Anekanta

( hi, अनेकान्तवाद, "many-sidedness") is the Jain doctrine about metaphysical truths that emerged in ancient India. It states that the ultimate truth and reality is complex and has multiple aspects.

According to Jainism, no single, specific statement can describe the nature of existence and the absolute truth. This knowledge ('' Kevala Jnana''), it adds, is comprehended only by the Arihants. Other beings and their statements about absolute truth are incomplete, and at best a partial truth. All knowledge claims, according to the ''anekāntavāda'' doctrine must be qualified in many ways, including being affirmed and denied. Anekāntavāda is a fundamental doctrine of Jainism.

The origins of ''anekāntavāda '' can be traced back to the teachings of Mahāvīra (599–527 BCE), the 24th Jain . The dialectical concepts of ''syādvāda'' "conditioned viewpoints" and ''nayavāda'' "partial viewpoints" arose from ''anekāntavāda'' in the medieval era, providing Jainism with more detailed logical structure and expression. The details of the doctrine emerged in Jainism in the 1st millennium CE, from debates between scholars of Jain, Buddhist and vedic schools of philosophies.

Anekantavada has also been interpreted to mean non-absolutism, "intellectual Ahimsa", religious pluralism, as well as a rejection of fanaticism that leads to terror attacks and mass violence. Some scholars state that modern revisionism has attempted to reinterpret anekantavada with religious tolerance, openmindedness and pluralism..The word may be literally translated as “non-one-sidedness doctrine,” or “the doctrine of not-one-side.”

Etymology

The word ''anekāntavāda'' is a compound of two Sanskrit words: ''anekānta'' and ''vāda''. The word ''anekānta'' itself is composed of three root words, "an" (not), "eka" (one) and "anta" (end, side), together it connotes "not one ended, sided", "many-sidedness", or "manifoldness".Grimes, John (1996) p. 34 The word ''vāda'' means "doctrine, way, speak, thesis". The term ''anekāntavāda'' is translated by scholars as the doctrine of "many-sidedness", "non-onesidedness", or "many pointedness".

The term ''anekāntavāda'' is not found in early texts considered canonical by Svetambara tradition of Jainism. However, traces of the doctrines are found in comments of Mahavira in these Svetambara texts, where he states that the finite and infinite depends on one's perspective. The word anekantavada was coined by Acharya Siddhasen Divakar to denote the teachings of Mahavira that state truth can be expressed in infinite ways. The earliest comprehensive teachings of anekāntavāda doctrine is found in the ''Tattvarthasutra'' by Acharya Umaswami, and is considered to be authoritative by all Jain sects. In the Digambara tradition texts, the 'two-truths theory' of Kundakunda also provides the core of this doctrine.

Philosophical overview

In fact, the Jain doctrine of anekantavada emerges to be a social attempt at equality and respect to all diverse views and ideologies through the philosophical elucidation of the truth or reality. The idea of reality gets enrichment in Jainism as it proposes that the reality cannot be the one and ultimate, it can have multi-dimensional form. So, what is reality for one individual may not be the reality for others. Anekantavada brings forth a synthesis, a happy blend and proposes that reality has many forms as seen by various individuals and all must respect the reality perceived by one-another. This is the way the society can progress and this is the way to resolve conflicts and to aim at peace in society. The Jain doctrine of ''anekāntavāda'', also known as ''anekāntatva'', states that truth and reality is complex and always has multiple aspects. Reality can be experienced, but it is not possible to totally express it with language. Human attempts to communicate is ''naya'', or "partial expression of the truth". Language is not Truth, but a means and attempt to express truth. From truth, according to Māhavira, language returns and not the other way around. One can experience the truth of a taste, but cannot fully express that taste through language. Any attempts to express the experience is ''syāt'', or valid "in some respect" but it still remains a "perhaps, just one perspective, incomplete".Jain philosophy
IEP, Mark Owen Webb, Texas Tech University In the same way, spiritual truths are complex, they have multiple aspects, language cannot express their plurality, yet through effort and appropriate karma they can be experienced.

The ''anekāntavāda'' premises of the Jains is ancient, as evidenced by its mention in Buddhist texts such as the ''Samaññaphala Sutta''. The Jain āgamas suggest that Māhavira's approach to answering all metaphysical philosophical questions was a "qualified yes" (''syāt''). These texts identify ''anekāntavāda'' doctrine to be one of the key differences between the teachings of the Māhavira and those of the Buddha. The Buddha taught the Middle Way, rejecting extremes of the answer "it is" or "it is not" to metaphysical questions. The Māhavira, in contrast, taught his followers to accept both "it is" and "it is not", with "from a viewpoint" qualification and with reconciliation to understand the absolute reality. ''Syādvāda'' (predication logic) and ''Nayavāda'' (perspective epistemology) of Jainism expand on the concept of ''anekāntavāda''. ''Syādvāda'' recommends the expression of ''anekānta'' by prefixing the epithet ''syād'' to every phrase or expression describing the nature of existence.

The Jain doctrine of ''anekāntavāda'', according to Bimal Matilal, states that "no philosophic or metaphysical proposition can be true if it is asserted without any condition or limitation". For a metaphysical proposition to be true, according to Jainism, it must include one or more conditions (''syadvada'') or limitations (''nayavada'', standpoints).

Syādvāda

''Syādvāda'' ( sa, स्याद्वाद) is the theory of ''conditioned predication'', the first part of which is derived from the Sanskrit word ''syāt'' ( sa, स्यात्), which is the third person singular of the optative tense of the Sanskrit verb ''as'' ( sa, अस्), 'to be', and which becomes ''syād'' when followed by a vowel or a voiced consonant, in accordance with ''sandhi''. The optative tense in Sanskrit (formerly known as the 'potential') has the same meaning as the present tense of the subjunctive mood in most Indo-European languages, including Hindi, Latin, Russian, French, etc. It is used when there is uncertainty in a statement; not 'it is', but 'it may be', 'one might', etc. The subjunctive is very commonly used in Hindi, for example, in 'kya kahun?', 'what to say?'. The subjunctive is also commonly used in conditional constructions; for example, one of the few English locutions in the subjunctive which remains more or less current is 'were it ०, then ०', or, more commonly, 'if it were..', where 'were' is in the past tense of the subjunctive.

Syat can be translated into English as meaning "perchance, may be, perhaps" (it is). The use of the verb 'as' in the optative tense is found in the more ancient Vedic era literature in a similar sense. For example, sutra 1.4.96 of Panini's Astadhyayi explains it as signifying "a chance, maybe, probable".

In Jainism, however, ''syadvada'' and ''anekanta'' is not a theory of uncertainty, doubt or relative probabilities. Rather, it is "conditional yes or conditional approval" of any proposition, state Matilal and other scholars. This usage has historic precedents in classical Sanskrit literature, and particularly in other ancient Indian religions (Buddhism and Hinduism) with the phrase , meaning "let it be so, but", or "an answer that is 'neither yes nor no', provisionally accepting an opponent's viewpoint for a certain premise". This would be expressed in archaic English with the subjunctive: 'be it so', a direct translation of . Traditionally, this debate methodology was used by Indian scholars to acknowledge the opponent's viewpoint, but disarm and bound its applicability to certain context and persuade the opponent of aspects not considered.

According to Charitrapragya, in Jain context ''syadvada'' does not mean a doctrine of doubt or skepticism, rather it means "multiplicity or multiple possibilities". ''Syat'' in Jainism connotes something different from what the term means in Buddhism and Hinduism. In Jainism, it does not connote an answer that is "neither yes nor no", but it connotes a "many sidedness" to any proposition with a sevenfold predication.

''Syādvāda'' is a theory of qualified predication, states Koller. It states that all knowledge claims must be qualified in many ways, because reality is many-sided. It is done so systematically in later Jain texts through ''saptibhaṅgīnaya'' or " the theory of sevenfold scheme". These ''saptibhaṅgī'' seem to be have been first formulated in Jainism by the 5th or 6th century CE Svetambara scholar Mallavadin, and they are:Grimes, John (1996) p. 312
#Affirmation: ''syād-asti''—in some ways, it is,
#Denial: ''syān-nāsti''—in some ways, it is not,
#Joint but successive affirmation and denial: ''syād-asti-nāsti''—in some ways, it is, and it is not,
#Joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial: '—in some ways, it is, and it is indescribable,
#Joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial: '—in some ways, it is not, and it is indescribable,
#Joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial: '—in some ways, it is, it is not, and it is indescribable,
#Joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial: '—in some ways, it is indescribable.

Each of these seven predicates state the Jain viewpoint of a multifaceted reality from the perspective of time, space, substance and mode. The phrase ''syāt'' declares the standpoint of expression – affirmation with regard to own substance (''dravya''), place (''kṣetra''), time (''kāla''), and being (''bhāva''), and negation with regard to other substance (''dravya''), place (kṣetra), time (kāla), and being (''bhāva''). Thus, for a ‘jar’, in regard to substance (''dravya'') – earthen, it simply is; wooden, it simply is not. In regard to place (''kṣetra'') – room, it simply is; terrace, it simply is not. In regard to time (''kāla'') – summer, it simply is; winter, it simply is not. In regard to being (''bhāva'') – brown, it simply is; white, it simply is not. And the word ‘simply’ has been inserted for the purpose of excluding a sense not approved by the ‘nuance’; for avoidance of a meaning not intended.

According to Samantabhadra's text ''Āptamīmāṁsā'' (Verse 105), "''Syādvāda'', the doctrine of conditional predications, and ''kevalajñāna'' (omniscience), are both illuminators of the substances of reality. The difference between the two is that while ''kevalajñāna'' illumines directly, ''syādvāda'' illumines indirectly". ''Syadvada'' is indispensable and helps establish the truth, according to Samantabhadra.

Nayavāda

''Nayavāda'' ( sa, नयवाद) is the theory of standpoints or viewpoints. ''Nayavāda'' is a compound of two Sanskrit words—''naya'' ("standpoint, viewpoint, interpretation") and ''vāda'' ("doctrine, thesis").Grimes, John (1996) p. 198, 202–03, 274, 301 Nayas are philosophical perspective about a particular topic, and how to make proper conclusions about that topic.

According to Jainism, there are seven ''nayas'' or viewpoints through which one can make complete judgments about absolute reality using ''syadvada''. These seven ''naya'', according to Umaswati, are:
#Naigama-naya: common sense or a universal view
#Samgraha-naya: generic or class view that classifies it
#Vyavahara-naya: pragmatic or a particular view assesses its utility
#Rijusutra-naya: linear view considers it in present time
#Sabda-naya: verbal view that names it
#Samabhirudha-naya: etymological view uses the name and establishes it nature
#Evambhuta-naya: actuality view considers its concrete particulars

The ''naya'' theory emerged after about the 5th century CE, and underwent extensive development in Jainism. There are many variants of ''nayavada'' concept in later Jain texts.

A particular viewpoint is called a ''naya'' or a partial viewpoint. According to Vijay Jain, ''Nayavada'' does not deny the attributes, qualities, modes and other aspects; but qualifies them to be from a particular perspective. A ''naya'' reveals only a part of the totality, and should not be mistaken for the whole. A synthesis of different viewpoints is said to be achieved by the doctrine of conditional predications (''syādvāda'').

Jiva, the changing soul

Ancient India, particularly the centuries in which the Mahavira and the Buddha lived, was a ground of intense intellectual debates, especially on the nature of reality and self or soul. Jain view of soul differs from those found in ancient Buddhist and Hindu texts, and Jain view about ''jiva'' and ''ajiva'' (self, matter) utilizes ''anekantavada''.For a complete discussion of ''anekantavada'' on the Jain concept of ''jiva'':

The Upanishadic thought (Hindu) postulated the impermanence of matter and body, but the existence of an unchanging, eternal metaphysical reality of ''Brahman'' and '' Ātman'' (soul, self). The Buddhist thought also postulated impermanence, but denied the existence of any unchanging, eternal soul or self and instead posited the concept of anatta (no-self). According to the vedāntin (Upanishadic) conceptual scheme, the Buddhists were wrong in denying permanence and absolutism, and within the Buddhist conceptual scheme, the vedāntins were wrong in denying the reality of impermanence. The two positions were contradictory and mutually exclusive from each other's point of view. The Jains managed a synthesis of the two uncompromising positions with ''anekāntavāda''.; Quote: "To counter the proponents of these diametrically opposed positions uddhist and Hindu Jains developed a position knows as syadvada eeud-VAH-duh the way or path of "perhaps, maybe or somehow." Syadvada states simply that judgments resting on different points of view may differ without any of them being wholly wrong. ..A limited and incomplete judgment is called a naya uh-yuh and all human knowledge is a compilation of nayas, judgments resulting from different attitudes. The Jains were thus able to accept equally the Hindu views of "being" and Buddhist views of "becoming," but took neither in the sense that their partisan advocates desired or found comforting. ..The Jain doctrine of syadvada is non-absolutist and stands firmly against all dogmatisms, even including any assertion that Jainism is the right religious path." Sharma, Arvind (2001) Preface xii From the perspective of a higher, inclusive level made possible by the ontology and epistemology of ''anekāntavāda'' and ''syādvāda'', Jains do not see such claims as contradictory or mutually exclusive; instead, they are seen as ''ekantika'' or only partially true. The Jain breadth of vision embraces the perspectives of both Vedānta which, according to Jainism, "recognizes substances but not process", and Buddhism, which "recognizes process but not substance". Jainism, on the other hand, pays equal attention to both substance (''dravya'') and process (''paryaya'').Burch, George (1964) pp. 68–93

This philosophical syncretisation of paradox of change through ''anekānta'' has been acknowledged by modern scholars such as Arvind Sharma, who wrote:

Inclusivist or exclusivist

Some Indian writers state that Anekantavada is an inclusivist doctrine positing that Jainism accepts "non-Jain teachings as partial versions of truth", a form of sectarian tolerance. Others scholars state this is incorrect and a reconstruction of Jain history because Jainism has consistently seen itself in "exclusivist term as the one true path". Classical Jain scholars saw their premises and models of reality as superior than the competing spiritual traditions of Buddhism and Hinduism, both of which Jainism considered inadequate. For instance, the Jain text ''Uttaradhyayana Sutra'' in section 23.63 calls the competing Indian thought to be "heterodox and heretics" and that they "have chosen a wrong path, the right path is that taught by the Jinas". Similarly, the early Jain scholar Haribhadra, who likely lived between the 6th and 8th century, states that those who do not follow the teachings of Jainism cannot be "approved or accommodated".

John Koller states ''anekāntavāda'' to be "epistemological respect for view of others" about the nature of existence whether it is "inherently enduring or constantly changing", but "not relativism; it does not mean conceding that all arguments and all views are equal".

In contemporary times, according to Paul Dundas, the ''Anekantavada'' doctrine has been interpreted by some Jains as intending to "promote a universal religious tolerance", and a teaching of "plurality" and "benign attitude to other thical, religiouspositions". This is problematic and a misreading of Jain historical texts and Mahavira's teachings, states Dundas. The "many pointedness, multiple perspective" teachings of the Mahavira is a doctrine about the nature of Absolute Reality and human existence, and it is sometimes called "non-absolutism" doctrine. However, it is not a doctrine about tolerating or condoning activities such as sacrificing or killing animals for food, violence against disbelievers or any other living being as "perhaps right". The Five vows for Jain monks and nuns, for example, are strict requirements and there is no "perhaps, just one perspective". Similarly, since ancient times, Jainism co-existed with Buddhism and Hinduism, according to Dundas, but Jainism was highly critical of the knowledge systems and ideologies of its rivals, and vice versa.

History and development

The principle of ''anekāntavāda'' is one of the foundational Jain philosophical concept. The development of ''anekāntavāda'' also encouraged the development of the dialectics of ''syādvāda'' (conditioned viewpoints) and ''nayavāda'' (partial viewpoints).

According to Karl Potter, the Jain ''anekāntavāda'' doctrine emerged in a milieu that included Buddhists and Hindus in ancient and medieval India. The diverse Hindu schools such as Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Samkhya-Yoga and Mimamsa-Vedanta, all accepted the premise of Atman that "unchanging permanent soul, self exists and is self-evident", while various schools of early Buddhism denied it and substituted it with Anatta (no-self, no-soul). But the leading school of Buddhism named Shunyavada falls apart which says that there is no permanent soul or everything is Shunya (Empty) with argument that who is the witness of everything is Shunya (Emptiness). Further, for causation theories, Vedanta schools and Madhyamika Buddhists had similar ideas, while Nyaya-Vaisheshika and non-Madhyamika Buddhists generally agreed on the other side. Jainism, using its ''anekāntavāda'' doctrine occupied the center of this theological divide on soul-self (''jiva'') and causation theories, between the various schools of Buddhist and Hindu thought.

Origins

The origins of ''anekāntavāda'' are traceable in the teachings of Mahāvīra, who used it effectively to show the relativity of truth and reality. Taking a relativistic viewpoint, Mahāvīra is said to have explained the nature of the soul as both permanent, from the point of view of underlying substance, and temporary, from the point of view of its modes and modification.

Early history

Early Jain texts were not composed in Vedic or classical Sanskrit, but in Ardhamagadhi Prakrit language. According to Matilal, the earliest Jain literature that present a developing form of a substantial ''anekantavada'' doctrine is found in Sanskrit texts, and after Jaina scholars had adopted Sanskrit to debate their ideas with Buddhists and Hindus of their era. These texts show a synthetic development, the existence and borrowing of terminology, ideas and concepts from rival schools of Indian thought but with innovation and original thought that disagreed with their peers.

The early Svetambara canons and teachings do not use the terms ''anekāntavāda'' and ''syādvāda'', but contain teachings in rudimentary form without giving it proper structure or establishing it as a separate doctrine. ''Śvētāmbara'' text, ''Sutrakritanga'' contains references to ''Vibhagyavāda'', which, according to Hermann Jacobi, is the same as ''syādvāda'' and ''saptibhaṅgī''.Jacobi, Hermann (1895) 14:21–22 For example, Jacobi in his 1895 translation interpreted ''vibhagyavada'' as ''syadvada'', the former mentioned in the Svetambara Jain canonical text ''Sutrakritanga''. However, the Digambara Jains dispute this text is canonical or even authentic.Jaina canon
Encyclopaedia Britannica

According to Upadhyaye, the ''Bhagvatisūtra'' (also called Vyākhyāprajñapti) mentions three primary predications of the ''saptibhaṅgīnaya''.Upadhyaye, A. N. (2001) pp. 6136–37 This too is a Svetambara text, and considered by Digambara Jains as unauthentic.

The earliest comprehensive teachings of anekāntavāda doctrine is found in the ''Tattvarthasutra'' of Umasvati, considered to be authoritative by all Jain sects including Svetambara and Digambara. The century in which Umaswati lived is unclear, but variously placed by contemporary scholars to sometime between 2nd and 5th century.

The Digambara scholar Kundakunda, in his mystical Jain texts, expounded on the doctrine of ''syādvāda'' and ''saptibhaṅgī'' in ''Pravacanasāra'' and '' Pancastikayasāra''. Kundakunda also used ''nayas'' to discuss the essence of the self in ''Samayasāra''. Kundakunda is believed in the Digambara tradition to have lived about the 1st-century CE, but has been placed by early modern era scholars to 2nd or 3rd century CE. In contrast, the earliest available secondary literature on Kundakunda appears in about the 10th century, which has led recent scholarship to suggest that he may have lived in or after 8th-century. This radical reassessment in Kundakunda chronology, if accurate, would place his comprehensive theories on ''anekantavada'' to the late 1st millennium CE.

Parable of the blind men and an elephant

The Jain texts explain the ''anekāntvāda'' concept using the parable of blind men and an elephant, in a manner similar to those found in both Buddhist and Hindu texts about limits of perception and the importance of complete context. The parable has several Indian variations, but broadly goes as follows:

This parable is called ''Andha-gaja-nyaya'' maxim in Jain texts.

Two of the Jain references to this parable are found in ''Tattvarthaslokavatika'' of Vidyanandi (9th century) and it appears twice in the ''Syādvādamanjari'' of Ācārya Mallisena (13th century). According to Mallisena, whenever anyone takes a partial, unconditional view of the ultimate reality, and denies the possibility of another aspect of that reality, it is an instance of the above parable and a defective view. Mallisena goes further in his second reference to the above parable and states that all reality has infinite aspects and attributes, all assertions can only be relatively true. This does not mean scepticism or doubt is the right path to knowledge, according to Mallisena and other Jain scholars, but that any philosophical assertion is only conditionally, partially true. Any and all viewpoints, states Mallisena, that do not admit an exception are false views.

While the same parable is found in Buddhist and Hindu texts to emphasize the need to be watchful for partial viewpoints of a complex reality, the Jain text apply it to isolated topic and all subjects. For example, the ''syadvada'' principle states that all the following seven predicates must be accepted as true for a cooking pot, according to Matilal:

*from a certain point of view, or in a certain sense, the pot exists
*from a certain point of view, the pot does not exist
*from a certain point of view, the pot exists and does not exist
*from a certain point of view, the pot is inexpressible
*from a certain point of view, the pot both exists and is inexpressible
*from a certain point of view, the pot both does not exist and is inexpressible
*from a certain point of view, the pot exists, does not exist, and is also inexpressible

Medieval developments

Ācārya Haribhadra (8th century CE) was one of the leading proponents of ''anekāntavāda''. He wrote a doxography, a compendium of a variety of intellectual views. This attempted to contextualise Jain thoughts within the broad framework, rather than espouse narrow partisan views. It interacted with the many possible intellectual orientations available to Indian thinkers around the 8th century.

Ācārya Amrtacandra starts his famous 10th century CE work ''Purusathasiddhiupaya'' with strong praise for ''anekāntavāda'': "I bow down to the principle of ''anekānta'', the source and foundation of the highest scriptures, the dispeller of wrong one-sided notions, that which takes into account all aspects of truth, reconciling diverse and even contradictory traits of all objects or entity."

Ācārya Vidyānandi (11th century CE) provides the analogy of the ocean to explain the nature of truth in ''Tattvarthaslokavārtikka'', 116:

, a 17th-century Jain monk, went beyond ''anekāntavāda'' by advocating ''madhāyastha'', meaning "standing in the middle" or "equidistance". This position allowed him to praise qualities in others even though the people were non-Jain and belonged to other faiths. There was a period of stagnation after Yasovijayaji, as there were no new contributions to the development of Jain philosophy.

Influence

The Jain philosophical concept of Anekantavada made important contributions to ancient Indian philosophy, in the areas of skepticism and relativity.McEvilley, Thomas (2002) p. 335 The epistemology of ''anekāntavāda'' and ''syādvāda'' also had a profound impact on the development of ancient Indian logic and philosophy.

While employing ''anekāntavāda'', the 17th century Jain scholar Yasovijaya stated that it is not ''anābhigrahika'' (indiscriminate attachment to all views as being true), which is effectively a kind of misconceived relativism. In Jain belief, ''anekāntavāda'' transcends the various traditions of Buddhism and Hinduism.

Role in Jain history

''Anekāntavāda'' played a role in the history of Jainism in India, during intellectual debates from Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas, Buddhists, Muslims, and Christians at various times. According to John Koller, professor of Asian studies, ''anekāntavāda'' allowed Jain thinkers to maintain the validity of their doctrine, while at the same time respectfully criticizing the views of their opponents. In other cases, it was a tool used by Jaina scholars to confront and dispute Buddhist scholars in ancient India, or in the case of Haribhadra justify the retaliation of the killing of his two nephews by Buddhist monks, with capital punishment for all Buddhist monks in the suspected monastery, according to the Buddhist version of Haribhadra's biography.

There is historical evidence that along with intolerance of non-Jains, Jains in their history have also been tolerant and generous just like Buddhists and Hindus. Their texts have never presented a theory for holy war. Jains and their temples have historically procured and preserved the classic manuscripts of Buddhism and Hinduism, a strong indicator of acceptance and plurality. The combination of historic facts, states Cort, suggest that Jain history is a combination or tolerance and intolerance of non-Jain views, and that it is inappropriate to rewrite the Jainism past as a history of "benevolence and tolerance" towards others.

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

Mahatma Gandhi mentioned Anekantavada and Syadvada in the journal ''Young India – 21 Jan 1926''. According to Jeffery D. Long – a scholar of Hindu and Jain studies, the Jain Syadvada doctrine helped Gandhi explain how he reconciled his commitment to the "reality of both the personal and impersonal aspects of Brahman", and his view of "Hindu religious pluralism":

Against religious intolerance and contemporary terrorism

Referring to the September 11 attacks, John Koller states that the threat to life from religious violence in modern society mainly exists due to faulty epistemology and metaphysics as well as faulty ethics. A failure to respect the life of other human beings and other life forms, states Koller, is "rooted in dogmatic but mistaken knowledge claims that fail to recognize other legitimate perspectives". Koller states that ''anekāntavāda'' is a Jain doctrine that each side commit to accepting truths of multiple perspectives, dialogue and negotiations.Koller, John (2004) pp. 85–98

According to Sabine Scholz, the application of the ''Anekantavada'' as a religious basis for "intellectual Ahimsa" is a modern era reinterpretation, one attributed to the writings of A.B. Dhruva in 1933. This view states that ''Anekantavada'' is an expression of "religious tolerance of other opinions and harmony". In the 21st century, some writers have presented it as an intellectual weapon against "intolerance, fundamentalism and terrorism". Other scholars such as John E. Cort and Paul Dundas state that, while Jainism indeed teaches non-violence as the highest ethical value, the reinterpretation of ''Anekantavada'' as "religious tolerance of other opinions" is a "misreading of the original doctrine". In Jain history, it was a metaphysical doctrine and a philosophical method to formulate its distinct ascetic practice of liberation. Jain history shows, to the contrary, that it persistently was harshly critical and intolerant of Buddhist and Hindu spiritual theories, beliefs and ideologies. John Cort states that the ''Anekantavada'' doctrine in pre-20th century Jain literature had no relation to religious tolerance or "intellectual Ahimsa". Jain intellectual and social history toward non-Jains, according to Cort, has been contrary to the modern revisionist attempts, particularly by diaspora Jains, to present "Jains having exhibited a spirit of understanding and tolerance toward non-Jains", or that Jains were rare or unique in practicing religious tolerance in Indian intellectual history. According to Padmanabha Jaini, states Cort, indiscriminate open mindedness and the approach of "accepting all religious paths as equally correct when in fact they are not" is an erroneous view in Jainism and not supported by the ''Anekantavada'' doctrine.

According to Paul Dundas, in and after the 12th century, the persecution and violence against Jains by Muslim state caused Jain scholars to revisit their theory of Ahimsa (non-violence). For example, Jinadatta Suri in 12th century, wrote during a time of widespread destruction of Jain temples and blocking of Jaina pilgrimage by Muslim armies, that "anybody engaged in a religious activity who was forced to fight and kill somebody" in self-defense would not lose any merit. N.L. Jain, quoting Acarya Mahaprajna, states ''Anekantavada'' doctrine is not a principle that can be applied to all situations or fields. In his view, the doctrine has its limits and ''Anekantavada'' doctrine does not mean intellectual tolerance or acceptance of religious violence, terrorism, taking of hostages, proxy wars such as in Kashmir, and that "to initiate a conflict is as sinful as to tolerate or not oppose it".

The reinterpretation of ''Anekantavada'' as a doctrine of religious tolerance is novel, popular but not unusual for contemporary Jains. It is a pattern of reinterpretation and reinvention to rebrand and reposition that is found in many religions, states Scholz.

Comparison with non-Jain doctrines

According to Bhagchandra Jain, one of the difference between the Buddhist and Jain views is that "Jainism accepts all statements to possess some relative (''anekāntika'') truth" while for Buddhism this is not the case.

In Jainism, states Jayatilleke, "no proposition could in theory be asserted to be categorically true or false, irrespective of the standpoint from which it was made, in Buddhism such categorical assertions were considered possible in the case of some propositions."Jayatilleke; Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. Publisher: George Allen and Unwin, 1963, pp. 279-280. Unlike Jainism, there are propositions that are categorically true in Buddhism, and there are others that are ''anekamsika'' (uncertain, indefinite). Examples of categorically true and certain doctrines are the Four Noble Truths