclement, and mindful of the fate that had befallen the Glosters, Burke had ordered a fighting withdrawal back to the Middlesex area to new defensive positions in rear of the brigade.Johnston 2003, p. 97. Indeed, despite holding the PVA at bay throughout the morning and afternoon, the increasing difficulty of resupply and casualty evacuation made it clear that the Australians would be unable to hold Hill 504 for another night in its exposed and isolated positions. Planning for the withdrawal had begun as the PVA renewed their assault on D Company around 11:30, while Ferguson and O'Dowd discussed the withdrawal by radio at 12:30. With the PVA dominating the road south, Ferguson ordered his companies to withdraw along a ridge running south-west from Hill 504, just east of the Kapyong River. The Middlesex position lay a further south-west of the foot of the ridge and could be reached by the ford secured earlier by Gerke, which would act as the battalion check point for the withdrawal. O'Dowd, as the senior company commander, was subsequently appointed to plan and command the withdrawal. Ferguson saw his role as ensuring that O'Dowd received the support he needed to achieve a clean break, and had as such decided to remain away from the battlefield area and not to move forward to lead the withdrawal himself.Breen 1992, p. 92.

Command of A Company was temporarily handed over to the second-in-command, Captain Bob Murdoch. Present at the Battle of Pakchon in November 1950, O'Dowd understood first-hand the dangers of withdrawing while in contact. The challenge was to protect the forward platoons as they withdrew from being followed up by the PVA occupying the old B Company positions and from D Company's position after they broke contact. The Australians would also have to clear the withdrawal route of any blocking forces, while at the same time the evacuation of a large number of wounded and PVA prisoners would hamper their movement.Breen 1992, p. 93. As such the timing of the withdrawal would be critical to its success. Consequently, the lead company would not move until mid-afternoon so that the rearguard would be able to use the protection of darkness to break contact, while at the same time offering good observation and fields of fire during the daylight to support the initial moves. Orders were delivered at 14:30. B Company would lead the withdrawal down the ridge line, carrying any wounded that still required evacuation, as well as clearing the route and securing the ford near the Middlesex position. C Company would wait for the artillery to neutralise the PVA on the old B Company position, before moving to establish a blocking position behind D Company. A Company would then withdraw to a blocking position behind C Company, in order to allow Gravener and Saunders to establish a clean break. Finally, D Company would withdraw through both C and A Company and set up a blocking position to delay any follow up and allow those companies to withdraw.

After 15:00 an airstrike was called in to dislodge the surviving PVA in front of D Company. However, the attack by two US Marine Corps F4U Corsairs was mistakenly directed at the Australians themselves after their positions were wrongly marked by the spotter plane. Two men were killed and several badly burnt by napalm before the attack was broken off after the company second-in-command—Captain Michael Ryan—ran out under PVA fire waving a marker panel. The company medical orderly—Private Ronald Dunque—was subsequently awarded the Military Medal for his efforts assisting the wounded despite his own injuries. The PVA quickly attempted to exploit the chaos, moving against D Company's long exposed eastern flank. 11 Platoon on the main ridge forward of the summit was subjected to a frontal assault; however, unaffected by the napalm, they broke up the PVA attack and inflicted heavy casualties on them. Regardless, further PVA attempts to infiltrate the Australian positions continued into the afternoon.Controversy surrounds the circumstances of this accident. While the Australian official historian states that Gravener requested the airstrike, it seems neither Gravener nor O'Dowd called for air support that afternoon, and it is more likely the request came from either Ferguson or Brigade Headquarters. See O'Neill 1985, p. 153 and Breen 1992, p. 97.

The withdrawal was scheduled to begin shortly following the misdirected airstrike, and was to be preceded by an artillery bombardment with high explosive and smoke at 16:00.There is some disagreement between sources on the timing of the withdrawal, with some sources nominating 15:30, while others claim it began at 17:30. The time of 16:00 is based on an account by O'Dowd himself. See Breen 1992, p. 93. The American tanks were subsequently moved forward to provide cover, and when the New Zealand artillery failed to fire at the appointed hour, they provided the direct fire support. Still in contact, the Australians began to pull back, fighting a number of well-disciplined rearguard actions as the companies leapfrogged each other. Meanwhile, the New Zealand artillery kept the PVA at bay, after it finally commenced firing. B Company had taken 39 PVA prisoners during the earlier fighting, and unable to leave these behind, they were used to carry many of the Australian wounded and much of their equipment as well. O'Dowd's fear that the PVA might have blocked the withdrawal route was not realised, and B Company moved back along the ridge and down to the ford without incident, reaching the Middlesex area after dark. C Company was the next to withdraw, departing at 16:30, just after suffering another casualty from sniper fire. Saunders led his company up the spur and then south down the main ridge without incident, followed by A Company during the next hour with the PVA in close pursuit.

Murdoch had been concerned lest he and his men should be engaged when they reached the Kapyong River in an exhausted condition and with little ammunition. Luck was with the Australians, and due to difficulties of communication and navigation along the ridge line in the dark, elements of A Company had become separated and the last two platoons descended to the river too early to strike the ford. However, reaching a deserted part of the bank they realised their mistake and immediately turned west again, following the river-bank to the ford. The PVA did not follow this sudden final turn and plunged on into the river, giving A Company an unexpected opportunity to break free. The pursuing Chinese soldiers were subsequently detected by the Canadians on Hill 677 and were fired on. Fortunately for the Australians, the Canadian heavy machine gun fire was accurately directed onto the Chinese forces and did not hit them. The possibility of Canadian supporting fire had been foreseen earlier; however, problems with the radio relay between the Canadians and Australians meant that there had been no guarantee that the withdrawing force would not be mistaken for PVA as they crossed the river.

Only D Company—which had been holding the summit and had withdrawn last—was heavily engaged and was unable to move at the scheduled time. The PVA launched a determined assault, preceding it with heavy machine-gun and mortar fire, before attempting to overrun the forward pits. Once again the Australians repelled the PVA assault and Gravener decided to begin to thin out his position before the situation deteriorated further. With one platoon covering their movement, D Company subsequently withdrew, closely pursued by the PVA. During the rapid withdrawal after the final PVA attack, Private Keith Gwyther was accidentally left behind after being knocked unconscious and buried in a forward pit by a mortar round. He regained consciousness some hours later and was subsequently captured by the PVA who had by then occupied Hill 504 and were digging in. Finally, the Australians succeeded in achieving a clean break after dark, and D Company was able to safely withdraw.Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 265. By 23:30 the battalion was clear, completing its withdrawal at full speed, and suffering only minimal casualties. Regardless, the previous 24 hours of fighting had been costly for the Australians, resulting in 32 killed, 59 wounded and three captured; the bulk of them in A Company and battalion headquarters. Yet they had temporarily delayed the assault on the brigade's right flank, and had inflicted far heavier casualties on the PVA before being withdrawn. Significantly for the Australians and New Zealanders 25 April was Anzac Day. Following their successful conquest of Hill 504 the Chinese turned their attention to the encircled Canadians on the left flank.

Canadian 2 PCCLI Last Stand on Hill 677, 24–25 April 1951

Preparations

On 23 April, Lt. Col. Stone, battalion commander of the Canadian 2 PPCLI, had personally reconnoitred the Kapyong battlefield and the approaches to Hill 677, discerning which routes of assault the Chinese could possibly choose. Stone then directed his Pioneer Platoon to widen and reconstruct a narrow, winding trail which ascended Hill 677 on the south slopes from the village of Tungmudae. This provided Stone with an essential supply route and the ability to maneouvre twelve half-tracks carrying heavy machine guns and mortars up to the summit of Hill 677, which he then positioned adjacent to his battalion headquarters. These engineering assignments were completed just before major Chinese forces arrived on the battlefield.

Now assembled on the summit of Hill 677, the 700 Canadians of 2 PPCLI spent the night of 23/24 April in their shallow pits listening to the sounds of the fighting on the Australian front. However, by early morning PVA activity increased and, with the situation deteriorating on Hill 504 on the Patricia's right flank, Lt. Col. Stone withdrew B Company from their position on the north edge of the Hill 677 summit to strengthen this eastern flank if the Australians were forced to withdraw. Under the command of Major Vince Lilley B company subsequently moved to occupy positions east of battalion headquarters on the high ground overlooking the valley road. Stone's intuitions were proven to be sound when this position, which protected not only his 2 PPCLI battalion headquarters but the battalion's major concentrations of heavy machine guns and mortars, would prove crucial during the fierce climax of the upcoming night battle.

With increasing fears that 3 RAR battalion would be overcome and leave his right flank exposed to attack, Lt. Col. Stone had redeployed B company to cover the area overlooking the valley of the Kapyong. B Company, 2 PPCLI completed its redeployment by 11:00 hours, just in time. However, a company of American tanks from US 72nd Tank Battalion supporting 3 RAR noticed the Canadian adjustment and mistook the movement of B Company for Chinese troops. The US tanks opened fire on the Canadians, wounding one man, and then continued their retreat from the battlefield. The 2 PCCLI battalion now occupied a northward-facing arc curving from the summit of Hill 677 in the west to the high ground on the east closest to the river. D Company defended the left flank of the battalion, removed at a substantial distance from the main positions of 2 PPCLI which were over on the battalion's centre and right, C Company the central forward slope, while A and B Company held the right flank. The high grass and severe terrain of Hill 677 limited the ability of each company to provide mutual support. At the same time, the numerous ravines on the edge of the 2000-ft. high hill afforded the attacking forces hidden avenues of approach to the summit of Hill 677 to within a short distance of the Canadian positions.

During the retreat of the Australian forces from Hill 504, Lt. Col. Stone ordered the Canadian B Company to provide covering fire to assist the Australian escape on the run, clearly visible from Hill 677. With the Chinese chasing the Australians in fast pursuit, the Canadians opened continuous heavy machine gun fire for about a ten minute period, exacting heavy Chinese losses and enabling the Australians to make good their escape. Major Ben O'Dowd, the Australian field commander, requested an end to the supporting fire, fearful of the possibility of unintended Australian casualties.

Lt. Col. Stone of the Canadian 2 PPCLI would later complain of the sudden disappearance of the American artillery support, "when the battle got hot on the Australian front the Forward Observation Officer for the US mortars on my front walked out and never a pop did we get from his company." The two American artillery companies had fled on foot, leaving their mortars, guns, supplies and 50 loaded trucks plus other vehicles behind on the battlefield. The two American mortar companies then hiked and traversed ten miles to the east before resting, apparently convinced that a major Chinese breakthrough was imminent at Kapyong. Stone later bitterly observed that among some of the UN forces "bug-outs were the accepted manner of withdrawing." With the departure of the American tanks and artillery support and the forced retreat of the Australian battalion, the Canadians were now surrounded and cut off from their possible supply routes and would be reliant upon their existing supplies and ammunition. Each of the four Canadian companies was allocated two Vickers medium machine guns, as well as three mortars. Defensive fire tasks were registered, while additional ammunition was pushed out to the forward companies in the afternoon.

As darkness descended on 24 April, Brigadier Burke, commanding officer of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, decided not to make use of his well-functioning radio contacts with 2 PPCLI headquarters on the summit of Hill 677. Instead, Burke chose to bypass the normal chain of communications through Lt. Col. Stone to the men under Stone's command. Brigadier Burke ordered a Douglas Dakota aircraft equipped with loudspeakers and personally flew over the Canadian positions on Hill 677. He announced to the Canadian soldiers that they were now on their own, cut off from any support and would have to fight the coming battle alone. He wished them good luck and encouraged them to fight bravely. He then flew back to Brigade HQ, amidst derisive response from the now angered and unsettled Canadian soldiers. Brigadier Burke's brief appearance over the battlefield served to cause further apprehension among the Canadian ranks. Many of the less experienced Canadian soldiers voiced a desire to run and abandon the position. Veteran war hero Tommy Prince played a central role in steadying and motivating the frightened men. Any hopes which Lt. Col. Stone and 2 PPCI might have entertained that 27th Brigade HQ forces would continue to engage the enemy or would assemble a relief column to break through the Chinese stranglehold on Hill 677 were now thoroughly extinguished. Stone was never in any doubt as to the essential strategic significance of Hill 677 for the UN forces and he issued a straightforward order to his battalion, "No retreat, no surrender."

Night Battle

To prepare and plan their initial assaults on Hill 677, the Chinese command were not able to pinpoint the Canadian defensive positions, having had no opportunity to carry out a thorough reconnaissance prior to the attack. However, the severe terrain and numerous ravines on the sides of Hill 677 provided the Chinese with hidden access routes to the summit near the Canadian positions where the PVA formations would gather. The Chinese were visible during the final mass assaults against the Canadian entrenchments. However, in the darkness the Canadian rifle fire would prove to be ineffective, forcing the Canadian soldiers to resort to using large amounts of grenades followed by bayonets in hand-to-hand combat. The front lines of the Chinese attackers were equipped with light machine guns, which in close quarters fighting were markedly superior to the Canadian rifles. The Canadians were issued Enfield Mark III single-shot manual bolt-action rifles of WWI vintage design, requiring a manual reload after each shot. A few Canadian soldiers possessed privately acquired Bren guns of their own to provide close quarters machine gun capability, and this factor would be crucial in the outcome of the Company B defence of battalion HQ and main artillery positions. The Chinese mortars and artillery were largely ineffective in the first assaults, and very few rounds fell on the Canadian positions during the initial assaults of the evening. However, in the later climactic mass attacks against Company D, the Chinese artillery and mortars were important in leading the assaults, now being directed with accurate observer information from the summit. In their haste to follow up the collapse of the ROK 6th Division, the PVA 118th Division had left the bulk of its heavy artillery and supplies well to the north.

Having dislodged the defenders from Hill 504, the PVA 354th Regiment, 118th Division would attempt to capture the dominating heights of Hill 677 held by the Canadians.Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 635. The PVA had detected the redeployment of B Company, 2 PPCLI and at 22:00 that evening they commenced an assault on the Canadian right flank, the first of four attacks directed at 6 Platoon of B Company. Although the initial moves were beaten back by medium machine gun fire and mortars, a second PVA assault an hour later succeeded in overrunning the right forward section of 6 Platoon. The Canadians successfully withdrew in small groups back to the company main defensive position, where they eventually halted the PVA advance.Johnston 2003, p. 100. In this first wave of mass assaults of the Chinese, the Canadians' mortars had proven vital, their stability allowing for rapid fire out to with an ability to accurately hit narrow ridgelines at maximum range. The PVA had telegraphed their intentions prior to the assault by using tracer fire for direction, and had used bugles to co-ordinate troops in their forming up positions. Such inflexibility had allowed the Canadians to co-ordinate indirect fires and took a heavy toll on the attackers in the forming up positions.Johnston 2003, p. 101.

During the successive attacks on 6 Platoon of B Company, Private W. R. Mitchell of 6 Platoon became prominent, possessing his own Bren gun with which he launched single-handed counter-attacks against Chinese formations, firing on the run and dispersing the enemy. Despite being twice wounded by Chinese shrapnel and a bullet, he persisted with his personal Bren gun forays, and later refused to leave combat for medical treatment, remaining in his position throughout the night. By the morning he could barely stand for loss of blood. Private Mitchell was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, the highest award for achievement in combat. The next morning 51 PVA dead were counted around the B Company perimeter.

Meanwhile, Lt. Hub Gray of B Company detected a large Chinese force of about 500 men climbing silently through the ravine access south of the B Company position. This force assembled quietly without the usual Chinese bugle and sound signals, and then moved en masse toward Lt. Col. Stone's battalion headquarters, apparently according to a preconceived plan of attack. Major Lilley of B Company warned Stone of the impending assault, and Stone himself assumed command of the HQ combat forces for this engagement. Twelve M3 Half-tracks from Mortar Platoon had already been positioned there by Stone before the battle, each armed with a .50-calibre and a .30-calibre machine gun. Stone held fire until the PVA broke through the tree-line just from their front. The Canadians opened fire with machine guns and with mortars at their minimum engagement distance. The PVA suffered severe casualties and the assault was beaten off. During the height of this battle for the Canadian HQ, the rear platoon of A Company to the north of B Company opened fire with their Vickers medium machine guns in support of Stone's position. Stone contacted the A Company second-in-command and rejoined, "Stop your firing...we can take care of ourselves. Save your ammunition, you're going to need it." The Chinese drew the appropriate conclusions from this action, and their next plan of attack would focus on areas where the Canadian heavy machine guns were not a factor in defense.

Shortly after the second major assault on B Company was repelled, another large PVA assault force was detected fording the Kapyong Valley river in the bright moonlight, some 2000 feet beneath the Kapyong summit height and about 800 metres distant. The 2 PCCLI .50 calibre Browning heavy machine guns were concentrated on this body of soldiers, and 71 bodies were counted on the banks of the river the following day.

The Chinese now turned their attention to D Company holding a portion of the summit of Hill 677, separated from the bulk of 2 PPCLI by a long distance on the battalion's left flank and beyond the range of the concentrated group of 2 PPCLI medium and heavy machine gun defensive fire.Johnston 2003, p. 102. Chinese success on this flank was intended to provide a spacious staging area to assemble an overwhelmingly large force for a final assault against the Canadian battalion HQ and principal machine gun/mortar positions. At 01:10 a large PVA force was detected forming up on a spur to the west towards Hill 865 and they were engaged by defensive fire. The huge Chinese formation assaulted 10 Platoon of D Company commanded by Lt. Michael George Levy, with supporting fire from Chinese medium machine-guns and artillery now directed and employed to better effect than previously. The PVA attackers were soon effectively engaged by Vickers machine guns from 12 Platoon firing in mutual support. Switching their axis of assault to 12 Platoon, the PVA succeeded in overrunning one of the Canadian sections and a medium machine gun, killing two of its crew who had remained at their post firing until the last moment. However, the Chinese made no attempt to use the Vickers gun for their own advantage or to disable or damage the weapon. With the supporting artillery of the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment's 25-pound guns now fully engaged, firing at the 'very slow' rate to conserve ammunition, the weight of the PVA assaults soon prompted the Canadians to request it be increased to the 'slow' rate of two rounds per gun per minute, so that 24 rounds fell every 30 seconds within a target area of .Johnston 2003, p. 103.

Despite the determined resistance from D Company, the PVA attack succeeded in infiltrating the Canadian perimeter through the gaps between platoons, and D Company was surrounded on three sides. The forward platoons of D company were completely overrun by Chinese infantry. The company commander, Captain J.G.W. Mills, acting on a request from 10 Platoon leader Lt. Mike Levy, in turn requested from Lt. Col. Stone a supporting artillery barrage on two separate occasions targeted directly onto Levy's position. Levy had commanded his men to seek whatever cover they could in the trenches which had been scraped out of the rocky ground. Stone approved the request, after first asking Cpt. Mills, "Do you know what you are asking?", and receiving an affirmative response. Stone then immediately contacted the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment and arranged for barrages of shrapnel shells from the NZ Field Regiment's mobile 25 pound guns, now located some 4.5 miles distant. The barrages onto Levy's platoon occurred on the two occasions during the early morning of 25 April after 10 Platoon was overrun by Chinese mass attacks, each barrage consisting of about twenty minutes duration, forty minutes in total. The shrapnel shells were fused to explode several metres or yards above ground. This bold tactic succeeded and the massed Chinese soldiers were devastated by the shrapnel fire, while the Canadians in their dug-out holes escaped unharmed. The number of Chinese soldiers killed by the artillery barrages fired by the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment in support of the D company location and the approaches to D Company during the climax of this assault is estimated at about 2,000. The 16th NZ Fld Rgt and their 25-pound guns fired an estimated 10,000 rounds in the course of the night battle in support of 2 PPCLI. The PVA persisted however, launching a number of smaller attacks against D company during the rest of the night, but these were again repulsed by artillery and small arms fire.

By dawn the attacks on the Canadian positions had abated, and with D Company remaining in control of the left flank they were able to recover the previously abandoned machine gun at first light in daring fashion. Private Kenneth Barwise, who had personally killed six enemy soldiers during the mass assaults on D Company, ran down through no-man's-land to the abandoned Vickers medium machine gun, snatched the heavy load in his arms, and raced back to Canadian lines, in full view of the enemy. Barwise was awarded the Military Medal for his deeds. Meanwhile, on the right flank B Company was able to re-occupy the platoon position it had been forced to relinquish earlier the previous evening. The PVA had suffered enormous casualties during the night assaults, with perhaps 300 or even more than 1,000 killed by the Patricia's, and there were also a great many more killed by the heavy artillery barrages from the 16th NZ Fld. Regiment. The Chinese, following their usual procedure, had removed most of their battlefield dead during the night, and Canadian soldiers did not venture out to count the dead until after the battle. Lt. Hub Gray found the bodies of a Canadian corporal and his Chinese opponent lying together after a bayonet combat, mute testimony to the intensity of the fighting. However, with the Canadian battalion now completely exhausted of its ammunition and medical and food supplies, another full-scale Chinese assault would have been difficult for the 2 PPCLI to resist. Fortunately for the Canadians, such an assault did not materialize.

Post Battle

Although the PVA continued to mount small attacks, 2 PCCLI were now in control of the summit. Following the retreat of the Australian battalion on the previous day, the Chinese had established blocking positions on the Hill 677 supply road from the rear slope of Hill 677 to the village of Tungmudae. This was the trail which had been improved by Lt. Col. Stone on 23 April just prior to the Chinese assaults. Chinese control of the rear slopes of Hill 677 had cut the 2 PPCLI off from resupply and prevented any form of military reinforcements or relief from reaching the Canadians, even from the UN units which had already been defeated on the Kapyong battlefield by the Chinese. Anticipating that the battle would continue into the evening of the 25th or be renewed with intensity by another major assault by the Chinese main 118th Division forces, Stone made a request at 4:00 that food, ammunition, and water be airdropped directly onto Hill 677 and by 10:00, six hours later, the required supplies—including mortar ammunition—were dropped by four American C-119 Flying Boxcars flying from an airbase in Japan. The Canadians continued to improve their defensive position and trenches. The Middlesex from the reserve positions deployed in front of 27th Commonwealth Brigade HQ sent out patrols during the morning in order to reconnoitre the Chinese forces that had occupied the rear areas behind Hill 677 and surrounded the 2 PCCLI positions during the previous day. It was not until 14:00 on 25 April that patrols from B Company, 2 PPCLI reported that the supply trail on the rear of Hill 677 was now clear, and the Chinese 118th Division apparently withdrawn to the north. Stone subsequently requested that further supplies be sent forward by vehicle as rapidly as feasible while the Canadian supply route remained open, and before the Chinese 118th Division could return. Having left their supplies of food and ammunition far behind during the advance two days earlier, the PVA 118th Division had withdrawn back up the Kapyong Valley in the late afternoon of 25 April in order to regroup and replenish following the extremely heavy casualties incurred during the fighting. The principal enemy formations had thus retreated prior to any UN relief forces reaching the Canadian positions, fulfilling the grim assessment given by Brigadier Burke to the encircled 2 PCCLI when he flew over them on the evening of 24 April.

The remainder of the 25 April was relatively quiet for the Canadians, although they were subjected to periodic harassing fire from the PVA. D Company received heavy machine-gun fire from Hill 865 to the west, in particular. Regardless, the PVA made no further attempt to attack, and confined themselves to limited patrolling activities across the front. Later the Patricia's cleared the remaining PVA from the northern slopes of Hill 677, while several PVA concentrations were again broken up by heavy artillery fire and airstrikes. The Canadians were finally relieved on Hill 677 by a battalion of the 5th US Cavalry Regiment on the evening of 26 April. The following day 27 April, the 5th US Cavalry Regiment launched an assault to recover Hill 504. The remaining PVA soldiers on that hill position offered some resistance until about 16:00. American patrols north of the feature met no resistance, while the Americans were also able to patrol east along Route 17 to Chunchon without contacting the enemy. By last light on 27 April, the situation had stabilised on the Kapyong Valley front.Johnston 2003, p 104. The 2 PPCLI now formed the rear guard of the 27th (renamed the 28th) Commonwealth Brigade as they moved out of the Kapyong sector towards the Seoul region of the UN front. This rear guard was given the sobriquet of "the Stone force", after their commander.

Lt. Col. Stone himself offered an assessment of the lesson emerging from the Battle of Kapyong, "Kapyong demonstrated that morale, spirit of the troops, is probably the most important factor in battle." At the 2 PPCLI last stand at Hill 677, in addition to the five high level medals awarded, there were eleven mentioned in dispatches, indicating a widespread highly motivated combat response from the 2 PPCLI. Most importantly, Stone had devised and had insisted upon over the objections of his unwilling superior generals a rigorous six-week training course in mountain combat at the Miryang mountains in southern South Korea immediately prior to the Kapyong assignment, which prepared his men for the confused and isolated night combats at Kapyong. Such training was rare for armies from North America. Stone's final assessment of his battalion's performance at Kapyong was that "with Nunits buckling all around them, the Patricia's did not give up an inch of ground." Stone claimed "...nobody panicked. They stayed. The front broke everywhere and we were the only battalion holding in the whole of Korea on our side at the time."

Aftermath

Casualties

With vastly superior numbers the PVA had attacked on a broad front, and had overrun a number of the UN positions, and after a fierce fire-fight had defeated the ROK, Australian and American forces at Kapyong, which then withdrew from the battle. The Canadian 2 PPCLI, supported by long distance artillery fire from the New Zealand 16 Fd Regt, managed to survive a two-day encirclement and resist full assaults of the Chinese 118th Division, causing the Chinese to withdraw before the arrival of UN relief forces. The UN allies ultimately prevailed, albeit through a last stand by the Canadians, despite being outnumbered on the field of battle by a factor of five to one, or by a factor of greater than ten to one. Indeed, despite their numerical advantage and possession of light machine guns, which gave the Chinese the advantage in small arms fire, the PVA had been outgunned in heavy artillery capacity. This edge in artillery fire would allow the Canadians to survive and succeed at Kapyong. And yet, despite their eventual defeat, the battle once again demonstrated that the PVA were tough and skillful soldiers capable of inflicting heavy casualties on the Australians and American tanks and forcing their retreat at the run off the field of battle, a significant victory. As a result of the fighting, Australian losses were 32 killed (two by friendly fire from US air strike), 59 wounded and three captured, while Canadian casualties on 24/25 April included 10 killed and 23 wounded, later amended to 12 killed and 35 wounded (one by friendly fire from US tanks). American casualties included three men killed, 12 wounded and two tanks destroyed, all from A Company, 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion. The New Zealanders lost two killed and five wounded. In contrast, PVA losses were far heavier, and may have included 1,000-5,000 killed and many more wounded.

Awards

2 PPCLI, 3 RAR and A Company, 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion were all subsequently awarded the US Presidential Unit Citation in June of 1951 for their actions during the Battle of Kapyong. The New Zealand 16th Field Regiment, RNZA — without whom the Australians and Canadians might have suffered a similar fate of annihilation to that of the Glosters at the Imjin River—were awarded the South Korean Presidential Unit Citation in November of 1951. Although the Canadians and Australians had borne the brunt of the fighting, the Middlesex had been briefly engaged in action early in the battle, but were not awarded.

Brigadier Brian Arthur Burke, who commanded the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade at Kapyong, had been awarded a DSO in Italy in April 1945, near the end of WWII. However, Burke was not awarded any recognition for his command leadership in the Battle of Kapyong, despite the victory. During the Chinese assault against the encircled Canadian positions on Hill 677, Brigadier Burke had withdrawn and collected his forces into a reserve position to the rear of the battle, and these reserve forces made no attempt to move forward and engage the enemy or to relieve 2 PCCLI through the supply road at Tungmudae until after the Chinese 118th Division had withdrawn from the battlefield. This delay had placed the 2 PPCLI in a perilous position, with ammunition and supplies exhausted and vulnerable to annihilation at the hands of the enemy. Brigadier Burke's refusal to communicate directly with Lt. Col. Stone, but rather choosing to utilize a broadcast from an airplane, had contributed to the difficulties of the encircled 2 PPCLI. The Chinese command were not aware how close a proximity to success they had attained on Hill 677 and failed to launch a final assault. Burke himself was removed from command almost immediately in late April and later assigned to Malaya.

Brigadier Burke refused to nominate Lt. Col. Stone for any award, although Burke had insisted upon an immediate DSO award for Lt. Col. Ferguson. However, in December of 1951, Stone was nominated by Brigadier Rockingham for a third Distinguished Service Order for Stone's period of command of 2 PPCLI throughout the year of 1951, and the award was made in February of 1952. Stone had remained in the front line of combat leading his men throughout several battles in Korea, which was a necessary requirement for the DSO award. He had won the Military Cross at the Battle of Ortona in Italy in 1943, one of the toughest battles of WWII, when as a Major and company commander he single-handedly and on foot assaulted a German anti-tank gun which was blocking his company's advance and silenced it with an accurately thrown grenade. As a Lt. Col. regimental commander, he had won a DSO at the Battle of Fortunato in Italy in 1944, where his actions hauling heavy guns up a steep mountain caused the German Gothic Line to withdraw at a strategic position. He was awarded another DSO in the Netherlands for actions against well-entrenched German forces in March 1945. Stone's insistence on creating a special mountain combat training course in Korea for the 2 PPCLI just prior to the Kapyong assignment, obtained by Stone over the objections of the American generals commanding U.S. Eighth Army, was vindicated, and Stone's previous experiences with mountain battles in Italy were employed to construct the Canadian defensive arrangements at Kapyong. In December 2016, Stone was posthumously (Stone died in 2005) designated as an official Korean War Hero by the Government of South Korea Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs. The citation stated that the Canadian 2 PCCLI battalion "achieved a milestone victory when they won the Battle of Gapyeong (Kapyong) against formidable attacks from Chinese troops" and that "with their victory in the Battle of Gapyeong (Kapyong), Stone and his soldiers are remembered as the Legends of Gapyeong to this day." Stone continued to command 2 PPCLI throughout the remainder of the Korean War, leading from the front lines of battle.

Capt. J. G. W. Mills, commander of D Company of 2 PPCLI, was awarded the Military Cross for endorsing and forwarding 10 Platoon commander Lt. Mike Levy's requests for artillery fire to be directed upon Levy's own position, an act which may have been responsible for the 2 PPCLI survival and success at Kapyong. Levy himself was not awarded a medal, which later became a point of controversy. However, in 2004 the Governor General of Canada awarded Levy an official grant of arms, flag and badge, with a personal coat of arms in recognition of his central role in the battle. In 2017, Lt. Mike Levy was posthumously (Levy died in 2007) awarded the Apostle of Peace Medal by the South Korean government.

On the personal initiative of Brigadier Burke, 3 RAR's commanding officer Lt. Col. Ferguson was immediately awarded the Distinguished Service Order on a rapidly accelerated basis. The award of the DSO is restricted to senior command officers serving under fire in combat roles. Burke claimed that Ferguson had displayed bravery under fire, although this claim was inconsistent with the perceptions of the 3 RAR company commanders on the field. For his part, Ferguson did not nominate Major Bernard O'Dowd for any award. O'Dowd had assumed field command of the Australians after Ferguson's sudden departure from the battlefield and had executed the 3 RAR escape, avoiding disaster for the 3 RAR. Ferguson was removed from command shortly afterwards and assigned to training duties in Australia.

Koch was awarded both the American Distinguished Service Cross and the British Military Cross for the part his tanks had played in the fighting around Hill 504.O'Neill 1985, p. 151.

The Royal Australian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Middlesex Regiment were subsequently granted the battle honour "Kapyong". Today, the battle is regarded as the most famous action fought by the Australian and Canadian armies in Korea, and the most famous action fought by the Canadian Armed Forces since WWII. On the Battle of Kapyong battlefield itself in South Korea, a major park and memorial to the Canadian Army was built and dedicated in 1983, the (Kapyong) Gapyeong Canada Monument. There is also a major park and monument dedicated to the Australian Defence Force participation in the Battle of Kapyong 1.3 kilometres distant from the Canadian monument in the same area.

Subsequent operations

By 29 April, Chinese Spring Offensive was halted by UN forces at a defensive line north of Seoul, known as the ''No-Name Line''; in total a withdrawal of in the US I and IX Corps sectors, and in the US X Corps and ROK III Corps sectors.Mossman 1990, p. 436. Although the main blow had fallen on US I Corps, the resistance by British Commonwealth forces in the battles at the Imjin River and at Kapyong had helped to blunt its impetus, with the defence mounted by the 27th Brigade stopping the PVA from isolating US I Corps from US IX Corps, thereby helping to halt the PVA advance on Seoul and preventing its capture.Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 636. The PVA had now nearly exhausted their resources of men and material, and were approaching the limit of their supply lines. Many PVA soldiers were now tired, hungry and short of equipment and during the fighting at Kapyong they had demonstrated a greater willingness to surrender than in previous encounters, with 3 RAR alone taking 39 prisoners, only eight of them wounded. Contingent on the rapid attainment of its objectives, the attempted PVA coup de main ultimately failed amid heavy casualties and they had little recourse but to abandon their attacks against US I and IX Corps. The PVA had suffered at least 30,000 casualties during the period 22–29 April. In contrast, US casualties during the same period numbered just 314 killed and 1,600 wounded, while Commonwealth, ROK and other UN contingents brought the total to 547 killed, 2,024 wounded and 2,170 captured; the disparity highlighting the devastating effect of enormous UN firepower against massed infantry. Undeterred by these setbacks, the Second Phase of the Spring Offensive began on 16 May to the east of Kapyong, which ended in the UN success at the Battle of the Soyang River.Appleman 1990, pp. 509, 550.

27th Brigade was replaced by the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade and Brigadier George Taylor took over command of the new formation on 26 April. The new Commonwealth formation was pulled back into IX Corps reserve to the southwest of Kapyong, near the junction of the Pukhan and Chojon rivers, with the 2PPCLI forming the rearguard of the manoevre. 3 RAR was transferred to 28th Brigade, while the 1st Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers and the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, 1st Battalion, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry replaced the Argylls and Middlesex regiments. Later, the Patricias were transferred to the newly arrived 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade on 27 May.O'Neill 1985, p. 166. After protracted negotiations between the governments of Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa, agreement had been reached to establish an integrated formation with the aim of increasing the political significance of their contribution, as well as facilitating the solution of the logistic and operational problems faced by the various Commonwealth contingents. The 1st Commonwealth Division was formed on 28 July 1951, with the division including the 25th Canadian, 28th British Commonwealth and 29th British Infantry Brigades under the command of Major General James Cassels (British Army officer), James Cassels, and was part of US I Corps.Grey 1988, pp. 192–195. For many of the Australians Kapyong was to be their last major battle before completing their period of duty and being replaced, having endured much hard fighting, appalling weather and the chaos and confusion of a campaign that had ranged up and down the length of the Korean Peninsula. Most had served in the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF) during the Second World War and this combat experience had proven vital. Regardless, casualties had been heavy, and since the battalion's arrival from Japan in September 1950 the Australians had lost 87 killed, 291 wounded and five captured.O'Neill 1985, p. 158.

See also

* List of last stands
* Military victories against the odds

* Gapyeong Canada Monument
* ''Kapyong (film), Kapyong'' (2011) – documentary about the battle
* United Nations Memorial Cemetery, Busan, South Korea – where many of the Australian and Canadian casualties are buried

Notes

Footnotes

Citations

References

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External links

China Intervenes in the Korean War: The Battle of Kapyong, 23–25 April 1951

{{DEFAULTSORT:Kapyong, Battle of
Battles and operations of the Korean War in 1951
Australia–Canada relations
Battles of the Korean War involving North Korea
Battles of the Korean War involving South Korea
Battles of the Korean War involving Australia
Battles of the Korean War involving Canada
Battles of the Korean War involving China
Battles of the Korean War involving New Zealand
Battles of the Korean War involving the United Kingdom
Battles of the Korean War involving the United States
Battles of the Korean War
History of Gyeonggi Province
Gapyeong County
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry