Battle Of Cape Bon (1941)

The naval Battle of Cape Bon took place on 13 December 1941 during the Second World War, between two Italian light cruisers and an Allied destroyer flotilla, off Cape Bon in Tunisia.

Background

When Italy declared war in June 1940, the was one of the largest navies in the world but it was restricted to operations in the Mediterranean. The British Empire possessed enough resources and naval might to maintain a strong presence in the area and replace most losses by redeploying ships. This led to caution by the Italian command and a tendency to avoid conflict. Control of the Mediterranean was disputed by the the Royal Navy and their allies. The sea was vital for the supply of the Italian and German forces in North Africa, as well as the maintenance of Malta as a British offensive base. Without Malta, it would have been much harder for the British to intercept Italian supply convoys.

Signals intelligence

The possession of radar and the breaking of Italian codes, particularly the C38 m cipher machine used by the , further contributed to British success. In November 1941, the supply of the Axis forces in Libya from Italy had been interrupted by Force K from Malta, which had destroyed several Italian convoys, notably in the Battle of the Duisburg Convoy and the loss of nearly 70 per cent of the supplies sent to Libya, including 92 per cent of the fuel. Force K and ships from Alexandria, intercepted an Axis convoy consisting of the German transports ''Maritza'' () and ''Procida'' (1,843 GRT), escorted by the Italian torpedo boats and , sailing from Greece to Benghazi of on 24 November. The convoy was about west of Crete when the merchant ships were sunk by the British cruisers and and the destroyers and , the torpedo boats making off once it was certain that the ships were doomed. The loss of the cargoes led the German command to report that the fuel situation of the in North Africa was desperate.

Axis convoys

The Italian and German forces in North Africa, facing Operation Crusader, a new British offensive, were in urgent need of fuel and ammunition. (the naval staff of the ), at the request of (supreme command of the Italian armed forces), made an emergency plan to shift supplies using warships. The light cruisers and of the 4th Cruiser Division ( ammiraglio di divisione ivisional admiral Antonino Toscano) were fast and too lightly armoured for employment with the battle fleet and were selected for this role.

''Da Barbiano'' and ''Di Giussano''

''Da Barbiano'' (flagship) and ''Di Giussano'' left Taranto at 8:15 on 5 December 1941, reached Brindisi at 17:50, took on about of supplies, then proceeded to Palermo on 8 December, where they loaded another of aviation fuel to alleviate a shortage in Libya and without which, aircraft would be unable to escort supply convoys. The fuel, contained in unsealed barrels, was placed on the stern deck, creating a grave risk of fire from British gunfire and from the discharge of the ships' guns, preventing the use of the stern turrets unless the fuel was jettisoned. The two cruisers sailed from Palermo at 17:20 on 9 December, heading for Tripoli. At 22:56, when north of Pantelleria, they were spotted by a British reconnaissance aircraft, which had been directed to the area by Ultra intercepts and shadowed them. At 23:55, Toscano (who was in the middle of the Sicilian Channel) decided to turn back to base as surprise had been lost, much British radio traffic foreshadowed air attack and worsening sea conditions would delay the ships, further exposing them to British attacks. ''Da Barbiano'' and ''Di Giussano'' reached Palermo at 8:20 on 10 December, after overcoming a British air attack off Marettimo. Toscano was much criticised by for his decision to abort the mission.

Prelude

Italian preparations

Convoy M. 41, was planned for 13 December but air cover by aircraft based in Libya would be impossible unless they received the fuel from Italy. On 12 December it was decided that the 4th Division would attempt again the trip to Tripoli. The cruiser ''Bande Nere'' was to join ''Da Barbiano'' and ''Di Giussano'' to carry more supplies but she was prevented from sailing by a breakdown and the cargo was transferred to the other two cruisers. ''Da Barbiano'' and ''Di Giussano'' were loaded with of aviation fuel, of gasoline, of naphtha, of food and 135 ratings on passage to Tripoli. The stern of ''Da Barbiano'' (and to a lesser extent, ''Di Giussano'') was packed with fuel barrels, so thickly that it was not possible to traverse the guns; Toscano held a briefing with his staff and officers from both ships, where it was decided that, in case of encounter with enemy ships, the barrels would be thrown overboard to enable the ships to open fire. ''Da Barbiano'', ''Di Giussano'' and their only escort, the torpedo boat (a second torpedo boat, , was left in the port due to a breakdown) sailed from Palermo at 18:10 on 12 December. The 4th Division was ordered to pass north-west of the Aegadian Islands and then head for Cape Bon and follow the Tunisian coast; the ships would keep a speed of to conserve fuel and deliver it at Tripoli. Air cover, air reconnaissance and defensive MAS ( orpedo-armed motorboat ambushes were planned to safeguard the convoy.

British plans

Four destroyers of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla consisting of the destroyers (Commander G. H. Stokes), , and the Dutch , had departed Gibraltar on 11 December to join the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria. By 8 December, the British had de-coded Italian C-38 m wireless signals about the Italian supply operation and its course for Tripoli. The RAF sent a Wellington bomber on a reconnaissance sortie to disguise the British source and on 12 December the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, heading eastwards towards the Italian ships, was ordered to increase speed to and intercept the Italian ships.

In the afternoon of 12 December, a CANT Z.1007 bis of the spotted the four destroyers heading east at an estimated speed of , off Algiers. was immediately informed but calculated that, even in the case the destroyers would increase their speed to , they would not reach Cape Bon until around 03:00 on 13 December, about one hour after the 4th Division. Toscano (who learned of the sighting while he was still in harbour) was not ordered to increase speed or alter course to avoid them.

Following new Ultra decodes a new reconnaissance aircraft spotted Toscano's ships at sunset on 12 December, after which the 4th Destroyer Flotilla was directed to intercept the two cruisers, increasing speed to . This speed, along with a one-hour delay that the 4th Division had accrued (and that Toscano omitted to report to ), frustrated calculations about the advantage that the 4th Division would have. At 22:23 Toscano was informed that he would possibly meet "''enemy steamers coming from Malta''" and at 23:15 he ordered action stations.

Battle

12/13 December, night

The 4th Destroyer Flotilla sighted the Italian cruisers near Cap Bon, at 02:30 on 13 December. At 2:45 on 13 December, seven miles off Cape Bon, the Italian ships heard the noise of a British plane (a radar-equipped Vickers Wellington, which located the ships and informed Stokes about their position), and at 3:15 they altered course to 157° to pass about a mile off Cape Bon. Five minutes later, Toscano suddenly ordered full speed ahead and to alter course to 337°, reversing course; this sudden change disrupted the Italian formation, as neither ''Cigno'' (which was about two miles ahead of the cruisers) nor ''Di Giussano'' (which was following ''Da Barbiano'' in line) received the order, and while ''Di Giussano'' saw the flagship reverse course and imitated her (but remained misaligned) ''Cigno'' did not noticed the change until 3:25, when she also reversed course, but remained much behind the two cruisers.

13 December, morning

Stokes's destroyers were just off Cape Bon by then and they had spotted the Italian ships. Arriving from astern, under the cover of darkness and using radar, the British ships sailed close inshore and surprised the Italians, who were further out to sea, by launching torpedoes from short range. The course reversal accelerated the approach between the two groups and the Allied destroyers attacked together; ''Sikh'' fired her guns and four torpedoes against ''Da Barbiano'' ess than distant ''Legion'' did the same, ''Isaac Sweers'' opened fire against ''Di Giussano'' and ''Maori'' fired six torpedoes against ''Di Giussano''. Toscano ordered full speed and to open fire (and ordered ''Di Giussano'' to increase speed to . ''Da Barbiano'' also started a turn to port (on orders from Captain Giorgio Rodocanacchi) but at 3:22, before her guns were able to fire (only some machine guns managed to), the cruiser was hit by a torpedo below the foremost turret, which caused her to list to port. ''Da Barbiano'' was then raked with machine gun fire, which killed or wounded many men and set fire to the fuel barrels and was hit by a second torpedo in the engine room.

At 3:26 ''Maori'' fired two torpedoes at ''Da Barbiano'' and opened fire with her guns, hitting the bridge. The cruiser was hit soon after by another torpedo in the stern (possibly launched by ''Legion''); ''Di Giussano'' was also hit by a torpedo and gunfire, being left disabled. The land behind the Allied destroyers made it impossible for the Italians to see them and ''Di Giussano'' managed to fire only three salvoes. In five minutes both cruisers were disabled; ''Da Barbiano'' rapidly listed to port, while fires quickly spread all over the ship and into the sea by the floating fuel; the crew abandoned ship. At 3:35, ''Da Barbiano'' capsized and sank in a sea of flame, with Toscano, Rodocanacchi and another 532 men still aboard. ''Di Giussano'' was left dead in the water with fires raging; the crew struggled to keep the ship afloat but she also had to be abandoned, breaking in two and sinking at 4:20, with the loss of 283 men.

Aftermath

Analysis

Toscano's decision to reverse course has never been fully explained and various possibilities have been suggested. He may have decided to turn back after realizing that he had been spotted by aircraft, as he did on 9 December. A course towards the Aegadian islands would have made more sense, instead of the north-westerly course ordered by Toscano. The course change was ordered more than 30 minutes after the cruisers had been spotted; Toscano may have wanted to mislead the reconnaissance aircraft about his real course, wait for it to leave and then turn again for Tripoli. He may have thought, from the aircraft noise, that torpedo bombers were coming and he wanted to get into waters farther away from the shore and from Italian minefields to gain freedom of manoeuvre. Toscano ordered his gunners to stand by; he may have known that Allied destroyers were astern of his ships and he wanted to avoid presenting his stern to them because his aft turrets were obstructed by the fuel barrels.

Casualties

After a brief encounter with ''Isaac Sweers'', ''Cigno'' rescued nearly 500 survivors; others reached the coast and another 145 men were later saved by Italian MAS boats (, called motor torpedo boats by the British). The Italians suffered more than 900 men killed.

Footnotes

References

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Further reading

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External links

Battle Of Cape Bon, Tunisia


* ttp://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/2855.html Dutch destroyer ''Isaac Sweers''
Italian description

{{DEFAULTSORT:Cape Bon, Battle of
Conflicts in 1941
Allied naval victories in the battle of the Mediterranean
1941 in Italy
Military history of Tunisia
Mediterranean convoys of World War II
Naval battles of World War II involving Italy
Cape Bon
Naval battles of World War II involving the Netherlands
December 1941 in Africa
Maritime incidents in December 1941