Affirmation Of Life

Nietzschean affirmation (german: Bejahung) is a concept in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The best example of this concept can be found in Nietzsche's ''The Will to Power'':

Opposition to Schopenhauer

Walter Kaufmann wrote that Nietzsche "celebrates the Greeks who, facing up to the terrors of nature and history, did not seek refuge in "a Buddhistic negation of the will," as Schopenhauer did, but instead created tragedies in which life is affirmed as beautiful in spite of everything." Schopenhauer’s negation of the will was a saying "no" to life and to the world, which he judged to be a scene of pain and evil. " rectly against Schopenhauer’s place as the ultimate nay-sayer to life, Nietzsche positioned himself as the ultimate yes-sayer…." Nietzsche's affirmation of life's pain and evil, in opposition to Schopenhauer, resulted from an overflow of life. Schopenhauer's advocacy of self-denial and negation of life was, according to Nietzsche, very harmful."For me the issue was the value of moralityand in that matter I had to take issue almost alone with my great teacher Schopenhauer…. The most specific issue was the worth of the 'unegoistic,' the instinct for pity, self-denial, self-sacrifice, something which Schopenhauer himself had painted with gold, deified, and projected into the next world for so long that it finally remained for him 'value in itself' and the reason why he said No to life and even to himself. But a constantly more fundamental suspicion of these very instincts voiced itself in me, a scepticism which always dug deeper! It was precisely here that I saw the great danger to humanity, its most sublime temptation and seduction." (Nietzsche, '' Ecce Homo'', "Why I Write Such Good Books," "The Birth of Tragedy," § 2.) For his entire mature life, Nietzsche was concerned with the damage that he thought resulted from Schopenhauerian disgust with life and turning against the world.

Derridean interpretation

Jacques Derrida appropriates this concept and applies it specifically to language, its structure and play. This application acknowledges that there is, in fact, no center or origin within language and its many parts, no firm ground from which to base any Truth or truths. This shock allows for two reactions in Derrida's philosophy: the more negative, melancholic response, which he designates as Rousseauistic, or the more positive Nietzschean affirmation. Rousseau's perspective focuses on deciphering the truth and origin of language and its many signs, an often exhaustive occupation. Derrida's response to Nietzsche, however, offers an active participation with these signs and arrives at, in Derridean philosophy, a more resolute response to language.

In "Structure, Sign, and Play", Derrida articulates Nietzsche's perspective as:

... the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.Derrida, Jacques. "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Humanities." '' Writing and Difference''. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978. 278–293.

Essentially, Derrida not only fosters Nietzsche's work but evolves it within the sphere of language; in doing so, Derrida acquires and employs Nietzsche's optimism in his concept of play: "the ''substitution'' of ''given'' and ''existing'', ''present'', pieces" (292). Much of this spirit resides in the abandonment of any sort of new humanism. This acceptance of the inevitable allows for considerable reliefevident in the designation of the loss of center as a non-centeras well as the opportunity to affirm and cultivate play, which enables humanity and the humanities "to pass beyond man and humanism" (292).

See also

*''Amor fati''
* Everlasting Yea

References

{{Nietzsche

Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
Jacques Derrida
Philosophy of life